Also, provide a general variable
(XSECURELOCK_ALLOW_LOCKING_IF_INEFFECTIVE) to bypass these checks,
when wanting to develop XSecureLock itself on a Chromebook (Wayland!) for
example.

Works around issues in third-party authentication modules.

Fixes #39.

Fixes #81.

This shouldn't be necessary but may work around graphics driver bugs.

Fixes #80.

For now they're C99-only; possibly to be fixed later.

Also, fix plurals of -moji words.

* Implement disco mode

* Add option to hide the password completely

* Update README.md

* Update README with new version of env variables (not yet implemented)

* Fix const-correctness

* Add XSECURELOCK_PASSWORD_PROMPT flag + 3 bonus prompts

* Remove XSECURELOCK_PASSWORD_PROMPT from readme

* Add "REMOVE IN v2" inside XSECURELOCK_PARANOID_PASSWORD setting name

* Revert accidental PARANOID_PASSWORD_MIN_CHANGE change

* Wrap _Static_assert in a macro

* Replace emoji escape codes with actual values

* Rename ShowFromArray function

* Use ++ as prefix operator

* Remove useless parentesis

* Move flag variables inside main

* Update README with samples for the different XSECURELOCK_PASSWORD_PROMPT values

Makes following semantic versioning easier.

Behaves somewhat better if the value is low; still could not get a zero value
to work, as X11 then still wakes up the screen on key-release events.

Note that after this change, SIGUSR1 is only sent if
XSECURELOCK_SAVER_RESET_ON_AUTH_CLOSE is enabled, and savers
should ideally handle it by soft-resetting the saver (implemented in
saver_xscreensaver only for now); not handling it will cause a hard-reset
of the saver by restarting it from scratch.

Fixes #75.

That script absolutely works from a release tarball.

Make it run at 60fps by default now, no longer 112fps when dithering.

Fix the displaymarker sometimes only moving by one character when starting from column zero (empty PW).

Without this, an attacker might infer the password length based on a
screenshot and the time of day, as rand() is a deterministic PRNG without
any runtime entropy sources.

After this change, the attacker will additionally need the exact
microsecond-accurate time of day, and the process ID.

We may alternatively move to using /dev/urandom or getrandom here, but this
does not seem worth the effort, given an attacker can learn the same info by
pointing a video camera at screen or keyboard, or a microphone at the keyboard.

Also stop accidentally including some .o files in the tarball; found in the
checking done by the script.

Not very fancy yet, but should do for now.

Contribute the example saver for displaying livestream feeds.

Internal reference: b/130370819.