diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'library/ssl_tls.c')
-rw-r--r-- | library/ssl_tls.c | 299 |
1 files changed, 181 insertions, 118 deletions
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index ee7a1cf..3b06fee 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -1299,32 +1299,10 @@ static void ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) ) ) + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) #define SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC #endif -/* The function below is only used in the Lucky 13 counter-measure in - * ssl_decrypt_buf(). These are the defines that guard the call site. */ -#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ) -/* This function makes sure every byte in the memory region is accessed - * (in ascending addresses order) */ -static void ssl_read_memory( unsigned char *p, size_t len ) -{ - unsigned char acc = 0; - volatile unsigned char force; - - for( ; len != 0; p++, len-- ) - acc ^= *p; - - force = acc; - (void) force; -} -#endif /* SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC && ( TLS1 || TLS1_1 || TLS1_2 ) */ - /* * Encryption/decryption functions */ @@ -1521,8 +1499,7 @@ static int ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) { int ret; @@ -1641,8 +1618,7 @@ static int ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && - ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C ) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); @@ -1660,6 +1636,156 @@ static int ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( 0 ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) +/* + * Constant-flow conditional memcpy: + * - if c1 == c2, equivalent to memcpy(dst, src, len), + * - otherwise, a no-op, + * but with execution flow independent of the values of c1 and c2. + * + * Use only bit operations to avoid branches that could be used by some + * compilers on some platforms to translate comparison operators. + */ +static void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dst, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t len, + size_t c1, size_t c2 ) +{ + /* diff = 0 if c1 == c2, non-zero otherwise */ + const size_t diff = c1 ^ c2; + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to c1 != c2 */ + const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | -diff ); + + /* diff1 = c1 != c2 */ + const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 ); + + /* mask = c1 != c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */ + const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) -diff1; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + /* dst[i] = c1 != c2 ? dst[i] : src[i] */ + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + dst[i] = ( dst[i] & mask ) | ( src[i] & ~mask ); +} + +/* + * Compute HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. + * + * Only works with MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384. + * (Otherwise, computation of block_size needs to be adapted.) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( + mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + /* + * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() + * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. + * + * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means + * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit + * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. + * + * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to + * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen + * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. + * + * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. + */ + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info ); + /* TLS 1.0-1.2 only support SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, + * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ + const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; + const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; + const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; + const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); + + unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_md_context_t aux; + size_t offset; + int ret; + + mbedtls_md_init( &aux ); + +#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \ + do { \ + ret = (func_call); \ + if( ret != 0 ) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while( 0 ) + + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) ); + + /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, + * so we can start directly with the message */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) ); + + /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ + for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ ) + { + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) ); + /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ + mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size, + offset, data_len_secret ); + + if( offset < max_data_len ) + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) ); + } + + /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) ); + + /* Done, get ready for next time */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ); + +#undef MD_CHK + +cleanup: + mbedtls_md_free( &aux ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Constant-flow memcpy from variable position in buffer. + * - functionally equivalent to memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len) + * - but with execution flow independent from the value of offset_secret. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst, + const unsigned char *src_base, + size_t offset_secret, + size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t offset; + + for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len, + offset, offset_secret ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { size_t i; @@ -1785,8 +1911,7 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) { /* @@ -1997,8 +2122,7 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->in_msglen -= padlen; } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && - ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C ) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); @@ -2017,6 +2141,7 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( auth_done == 0 ) { unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen; @@ -2031,6 +2156,8 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype, mac_expect ); + memcpy( mac_peer, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, + ssl->transform_in->maclen ); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ @@ -2038,34 +2165,8 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if( ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) { - /* - * Process MAC and always update for padlen afterwards to make - * total time independent of padlen. - * - * Known timing attacks: - * - Lucky Thirteen (http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf) - * - * To compensate for different timings for the MAC calculation - * depending on how much padding was removed (which is determined - * by padlen), process extra_run more blocks through the hash - * function. - * - * The formula in the paper is - * extra_run = ceil( (L1-55) / 64 ) - ceil( (L2-55) / 64 ) - * where L1 is the size of the header plus the decrypted message - * plus CBC padding and L2 is the size of the header plus the - * decrypted message. This is for an underlying hash function - * with 64-byte blocks. - * We use ( (Lx+8) / 64 ) to handle 'negative Lx' values - * correctly. We round down instead of up, so -56 is the correct - * value for our calculations instead of -55. - * - * Repeat the formula rather than defining a block_size variable. - * This avoids requiring division by a variable at runtime - * (which would be marginally less efficient and would require - * linking an extra division function in some builds). - */ - size_t j, extra_run = 0; + int ret; + unsigned char add_data[13]; /* * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of @@ -2080,66 +2181,25 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) const size_t max_len = ssl->in_msglen + padlen; const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0; - switch( ssl->transform_in->ciphersuite_info->mac ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - /* 8 bytes of message size, 64-byte compression blocks */ - extra_run = ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + padlen + 8 ) / 64 - - ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + 8 ) / 64; - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - /* 16 bytes of message size, 128-byte compression blocks */ - extra_run = ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + padlen + 16 ) / 128 - - ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + 16 ) / 128; - break; -#endif - default: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - extra_run &= correct * 0xFF; - - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_ctr, 8 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_hdr, 3 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_len, 2 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg, - ssl->in_msglen ); - /* Make sure we access everything even when padlen > 0. This - * makes the synchronisation requirements for just-in-time - * Prime+Probe attacks much tighter and hopefully impractical. */ - ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, padlen ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect ); + memcpy( add_data + 0, ssl->in_ctr, 8 ); + memcpy( add_data + 8, ssl->in_hdr, 3 ); + memcpy( add_data + 11, ssl->in_len, 2 ); - /* Dummy calls to compression function. - * Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache attacks - * that observe whether md_process() was called of not. - * Respect the usual start-(process|update)-finish sequence for - * the sake of hardware accelerators that might require it. */ - mbedtls_md_starts( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec ); - for( j = 0; j < extra_run + 1; j++ ) - mbedtls_md_process( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg ); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, + add_data, sizeof( add_data ), + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen, + min_len, max_len, + mac_expect ); + if( ret != 0 ) { - /* The switch statement above already checks that we're using - * one of MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-384. */ - unsigned char tmp[384 / 8]; - mbedtls_md_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, tmp ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac", ret ); + return( ret ); } - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec ); - - /* Make sure we access all the memory that could contain the MAC, - * before we check it in the next code block. This makes the - * synchronisation requirements for just-in-time Prime+Probe - * attacks much tighter and hopefully impractical. */ - ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + min_len, - max_len - min_len + ssl->transform_in->maclen ); + mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, ssl->in_msg, + ssl->in_msglen, + min_len, max_len, + ssl->transform_in->maclen ); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ @@ -2151,11 +2211,10 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", mac_peer, ssl->transform_in->maclen ); #endif - if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect, + if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) @@ -7345,6 +7404,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) memcpy( buf, ssl->in_offt, n ); ssl->in_msglen -= n; + /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data + from the memory. */ + mbedtls_zeroize( ssl->in_offt, n ); + if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 ) { /* all bytes consumed */ |