diff options
61 files changed, 1727 insertions, 792 deletions
@@ -1,5 +1,171 @@ mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date) += mbed TLS 2.25.0 branch released 2020-12-11 + +API changes + * The numerical values of the PSA Crypto API macros have been updated to + conform to version 1.0.0 of the specification. + * PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER replaces PSA_ALG_CHACHA20 and PSA_ALG_ARC4. + The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4). + * The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() no longer accept NIST_KW contexts, + as they have no way to check if the output buffer is large enough. + Please use mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() instead. Credit to OSS-Fuzz and + Cryptofuzz. Fixes #3665. + +Requirement changes + * Update the minimum required CMake version to 2.8.12. This silences a + warning on CMake 3.19.0. #3801 + +New deprecations + * PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 and PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 have been deprecated. + Use PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER instead. + * The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() are deprecated in favour of the new + functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). Please note that with AEAD ciphers, + these new functions always append the tag to the ciphertext, and include + the tag in the ciphertext length. + +Features + * Partial implementation of the new PSA Crypto accelerator APIs. (Symmetric + ciphers, asymmetric signing/verification and key generation, validate_key + entry point, and export_public_key interface.) + * Add support for ECB to the PSA cipher API. + * In PSA, allow using a key declared with a base key agreement algorithm + in combined key agreement and derivation operations, as long as the key + agreement algorithm in use matches the algorithm the key was declared with. + This is currently non-standard behaviour, but expected to make it into a + future revision of the PSA Crypto standard. + * Add MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX CMake variable, which is prefixed to the mbedtls, + mbedcrypto, mbedx509 and apidoc CMake target names. This can be used by + external CMake projects that include this one to avoid CMake target name + clashes. The default value of this variable is "", so default target names + are unchanged. + * Add support for DTLS-SRTP as defined in RFC 5764. Contributed by Johan + Pascal, improved by Ron Eldor. + * In the PSA API, it is no longer necessary to open persistent keys: + operations now accept the key identifier. The type psa_key_handle_t is now + identical to psa_key_id_t instead of being platform-defined. This bridges + the last major gap to compliance with the PSA Cryptography specification + version 1.0.0. Opening persistent keys is still supported for backward + compatibility, but will be deprecated and later removed in future + releases. + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH, PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE, PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH and + PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE macros have been added as defined in version + 1.0.0 of the PSA Crypto API specification. + +Security + * The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() would write past the minimum documented + size of the output buffer when used with NIST_KW. As a result, code using + those functions as documented with NIST_KW could have a buffer overwrite + of up to 15 bytes, with consequences ranging up to arbitrary code + execution depending on the location of the output buffer. + * Limit the size of calculations performed by mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod to + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE to prevent a potential denial of service when + generating Diffie-Hellman key pairs. Credit to OSS-Fuzz. + * A failure of the random generator was ignored in mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(), + which is how most uses of randomization in asymmetric cryptography + (including key generation, intermediate value randomization and blinding) + are implemented. This could cause failures or the silent use of non-random + values. A random generator can fail if it needs reseeding and cannot not + obtain entropy, or due to an internal failure (which, for Mbed TLS's own + CTR_DRBG or HMAC_DRBG, can only happen due to a misconfiguration). + * Fix a compliance issue whereby we were not checking the tag on the + algorithm parameters (only the size) when comparing the signature in the + description part of the cert to the real signature. This meant that a + NULL algorithm parameters entry would look identical to an array of REAL + (size zero) to the library and thus the certificate would be considered + valid. However, if the parameters do not match in *any* way then the + certificate should be considered invalid, and indeed OpenSSL marks these + certs as invalid when mbedtls did not. + Many thanks to guidovranken who found this issue via differential fuzzing + and reported it in #3629. + * Zeroising of local buffers and variables which are used for calculations + in mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(), mbedtls_internal_sha*_process(), + mbedtls_internal_md*_process() and mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process() + functions to erase sensitive data from memory. Reported by + Johan Malmgren and Johan Uppman Bruce from Sectra. + +Bugfix + * Fix an invalid (but nonzero) return code from mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey() + when the input has trailing garbage. Fixes #2512. + * Fix build failure in configurations where MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is + enabled but ECDSA is disabled. Contributed by jdurkop. Fixes #3294. + * Include the psa_constant_names generated source code in the source tree + instead of generating it at build time. Fixes #3524. + * Fix rsa_prepare_blinding() to retry when the blinding value is not + invertible (mod N), instead of returning MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED. This + addresses a regression but is rare in practice (approx. 1 in 2/sqrt(N)). + Found by Synopsys Coverity, fix contributed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). + Fixes #3647. + * Use socklen_t on Android and other POSIX-compliant system + * Fix the build when the macro _GNU_SOURCE is defined to a non-empty value. + Fix #3432. + * Consistently return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT on invalid cipher input + sizes (instead of PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE in some cases) to make the + psa_cipher_* functions compliant with the PSA Crypto API specification. + * mbedtls_ecp_curve_list() now lists Curve25519 and Curve448 under the names + "x25519" and "x448". These curves support ECDH but not ECDSA. If you need + only the curves that support ECDSA, filter the list with + mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(). + * Fix psa_generate_key() returning an error when asked to generate + an ECC key pair on Curve25519 or secp244k1. + * Fix psa_key_derivation_output_key() to allow the output of a combined key + agreement and subsequent key derivation operation to be used as a key + inside of the PSA Crypto core. + * Fix handling of EOF against 0xff bytes and on platforms with unsigned + chars. Fixes a build failure on platforms where char is unsigned. Fixes + #3794. + * Fix an off-by-one error in the additional data length check for + CCM, which allowed encryption with a non-standard length field. + Fixes #3719. + * Correct the default IV size for mbedtls_cipher_info_t structures using + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB to 0, since ECB mode ciphers don't use IVs. + * Make arc4random_buf available on NetBSD and OpenBSD when _POSIX_C_SOURCE is + defined. Fix contributed in #3571. + * Fix conditions for including string.h in error.c. Fixes #3866. + * psa_set_key_id() now also sets the lifetime to persistent for keys located + in a secure element. + * Attempting to create a volatile key with a non-zero key identifier now + fails. Previously the key identifier was just ignored when creating a + volatile key. + * Attempting to create or register a key with a key identifier in the vendor + range now fails. + * Fix build failures on GCC 11. Fixes #3782. + * Add missing arguments of debug message in mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf. + * Fix a memory leak in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() when the result was negative + (an error condition) and the second operand was aliased to the result. + * Fix a case in elliptic curve arithmetic where an out-of-memory condition + could go undetected, resulting in an incorrect result. + * In CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG, don't reset the reseed interval in seed(). + Fixes #2927. + * In PEM writing functions, fill the trailing part of the buffer with null + bytes. This guarantees that the corresponding parsing function can read + the buffer back, which was the case for mbedtls_x509write_{crt,csr}_pem + until this property was inadvertently broken in Mbed TLS 2.19.0. + Fixes #3682. + * Fix a build failure that occurred with the MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT + option on. In this configuration key management methods that are required + for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS were excluded from the build and made it fail. + Fixes #3818. Reported by John Stroebel. + +Changes + * Reduce stack usage significantly during sliding window exponentiation. + Reported in #3591 and fix contributed in #3592 by Daniel Otte. + * The PSA persistent storage format is updated to always store the key bits + attribute. No automatic upgrade path is provided. Previously stored keys + must be erased, or manually upgraded based on the key storage format + specification (docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md). + Fixes #3740. + * Remove the zeroization of a pointer variable in AES rounds. It was valid + but spurious and misleading since it looked like a mistaken attempt to + zeroize the pointed-to buffer. Reported by Antonio de la Piedra, CEA + Leti, France. + = mbed TLS 2.24.0 branch released 2020-09-01 API changes diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/_GNU_SOURCE-redefined.txt b/ChangeLog.d/_GNU_SOURCE-redefined.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 59c8a15..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/_GNU_SOURCE-redefined.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Fix the build when the macro _GNU_SOURCE is defined to a non-empty value. - Fix #3432. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-ecb-to-psa.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-ecb-to-psa.txt deleted file mode 100644 index b0de67c..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-ecb-to-psa.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -Features - * Add support for ECB to the PSA cipher API. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add_MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX_to_cmake.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add_MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX_to_cmake.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 533f309..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/add_MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX_to_cmake.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ -Features - * Add MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX CMake variable, which is prefixed to the mbedtls, - mbedcrypto, mbedx509 and apidoc CMake target names. This can be used by - external CMake projects that include this one to avoid CMake target name - clashes. The default value of this variable is "", so default target names - are unchanged. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add_cipher_transparent_driver.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add_cipher_transparent_driver.txt deleted file mode 100644 index ce6f33d..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/add_cipher_transparent_driver.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ -Features - * Partial implementation of the new PSA Crypto accelerator APIs for - enabling symmetric cipher acceleration through crypto accelerators. - Contributed by Steven Cooreman in #3644. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add_export_public_key_driver.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add_export_public_key_driver.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a9bffbc..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/add_export_public_key_driver.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -Features - * Implementation of the export_public_key interface for PSA Crypto - accelerator drivers, as defined in #3493. Contributed in #3786. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add_sign_verify_keygen_transparent_driver.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add_sign_verify_keygen_transparent_driver.txt deleted file mode 100644 index fe43899..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/add_sign_verify_keygen_transparent_driver.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ -Features - * Partial implementation of the new PSA Crypto accelerator APIs for - enabling key generation and asymmetric signing/verification through crypto - accelerators. Contributed by Steven Cooreman in #3501. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/adjusting sliding_window_size_PR3592.txt b/ChangeLog.d/adjusting sliding_window_size_PR3592.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 6089565..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/adjusting sliding_window_size_PR3592.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -Changes - * Reduce stack usage significantly during sliding window exponentiation. - Reported in #3591 and fix contributed in #3592 by Daniel Otte. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/aes-zeroize-pointer.txt b/ChangeLog.d/aes-zeroize-pointer.txt deleted file mode 100644 index ccc6dc1..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/aes-zeroize-pointer.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -Changes - * Remove the zeroization of a pointer variable in AES rounds. It was valid - but spurious and misleading since it looked like a mistaken attempt to - zeroize the pointed-to buffer. Reported by Antonio de la Piedra, CEA - Leti, France. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/android-socklen_t.txt b/ChangeLog.d/android-socklen_t.txt deleted file mode 100644 index d795a52..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/android-socklen_t.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Use socklen_t on Android and other POSIX-compliant system - diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/arc4random_buf-implicit.txt b/ChangeLog.d/arc4random_buf-implicit.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 81c245e..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/arc4random_buf-implicit.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Make arc4random_buf available on NetBSD and OpenBSD when _POSIX_C_SOURCE is - defined. Fix contributed in #3571. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix-2927.txt b/ChangeLog.d/bugfix-2927.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 2213c6e..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix-2927.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * In CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG, don't reset the reseed interval in seed(). - Fixes #2927. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_3524.txt b/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_3524.txt deleted file mode 100644 index e038340..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_3524.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Include the psa_constant_names generated source code in the source tree - instead of generating it at build time. Fixes #3524. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_3782.txt b/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_3782.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 25e18cb..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_3782.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Fix build failures on GCC 11. Fixes #3782. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_3794.txt b/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_3794.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a483ea7..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_3794.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Fix handling of EOF against 0xff bytes and on platforms with - unsigned chars. Fixes a build failure on platforms where char is - unsigned. Fixes #3794. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_PR3294.txt b/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_PR3294.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a6ea75e..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_PR3294.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Fix build failure in configurations where MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is - enabled but ECDSA is disabled. Contributed by jdurkop. Fixes #3294. - diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/clean_pem_buffers.txt b/ChangeLog.d/clean_pem_buffers.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 818fad9..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/clean_pem_buffers.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * In PEM writing functions, fill the trailing part of the buffer with null - bytes. This guarantees that the corresponding parsing function can read - the buffer back, which was the case for mbedtls_x509write_{crt,csr}_pem - until this property was inadvertently broken in Mbed TLS 2.19.0. - Fixes #3682. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/ecb_iv_fix.txt b/ChangeLog.d/ecb_iv_fix.txt deleted file mode 100644 index ae2ae25..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/ecb_iv_fix.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Correct the default IV size for mbedtls_cipher_info_t structures using - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB to 0, since ECB mode ciphers don't use IVs. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/ecp-bignum-error-checks.txt b/ChangeLog.d/ecp-bignum-error-checks.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 8cad08e..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/ecp-bignum-error-checks.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Fix a memory leak in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() when the result was negative - (an error condition) and the second operand was aliased to the result. - * Fix a case in elliptic curve arithmetic where an out-of-memory condition - could go undetected, resulting in an incorrect result. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/ecp_curve_list.txt b/ChangeLog.d/ecp_curve_list.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 55745d3..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/ecp_curve_list.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * mbedtls_ecp_curve_list() now lists Curve25519 and Curve448 under the names - "x25519" and "x448". These curves support ECDH but not ECDSA. If you need - only the curves that support ECDSA, filter the list with - mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(). diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/error-include-string.txt b/ChangeLog.d/error-include-string.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 0a12c7b..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/error-include-string.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Fix conditions for including string.h in error.c. Fixes #3866. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/feature-dtls-srtp.txt b/ChangeLog.d/feature-dtls-srtp.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 8b9186b..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/feature-dtls-srtp.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -Features -* Add support for DTLS-SRTP as defined in RFC 5764. Contributed by Johan Pascal, improved by Ron Eldor. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-rsa-blinding.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-rsa-blinding.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a13572c..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-rsa-blinding.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Fix rsa_prepare_blinding() to retry when the blinding value is not - invertible (mod N), instead of returning MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED. This - addresses a regression but is rare in practice (approx. 1 in 2/sqrt(N)). - Found by Synopsys Coverity, fix contributed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). - Fixes #3647. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_ccm_add_length_check.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_ccm_add_length_check.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 259399f..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_ccm_add_length_check.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Fix an off-by-one error in the additional data length check for - CCM, which allowed encryption with a non-standard length field. - Fixes #3719. - diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/minimum_cmake_version_PR3802.txt b/ChangeLog.d/minimum_cmake_version_PR3802.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 549f9b1..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/minimum_cmake_version_PR3802.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -Requirement changes -* Update the minimum required CMake version to 2.8.12. -* This silences a warning on CMake 3.19.0. #3801 diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/missing-debug-message-arguments_mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf.txt b/ChangeLog.d/missing-debug-message-arguments_mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf.txt deleted file mode 100644 index e03178f..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/missing-debug-message-arguments_mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Add missing arguments of debug message in mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa-crypto-api-values-1.0.0.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa-crypto-api-values-1.0.0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 0bd3764..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/psa-crypto-api-values-1.0.0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -API changes - * The numerical values of the PSA Crypto API macros have been updated to - conform to version 1.0.0 of the specification. - * PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER replaces PSA_ALG_CHACHA20 and PSA_ALG_ARC4. - The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type - (PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4). -New deprecations - * PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 and PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 have been deprecated. - Use PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER instead. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa-openless.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa-openless.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 2e40cdf..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/psa-openless.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17 +0,0 @@ -Features - * In the PSA API, it is no longer necessary to open persistent keys: - operations now accept the key identifier. The type psa_key_handle_t is now - identical to psa_key_id_t instead of being platform-defined. This bridges - the last major gap to compliance with the PSA Cryptography specification - version 1.0.0. Opening persistent keys is still supported for backward - compatibility, but will be deprecated and later removed in future - releases. - -Bugfix - * psa_set_key_id() now also sets the lifetime to persistent for keys located - in a secure element. - * Attempting to create a volatile key with a non-zero key identifier now - fails. Previously the key identifier was just ignored when creating a - volatile key. - * Attempting to create or register a key with a key identifier in the vendor - range now fails. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_error_invalid_argument_for_invalid_cipher_input_sizes.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_error_invalid_argument_for_invalid_cipher_input_sizes.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 85c363b..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/psa_error_invalid_argument_for_invalid_cipher_input_sizes.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Consistently return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT on invalid cipher input - sizes (instead of PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE in some cases) to make the - psa_cipher_* functions compliant with the PSA Crypto API specification. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_generate_key-curve25519.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_generate_key-curve25519.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 24b6fcf..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/psa_generate_key-curve25519.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Fix psa_generate_key() returning an error when asked to generate - an ECC key pair on Curve25519 or secp244k1. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/support-ecdh-kdf-with-ecdh-key.txt b/ChangeLog.d/support-ecdh-kdf-with-ecdh-key.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 6660dc3..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/support-ecdh-kdf-with-ecdh-key.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ -Features - * In PSA, allow using a key declared with a base key agreement algorithm - in combined key agreement and derivation operations, as long as the key - agreement algorithm in use matches the algorithm the key was declared with. - This is currently non-standard behaviour, but expected to make it into a - future revision of the PSA Crypto standard. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/support-key-agreement-and-derivation-output-as-key.txt b/ChangeLog.d/support-key-agreement-and-derivation-output-as-key.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 3f61481..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/support-key-agreement-and-derivation-output-as-key.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ -Bugfix - * Fix psa_key_derivation_output_key() to allow the output of a combined key - agreement and subsequent key derivation operation to be used as a key - inside of the PSA Crypto core. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/systematically_store_bit_size_3740.txt b/ChangeLog.d/systematically_store_bit_size_3740.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 9e63bbc..0000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/systematically_store_bit_size_3740.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -Changes - * The PSA persistent storage format is updated to always store the key bits - attribute. No automatic upgrade path is provided. Previously stored keys - must be erased, or manually upgraded based on the key storage format - specification (docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md). #3740 diff --git a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h index c13b279..5b51bd5 100644 --- a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h +++ b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ */ /** - * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.24.0 source code documentation + * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.25.0 source code documentation * * This documentation describes the internal structure of mbed TLS. It was * automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in diff --git a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile index bf33dab..dd4237a 100644 --- a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile +++ b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ DOXYFILE_ENCODING = UTF-8 # identify the project. Note that if you do not use Doxywizard you need # to put quotes around the project name if it contains spaces. -PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.24.0" +PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.25.0" # The PROJECT_NUMBER tag can be used to enter a project or revision number. # This could be handy for archiving the generated documentation or diff --git a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h index 8827e0b..1cafa6e 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h @@ -857,30 +857,52 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ /** - * \brief The generic autenticated encryption (AEAD) function. + * \brief The generic authenticated encryption (AEAD) function. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + * + * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key + * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and - * bound to a key. - * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. - * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p iv_len - * Bytes. - * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV. - * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV. + * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the + * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used. * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes. + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes. + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be able to - * hold at least \p ilen Bytes. - * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the - * actual number of Bytes written. This must not be - * \c NULL. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must + * not be \c NULL. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a - * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. - * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. + * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note + * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts. + * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. This + * must match the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher + * used, and in particular must not be \c 0. + * + * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up + * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required + * that \c tag == output + ilen. That is, the tag must be + * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on @@ -892,36 +914,53 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; /** - * \brief The generic autenticated decryption (AEAD) function. + * \brief The generic authenticated decryption (AEAD) function. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). + * + * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key + * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). * * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being * used, making this interface safer. * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and - * and bound to a key. - * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. - * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p iv_len - * Bytes. - * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV. - * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV. - * \param ad The additional data to be authenticated. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes. + * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the + * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes. + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The buffer for the output data. - * This must be able to hold at least \p ilen Bytes. - * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the - * actual number of Bytes written. This must not be - * \c NULL. - * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication tag. This must be - * a readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. - * \param tag_len The length of the authentication tag. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must + * not be \c NULL. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note + * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts. + * \param tag_len The length of the authentication tag. This must match + * the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used, and in + * particular must not be \c 0. + * + * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up + * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required + * that \c tag == input + len. That is, the tag must be + * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on @@ -934,9 +973,120 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +/** + * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function. + * + * \note For AEAD modes, the tag will be appended to the + * ciphertext, as recommended by RFC 5116. + * (NIST_KW doesn't have a separate tag.) + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key, with an AEAD algorithm or NIST_KW. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and may be \c NULL if \p + * iv_len is \c 0. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. For AEAD ciphers, this must + * satisfy the constraints imposed by the cipher used. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p output_len Bytes, and + * must not be \c NULL. + * \param output_len The length of the \p output buffer in Bytes. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must be at least \p ilen + \p tag_len. + * For NIST_KW, this must be at least \p ilen + 8 + * (rounded up to a multiple of 8 if KWP is used); + * \p ilen + 15 is always a safe value. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must match the constraints imposed by + * the cipher used, and in particular must not be \c 0. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function. + * + * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer + * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being + * used, making this interface safer. + * + * \note For AEAD modes, the tag must be appended to the + * ciphertext, as recommended by RFC 5116. + * (NIST_KW doesn't have a separate tag.) + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key, with an AEAD algorithm or NIST_KW. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and may be \c NULL if \p + * iv_len is \c 0. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. For AEAD ciphers, this must + * satisfy the constraints imposed by the cipher used. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. For AEAD ciphers this + * must be at least \p tag_len. For NIST_KW this must be + * at least \c 8. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p output_len Bytes, and + * may be \c NULL if \p output_len is \c 0. + * \param output_len The length of the \p output buffer in Bytes. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must be at least \p ilen - \p tag_len. + * For NIST_KW, this must be at least \p ilen - 8. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag_len The actual length of the authentication tag. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must match the constraints imposed by + * the cipher used, and in particular must not be \c 0. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/include/mbedtls/version.h b/include/mbedtls/version.h index 665a283..10c4316 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/version.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/version.h @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ * Major, Minor, Patchlevel */ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 24 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 25 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 0 /** @@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ * MMNNPP00 * Major version | Minor version | Patch version */ -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02180000 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.24.0" -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.24.0" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02190000 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.25.0" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.25.0" #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt index 8962555..b309b6e 100644 --- a/library/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt @@ -193,15 +193,15 @@ endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto}) - set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.24.0 SOVERSION 5) + set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.25.0 SOVERSION 6) target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs}) add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509}) - set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.24.0 SOVERSION 1) + set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.25.0 SOVERSION 1) target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target}) add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls}) - set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.24.0 SOVERSION 13) + set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.25.0 SOVERSION 13) target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target}) endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) diff --git a/library/Makefile b/library/Makefile index a6db9b3..ae33bf2 100644 --- a/library/Makefile +++ b/library/Makefile @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ endif SOEXT_TLS=so.13 SOEXT_X509=so.1 -SOEXT_CRYPTO=so.5 +SOEXT_CRYPTO=so.6 # Set AR_DASH= (empty string) to use an ar implementation that does not accept # the - prefix for command line options (e.g. llvm-ar) diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c index b11239e..9cc5d66 100644 --- a/library/bignum.c +++ b/library/bignum.c @@ -2118,6 +2118,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 0 ) < 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( E ) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + /* * Init temps and window size */ @@ -2394,7 +2398,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); Xp = (unsigned char*) X->p; - f_rng( p_rng, Xp + overhead, size ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, Xp + overhead, size ) ); mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); diff --git a/library/cipher.c b/library/cipher.c index 853eeec..457f8f6 100644 --- a/library/cipher.c +++ b/library/cipher.c @@ -1288,23 +1288,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) /* - * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). */ -int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, +static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) { @@ -1320,7 +1313,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag * at the end of the encrypted message. */ - if( tag != output + ilen ) + if( output == NULL || tag != output + ilen ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); status = psa_aead_encrypt( cipher_psa->slot, @@ -1370,44 +1363,21 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, ilen, iv, ad, ad_len, input, output, tag ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) - if( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) - { - mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ? - MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; - - /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, these length should be 0 */ - if( iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - return( mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, output, olen, SIZE_MAX ) ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); } /* - * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD modes + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). */ -int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, +static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) { @@ -1423,7 +1393,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag * at the end of the encrypted message. */ - if( tag != input + ilen ) + if( input == NULL || tag != input + ilen ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); status = psa_aead_decrypt( cipher_psa->slot, @@ -1495,25 +1465,169 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return( ret ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + tag, tag_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + tag, tag_len ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) - if( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + if( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && +#endif + ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ) { mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ? MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; - /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, these length should be 0 */ + /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, + * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ if( iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0 ) - { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - return( mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, output, olen, SIZE_MAX ) ); + (void) iv; + (void) ad; + + return( mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, + output, olen, output_len ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */ + if( output_len < ilen + tag_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + int ret = mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + output + ilen, tag_len ); + *olen += tag_len; + return( ret ); +#else return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ } + +/* + * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + if( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && +#endif + ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ) + { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + + /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, + * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ + if( iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + (void) iv; + (void) ad; + + return( mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, + output, olen, output_len ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */ + if( ilen < tag_len || output_len < ilen - tag_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen - tag_len, output, olen, + input + ilen - tag_len, tag_len ) ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/library/md2.c b/library/md2.c index b4f7cc6..7264e30 100644 --- a/library/md2.c +++ b/library/md2.c @@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ int mbedtls_internal_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) t = ctx->cksum[i]; } + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); + return( 0 ); } diff --git a/library/md4.c b/library/md4.c index 1cac0a4..4fd6bc3 100644 --- a/library/md4.c +++ b/library/md4.c @@ -113,31 +113,34 @@ void mbedtls_md4_starts( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_internal_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ) { - uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; - - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 0], data, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 1], data, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 2], data, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 3], data, 12 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 4], data, 16 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 5], data, 20 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 6], data, 24 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 7], data, 28 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 8], data, 32 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 9], data, 36 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[10], data, 40 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[11], data, 44 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[12], data, 48 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[13], data, 52 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[14], data, 56 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[15], data, 60 ); + struct + { + uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; + } local; + + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 0], data, 0 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 1], data, 4 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 2], data, 8 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 3], data, 12 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 4], data, 16 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 5], data, 20 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 6], data, 24 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 7], data, 28 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 8], data, 32 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 9], data, 36 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[10], data, 40 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[11], data, 44 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[12], data, 48 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[13], data, 52 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[14], data, 56 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[15], data, 60 ); #define S(x,n) (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) - A = ctx->state[0]; - B = ctx->state[1]; - C = ctx->state[2]; - D = ctx->state[3]; + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; #define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~(x)) & (z))) #define P(a,b,c,d,x,s) \ @@ -148,22 +151,22 @@ int mbedtls_internal_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, } while( 0 ) - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 0], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 1], 7 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 2], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[ 3], 19 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 4], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 5], 7 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 6], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[ 7], 19 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 8], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 9], 7 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[10], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[11], 19 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[12], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[13], 7 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[14], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[15], 19 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 0], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 1], 7 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 2], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[ 3], 19 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 4], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 5], 7 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 6], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[ 7], 19 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 8], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 9], 7 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[10], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[11], 19 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[12], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[13], 7 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[14], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 19 ); #undef P #undef F @@ -176,22 +179,22 @@ int mbedtls_internal_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, (a) = S((a),(s)); \ } while( 0 ) - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 0], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 4], 5 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 8], 9 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[12], 13 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 1], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 5], 5 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 9], 9 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[13], 13 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 2], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 6], 5 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[10], 9 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[14], 13 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 3], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 7], 5 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[11], 9 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[15], 13 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 0], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 4], 5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 8], 9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[12], 13 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 1], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 5], 5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 9], 9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[13], 13 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 2], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 6], 5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[10], 9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[14], 13 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 3], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 7], 5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[11], 9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 13 ); #undef P #undef F @@ -204,30 +207,33 @@ int mbedtls_internal_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, (a) = S((a),(s)); \ } while( 0 ) - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 0], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 8], 9 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 4], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[12], 15 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 2], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[10], 9 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 6], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[14], 15 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 1], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 9], 9 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 5], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[13], 15 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 3], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[11], 9 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 7], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[15], 15 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 0], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 8], 9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 4], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[12], 15 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 2], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[10], 9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 6], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[14], 15 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 1], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 9], 9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 5], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[13], 15 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 3], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[11], 9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 7], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 15 ); #undef F #undef P - ctx->state[0] += A; - ctx->state[1] += B; - ctx->state[2] += C; - ctx->state[3] += D; + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); return( 0 ); } diff --git a/library/md5.c b/library/md5.c index 1e702b4..c4f2dbf 100644 --- a/library/md5.c +++ b/library/md5.c @@ -112,128 +112,134 @@ void mbedtls_md5_starts( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_internal_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ) { - uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; - - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 0], data, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 1], data, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 2], data, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 3], data, 12 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 4], data, 16 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 5], data, 20 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 6], data, 24 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 7], data, 28 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 8], data, 32 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 9], data, 36 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[10], data, 40 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[11], data, 44 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[12], data, 48 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[13], data, 52 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[14], data, 56 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[15], data, 60 ); + struct + { + uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; + } local; + + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 0], data, 0 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 1], data, 4 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 2], data, 8 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 3], data, 12 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 4], data, 16 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 5], data, 20 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 6], data, 24 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 7], data, 28 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 8], data, 32 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 9], data, 36 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[10], data, 40 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[11], data, 44 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[12], data, 48 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[13], data, 52 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[14], data, 56 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[15], data, 60 ); #define S(x,n) \ ( ( (x) << (n) ) | ( ( (x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> ( 32 - (n) ) ) ) -#define P(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) \ - do \ - { \ - (a) += F((b),(c),(d)) + X[(k)] + (t); \ - (a) = S((a),(s)) + (b); \ +#define P(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += F((b),(c),(d)) + local.X[(k)] + (t); \ + (a) = S((a),(s)) + (b); \ } while( 0 ) - A = ctx->state[0]; - B = ctx->state[1]; - C = ctx->state[2]; - D = ctx->state[3]; + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; #define F(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) - P( A, B, C, D, 0, 7, 0xD76AA478 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 1, 12, 0xE8C7B756 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 2, 17, 0x242070DB ); - P( B, C, D, A, 3, 22, 0xC1BDCEEE ); - P( A, B, C, D, 4, 7, 0xF57C0FAF ); - P( D, A, B, C, 5, 12, 0x4787C62A ); - P( C, D, A, B, 6, 17, 0xA8304613 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 7, 22, 0xFD469501 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 8, 7, 0x698098D8 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 9, 12, 0x8B44F7AF ); - P( C, D, A, B, 10, 17, 0xFFFF5BB1 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 11, 22, 0x895CD7BE ); - P( A, B, C, D, 12, 7, 0x6B901122 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 13, 12, 0xFD987193 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 14, 17, 0xA679438E ); - P( B, C, D, A, 15, 22, 0x49B40821 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 0, 7, 0xD76AA478 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 1, 12, 0xE8C7B756 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 2, 17, 0x242070DB ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 3, 22, 0xC1BDCEEE ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 4, 7, 0xF57C0FAF ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 5, 12, 0x4787C62A ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 6, 17, 0xA8304613 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 7, 22, 0xFD469501 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 7, 0x698098D8 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 9, 12, 0x8B44F7AF ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 10, 17, 0xFFFF5BB1 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 11, 22, 0x895CD7BE ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 12, 7, 0x6B901122 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 13, 12, 0xFD987193 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 14, 17, 0xA679438E ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 15, 22, 0x49B40821 ); #undef F #define F(x,y,z) ((y) ^ ((z) & ((x) ^ (y)))) - P( A, B, C, D, 1, 5, 0xF61E2562 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 6, 9, 0xC040B340 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 11, 14, 0x265E5A51 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 0, 20, 0xE9B6C7AA ); - P( A, B, C, D, 5, 5, 0xD62F105D ); - P( D, A, B, C, 10, 9, 0x02441453 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 15, 14, 0xD8A1E681 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 4, 20, 0xE7D3FBC8 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 9, 5, 0x21E1CDE6 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 14, 9, 0xC33707D6 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 3, 14, 0xF4D50D87 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 8, 20, 0x455A14ED ); - P( A, B, C, D, 13, 5, 0xA9E3E905 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 2, 9, 0xFCEFA3F8 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 7, 14, 0x676F02D9 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 12, 20, 0x8D2A4C8A ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 5, 0xF61E2562 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 9, 0xC040B340 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 11, 14, 0x265E5A51 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 0, 20, 0xE9B6C7AA ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 5, 0xD62F105D ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 10, 9, 0x02441453 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 15, 14, 0xD8A1E681 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 4, 20, 0xE7D3FBC8 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 5, 0x21E1CDE6 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 14, 9, 0xC33707D6 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 3, 14, 0xF4D50D87 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 8, 20, 0x455A14ED ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 5, 0xA9E3E905 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 2, 9, 0xFCEFA3F8 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 7, 14, 0x676F02D9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 12, 20, 0x8D2A4C8A ); #undef F #define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) - P( A, B, C, D, 5, 4, 0xFFFA3942 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 8, 11, 0x8771F681 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 11, 16, 0x6D9D6122 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 14, 23, 0xFDE5380C ); - P( A, B, C, D, 1, 4, 0xA4BEEA44 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 4, 11, 0x4BDECFA9 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 7, 16, 0xF6BB4B60 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 10, 23, 0xBEBFBC70 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 13, 4, 0x289B7EC6 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 0, 11, 0xEAA127FA ); - P( C, D, A, B, 3, 16, 0xD4EF3085 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 6, 23, 0x04881D05 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 9, 4, 0xD9D4D039 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 12, 11, 0xE6DB99E5 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 15, 16, 0x1FA27CF8 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 2, 23, 0xC4AC5665 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 4, 0xFFFA3942 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 8, 11, 0x8771F681 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 11, 16, 0x6D9D6122 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 14, 23, 0xFDE5380C ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 4, 0xA4BEEA44 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 4, 11, 0x4BDECFA9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 7, 16, 0xF6BB4B60 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 10, 23, 0xBEBFBC70 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 4, 0x289B7EC6 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 11, 0xEAA127FA ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 3, 16, 0xD4EF3085 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 6, 23, 0x04881D05 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 4, 0xD9D4D039 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 11, 0xE6DB99E5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 15, 16, 0x1FA27CF8 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 2, 23, 0xC4AC5665 ); #undef F #define F(x,y,z) ((y) ^ ((x) | ~(z))) - P( A, B, C, D, 0, 6, 0xF4292244 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 7, 10, 0x432AFF97 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 14, 15, 0xAB9423A7 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 5, 21, 0xFC93A039 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 12, 6, 0x655B59C3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 3, 10, 0x8F0CCC92 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 10, 15, 0xFFEFF47D ); - P( B, C, D, A, 1, 21, 0x85845DD1 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 8, 6, 0x6FA87E4F ); - P( D, A, B, C, 15, 10, 0xFE2CE6E0 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 6, 15, 0xA3014314 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 13, 21, 0x4E0811A1 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 4, 6, 0xF7537E82 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 11, 10, 0xBD3AF235 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 2, 15, 0x2AD7D2BB ); - P( B, C, D, A, 9, 21, 0xEB86D391 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 0, 6, 0xF4292244 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 7, 10, 0x432AFF97 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 14, 15, 0xAB9423A7 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 5, 21, 0xFC93A039 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 12, 6, 0x655B59C3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 10, 0x8F0CCC92 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 10, 15, 0xFFEFF47D ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 1, 21, 0x85845DD1 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 6, 0x6FA87E4F ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 10, 0xFE2CE6E0 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 6, 15, 0xA3014314 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 13, 21, 0x4E0811A1 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 4, 6, 0xF7537E82 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 11, 10, 0xBD3AF235 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 2, 15, 0x2AD7D2BB ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 9, 21, 0xEB86D391 ); #undef F - ctx->state[0] += A; - ctx->state[1] += B; - ctx->state[2] += C; - ctx->state[3] += D; + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); return( 0 ); } diff --git a/library/pkcs5.c b/library/pkcs5.c index f89cc64..e9e743f 100644 --- a/library/pkcs5.c +++ b/library/pkcs5.c @@ -221,7 +221,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned int iteration_count, uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret, j; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int j; unsigned int i; unsigned char md1[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char work[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; @@ -245,16 +246,16 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, // U1 ends up in work // if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, counter, 4 ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( ctx, work ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; memcpy( md1, work, md_size ); @@ -263,13 +264,13 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, // U2 ends up in md1 // if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, md1, md_size ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( ctx, md1 ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; // U1 xor U2 // @@ -288,7 +289,12 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, break; } - return( 0 ); +cleanup: + /* Zeroise buffers to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( work, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( md1, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); + + return( ret ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) diff --git a/library/ripemd160.c b/library/ripemd160.c index 603b6ba..ae4dee4 100644 --- a/library/ripemd160.c +++ b/library/ripemd160.c @@ -117,30 +117,33 @@ void mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ) { - uint32_t A, B, C, D, E, Ap, Bp, Cp, Dp, Ep, X[16]; - - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 0], data, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 1], data, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 2], data, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 3], data, 12 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 4], data, 16 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 5], data, 20 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 6], data, 24 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 7], data, 28 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 8], data, 32 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 9], data, 36 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[10], data, 40 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[11], data, 44 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[12], data, 48 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[13], data, 52 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[14], data, 56 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[15], data, 60 ); - - A = Ap = ctx->state[0]; - B = Bp = ctx->state[1]; - C = Cp = ctx->state[2]; - D = Dp = ctx->state[3]; - E = Ep = ctx->state[4]; + struct + { + uint32_t A, B, C, D, E, Ap, Bp, Cp, Dp, Ep, X[16]; + } local; + + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 0], data, 0 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 1], data, 4 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 2], data, 8 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 3], data, 12 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 4], data, 16 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 5], data, 20 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 6], data, 24 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 7], data, 28 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 8], data, 32 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 9], data, 36 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[10], data, 40 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[11], data, 44 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[12], data, 48 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[13], data, 52 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[14], data, 56 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[15], data, 60 ); + + local.A = local.Ap = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = local.Bp = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = local.Cp = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = local.Dp = ctx->state[3]; + local.E = local.Ep = ctx->state[4]; #define F1( x, y, z ) ( (x) ^ (y) ^ (z) ) #define F2( x, y, z ) ( ( (x) & (y) ) | ( ~(x) & (z) ) ) @@ -150,12 +153,12 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, #define S( x, n ) ( ( (x) << (n) ) | ( (x) >> (32 - (n)) ) ) -#define P( a, b, c, d, e, r, s, f, k ) \ - do \ - { \ - (a) += f( (b), (c), (d) ) + X[r] + (k); \ - (a) = S( (a), (s) ) + (e); \ - (c) = S( (c), 10 ); \ +#define P( a, b, c, d, e, r, s, f, k ) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += f( (b), (c), (d) ) + local.X[r] + (k); \ + (a) = S( (a), (s) ) + (e); \ + (c) = S( (c), 10 ); \ } while( 0 ) #define P2( a, b, c, d, e, r, s, rp, sp ) \ @@ -170,22 +173,22 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, #define K 0x00000000 #define Fp F5 #define Kp 0x50A28BE6 - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 0, 11, 5, 8 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 1, 14, 14, 9 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 2, 15, 7, 9 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 3, 12, 0, 11 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 4, 5, 9, 13 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 5, 8, 2, 15 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 6, 7, 11, 15 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 7, 9, 4, 5 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 8, 11, 13, 7 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 9, 13, 6, 7 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 10, 14, 15, 8 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 11, 15, 8, 11 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 12, 6, 1, 14 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 13, 7, 10, 14 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 14, 9, 3, 12 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 15, 8, 12, 6 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 11, 5, 8 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 14, 14, 9 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 2, 15, 7, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 3, 12, 0, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 4, 5, 9, 13 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 5, 8, 2, 15 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 6, 7, 11, 15 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 7, 9, 4, 5 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 11, 13, 7 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 9, 13, 6, 7 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 10, 14, 15, 8 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 11, 15, 8, 11 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 6, 1, 14 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 13, 7, 10, 14 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 9, 3, 12 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 15, 8, 12, 6 ); #undef F #undef K #undef Fp @@ -195,22 +198,22 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, #define K 0x5A827999 #define Fp F4 #define Kp 0x5C4DD124 - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 7, 7, 6, 9 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 4, 6, 11, 13 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 13, 8, 3, 15 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 1, 13, 7, 7 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 10, 11, 0, 12 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 6, 9, 13, 8 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 15, 7, 5, 9 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 3, 15, 10, 11 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 12, 7, 14, 7 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 0, 12, 15, 7 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 9, 15, 8, 12 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 5, 9, 12, 7 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 2, 11, 4, 6 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 14, 7, 9, 15 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 11, 13, 1, 13 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 8, 12, 2, 11 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 7, 7, 6, 9 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 4, 6, 11, 13 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 13, 8, 3, 15 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 1, 13, 7, 7 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 10, 11, 0, 12 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 6, 9, 13, 8 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 7, 5, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 3, 15, 10, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 7, 14, 7 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 12, 15, 7 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 15, 8, 12 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 5, 9, 12, 7 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 2, 11, 4, 6 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 7, 9, 15 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 13, 1, 13 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 12, 2, 11 ); #undef F #undef K #undef Fp @@ -220,22 +223,22 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, #define K 0x6ED9EBA1 #define Fp F3 #define Kp 0x6D703EF3 - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 3, 11, 15, 9 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 10, 13, 5, 7 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 14, 6, 1, 15 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 4, 7, 3, 11 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 9, 14, 7, 8 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 15, 9, 14, 6 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 8, 13, 6, 6 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 1, 15, 9, 14 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 2, 14, 11, 12 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 7, 8, 8, 13 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 0, 13, 12, 5 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 6, 6, 2, 14 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 13, 5, 10, 13 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 11, 12, 0, 13 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 5, 7, 4, 7 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 12, 5, 13, 5 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 11, 15, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 10, 13, 5, 7 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 6, 1, 15 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 4, 7, 3, 11 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 14, 7, 8 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 9, 14, 6 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 13, 6, 6 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 1, 15, 9, 14 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 2, 14, 11, 12 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 7, 8, 8, 13 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 13, 12, 5 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 6, 6, 2, 14 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 13, 5, 10, 13 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 12, 0, 13 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 7, 4, 7 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 5, 13, 5 ); #undef F #undef K #undef Fp @@ -245,22 +248,22 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, #define K 0x8F1BBCDC #define Fp F2 #define Kp 0x7A6D76E9 - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 1, 11, 8, 15 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 9, 12, 6, 5 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 11, 14, 4, 8 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 10, 15, 1, 11 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 0, 14, 3, 14 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 8, 15, 11, 14 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 12, 9, 15, 6 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 4, 8, 0, 14 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 13, 9, 5, 6 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 3, 14, 12, 9 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 7, 5, 2, 12 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 15, 6, 13, 9 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 14, 8, 9, 12 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 5, 6, 7, 5 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 6, 5, 10, 15 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 2, 12, 14, 8 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 1, 11, 8, 15 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 9, 12, 6, 5 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 14, 4, 8 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 10, 15, 1, 11 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 14, 3, 14 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 15, 11, 14 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 9, 15, 6 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 4, 8, 0, 14 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 9, 5, 6 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 14, 12, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 7, 5, 2, 12 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 15, 6, 13, 9 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 14, 8, 9, 12 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 6, 7, 5 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 5, 10, 15 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 2, 12, 14, 8 ); #undef F #undef K #undef Fp @@ -270,33 +273,36 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, #define K 0xA953FD4E #define Fp F1 #define Kp 0x00000000 - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 4, 9, 12, 8 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 0, 15, 15, 5 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 5, 5, 10, 12 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 9, 11, 4, 9 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 7, 6, 1, 12 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 12, 8, 5, 5 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 2, 13, 8, 14 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 10, 12, 7, 6 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 14, 5, 6, 8 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 1, 12, 2, 13 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 3, 13, 13, 6 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 8, 14, 14, 5 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 11, 11, 0, 15 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 6, 8, 3, 13 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 15, 5, 9, 11 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 13, 6, 11, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 4, 9, 12, 8 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 15, 15, 5 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 5, 10, 12 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 9, 11, 4, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 7, 6, 1, 12 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 8, 5, 5 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 2, 13, 8, 14 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 10, 12, 7, 6 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 14, 5, 6, 8 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 1, 12, 2, 13 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 3, 13, 13, 6 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 8, 14, 14, 5 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 11, 11, 0, 15 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 8, 3, 13 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 15, 5, 9, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 13, 6, 11, 11 ); #undef F #undef K #undef Fp #undef Kp - C = ctx->state[1] + C + Dp; - ctx->state[1] = ctx->state[2] + D + Ep; - ctx->state[2] = ctx->state[3] + E + Ap; - ctx->state[3] = ctx->state[4] + A + Bp; - ctx->state[4] = ctx->state[0] + B + Cp; - ctx->state[0] = C; + local.C = ctx->state[1] + local.C + local.Dp; + ctx->state[1] = ctx->state[2] + local.D + local.Ep; + ctx->state[2] = ctx->state[3] + local.E + local.Ap; + ctx->state[3] = ctx->state[4] + local.A + local.Bp; + ctx->state[4] = ctx->state[0] + local.B + local.Cp; + ctx->state[0] = local.C; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); return( 0 ); } diff --git a/library/sha1.c b/library/sha1.c index 593f795..6b0f58e 100644 --- a/library/sha1.c +++ b/library/sha1.c @@ -125,35 +125,40 @@ void mbedtls_sha1_starts( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ) { - uint32_t temp, W[16], A, B, C, D, E; + struct + { + uint32_t temp, W[16], A, B, C, D, E; + } local; SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 0], data, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 1], data, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 2], data, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 3], data, 12 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 4], data, 16 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 5], data, 20 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 6], data, 24 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 7], data, 28 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 8], data, 32 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 9], data, 36 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[10], data, 40 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[11], data, 44 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[12], data, 48 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[13], data, 52 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[14], data, 56 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[15], data, 60 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 0], data, 0 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 1], data, 4 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 2], data, 8 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 3], data, 12 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 4], data, 16 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 5], data, 20 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 6], data, 24 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 7], data, 28 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 8], data, 32 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 9], data, 36 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[10], data, 40 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[11], data, 44 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[12], data, 48 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[13], data, 52 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[14], data, 56 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[15], data, 60 ); #define S(x,n) (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) #define R(t) \ ( \ - temp = W[( (t) - 3 ) & 0x0F] ^ W[( (t) - 8 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ - W[( (t) - 14 ) & 0x0F] ^ W[ (t) & 0x0F], \ - ( W[(t) & 0x0F] = S(temp,1) ) \ + local.temp = local.W[( (t) - 3 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[( (t) - 8 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[( (t) - 14 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[ (t) & 0x0F], \ + ( local.W[(t) & 0x0F] = S(local.temp,1) ) \ ) #define P(a,b,c,d,e,x) \ @@ -163,35 +168,35 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, (b) = S((b),30); \ } while( 0 ) - A = ctx->state[0]; - B = ctx->state[1]; - C = ctx->state[2]; - D = ctx->state[3]; - E = ctx->state[4]; + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; + local.E = ctx->state[4]; #define F(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) #define K 0x5A827999 - P( A, B, C, D, E, W[0] ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, W[1] ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, W[2] ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, W[3] ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, W[4] ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, W[5] ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, W[6] ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, W[7] ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, W[8] ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, W[9] ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, W[10] ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, W[11] ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, W[12] ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, W[13] ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, W[14] ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, W[15] ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(16) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(17) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(18) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(19) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[0] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[1] ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[2] ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[3] ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[4] ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[5] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[6] ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[7] ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[8] ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[9] ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[10] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[11] ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[12] ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[13] ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[14] ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[15] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(16) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(17) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(18) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(19) ); #undef K #undef F @@ -199,26 +204,26 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, #define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) #define K 0x6ED9EBA1 - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(20) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(21) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(22) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(23) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(24) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(25) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(26) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(27) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(28) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(29) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(30) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(31) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(32) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(33) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(34) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(35) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(36) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(37) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(38) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(39) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(20) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(21) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(22) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(23) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(24) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(25) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(26) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(27) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(28) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(29) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(30) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(31) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(32) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(33) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(34) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(35) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(36) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(37) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(38) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(39) ); #undef K #undef F @@ -226,26 +231,26 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, #define F(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) #define K 0x8F1BBCDC - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(40) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(41) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(42) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(43) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(44) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(45) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(46) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(47) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(48) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(49) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(50) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(51) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(52) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(53) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(54) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(55) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(56) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(57) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(58) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(59) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(40) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(41) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(42) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(43) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(44) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(45) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(46) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(47) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(48) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(49) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(50) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(51) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(52) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(53) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(54) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(55) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(56) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(57) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(58) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(59) ); #undef K #undef F @@ -253,35 +258,38 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, #define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) #define K 0xCA62C1D6 - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(60) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(61) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(62) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(63) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(64) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(65) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(66) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(67) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(68) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(69) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(70) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(71) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(72) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(73) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(74) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(75) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(76) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(77) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(78) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(79) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(60) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(61) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(62) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(63) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(64) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(65) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(66) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(67) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(68) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(69) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(70) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(71) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(72) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(73) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(74) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(75) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(76) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(77) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(78) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(79) ); #undef K #undef F - ctx->state[0] += A; - ctx->state[1] += B; - ctx->state[2] += C; - ctx->state[3] += D; - ctx->state[4] += E; + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + ctx->state[4] += local.E; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); return( 0 ); } diff --git a/library/sha256.c b/library/sha256.c index b4c4b36..be373d9 100644 --- a/library/sha256.c +++ b/library/sha256.c @@ -179,77 +179,104 @@ static const uint32_t K[] = #define F0(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) #define F1(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) -#define R(t) \ - ( \ - W[t] = S1(W[(t) - 2]) + W[(t) - 7] + \ - S0(W[(t) - 15]) + W[(t) - 16] \ +#define R(t) \ + ( \ + local.W[t] = S1(local.W[(t) - 2]) + local.W[(t) - 7] + \ + S0(local.W[(t) - 15]) + local.W[(t) - 16] \ ) -#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ - do \ - { \ - temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e),(f),(g)) + (K) + (x); \ - temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a),(b),(c)); \ - (d) += temp1; (h) = temp1 + temp2; \ +#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ + do \ + { \ + local.temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e),(f),(g)) + (K) + (x); \ + local.temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a),(b),(c)); \ + (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ } while( 0 ) int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ) { - uint32_t temp1, temp2, W[64]; - uint32_t A[8]; + struct + { + uint32_t temp1, temp2, W[64]; + uint32_t A[8]; + } local; + unsigned int i; SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - A[i] = ctx->state[i]; + local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) for( i = 0; i < 64; i++ ) { if( i < 16 ) - GET_UINT32_BE( W[i], data, 4 * i ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[i], data, 4 * i ); else R( i ); - P( A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], W[i], K[i] ); + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); - temp1 = A[7]; A[7] = A[6]; A[6] = A[5]; A[5] = A[4]; A[4] = A[3]; - A[3] = A[2]; A[2] = A[1]; A[1] = A[0]; A[0] = temp1; + local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; + local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; + local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; + local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; + local.A[0] = local.temp1; } #else /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) - GET_UINT32_BE( W[i], data, 4 * i ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[i], data, 4 * i ); for( i = 0; i < 16; i += 8 ) { - P( A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], W[i+0], K[i+0] ); - P( A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], W[i+1], K[i+1] ); - P( A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], W[i+2], K[i+2] ); - P( A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], W[i+3], K[i+3] ); - P( A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], W[i+4], K[i+4] ); - P( A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], W[i+5], K[i+5] ); - P( A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], W[i+6], K[i+6] ); - P( A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], W[i+7], K[i+7] ); + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i+0], K[i+0] ); + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i+1], K[i+1] ); + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i+2], K[i+2] ); + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i+3], K[i+3] ); + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i+4], K[i+4] ); + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i+5], K[i+5] ); + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i+6], K[i+6] ); + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i+7], K[i+7] ); } for( i = 16; i < 64; i += 8 ) { - P( A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], R(i+0), K[i+0] ); - P( A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], R(i+1), K[i+1] ); - P( A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], R(i+2), K[i+2] ); - P( A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], R(i+3), K[i+3] ); - P( A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], R(i+4), K[i+4] ); - P( A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], R(i+5), K[i+5] ); - P( A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], R(i+6), K[i+6] ); - P( A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], R(i+7), K[i+7] ); + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], R(i+0), K[i+0] ); + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], R(i+1), K[i+1] ); + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], R(i+2), K[i+2] ); + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], R(i+3), K[i+3] ); + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], R(i+4), K[i+4] ); + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], R(i+5), K[i+5] ); + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], R(i+6), K[i+6] ); + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], R(i+7), K[i+7] ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - ctx->state[i] += A[i]; + ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); return( 0 ); } diff --git a/library/sha512.c b/library/sha512.c index e881198..06a628a 100644 --- a/library/sha512.c +++ b/library/sha512.c @@ -232,8 +232,11 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[128] ) { int i; - uint64_t temp1, temp2, W[80]; - uint64_t A[8]; + struct + { + uint64_t temp1, temp2, W[80]; + uint64_t A[8]; + } local; SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); @@ -250,64 +253,79 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, #define F0(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) #define F1(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) -#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ - do \ - { \ - temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e),(f),(g)) + (K) + (x); \ - temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a),(b),(c)); \ - (d) += temp1; (h) = temp1 + temp2; \ +#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ + do \ + { \ + local.temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e),(f),(g)) + (K) + (x); \ + local.temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a),(b),(c)); \ + (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ } while( 0 ) for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - A[i] = ctx->state[i]; + local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) for( i = 0; i < 80; i++ ) { if( i < 16 ) { - GET_UINT64_BE( W[i], data, i << 3 ); + GET_UINT64_BE( local.W[i], data, i << 3 ); } else { - W[i] = S1(W[i - 2]) + W[i - 7] + - S0(W[i - 15]) + W[i - 16]; + local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + + S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; } - P( A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], W[i], K[i] ); + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); - temp1 = A[7]; A[7] = A[6]; A[6] = A[5]; A[5] = A[4]; A[4] = A[3]; - A[3] = A[2]; A[2] = A[1]; A[1] = A[0]; A[0] = temp1; + local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; + local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; + local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; + local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; + local.A[0] = local.temp1; } #else /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) { - GET_UINT64_BE( W[i], data, i << 3 ); + GET_UINT64_BE( local.W[i], data, i << 3 ); } for( ; i < 80; i++ ) { - W[i] = S1(W[i - 2]) + W[i - 7] + - S0(W[i - 15]) + W[i - 16]; + local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + + S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; } i = 0; do { - P( A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; } while( i < 80 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - ctx->state[i] += A[i]; + ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); return( 0 ); } diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c index 0718d5a..72f09bb 100644 --- a/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -850,20 +850,21 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * Encrypt and authenticate */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, iv, transform->ivlen, - add_data, add_data_len, /* add data */ - data, rec->data_len, /* source */ - data, &rec->data_len, /* destination */ - data + rec->data_len, transform->taglen ) ) != 0 ) + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), /* dst */ + &rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret ); return( ret ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag", - data + rec->data_len, transform->taglen ); + data + rec->data_len - transform->taglen, + transform->taglen ); /* Account for authentication tag. */ - rec->data_len += transform->taglen; post_avail -= transform->taglen; /* @@ -1422,12 +1423,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, /* * Decrypt and authenticate */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, iv, transform->ivlen, add_data, add_data_len, - data, rec->data_len, - data, &olen, - data + rec->data_len, + data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */ transform->taglen ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret ); diff --git a/library/ssl_ticket.c b/library/ssl_ticket.c index e3e8023..626d137 100644 --- a/library/ssl_ticket.c +++ b/library/ssl_ticket.c @@ -209,7 +209,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, unsigned char *iv = start + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; - unsigned char *tag; size_t clear_len, ciph_len; *tlen = 0; @@ -250,23 +249,23 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, state_len_bytes[1] = ( clear_len ) & 0xff; /* Encrypt and authenticate */ - tag = state + clear_len; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &key->ctx, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &key->ctx, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, - state, clear_len, state, &ciph_len, - tag, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) + state, clear_len, + state, end - state, &ciph_len, + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) { goto cleanup; } - if( ciph_len != clear_len ) + if( ciph_len != clear_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto cleanup; } - *tlen = TICKET_MIN_LEN + ciph_len; + *tlen = TICKET_MIN_LEN + ciph_len - TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES; cleanup: #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) @@ -308,7 +307,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, unsigned char *iv = buf + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; - unsigned char *tag; size_t enc_len, clear_len; if( ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL ) @@ -326,7 +324,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, goto cleanup; enc_len = ( enc_len_p[0] << 8 ) | enc_len_p[1]; - tag = ticket + enc_len; if( len != TICKET_MIN_LEN + enc_len ) { @@ -344,13 +341,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, } /* Decrypt and authenticate */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &key->ctx, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &key->ctx, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, - ticket, enc_len, - ticket, &clear_len, - tag, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) + ticket, enc_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES, + ticket, enc_len, &clear_len, + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) { if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; diff --git a/library/x509_crt.c b/library/x509_crt.c index 71e9cec..a623c57 100644 --- a/library/x509_crt.c +++ b/library/x509_crt.c @@ -1304,6 +1304,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, if( crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len || memcmp( crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len ) != 0 || + sig_params1.tag != sig_params2.tag || sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len || ( sig_params1.len != 0 && memcmp( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) ) diff --git a/tests/data_files/Makefile b/tests/data_files/Makefile index bf2f538..b90ce74 100644 --- a/tests/data_files/Makefile +++ b/tests/data_files/Makefile @@ -208,7 +208,11 @@ cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der: cli-rsa-sha256.crt $(OPENSSL) x509 -in $< -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER all_final += cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der - cli-rsa.key.der: $(cli_crt_key_file_rsa) +cli-rsa-sha256-badalg.crt.der: cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der + hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/06092A864886F70D01010B0500/06092A864886F70D01010B0900/2" | xxd -r -p > $@ +all_final += cli-rsa-sha256-badalg.crt.der + +cli-rsa.key.der: $(cli_crt_key_file_rsa) $(OPENSSL) pkey -in $< -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER all_final += cli-rsa.key.der diff --git a/tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256-badalg.crt.der b/tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256-badalg.crt.der Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..c40ba2a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256-badalg.crt.der diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function index ea1e9ad..1d98f3d 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function @@ -13,6 +13,65 @@ #include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AUTH_CRYPT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AUTH_CRYPT) +/* Helper for resetting key/direction + * + * The documentation doesn't explicitly say whether calling + * mbedtls_cipher_setkey() twice is allowed or not. This currently works with + * the default software implementation, but only by accident. It isn't + * guaranteed to work with new ciphers or with alternative implementations of + * individual ciphers, and it doesn't work with the PSA wrappers. So don't do + * it, and instead start with a fresh context. + */ +static int cipher_reset_key( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, int cipher_id, + int use_psa, size_t tag_len, const data_t *key, int direction ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_cipher_init( ctx ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + (void) use_psa; + (void) tag_len; +#else + if( use_psa == 1 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ), + tag_len ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ) ) ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( ctx, key->x, 8 * key->len, + direction ) ); + return( 1 ); + +exit: + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Check if a buffer is all-0 bytes: + * return 1 if it is, + * 0 if it isn't. + */ +int buffer_is_all_zero( const uint8_t *buf, size_t size ) +{ + for( size_t i = 0; i < size; i++ ) + if( buf[i] != 0 ) + return 0; + return 1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AUTH_CRYPT */ + /* END_HEADER */ /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES @@ -485,6 +544,108 @@ void cipher_invalid_param_conditional( ) NULL, valid_size ) ); #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + /* mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, NULL, + valid_size ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, NULL, + valid_size ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + /* mbedtls_cipher_free() */ TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_cipher_free( NULL ) ); exit: @@ -959,129 +1120,338 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ -/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AUTH_CRYPT */ void auth_crypt_tv( int cipher_id, data_t * key, data_t * iv, data_t * ad, data_t * cipher, data_t * tag, char * result, data_t * clear, int use_psa ) { - /* Takes an AEAD ciphertext + tag and performs a pair - * of AEAD decryption and AEAD encryption. It checks that + /* + * Take an AEAD ciphertext + tag and perform a pair + * of AEAD decryption and AEAD encryption. Check that * this results in the expected plaintext, and that - * decryption and encryption are inverse to one another. */ + * decryption and encryption are inverse to one another. + * + * Do that twice: + * - once with legacy functions auth_decrypt/auth_encrypt + * - once with new functions auth_decrypt_ext/auth_encrypt_ext + * This allows testing both without duplicating test cases. + */ int ret; - unsigned char output[300]; /* Temporary buffer for results of - * encryption and decryption. */ - unsigned char *output_tag = NULL; /* Temporary buffer for tag in the - * encryption step. */ + int using_nist_kw, using_nist_kw_padding; mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; size_t outlen; + unsigned char *cipher_plus_tag = NULL; + size_t cipher_plus_tag_len; + unsigned char *decrypt_buf = NULL; + size_t decrypt_buf_len = 0; + unsigned char *encrypt_buf = NULL; + size_t encrypt_buf_len = 0; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) unsigned char *tmp_tag = NULL; unsigned char *tmp_cipher = NULL; + unsigned char *tag_buf = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + + /* Null pointers are documented as valid for inputs of length 0. + * The test framework passes non-null pointers, so set them to NULL. + * key, cipher and tag can't be empty. */ + if( iv->len == 0 ) + iv->x = NULL; + if( ad->len == 0 ) + ad->x = NULL; + if( clear->len == 0 ) + clear->x = NULL; mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); - memset( output, 0xFF, sizeof( output ) ); - /* Prepare context */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - (void) use_psa; -#else + /* Initialize PSA Crypto */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if( use_psa == 1 ) - { PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); +#else + (void) use_psa; +#endif - /* PSA requires that the tag immediately follows the ciphertext. */ - tmp_cipher = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cipher->len + tag->len ); - TEST_ASSERT( tmp_cipher != NULL ); - tmp_tag = tmp_cipher + cipher->len; + /* + * Are we using NIST_KW? with padding? + */ + using_nist_kw_padding = cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP || + cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP || + cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP; + using_nist_kw = cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW || + cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW || + cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW || + using_nist_kw_padding; + + /**************************************************************** + * * + * Part 1: non-deprecated API * + * * + ****************************************************************/ - memcpy( tmp_cipher, cipher->x, cipher->len ); - memcpy( tmp_tag, tag->x, tag->len ); + /* + * Prepare context for decryption + */ + if( ! cipher_reset_key( &ctx, cipher_id, use_psa, tag->len, key, + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ) + goto exit; - TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx, - mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ), - tag->len ) ); - } + /* + * prepare buffer for decryption + * (we need the tag appended to the ciphertext) + */ + cipher_plus_tag_len = cipher->len + tag->len; + ASSERT_ALLOC( cipher_plus_tag, cipher_plus_tag_len ); + memcpy( cipher_plus_tag, cipher->x, cipher->len ); + memcpy( cipher_plus_tag + cipher->len, tag->x, tag->len ); + + /* + * Compute length of output buffer according to the documentation + */ + if( using_nist_kw ) + decrypt_buf_len = cipher_plus_tag_len - 8; else -#endif + decrypt_buf_len = cipher_plus_tag_len - tag->len; + + + /* + * Try decrypting to a buffer that's 1B too small + */ + if( decrypt_buf_len != 0 ) { - tmp_tag = tag->x; - tmp_cipher = cipher->x; - TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, - mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ) ) ); - } + ASSERT_ALLOC( decrypt_buf, decrypt_buf_len - 1 ); - TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx, key->x, 8 * key->len, - MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ); + outlen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, + ad->x, ad->len, cipher_plus_tag, cipher_plus_tag_len, + decrypt_buf, decrypt_buf_len - 1, &outlen, tag->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - /* decode buffer and check tag->x */ + mbedtls_free( decrypt_buf ); + decrypt_buf = NULL; + } - /* Sanity check that we don't use overly long inputs. */ - TEST_ASSERT( sizeof( output ) >= cipher->len ); + /* + * Authenticate and decrypt, and check result + */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( decrypt_buf, decrypt_buf_len ); - ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, ad->x, ad->len, - tmp_cipher, cipher->len, output, &outlen, - tmp_tag, tag->len ); + outlen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, + ad->x, ad->len, cipher_plus_tag, cipher_plus_tag_len, + decrypt_buf, decrypt_buf_len, &outlen, tag->len ); - /* make sure the message is rejected if it should be */ if( strcmp( result, "FAIL" ) == 0 ) { TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ); - goto exit; + TEST_ASSERT( buffer_is_all_zero( decrypt_buf, decrypt_buf_len ) ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( decrypt_buf, outlen, clear->x, clear->len ); } - /* otherwise, make sure it was decrypted properly */ - TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + /* Free this, but keep cipher_plus_tag for deprecated function with PSA */ + mbedtls_free( decrypt_buf ); + decrypt_buf = NULL; + + /* + * Encrypt back if test data was authentic + */ + if( strcmp( result, "FAIL" ) != 0 ) + { + /* prepare context for encryption */ + if( ! cipher_reset_key( &ctx, cipher_id, use_psa, tag->len, key, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Compute size of output buffer according to documentation + */ + if( using_nist_kw ) + { + encrypt_buf_len = clear->len + 8; + if( using_nist_kw_padding && encrypt_buf_len % 8 != 0 ) + encrypt_buf_len += 8 - encrypt_buf_len % 8; + } + else + { + encrypt_buf_len = clear->len + tag->len; + } + + /* + * Try encrypting with an output buffer that's 1B too small + */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( encrypt_buf, encrypt_buf_len - 1 ); - TEST_ASSERT( outlen == clear->len ); - TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, clear->x, clear->len ) == 0 ); + outlen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, + ad->x, ad->len, clear->x, clear->len, + encrypt_buf, encrypt_buf_len - 1, &outlen, tag->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret != 0 ); - /* then encrypt the clear->x and make sure we get the same ciphertext and tag->x */ - mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_free( encrypt_buf ); + encrypt_buf = NULL; + + /* + * Encrypt and check the result + */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( encrypt_buf, encrypt_buf_len ); + + outlen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, + ad->x, ad->len, clear->x, clear->len, + encrypt_buf, encrypt_buf_len, &outlen, tag->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( outlen == cipher->len + tag->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( encrypt_buf, cipher->x, cipher->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( encrypt_buf + cipher->len, + tag->x, tag->len ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_free( encrypt_buf ); + encrypt_buf = NULL; + } + + /**************************************************************** + * * + * Part 2: deprecated API * + * * + ****************************************************************/ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + + /* + * Prepare context for decryption + */ + if( ! cipher_reset_key( &ctx, cipher_id, use_psa, tag->len, key, + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Prepare pointers for decryption + */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if( use_psa == 1 ) { - TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx, - mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ), - tag->len ) ); + /* PSA requires that the tag immediately follows the ciphertext. + * Fortunately, we already have that from testing the new API. */ + tmp_cipher = cipher_plus_tag; + tmp_tag = tmp_cipher + cipher->len; } else -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ { - TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, - mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ) ) ); + tmp_cipher = cipher->x; + tmp_tag = tag->x; } - TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx, key->x, 8 * key->len, - MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ); - memset( output, 0xFF, sizeof( output ) ); + /* + * Authenticate and decrypt, and check result + */ + + ASSERT_ALLOC( decrypt_buf, cipher->len ); outlen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, ad->x, ad->len, + tmp_cipher, cipher->len, decrypt_buf, &outlen, + tmp_tag, tag->len ); - /* Sanity check that we don't use overly long inputs. */ - TEST_ASSERT( sizeof( output ) >= clear->len + tag->len ); + if( using_nist_kw ) + { + /* NIST_KW with legacy API */ + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + else if( strcmp( result, "FAIL" ) == 0 ) + { + /* unauthentic message */ + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ); + TEST_ASSERT( buffer_is_all_zero( decrypt_buf, cipher->len ) ); + } + else + { + /* authentic message: is the plaintext correct? */ + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( decrypt_buf, outlen, clear->x, clear->len ); + } - output_tag = output + clear->len; - ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, ad->x, ad->len, - clear->x, clear->len, output, &outlen, - output_tag, tag->len ); - TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + mbedtls_free( decrypt_buf ); + decrypt_buf = NULL; + mbedtls_free( cipher_plus_tag ); + cipher_plus_tag = NULL; - TEST_ASSERT( outlen == cipher->len ); - TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, cipher->x, cipher->len ) == 0 ); - TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output_tag, tag->x, tag->len ) == 0 ); + /* + * Encrypt back if test data was authentic + */ + if( strcmp( result, "FAIL" ) != 0 ) + { + /* prepare context for encryption */ + if( ! cipher_reset_key( &ctx, cipher_id, use_psa, tag->len, key, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) + goto exit; + + /* prepare buffers for encryption */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( use_psa ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( cipher_plus_tag, cipher->len + tag->len ); + tmp_cipher = cipher_plus_tag; + tmp_tag = cipher_plus_tag + cipher->len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( encrypt_buf, cipher->len ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buf, tag->len ); + tmp_cipher = encrypt_buf; + tmp_tag = tag_buf; + } + + /* + * Encrypt and check the result + */ + outlen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, ad->x, ad->len, + clear->x, clear->len, tmp_cipher, &outlen, + tmp_tag, tag->len ); + + if( using_nist_kw ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( outlen == cipher->len ); + if( cipher->len != 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( tmp_cipher, cipher->x, cipher->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( tmp_tag, tag->x, tag->len ) == 0 ); + } + } + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ exit: mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_free( decrypt_buf ); + mbedtls_free( encrypt_buf ); + mbedtls_free( cipher_plus_tag ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + mbedtls_free( tag_buf ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if( use_psa == 1 ) - { - mbedtls_free( tmp_cipher ); PSA_DONE( ); - } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } /* END_CASE */ diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data index 4e884f4..c4795b6 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data @@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ dhm_do_dhm:10:"3":10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED Diffie-Hellman zero modulus dhm_do_dhm:10:"0":10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA +Diffie-Hellman MPI_MAX_SIZE modulus +dhm_make_public:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:10:"5":0 + +Diffie-Hellman MPI_MAX_SIZE + 1 modulus +dhm_make_public:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + 1:10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED+MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + Diffie-Hellman load parameters from file [#1] dhm_file:"data_files/dhparams.pem":"9e35f430443a09904f3a39a979797d070df53378e79c2438bef4e761f3c714553328589b041c809be1d6c6b5f1fc9f47d3a25443188253a992a56818b37ba9de5a40d362e56eff0be5417474c125c199272c8fe41dea733df6f662c92ae76556e755d10c64e6a50968f67fc6ea73d0dca8569be2ba204e23580d8bca2f4975b3":"02":128 diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function index 0a5c617..1726b9e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function @@ -223,6 +223,36 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void dhm_make_public( int P_bytes, int radix_G, char *input_G, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi P, G; + mbedtls_dhm_context ctx; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); + mbedtls_dhm_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &P, ( P_bytes * 8 ) - 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &P, 0, 1 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &G, radix_G, input_G ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_set_group( &ctx, &P, &G ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ctx, (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &P ), + output, sizeof(output), + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + NULL ) == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &G ); + mbedtls_dhm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ void dhm_file( char * filename, char * p, char * g, int len ) { diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.data index 212c2f3..0966393 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.data @@ -685,16 +685,36 @@ mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"-23":10:"13":10:"29":10:"":10:"5":0 Base test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #5 (Negative exponent) mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"23":10:"-13":10:"29":10:"":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA -Base test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #7 (Negative base + exponent) +Base test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #6 (Negative base + exponent) mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"-23":10:"-13":10:"29":10:"":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE exponent +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:10:10:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE + 1 exponent +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + 1:10:10:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE modulus +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size:2:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:10:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE + 1 modulus +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size:2:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + 1:10:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE exponent and modulus +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:10:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE + 1 exponent and modulus +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + 1:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + 1:10:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #1 +depends_on:MPI_MAX_BITS_LARGER_THAN_792 mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"433019240910377478217373572959560109819648647016096560523769010881172869083338285573756574557395862965095016483867813043663981946477698466501451832407592327356331263124555137732393938242285782144928753919588632679050799198937132922145084847":10:"5781538327977828897150909166778407659250458379645823062042492461576758526757490910073628008613977550546382774775570888130029763571528699574717583228939535960234464230882573615930384979100379102915657483866755371559811718767760594919456971354184113721":10:"583137007797276923956891216216022144052044091311388601652961409557516421612874571554415606746479105795833145583959622117418531166391184939066520869800857530421873250114773204354963864729386957427276448683092491947566992077136553066273207777134303397724679138833126700957":10:"":10:"114597449276684355144920670007147953232659436380163461553186940113929777196018164149703566472936578890991049344459204199888254907113495794730452699842273939581048142004834330369483813876618772578869083248061616444392091693787039636316845512292127097865026290173004860736":0 Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod (Negative base) [#1] mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"-10000000000":10:"10000000000":10:"99999":10:"":10:"1":0 Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod (Negative base) [#2] +depends_on:MPI_MAX_BITS_LARGER_THAN_792 mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"-9f13012cd92aa72fb86ac8879d2fde4f7fd661aaae43a00971f081cc60ca277059d5c37e89652e2af2585d281d66ef6a9d38a117e9608e9e7574cd142dc55278838a2161dd56db9470d4c1da2d5df15a908ee2eb886aaa890f23be16de59386663a12f1afbb325431a3e835e3fd89b98b96a6f77382f458ef9a37e1f84a03045c8676ab55291a94c2228ea15448ee96b626b998":16:"40a54d1b9e86789f06d9607fb158672d64867665c73ee9abb545fc7a785634b354c7bae5b962ce8040cf45f2c1f3d3659b2ee5ede17534c8fc2ec85c815e8df1fe7048d12c90ee31b88a68a081f17f0d8ce5f4030521e9400083bcea73a429031d4ca7949c2000d597088e0c39a6014d8bf962b73bb2e8083bd0390a4e00b9b3":16:"eeaf0ab9adb38dd69c33f80afa8fc5e86072618775ff3c0b9ea2314c9c256576d674df7496ea81d3383b4813d692c6e0e0d5d8e250b98be48e495c1d6089dad15dc7d7b46154d6b6ce8ef4ad69b15d4982559b297bcf1885c529f566660e57ec68edbc3c05726cc02fd4cbf4976eaa9afd5138fe8376435b9fc61d2fc0eb06e3":16:"":16:"21acc7199e1b90f9b4844ffe12c19f00ec548c5d32b21c647d48b6015d8eb9ec9db05b4f3d44db4227a2b5659c1a7cceb9d5fa8fa60376047953ce7397d90aaeb7465e14e820734f84aa52ad0fc66701bcbb991d57715806a11531268e1e83dd48288c72b424a6287e9ce4e5cc4db0dd67614aecc23b0124a5776d36e5c89483":0 Base test GCD #1 @@ -935,6 +955,48 @@ mbedtls_mpi_set_bit:16:"00":32:1:16:"0100000000":0 Test bit set (Invalid bit value) mbedtls_mpi_set_bit:16:"00":5:2:16:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA +Fill random: 0 bytes +mpi_fill_random:0:0:0 + +Fill random: 1 byte, good +mpi_fill_random:1:1:0 + +Fill random: 2 bytes, good, no leading zero +mpi_fill_random:2:2:0 + +Fill random: 2 bytes, good, 1 leading zero +mpi_fill_random:2:256:0 + +Fill random: MAX_SIZE - 7, good +mpi_fill_random:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE - 7:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE - 7:0 + +Fill random: MAX_SIZE, good +mpi_fill_random:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:0 + +Fill random: 1 byte, RNG failure +mpi_fill_random:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: 2 bytes, RNG failure after 1 byte +mpi_fill_random:2:1:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: 4 bytes, RNG failure after 3 bytes +mpi_fill_random:4:3:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: 8 bytes, RNG failure after 7 bytes +mpi_fill_random:8:7:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: 16 bytes, RNG failure after 1 bytes +mpi_fill_random:16:1:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: 16 bytes, RNG failure after 8 bytes +mpi_fill_random:16:8:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: 16 bytes, RNG failure after 15 bytes +mpi_fill_random:16:15:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: MAX_SIZE bytes, RNG failure after MAX_SIZE-1 bytes +mpi_fill_random:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE-1:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + MPI Selftest depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST mpi_selftest: diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.function index 8436742..c5bb5a6 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.function @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ /* BEGIN_HEADER */ #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +#if MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS > 792 +#define MPI_MAX_BITS_LARGER_THAN_792 +#endif typedef struct mbedtls_test_mpi_random { @@ -43,6 +48,22 @@ int mbedtls_test_mpi_miller_rabin_determinizer( void* state, return( 0 ); } + +/* Random generator that is told how many bytes to return. */ +static int f_rng_bytes_left( void *state, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + size_t *bytes_left = state; + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + { + if( *bytes_left == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + buf[i] = *bytes_left & 0xff; + --( *bytes_left ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + /* END_HEADER */ /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES @@ -1167,6 +1188,40 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size( int A_bytes, int E_bytes, int N_bytes, + int radix_RR, char * input_RR, int exp_result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi A, E, N, RR, Z; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + + /* Set A to 2^(A_bytes - 1) + 1 */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &A, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &A, ( A_bytes * 8 ) - 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &A, 0, 1 ) == 0 ); + + /* Set E to 2^(E_bytes - 1) + 1 */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &E, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &E, ( E_bytes * 8 ) - 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &E, 0, 1 ) == 0 ); + + /* Set N to 2^(N_bytes - 1) + 1 */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &N, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &N, ( N_bytes * 8 ) - 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &N, 0, 1 ) == 0 ); + + if( strlen( input_RR ) ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &RR, radix_RR, input_RR ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &Z, &A, &E, &N, &RR ) == exp_result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ void mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_Y, char * input_Y, int radix_A, char * input_A, int div_result ) @@ -1310,6 +1365,37 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mpi_fill_random( int wanted_bytes, int rng_bytes, int expected_ret ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + int ret; + size_t bytes_left = rng_bytes; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &X, wanted_bytes, + f_rng_bytes_left, &bytes_left ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == expected_ret ); + + if( expected_ret == 0 ) + { + /* mbedtls_mpi_fill_random is documented to use bytes from the RNG + * as a big-endian representation of the number. We know when + * our RNG function returns null bytes, so we know how many + * leading zero bytes the number has. */ + size_t leading_zeros = 0; + if( wanted_bytes > 0 && rng_bytes % 256 == 0 ) + leading_zeros = 1; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_size( &X ) + leading_zeros == + (size_t) wanted_bytes ); + TEST_ASSERT( (int) bytes_left == rng_bytes - wanted_bytes ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ void mpi_selftest( ) { diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data index bb26246..2b01227 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ Check compiletime library version -check_compiletime_version:"2.24.0" +check_compiletime_version:"2.25.0" Check runtime library version -check_runtime_version:"2.24.0" +check_runtime_version:"2.25.0" Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0 diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data index bfdbab2..3b84609 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data @@ -2652,6 +2652,10 @@ X509 File parse (trailing spaces, OK) depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C x509parse_crt_file:"data_files/server7_trailing_space.crt":0 +X509 File parse (Algorithm Params Tag mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt_file:"data_files/cli-rsa-sha256-badalg.crt.der":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH + X509 Get time (UTC no issues) depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"500101000000Z":0:1950:1:1:0:0:0 |