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authorDave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>2021-03-12 16:55:26 +0000
committerGitHub <noreply@github.com>2021-03-12 16:55:26 +0000
commite483a77c85e1f9c1dd2eb1c5a8f552d2617fe400 (patch)
tree7854bf29ffd507af789daefb50bb7cec414ad77a
parent1c4e78421e3b289886271d0e10bbfef03aa1d0f4 (diff)
parent6a69ac44531c02bea209aa71de31d1fa9ecc1a6d (diff)
downloadmbedtls-2.26.0.zip
mbedtls-2.26.0.tar.gz
mbedtls-2.26.0.tar.bz2
Merge pull request #816 from ARMmbed/developmentv2.26.0mbedtls-2.26.0
Merge recent commits from development into 2.26.0-rc
-rw-r--r--CMakeLists.txt8
-rw-r--r--ChangeLog.d/fix-printf-specifiers.txt10
-rw-r--r--ChangeLog.d/fix_memsan_build_clang11.txt2
-rw-r--r--include/mbedtls/debug.h46
-rw-r--r--include/psa/crypto_sizes.h505
-rw-r--r--library/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--library/debug.c1
-rw-r--r--library/psa_crypto.c492
-rw-r--r--library/psa_crypto_core.h87
-rw-r--r--library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c156
-rw-r--r--library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h25
-rw-r--r--library/psa_crypto_ecp.c257
-rw-r--r--library/psa_crypto_ecp.h84
-rw-r--r--library/psa_crypto_rsa.c314
-rw-r--r--library/psa_crypto_rsa.h87
-rw-r--r--library/psa_its_file.c6
-rw-r--r--library/ssl_cli.c35
-rw-r--r--library/ssl_msg.c173
-rw-r--r--library/ssl_srv.c32
-rw-r--r--library/ssl_tls.c27
-rw-r--r--library/x509_crt.c2
-rw-r--r--programs/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c2
-rw-r--r--tests/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--tests/include/test/drivers/signature.h2
-rwxr-xr-xtests/scripts/all.sh24
-rw-r--r--tests/src/drivers/signature.c250
-rw-r--r--tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c33
-rw-r--r--tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data6
-rw-r--r--tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function192
-rw-r--r--tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data3
-rw-r--r--tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.function1
32 files changed, 1981 insertions, 889 deletions
diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
index fdaa2f1..2ab2e01 100644
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -179,6 +179,9 @@ if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU)
execute_process(COMMAND ${CMAKE_C_COMPILER} -dumpversion
OUTPUT_VARIABLE GCC_VERSION)
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Wextra -Wwrite-strings")
+ if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 3.0 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 3.0)
+ set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral")
+ endif()
if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 4.3 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 4.3)
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wvla")
endif()
@@ -194,6 +197,9 @@ if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU)
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wformat-signedness")
endif()
endif()
+ if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 7.0 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 7.0)
+ set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wformat-overflow=2 -Wformat-truncation=2")
+ endif()
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE "-O2")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_DEBUG "-O0 -g3")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_COVERAGE "-O0 -g3 --coverage")
@@ -204,7 +210,7 @@ if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU)
endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU)
if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG)
- set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Wextra -Wwrite-strings -Wpointer-arith -Wimplicit-fallthrough -Wshadow -Wvla")
+ set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Wextra -Wwrite-strings -Wpointer-arith -Wimplicit-fallthrough -Wshadow -Wvla -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE "-O2")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_DEBUG "-O0 -g3")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_COVERAGE "-O0 -g3 --coverage")
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-printf-specifiers.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-printf-specifiers.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4867721
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-printf-specifiers.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Add printf function attributes to mbedtls_debug_print_msg to ensure we
+ get printf format specifier warnings.
+Changes
+ * Add extra printf compiler warning flags to builds.
+Requirement changes
+ * The library now uses the %zu format specifier with the printf() family of
+ functions, so requires a toolchain that supports it. This change does not
+ affect the maintained LTS branches, so when contributing changes please
+ bear this in mind and do not add them to backported code.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_memsan_build_clang11.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_memsan_build_clang11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f5cc05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_memsan_build_clang11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Changes
+ * Fix memsan build false positive in x509_crt.c with clang 11
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/debug.h b/include/mbedtls/debug.h
index ab5b037..dd20ba0 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/debug.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/debug.h
@@ -80,6 +80,50 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE
+ *
+ * Mark a function as having printf attributes, and thus enable checking
+ * via -wFormat and other flags. This does nothing on builds with compilers
+ * that do not support the format attribute
+ *
+ * Module: library/debug.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * This module provides debugging functions.
+ */
+#if defined(__has_attribute)
+#if __has_attribute(format)
+#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) \
+ __attribute__((format (printf, string_index, first_to_check)))
+#else /* __has_attribute(format) */
+#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check)
+#endif /* __has_attribute(format) */
+#else /* defined(__has_attribute) */
+#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check)
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_PRINTF_xxx: Due to issues with older window compilers
+ * and MinGW we need to define the printf specifier for size_t
+ * and long long per platform.
+ *
+ * Module: library/debug.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * This module provides debugging functions.
+ */
+#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800)
+ #include <inttypes.h>
+ #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET PRIuPTR
+ #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "I64d"
+#else /* defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */
+ #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET "zu"
+ #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "lld"
+#endif /* defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@@ -118,7 +162,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( int threshold );
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_msg( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
- const char *format, ... );
+ const char *format, ... ) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6);
/**
* \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h b/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
index 3956834..9bb7a05 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
@@ -65,8 +65,6 @@
*
* \return The hash size for the specified hash algorithm.
* If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
- * An implementation may return either 0 or the correct size
- * for a hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.
*/
#define PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) \
( \
@@ -91,9 +89,8 @@
*
* Maximum size of a hash.
*
- * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. This value
- * should be the maximum size of a hash supported by the implementation,
- * in bytes, and must be no smaller than this maximum.
+ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value
+ * is the maximum size of a hash in bytes.
*/
/* Note: for HMAC-SHA-3, the block size is 144 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-226,
* 136 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-256, 104 bytes for SHA3-384, 72 bytes for
@@ -110,9 +107,8 @@
*
* Maximum size of a MAC.
*
- * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. This value
- * should be the maximum size of a MAC supported by the implementation,
- * in bytes, and must be no smaller than this maximum.
+ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value
+ * is the maximum size of a MAC in bytes.
*/
/* All non-HMAC MACs have a maximum size that's smaller than the
* minimum possible value of PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE in this implementation. */
@@ -132,15 +128,18 @@
* tag that can be distinguished from the rest of
* the ciphertext, return 0.
* If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
- * An implementation may return either 0 or a
- * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it
- * recognizes, but does not support.
*/
#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >> PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET) : \
0)
+/** The maximum tag size for all supported AEAD algorithms, in bytes.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\p alg).
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE 16
+
/* The maximum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits.
* This is a vendor-specific macro.
*
@@ -205,7 +204,7 @@
*/
#define PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE 128
-/** The maximum size of a block cipher supported by the implementation. */
+/** The maximum size of a block cipher. */
#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE 16
/** The size of the output of psa_mac_sign_finish(), in bytes.
@@ -242,6 +241,10 @@
* insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of
* the ciphertext may be smaller.
*
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
* \param alg An AEAD algorithm
* (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
@@ -250,15 +253,33 @@
* \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified
* algorithm.
* If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
- * An implementation may return either 0 or a
- * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it
- * recognizes, but does not support.
*/
#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, plaintext_length) \
(PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) != 0 ? \
(plaintext_length) + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \
0)
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_encrypt(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
+ * compile-time constants.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p plaintext_length).
+ *
+ * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient output buffer size for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(plaintext_length) \
+ ((plaintext_length) + PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE)
+
+
/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes.
*
* If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is
@@ -266,6 +287,10 @@
* insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of
* the plaintext may be smaller.
*
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
* \param alg An AEAD algorithm
* (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
@@ -274,15 +299,78 @@
* \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified
* algorithm.
* If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
- * An implementation may return either 0 or a
- * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it
- * recognizes, but does not support.
*/
#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, ciphertext_length) \
(PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) != 0 ? \
(ciphertext_length) - PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \
0)
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_decrypt(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
+ * compile-time constants.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p ciphertext_length).
+ *
+ * \param ciphertext_length Size of the ciphertext in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient output buffer size for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(ciphertext_length) \
+ (ciphertext_length)
+
+/** The default nonce size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes.
+ *
+ * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to
+ * store the nonce output from #psa_aead_generate_nonce().
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE.
+ *
+ * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to
+ * #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(),
+ * just the default size that is generated by #psa_aead_generate_nonce().
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with
+ * algorithm \p alg.
+ *
+ * \param alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The default nonce size for the specified key type and algorithm.
+ * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized,
+ * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \
+ (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) == 16 && \
+ (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(alg) == PSA_ALG_CCM || \
+ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(alg) == PSA_ALG_GCM) ? 12 : \
+ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \
+ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(alg) == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ? 12 : \
+ 0)
+
+/** The maximum default nonce size among all supported pairs of key types and
+ * AEAD algorithms, in bytes.
+ *
+ * This is equal to or greater than any value that #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH()
+ * may return.
+ *
+ * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to
+ * #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(),
+ * just the largest size that may be generated by
+ * #psa_aead_generate_nonce().
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE 12
+
/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update().
*
* If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is
@@ -290,6 +378,10 @@
* insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output may be smaller
* in any given call.
*
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
* \param alg An AEAD algorithm
* (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
@@ -298,19 +390,29 @@
* \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified
* algorithm.
* If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
- * An implementation may return either 0 or a
- * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it
- * recognizes, but does not support.
*/
/* For all the AEAD modes defined in this specification, it is possible
* to emit output without delay. However, hardware may not always be
* capable of this. So for modes based on a block cipher, allow the
* implementation to delay the output until it has a full block. */
-#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, input_length) \
- (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \
- PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, (input_length)) : \
+#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, input_length) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \
+ PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, (input_length)) : \
(input_length))
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p input_length).
+ *
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
+ (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, (input_length)))
+
/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish().
*
* If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is
@@ -325,15 +427,19 @@
* \return A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the
* specified algorithm.
* If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
- * An implementation may return either 0 or a
- * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it
- * recognizes, but does not support.
*/
#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \
PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE : \
0)
+/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg).
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE)
+
/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify().
*
* If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is
@@ -348,15 +454,19 @@
* \return A sufficient plaintext buffer size for the
* specified algorithm.
* If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
- * An implementation may return either 0 or a
- * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it
- * recognizes, but does not support.
*/
#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \
PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE : \
0)
+/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg).
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE)
+
#define PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \
2 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)) + 1 : \
@@ -393,9 +503,8 @@
* a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
* psa_sign_hash() will not fail with
* #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
- * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported
- * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a
- * sensible size or 0.
+ * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported,
+ * return either a sensible size or 0.
* If the parameters are not valid, the
* return value is unspecified.
*/
@@ -411,9 +520,8 @@
*
* Maximum size of an asymmetric signature.
*
- * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. This value
- * should be the maximum size of a signature supported by the implementation,
- * in bytes, and must be no smaller than this maximum.
+ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value
+ * is the maximum size of a signature in bytes.
*/
#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \
(PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ? \
@@ -440,9 +548,8 @@
* a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
* psa_asymmetric_encrypt() will not fail with
* #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
- * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported
- * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a
- * sensible size or 0.
+ * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported,
+ * return either a sensible size or 0.
* If the parameters are not valid, the
* return value is unspecified.
*/
@@ -451,6 +558,15 @@
((void)alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \
0)
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), for any
+ * supported asymmetric encryption.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg).
+ */
+/* This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption. */
+#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
+ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS))
+
/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt().
*
* This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a plaintext produced using
@@ -471,9 +587,8 @@
* a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
* psa_asymmetric_decrypt() will not fail with
* #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
- * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported
- * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a
- * sensible size or 0.
+ * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported,
+ * return either a sensible size or 0.
* If the parameters are not valid, the
* return value is unspecified.
*/
@@ -482,6 +597,16 @@
PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) - PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) : \
0)
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(), for any
+ * supported asymmetric decryption.
+ *
+ * This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg).
+ */
+#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
+ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS))
+
/* Maximum size of the ASN.1 encoding of an INTEGER with the specified
* number of bits.
*
@@ -627,11 +752,9 @@
* a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
* psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() will not fail with
* #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
- * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported
- * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a
- * sensible size or 0.
- * If the parameters are not valid, the
- * return value is unspecified.
+ * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported,
+ * return either a sensible size or 0.
+ * If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified.
*/
#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \
@@ -643,48 +766,123 @@
PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
0)
-/** The default nonce size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes.
+/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_public_key().
*
- * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to
- * store the nonce output from #psa_aead_generate_nonce().
+ * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
+ * compile-time constants.
*
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE.
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
*
- * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to #psa_aead_set_nonce(),
- * #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(), just the default size that is generated by
- * #psa_aead_generate_nonce().
+ * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export
+ * a public key by querying the key type and size at runtime.
+ * \code{c}
+ * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ * psa_status_t status;
+ * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes);
+ * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
+ * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
+ * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes);
+ * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits);
+ * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+ * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
+ * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...);
+ * size_t buffer_length;
+ * status = psa_export_public_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length);
+ * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * \param key_type A public key or key pair key type.
+ * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits.
+ *
+ * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
+ * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
+ * psa_export_public_key() will not fail with
+ * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
+ * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not
+ * supported, return either a sensible size or 0.
+ * If the parameters are not valid,
+ * the return value is unspecified.
+ *
+ * If the parameters are valid and supported,
+ * return the same result as
+ * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(
+ * \p #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\p key_type),
+ * \p key_bits).
+ */
+#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
+ 0)
+
+/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric key pair.
+ *
+ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is
+ * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() to export any
+ * asymmetric key pair, regardless of the exact key type and key size.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits).
+ */
+#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \
+ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) ? \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS))
+
+/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric public key.
+ *
+ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is
+ * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() or
+ * psa_export_public_key() to export any asymmetric public key,
+ * regardless of the exact key type and key size.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits).
+ */
+#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \
+ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) ? \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS))
+
+/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_raw_key_agreement().
+ *
+ * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
+ * compile-time constants.
*
* \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
* zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
* side effects.
*
- * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm \p alg.
+ * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.
*
- * \param alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param key_type A supported key type.
+ * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits.
*
- * \return The default nonce size for the specified key type and algorithm.
- * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized,
- * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
- * An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type
- * and AEAD algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.
+ * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
+ * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
+ * psa_raw_key_agreement() will not fail with
+ * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
+ * If the parameters are a valid combination that
+ * is not supported, return either a sensible size or 0.
+ * If the parameters are not valid,
+ * the return value is unspecified.
*/
-#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \
- (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) == 16 && \
- (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(alg) == PSA_ALG_CCM || \
- PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(alg) == PSA_ALG_GCM) ? 12 : \
- (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \
- PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(alg) == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ? 12 : \
+/* FFDH is not yet supported in PSA. */
+#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? \
+ PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \
0)
-/** The maximum default nonce size among all supported pairs of key types and AEAD algorithms, in bytes.
+/** Maximum size of the output from psa_raw_key_agreement().
*
- * This is equal to or greater than any value that #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH() may return.
+ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is the
+ * maximum size of the output any raw key agreement algorithm, in bytes.
*
- * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to #psa_aead_set_nonce(),
- * #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(), just the largest size that may be generated by
- * #psa_aead_generate_nonce().
+ * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits).
*/
-#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE 12
+#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
+ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS))
/** The default IV size for a cipher algorithm, in bytes.
*
@@ -709,8 +907,6 @@
* If the algorithm does not use an IV, return 0.
* If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized,
* or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
- * An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type
- * and cipher algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.
*/
#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \
(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) > 1 && \
@@ -730,4 +926,163 @@
*/
#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE 16
+/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_encrypt(), in bytes.
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length).
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm
+ * alg.
+ * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and
+ * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
+ * return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
+ (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \
+ PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \
+ (input_length) + 1) + \
+ PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \
+ (input_length) + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : \
+ 0))
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_encrypt(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and cipher algorithms.
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length).
+ *
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ *
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
+ (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, \
+ (input_length) + 1) + \
+ PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE)
+
+/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_decrypt(), in bytes.
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length).
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm
+ * alg.
+ * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and
+ * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
+ * return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) && \
+ ((key_type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \
+ (input_length) : \
+ 0)
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_decrypt(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and cipher algorithms.
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length).
+ *
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
+ (input_length)
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update().
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ * The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length).
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm
+ * alg.
+ * \param alg A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and
+ * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \
+ (((alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 || \
+ (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \
+ (alg) == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) ? \
+ PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \
+ input_length) : \
+ (input_length)) : \
+ 0)
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and cipher algorithms.
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length).
+ *
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
+ (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, input_length))
+
+/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish().
+ *
+ * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is
+ * guaranteed that psa_cipher_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient
+ * ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in
+ * any given call.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE().
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm
+ * alg.
+ * \param alg A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and
+ * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \
+ (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \
+ PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \
+ 0) : \
+ 0)
+
+/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and cipher algorithms.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg).
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
+ (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE)
+
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H */
diff --git a/library/Makefile b/library/Makefile
index 903dc0d..6bb9c17 100644
--- a/library/Makefile
+++ b/library/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Also see "include/mbedtls/config.h"
CFLAGS ?= -O2
-WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra
+WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral
LDFLAGS ?=
# Include ../include for public headers and . for private headers.
diff --git a/library/debug.c b/library/debug.c
index c3384be..e91d1ad 100644
--- a/library/debug.c
+++ b/library/debug.c
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ static inline void debug_send_line( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
#endif
}
+MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6)
void mbedtls_debug_print_msg( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *format, ... )
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 57053ef..6225272 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -2145,7 +2145,7 @@ exit:
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
-static const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg )
+const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg )
{
switch( alg )
{
@@ -3280,275 +3280,59 @@ cleanup:
/* Asymmetric cryptography */
/****************************************************************/
+psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_internal(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
+{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)
-/* Decode the hash algorithm from alg and store the mbedtls encoding in
- * md_alg. Verify that the hash length is acceptable. */
-static psa_status_t psa_rsa_decode_md_type( psa_algorithm_t alg,
- size_t hash_length,
- mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg )
-{
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg );
- const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg );
- *md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info );
-
- /* The Mbed TLS RSA module uses an unsigned int for hash length
- * parameters. Validate that it fits so that we don't risk an
- * overflow later. */
-#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
- if( hash_length > UINT_MAX )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
- /* For PKCS#1 v1.5 signature, if using a hash, the hash length
- * must be correct. */
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) &&
- alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW )
- {
- if( md_info == NULL )
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- if( mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) != hash_length )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)
- /* PSS requires a hash internally. */
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) )
- {
- if( md_info == NULL )
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */
-
- return( PSA_SUCCESS );
-}
-
-static psa_status_t psa_rsa_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
- psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *hash,
- size_t hash_length,
- uint8_t *signature,
- size_t signature_size,
- size_t *signature_length )
-{
- psa_status_t status;
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
-
- status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type( alg, hash_length, &md_alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
-
- if( signature_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) )
- return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) )
- {
- mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15,
- MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa,
- mbedtls_psa_get_random,
- MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
- MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
- md_alg,
- (unsigned int) hash_length,
- hash,
- signature );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) )
+ if( attributes->core.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR )
{
- mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg );
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( rsa,
- mbedtls_psa_get_random,
- MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
- MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
- MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
- (unsigned int) hash_length,
- hash,
- signature );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */
- {
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- }
-
- if( ret == 0 )
- *signature_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa );
- return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
-}
-
-static psa_status_t psa_rsa_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
- psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *hash,
- size_t hash_length,
- const uint8_t *signature,
- size_t signature_length )
-{
- psa_status_t status;
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
-
- status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type( alg, hash_length, &md_alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
-
- if( signature_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) )
- {
- mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15,
- MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa,
- mbedtls_psa_get_random,
- MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
- MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
- md_alg,
- (unsigned int) hash_length,
- hash,
- signature );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) )
- {
- mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg );
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( rsa,
- mbedtls_psa_get_random,
- MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
- MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
- MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
- (unsigned int) hash_length,
- hash,
- signature );
+ return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length ) );
}
else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */
- {
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- }
-
- /* Mbed TLS distinguishes "invalid padding" from "valid padding but
- * the rest of the signature is invalid". This has little use in
- * practice and PSA doesn't report this distinction. */
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
- return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
-}
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) ||
* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
-/* `ecp` cannot be const because `ecp->grp` needs to be non-const
- * for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det()
- * (even though these functions don't modify it). */
-static psa_status_t psa_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp,
- psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *hash,
- size_t hash_length,
- uint8_t *signature,
- size_t signature_size,
- size_t *signature_length )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_mpi r, s;
- size_t curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.pbits );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
-
- if( signature_size < 2 * curve_bytes )
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) )
{
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
- if( PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC( alg ) )
- {
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg );
- const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg );
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &ecp->grp, &r, &s,
- &ecp->d, hash,
- hash_length, md_alg,
- mbedtls_psa_get_random,
- MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) );
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) )
+ {
+ return( mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length ) );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
}
else
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) ||
+ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
{
- (void) alg;
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ecp->grp, &r, &s, &ecp->d,
- hash, hash_length,
- mbedtls_psa_get_random,
- MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) );
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &r,
- signature,
- curve_bytes ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &s,
- signature + curve_bytes,
- curve_bytes ) );
-
-cleanup:
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
- if( ret == 0 )
- *signature_length = 2 * curve_bytes;
- return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
-}
-
-static psa_status_t psa_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp,
- const uint8_t *hash,
- size_t hash_length,
- const uint8_t *signature,
- size_t signature_length )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_mpi r, s;
- size_t curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.pbits );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
-
- if( signature_length != 2 * curve_bytes )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &r,
- signature,
- curve_bytes ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &s,
- signature + curve_bytes,
- curve_bytes ) );
+ (void)attributes;
+ (void)key_buffer;
+ (void)key_buffer_size;
+ (void)alg;
+ (void)hash;
+ (void)hash_length;
+ (void)signature;
+ (void)signature_size;
+ (void)signature_length;
- /* Check whether the public part is loaded. If not, load it. */
- if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &ecp->Q ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
- mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G,
- mbedtls_psa_get_random, MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) );
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
-
- ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ecp->grp, hash, hash_length,
- &ecp->Q, &r, &s );
-
-cleanup:
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
- return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
}
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) ||
- * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
psa_status_t psa_sign_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
@@ -3581,83 +3365,14 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
goto exit;
}
- /* Try any of the available accelerators first */
- status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( slot,
- alg,
- hash,
- hash_length,
- signature,
- signature_size,
- signature_length );
- if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ||
- psa_key_lifetime_is_external( slot->attr.lifetime ) )
- goto exit;
-
- /* If the operation was not supported by any accelerator, try fallback. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)
- if( slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR )
- {
- mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
-
- status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( slot->attr.type,
- slot->key.data,
- slot->key.bytes,
- &rsa );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
-
- status = psa_rsa_sign( rsa,
- alg,
- hash, hash_length,
- signature, signature_size,
- signature_length );
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+ .core = slot->attr
+ };
- mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
- mbedtls_free( rsa );
- }
- else
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) ||
- * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */
- if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( slot->attr.type ) )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
- if(
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
- PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg )
-#else
- PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA( alg )
-#endif
- )
- {
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
- status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( slot->attr.type,
- slot->attr.bits,
- slot->key.data,
- slot->key.bytes,
- &ecp );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
- status = psa_ecdsa_sign( ecp,
- alg,
- hash, hash_length,
- signature, signature_size,
- signature_length );
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
- mbedtls_free( ecp );
- }
- else
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) ||
- * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
- {
- status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- }
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
+ &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length );
exit:
/* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error,
@@ -3677,93 +3392,84 @@ exit:
return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
-psa_status_t psa_verify_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
- psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *hash,
- size_t hash_length,
- const uint8_t *signature,
- size_t signature_length )
+psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_internal(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
{
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_key_slot_t *slot;
-
- status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
- PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
- alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
-
- /* Try any of the available accelerators first */
- status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( slot,
- alg,
- hash,
- hash_length,
- signature,
- signature_length );
- if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ||
- psa_key_lifetime_is_external( slot->attr.lifetime ) )
- goto exit;
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)
- if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) )
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( attributes->core.type ) )
{
- mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
-
- status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( slot->attr.type,
- slot->key.data,
- slot->key.bytes,
- &rsa );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
-
- status = psa_rsa_verify( rsa,
- alg,
- hash, hash_length,
- signature, signature_length );
- mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
- mbedtls_free( rsa );
- goto exit;
+ return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length ) );
}
else
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) ||
* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */
- if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( slot->attr.type ) )
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) )
{
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
- status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( slot->attr.type,
- slot->attr.bits,
- slot->key.data,
- slot->key.bytes,
- &ecp );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
- status = psa_ecdsa_verify( ecp,
- hash, hash_length,
- signature, signature_length );
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
- mbedtls_free( ecp );
- goto exit;
+ return( mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length ) );
}
else
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) ||
* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
{
- status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto exit;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
}
else
{
- status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ (void)key_buffer;
+ (void)key_buffer_size;
+ (void)alg;
+ (void)hash;
+ (void)hash_length;
+ (void)signature;
+ (void)signature_length;
+
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_verify_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *hash,
+ size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+
+ status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
+ alg );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+ .core = slot->attr
+ };
+
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
+ &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length );
-exit:
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
index 9f10868..da69044 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h"
+#include <mbedtls/md_internal.h>
+
/** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material
* and metadata for one key.
*/
@@ -212,6 +214,15 @@ psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
*/
psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error( int ret );
+/** Get Mbed TLS MD information of a hash algorithm given its PSA identifier
+ *
+ * \param[in] alg PSA hash algorithm identifier
+ *
+ * \return The Mbed TLS MD information of the hash algorithm. \c NULL if the
+ * PSA hash algorithm is not supported.
+ */
+const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
/** Import a key in binary format.
*
* \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
@@ -324,4 +335,80 @@ psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
size_t key_buffer_size,
size_t *key_buffer_length );
+/** Sign an already-calculated hash with a private key.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash
+ * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ * transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context.
+ * format.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
+ * the type of the key.
+ * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign.
+ * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.
+ * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned signature value.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
+ * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
+ * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
+ * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
+ * respectively of the key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_internal(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public key.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash
+ * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ * transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context.
+ * format.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
+ * the type of the key.
+ * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be
+ * verified.
+ * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.
+ * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The signature is valid.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
+ * signature is not a valid signature.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_internal(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length );
+
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c
index 3cb7557..6cf23ce 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c
@@ -57,21 +57,18 @@
#endif
/* Start delegation functions */
-psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
- psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *hash,
- size_t hash_length,
- uint8_t *signature,
- size_t signature_size,
- size_t *signature_length )
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
{
-#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT)
/* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
const psa_drv_se_t *drv;
psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context;
- if( psa_get_se_driver( slot->attr.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) )
+ if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) )
{
if( drv->asymmetric == NULL ||
drv->asymmetric->p_sign == NULL )
@@ -79,32 +76,27 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
/* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
- return( drv->asymmetric->p_sign( drv_context,
- psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ),
- alg,
- hash, hash_length,
- signature, signature_size,
- signature_length ) );
+ return( drv->asymmetric->p_sign(
+ drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ),
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length ) );
}
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
- /* Then try accelerator API */
-#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(slot->attr.lifetime);
- psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
- .core = slot->attr
- };
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_location_t location =
+ PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
switch( location )
{
case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
/* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
* cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
- status = test_transparent_signature_sign_hash( &attributes,
- slot->key.data,
- slot->key.bytes,
+ status = test_transparent_signature_sign_hash( attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
alg,
hash,
hash_length,
@@ -115,14 +107,25 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
return( status );
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
/* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ return( psa_sign_hash_internal( attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ alg,
+ hash,
+ hash_length,
+ signature,
+ signature_size,
+ signature_length ) );
+
/* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LIFETIME:
- return( test_opaque_signature_sign_hash( &attributes,
- slot->key.data,
- slot->key.bytes,
+ return( test_opaque_signature_sign_hash( attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
alg,
hash,
hash_length,
@@ -130,40 +133,26 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
signature_size,
signature_length ) );
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
default:
/* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
- return( status );
+ (void)status;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
-#else /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
-#else /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT */
- (void)slot;
- (void)alg;
- (void)hash;
- (void)hash_length;
- (void)signature;
- (void)signature_size;
- (void)signature_length;
-
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT */
}
-psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
- psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *hash,
- size_t hash_length,
- const uint8_t *signature,
- size_t signature_length )
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
{
-#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT)
/* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
const psa_drv_se_t *drv;
psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context;
- if( psa_get_se_driver( slot->attr.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) )
+ if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) )
{
if( drv->asymmetric == NULL ||
drv->asymmetric->p_verify == NULL )
@@ -171,31 +160,27 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
/* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
- return( drv->asymmetric->p_verify( drv_context,
- psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ),
- alg,
- hash, hash_length,
- signature, signature_length ) );
+ return( drv->asymmetric->p_verify(
+ drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ),
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length ) );
}
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
- /* Then try accelerator API */
-#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(slot->attr.lifetime);
- psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
- .core = slot->attr
- };
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_location_t location =
+ PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
switch( location )
{
case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
/* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
* cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
- status = test_transparent_signature_verify_hash( &attributes,
- slot->key.data,
- slot->key.bytes,
+ status = test_transparent_signature_verify_hash( attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
alg,
hash,
hash_length,
@@ -205,37 +190,36 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
return( status );
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
- /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+
+ return( psa_verify_hash_internal( attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ alg,
+ hash,
+ hash_length,
+ signature,
+ signature_length ) );
+
/* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LIFETIME:
- return( test_opaque_signature_verify_hash( &attributes,
- slot->key.data,
- slot->key.bytes,
+ return( test_opaque_signature_verify_hash( attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
alg,
hash,
hash_length,
signature,
signature_length ) );
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
default:
/* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
- return( status );
+ (void)status;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
-#else /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
-#else /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT */
- (void)slot;
- (void)alg;
- (void)hash;
- (void)hash_length;
- (void)signature;
- (void)signature_length;
-
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT */
}
/** Get the key buffer size for the key material of a generated key in the
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
index ad16cdd..22d22d6 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
@@ -28,20 +28,17 @@
/*
* Signature functions
*/
-psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
- psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *hash,
- size_t hash_length,
- uint8_t *signature,
- size_t signature_size,
- size_t *signature_length );
-
-psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
- psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *hash,
- size_t hash_length,
- const uint8_t *signature,
- size_t signature_length );
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length );
/*
* Key handling functions
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
index 23ec6ac..75ab169 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
+#include <mbedtls/ecdsa.h>
#include <mbedtls/ecp.h>
#include <mbedtls/error.h>
@@ -50,11 +51,25 @@
#define BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1
#endif
+#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) ) )
+#define BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1
+#endif
+
+#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \
+ ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) ) )
+#define BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1
+#endif
+
#if defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \
defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
+ defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH)
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(
psa_key_type_t type, size_t curve_bits,
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length,
@@ -167,9 +182,9 @@ exit:
}
#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) ||
* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) ||
- * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) ||
- * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) ||
- * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
+ * defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) ||
+ * defined(BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) ||
+ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) */
#if defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \
defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
@@ -337,6 +352,148 @@ static psa_status_t ecp_generate_key(
}
#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */
+/****************************************************************/
+/* ECDSA sign/verify */
+/****************************************************************/
+
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
+static psa_status_t ecdsa_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t curve_bytes;
+ mbedtls_mpi r, s;
+
+ status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( attributes->core.type,
+ attributes->core.bits,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ &ecp );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.pbits );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
+
+ if( signature_size < 2 * curve_bytes )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if( PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC( alg ) )
+ {
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg );
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg );
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(
+ &ecp->grp, &r, &s,
+ &ecp->d, hash,
+ hash_length, md_alg,
+ mbedtls_psa_get_random,
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) );
+#else
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ goto cleanup;
+#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ (void) alg;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ecp->grp, &r, &s, &ecp->d,
+ hash, hash_length,
+ mbedtls_psa_get_random,
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &r,
+ signature,
+ curve_bytes ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &s,
+ signature + curve_bytes,
+ curve_bytes ) );
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ *signature_length = 2 * curve_bytes;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
+ mbedtls_free( ecp );
+
+ return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t ecdsa_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t curve_bytes;
+ mbedtls_mpi r, s;
+
+ (void)alg;
+
+ status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( attributes->core.type,
+ attributes->core.bits,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ &ecp );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.pbits );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
+
+ if( signature_length != 2 * curve_bytes )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &r,
+ signature,
+ curve_bytes ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &s,
+ signature + curve_bytes,
+ curve_bytes ) );
+
+ /* Check whether the public part is loaded. If not, load it. */
+ if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &ecp->Q ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G,
+ mbedtls_psa_get_random, MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) );
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ecp->grp, hash, hash_length,
+ &ecp->Q, &r, &s );
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
+ mbedtls_free( ecp );
+
+ return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ * defined(BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
@@ -373,6 +530,38 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key(
}
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
+{
+
+ return( ecdsa_sign_hash( attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length ) );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
+{
+ return( ecdsa_verify_hash( attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length ) );
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) ||
+ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
+
/*
* BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY.
*/
@@ -417,6 +606,62 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_generate_key(
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) &&
defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecdsa_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
+{
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+ return( ecdsa_sign_hash( attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length ) );
+#else
+ (void)attributes;
+ (void)key_buffer;
+ (void)key_buffer_size;
+ (void)alg;
+ (void)hash;
+ (void)hash_length;
+ (void)signature;
+ (void)signature_size;
+ (void)signature_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+#endif
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecdsa_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+ return( ecdsa_verify_hash( attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length ) );
+#else
+ (void)attributes;
+ (void)key_buffer;
+ (void)key_buffer_size;
+ (void)alg;
+ (void)hash;
+ (void)hash_length;
+ (void)signature;
+ (void)signature_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) ||
+ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
+
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h
index 5c9b63c..0c2b928 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h
@@ -146,6 +146,78 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length );
+/** Sign an already-calculated hash with ECDSA.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash
+ * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ * transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the ECC key to use for the
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the ECC key context.
+ * format.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] alg Randomized or deterministic ECDSA algorithm.
+ * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign.
+ * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.
+ * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned signature value.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
+ * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
+ * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits,
+ * \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the ECC key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verify an ECDSA hash or short message signature.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash
+ * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ * transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the ECC key to use for the
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the ECC key context.
+ * format.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] alg Randomized or deterministic ECDSA algorithm.
+ * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be
+ * verified.
+ * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.
+ * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The signature is valid.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
+ * signature is not a valid signature.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length );
/*
* BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY.
*/
@@ -167,6 +239,18 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_generate_key(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length );
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecdsa_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecdsa_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length );
+
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
index fa64001..3e95d3a 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
@@ -52,10 +52,24 @@
#define BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1
#endif
+#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
+ ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) )
+#define BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1
+#endif
+
+#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \
+ ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) ) )
+#define BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1
+#endif
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \
+ defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
+ defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \
defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \
defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
@@ -131,9 +145,9 @@ exit:
return( status );
}
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) ||
- * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) ||
* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) ||
- * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) ||
+ * defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) ||
+ * defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) ||
* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) ||
* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */
@@ -319,6 +333,211 @@ static psa_status_t rsa_generate_key(
}
#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) */
+/****************************************************************/
+/* Sign/verify hashes */
+/****************************************************************/
+
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+
+/* Decode the hash algorithm from alg and store the mbedtls encoding in
+ * md_alg. Verify that the hash length is acceptable. */
+static psa_status_t psa_rsa_decode_md_type( psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ size_t hash_length,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg )
+{
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg );
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg );
+ *md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info );
+
+ /* The Mbed TLS RSA module uses an unsigned int for hash length
+ * parameters. Validate that it fits so that we don't risk an
+ * overflow later. */
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
+ if( hash_length > UINT_MAX )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
+ /* For PKCS#1 v1.5 signature, if using a hash, the hash length
+ * must be correct. */
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) &&
+ alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW )
+ {
+ if( md_info == NULL )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ if( mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) != hash_length )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */
+
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+ /* PSS requires a hash internally. */
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) )
+ {
+ if( md_info == NULL )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ }
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */
+
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t rsa_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+
+ status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( attributes->core.type,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ &rsa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type( alg, hash_length, &md_alg );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+
+ if( signature_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) )
+ {
+ status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) )
+ {
+ mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa,
+ mbedtls_psa_get_random,
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
+ md_alg,
+ (unsigned int) hash_length,
+ hash,
+ signature );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) )
+ {
+ mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg );
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( rsa,
+ mbedtls_psa_get_random,
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ (unsigned int) hash_length,
+ hash,
+ signature );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */
+ {
+ status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ *signature_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa );
+ status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
+ mbedtls_free( rsa );
+
+ return( status );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t rsa_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+
+ status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( attributes->core.type,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ &rsa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+
+ status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type( alg, hash_length, &md_alg );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+
+ if( signature_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) )
+ {
+ status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) )
+ {
+ mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa,
+ mbedtls_psa_get_random,
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
+ md_alg,
+ (unsigned int) hash_length,
+ hash,
+ signature );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) )
+ {
+ mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg );
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( rsa,
+ mbedtls_psa_get_random,
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ (unsigned int) hash_length,
+ hash,
+ signature );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */
+ {
+ status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Mbed TLS distinguishes "invalid padding" from "valid padding but
+ * the rest of the signature is invalid". This has little use in
+ * practice and PSA doesn't report this distinction. */
+ status = ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ) ?
+ PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE :
+ mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
+ mbedtls_free( rsa );
+
+ return( status );
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) ||
+ * defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
@@ -355,6 +574,36 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key(
}
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
+{
+ return( rsa_sign_hash(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length ) );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
+{
+ return( rsa_verify_hash(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length ) );
+}
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) ||
+ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */
+
/*
* BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY.
*/
@@ -397,6 +646,63 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_generate_key(
}
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21))
+ return( rsa_sign_hash(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length ) );
+#else
+ (void)attributes;
+ (void)key_buffer;
+ (void)key_buffer_size;
+ (void)alg;
+ (void)hash;
+ (void)hash_length;
+ (void)signature;
+ (void)signature_size;
+ (void)signature_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+#endif
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21))
+ return( rsa_verify_hash(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length ) );
+#else
+ (void)attributes;
+ (void)key_buffer;
+ (void)key_buffer_size;
+ (void)alg;
+ (void)hash;
+ (void)hash_length;
+ (void)signature;
+ (void)signature_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+#endif
+}
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) ||
+ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) */
+
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h
index 08182a7..41a90f7 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h
@@ -137,6 +137,81 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length );
+/** Sign an already-calculated hash with an RSA private key.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash
+ * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ * transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the RSA key to use for the
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the RSA key context.
+ * format.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
+ * an RSA key.
+ * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign.
+ * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.
+ * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned signature value.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
+ * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
+ * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits,
+ * \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the RSA key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public RSA key.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash
+ * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ * transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the RSA key to use for the
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the RSA key context.
+ * format.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
+ * an RSA key.
+ * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be
+ * verified.
+ * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.
+ * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The signature is valid.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
+ * signature is not a valid signature.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length );
+
/*
* BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY.
*/
@@ -158,6 +233,18 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_generate_key(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
uint8_t *key, size_t key_size, size_t *key_length );
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length );
+
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H */
diff --git a/library/psa_its_file.c b/library/psa_its_file.c
index 2fbff20..7798da6 100644
--- a/library/psa_its_file.c
+++ b/library/psa_its_file.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX ""
#endif
-#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%08lx%08lx"
+#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%08x%08x"
#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ".psa_its"
#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH \
( sizeof( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX ) - 1 + /*prefix without terminating 0*/ \
@@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ static void psa_its_fill_filename( psa_storage_uid_t uid, char *filename )
mbedtls_snprintf( filename, PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH,
"%s" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%s",
PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX,
- (unsigned long) ( uid >> 32 ),
- (unsigned long) ( uid & 0xffffffff ),
+ (unsigned) ( uid >> 32 ),
+ (unsigned) ( uid & 0xffffffff ),
PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX );
}
diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index a8331d9..55a8e61 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
- ( "sending session ticket of length %d", tlen ) );
+ ( "sending session ticket of length %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, tlen ) );
memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen );
@@ -905,7 +905,8 @@ static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, current time: %lu", t ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG,
+ (long long) t ) );
#else
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
*p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->id[i];
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, session id len.: %d", n ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 39, n );
/*
@@ -1182,7 +1183,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
continue;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)",
- ciphersuites[i], ciphersuite_info->name ) );
+ (unsigned int)ciphersuites[i], ciphersuite_info->name ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
@@ -1197,7 +1198,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
- ( "client hello, got %d ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) );
+ ( "client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) );
/*
* Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
@@ -1420,7 +1421,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/* olen unused if all extensions are disabled */
((void) olen);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ext_len ) );
if( ext_len > 0 )
@@ -2167,10 +2168,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu",
- ( (uint32_t) buf[2] << 24 ) |
- ( (uint32_t) buf[3] << 16 ) |
- ( (uint32_t) buf[4] << 8 ) |
- ( (uint32_t) buf[5] ) ) );
+ ( (unsigned long) buf[2] << 24 ) |
+ ( (unsigned long) buf[3] << 16 ) |
+ ( (unsigned long) buf[4] << 8 ) |
+ ( (unsigned long) buf[5] ) ) );
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 );
@@ -2253,7 +2254,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
- ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", i ) );
+ ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", (unsigned int)i ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -2261,7 +2262,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n );
/*
@@ -2304,7 +2305,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed",
ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", i ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", (unsigned) i ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d",
buf[37 + n] ) );
@@ -2373,7 +2374,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ext = buf + 40 + n;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2,
- ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) );
+ ( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ext_len ) );
while( ext_len )
{
@@ -2537,7 +2538,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
- ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)", ext_id ) );
+ ( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id ) );
}
ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
@@ -2628,7 +2629,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len * 8 < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %d < %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u",
ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len * 8,
ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
@@ -4347,7 +4348,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %d", ticket_len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len ) );
/* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index 72f09bb..54a7be0 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -283,8 +283,8 @@ static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = new_timeout;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %d millisecs",
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs",
+ (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) );
return( 0 );
}
@@ -292,8 +292,8 @@ static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %d millisecs",
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs",
+ (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
@@ -623,9 +623,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record content %u too large, maximum %d",
- (unsigned) rec->data_len,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record content %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " too large, maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ rec->data_len,
+ (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
@@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, "
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
"including %d bytes of padding",
rec->data_len, 0 ) );
@@ -842,7 +843,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
dynamic_iv_is_explicit ? dynamic_iv_len : 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD",
add_data, add_data_len );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, "
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
"including 0 bytes of padding",
rec->data_len ) );
@@ -945,8 +946,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, "
- "including %d bytes of IV and %d bytes of padding",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
+ "including %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " bytes of IV and %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes of padding",
rec->data_len, transform->ivlen,
padlen + 1 ) );
@@ -1366,7 +1368,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
{
if( rec->data_len < dynamic_iv_len )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < explicit_iv_len (%d) ",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " ) < explicit_iv_len (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ",
rec->data_len,
dynamic_iv_len ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
@@ -1385,7 +1388,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
/* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */
if( rec->data_len < transform->taglen )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < taglen (%d) ",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ") < taglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ",
rec->data_len,
transform->taglen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
@@ -1488,7 +1492,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
if( rec->data_len < minlen + transform->ivlen ||
rec->data_len < minlen + transform->maclen + 1 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < max( ivlen(%d), maclen (%d) "
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ") < max( ivlen(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ "), maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") "
"+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", rec->data_len,
transform->ivlen,
transform->maclen ) );
@@ -1554,7 +1560,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
* data_len >= minlen + ivlen ( = minlen or 2 * minlen ). */
if( rec->data_len % transform->ivlen != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) %% ivlen (%d) != 0",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ") %% ivlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") != 0",
rec->data_len, transform->ivlen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
@@ -1624,7 +1631,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
if( rec->data_len < transform->maclen + padlen + 1 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < maclen (%d) + padlen (%d)",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ") < maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ") + padlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ")",
rec->data_len,
transform->maclen,
padlen + 1 ) );
@@ -1653,8 +1662,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
if( padlen > transform->ivlen )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding length: is %d, "
- "should be no more than %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding length: is %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
+ "should be no more than %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
padlen, transform->ivlen ) );
#endif
correct = 0;
@@ -1890,7 +1899,7 @@ static int ssl_compress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->out_msg, len_pre );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before compression: msglen = %d, ",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ",
ssl->out_msglen ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before compression: output payload",
@@ -1911,7 +1920,7 @@ static int ssl_compress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->out_msglen = out_buf_len -
ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out - bytes_written;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after compression: msglen = %d, ",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ",
ssl->out_msglen ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after compression: output payload",
@@ -1942,7 +1951,7 @@ static int ssl_decompress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->in_msg, len_pre );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before decompression: msglen = %d, ",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ",
ssl->in_msglen ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before decompression: input payload",
@@ -1963,7 +1972,7 @@ static int ssl_decompress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->in_msglen = in_buf_len -
ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out - header_bytes;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after decompression: msglen = %d, ",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ",
ssl->in_msglen ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after decompression: input payload",
@@ -2042,7 +2051,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
if( ssl->in_left != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "next record in same datagram, offset: %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "next record in same datagram, offset: %"
+ MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->next_record_offset ) );
memmove( ssl->in_hdr,
ssl->in_hdr + ssl->next_record_offset,
@@ -2052,7 +2062,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
/*
@@ -2094,7 +2105,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
else
timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "f_recv_timeout: %u ms", timeout ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "f_recv_timeout: %lu ms", (unsigned long) timeout ) );
if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL )
ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len,
@@ -2153,7 +2164,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
else
#endif
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
while( ssl->in_left < nb_want )
@@ -2177,7 +2189,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
}
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret );
@@ -2190,8 +2203,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
if ( (size_t)ret > len || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
- ( "f_recv returned %d bytes but only %lu were requested",
- ret, (unsigned long)len ) );
+ ( "f_recv returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " were requested",
+ ret, len ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
@@ -2230,7 +2243,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
while( ssl->out_left > 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message length: %d, out_left: %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", out_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->out_msglen, ssl->out_left ) );
buf = ssl->out_hdr - ssl->out_left;
@@ -2244,8 +2258,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( (size_t)ret > ssl->out_left || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
- ( "f_send returned %d bytes but only %lu bytes were sent",
- ret, (unsigned long)ssl->out_left ) );
+ ( "f_send returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes were sent",
+ ret, ssl->out_left ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
@@ -2286,14 +2300,15 @@ static int ssl_flight_append( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/* Allocate space for current message */
if( ( msg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ) == NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %d bytes failed",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed",
sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
}
if( ( msg->p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ssl->out_msglen ) ) == NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %d bytes failed", ssl->out_msglen ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed",
+ ssl->out_msglen ) );
mbedtls_free( msg );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
}
@@ -2699,9 +2714,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record too large: "
- "size %u, maximum %u",
- (unsigned) ssl->out_msglen,
- (unsigned) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
+ "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ssl->out_msglen,
+ (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
@@ -2728,9 +2744,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS handshake message too large: "
- "size %u, maximum %u",
- (unsigned) ( hs_len ),
- (unsigned) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) );
+ "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ hs_len,
+ (size_t) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
@@ -2922,8 +2938,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush )
/* Now write the potentially updated record content type. */
ssl->out_hdr[0] = (unsigned char) ssl->out_msgtype;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "output record: msgtype = %d, "
- "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "output record: msgtype = %u, "
+ "version = [%u:%u], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1],
ssl->out_hdr[2], len ) );
@@ -3119,7 +3135,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake message too short: %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake message too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_msglen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
@@ -3127,7 +3143,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "handshake message: msglen ="
- " %d, type = %d, hslen = %d",
+ " %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", type = %u, hslen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_hslen ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
@@ -3163,7 +3179,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received message from last flight, "
- "message_seq = %d, start_of_flight = %d",
+ "message_seq = %u, start_of_flight = %u",
recv_msg_seq,
ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq ) );
@@ -3176,7 +3192,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "dropping out-of-sequence message: "
- "message_seq = %d, expected = %d",
+ "message_seq = %u, expected = %u",
recv_msg_seq,
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) );
}
@@ -3746,8 +3762,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 1 ] << 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record header", buf, rec->data_offset );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "input record: msgtype = %d, "
- "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "input record: msgtype = %u, "
+ "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
rec->type,
major_ver, minor_ver, rec->data_len ) );
@@ -3790,8 +3806,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: "
- "expected %d, received %d",
- ssl->in_epoch, rec_epoch ) );
+ "expected %u, received %lu",
+ ssl->in_epoch, (unsigned long) rec_epoch ) );
/* Records from the next epoch are considered for buffering
* (concretely: early Finished messages). */
@@ -4325,31 +4341,41 @@ static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
/* If we can't buffer a future message because
* of space limitations -- ignore. */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- ignore\n",
- (unsigned) msg_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
- (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n",
+ msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
+ hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
goto exit;
}
else
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n",
- (unsigned) msg_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
- (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n",
+ msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
+ hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
}
if( ssl_buffer_make_space( ssl, reassembly_buf_sz ) != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reassembly of next message of size %u (%u with bitmap) would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- fail\n",
- (unsigned) msg_len,
- (unsigned) reassembly_buf_sz,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
- (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reassembly of next message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " with bitmap) would exceed"
+ " the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " bytes buffered) -- fail\n",
+ msg_len,
+ reassembly_buf_sz,
+ (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
+ hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
goto exit;
}
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialize reassembly, total length = %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialize reassembly, total length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
msg_len ) );
hs_buf->data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, reassembly_buf_sz );
@@ -4395,7 +4421,8 @@ static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl );
frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "adding fragment, offset = %d, length = %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "adding fragment, offset = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
frag_off, frag_len ) );
memcpy( msg + frag_off, ssl->in_msg + 12, frag_len );
@@ -4622,15 +4649,18 @@ static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( rec->buf_len > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future epoch record of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- ignore\n",
- (unsigned) rec->buf_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
- (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future epoch record of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n",
+ rec->buf_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
+ hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
return( 0 );
}
/* Buffer record */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffer record from epoch %u",
- ssl->in_epoch + 1 ) );
+ ssl->in_epoch + 1U ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered record", rec->buf, rec->buf_len );
/* ssl_parse_record_header() only considers records
@@ -4903,7 +4933,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->in_msglen != 1 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, len: %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_msglen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
@@ -4939,12 +4969,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/* Note: Standard allows for more than one 2 byte alert
to be packed in a single message, but Mbed TLS doesn't
currently support this. */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid alert message, len: %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid alert message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_msglen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got an alert message, type: [%d:%d]",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got an alert message, type: [%u:%u]",
ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_msg[1] ) );
/*
@@ -5771,7 +5801,8 @@ static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "fragment larger than the (negotiated) "
- "maximum fragment length: %d > %d",
+ "maximum fragment length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
len, max_len ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index e33b828..807fb18 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -298,13 +298,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
{
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_cur, md_cur );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:"
- " match sig %d and hash %d",
- sig_cur, md_cur ) );
+ " match sig %u and hash %u",
+ (unsigned) sig_cur, (unsigned) md_cur ) );
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: "
- "hash alg %d not supported", md_cur ) );
+ "hash alg %u not supported", (unsigned) md_cur ) );
}
}
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
/* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %d", len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, len ) );
if( len == 0 )
return( 0 );
@@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id,
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)",
- suite_id, suite_info->name ) );
+ (unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name ) );
if( suite_info->min_minor_ver > ssl->minor_ver ||
suite_info->max_minor_ver < ssl->minor_ver )
@@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id,
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_type ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm "
- "for signature algorithm %d", sig_type ) );
+ "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type ) );
return( 0 );
}
}
@@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
sess_len = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3];
chal_len = ( buf[4] << 8 ) | buf[5];
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciph_len: %d, sess_len: %d, chal_len: %d",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciph_len: %u, sess_len: %u, chal_len: %u",
ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len ) );
/*
@@ -1629,7 +1629,7 @@ read_record_header:
if( cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message_seq: "
- "%d (expected %d)", cli_msg_seq,
+ "%u (expected %u)", cli_msg_seq,
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
@@ -2073,7 +2073,7 @@ read_record_header:
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
default:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)",
ext_id ) );
}
@@ -2274,7 +2274,7 @@ have_ciphersuite:
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no hash algorithm for signature algorithm "
- "%d - should not happen", sig_alg ) );
+ "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg ) );
}
}
#endif
@@ -2826,7 +2826,8 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu", t ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG,
+ (long long) t ) );
#else
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
@@ -2914,7 +2915,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len );
p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed",
ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) );
@@ -2926,7 +2927,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s",
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X",
- ssl->session_negotiate->compression ) );
+ (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->compression ) );
/* Do not write the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
@@ -2995,7 +2996,8 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ext_len += olen;
#endif
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ext_len ) );
if( ext_len > 0 )
{
@@ -3502,7 +3504,7 @@ curve_matching_done:
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pick hash algorithm %d for signing", md_alg ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg ) );
/*
* 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 336cbea..e367fbd 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -283,7 +283,8 @@ static void handle_buffer_resizing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing,
}
else
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating in_buf to %d", in_buf_new_len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating in_buf to %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ in_buf_new_len ) );
modified = 1;
}
}
@@ -304,7 +305,8 @@ static void handle_buffer_resizing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing,
}
else
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating out_buf to %d", out_buf_new_len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating out_buf to %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ out_buf_new_len ) );
modified = 1;
}
}
@@ -961,7 +963,7 @@ static int ssl_populate_transform( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->cipher );
if( cipher_info == NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cipher info for %d not found",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cipher info for %u not found",
ciphersuite_info->cipher ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
@@ -969,8 +971,8 @@ static int ssl_populate_transform( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->mac );
if( md_info == NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "mbedtls_md info for %d not found",
- ciphersuite_info->mac ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "mbedtls_md info for %u not found",
+ (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
@@ -2215,8 +2217,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
n = crt->raw.len;
if( n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 3 - i )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate too large, %d > %d",
- i + 3 + n, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate too large, %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ i + 3 + n, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE );
}
@@ -2707,8 +2710,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %x",
- ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %08x",
+ (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) );
}
else
{
@@ -2831,7 +2834,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
chain = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );
if( chain == NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed",
sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
@@ -3858,7 +3861,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, in_buf_len );
if( ssl->in_buf == NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", in_buf_len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", in_buf_len ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto error;
}
@@ -3869,7 +3872,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, out_buf_len );
if( ssl->out_buf == NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", out_buf_len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", out_buf_len ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto error;
}
diff --git a/library/x509_crt.c b/library/x509_crt.c
index a623c57..0aa4f4c 100644
--- a/library/x509_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509_crt.c
@@ -1629,6 +1629,8 @@ cleanup:
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+ memset( &sb, 0, sizeof( sb ) );
+
while( ( entry = readdir( dir ) ) != NULL )
{
snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf( entry_name, sizeof entry_name,
diff --git a/programs/Makefile b/programs/Makefile
index e0a324f..9033875 100644
--- a/programs/Makefile
+++ b/programs/Makefile
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
# To compile with PKCS11: add "-lpkcs11-helper" to LDFLAGS
CFLAGS ?= -O2
-WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra
-WARNING_CXXFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra
+WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral
+WARNING_CXXFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral
LDFLAGS ?=
MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH:=../tests/src
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
index d0758bc..3937981 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
@@ -1667,7 +1667,7 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! "
- "mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
+ "mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
}
diff --git a/tests/Makefile b/tests/Makefile
index d11d904..d250d71 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile
+++ b/tests/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
# To compile with PKCS11: add "-lpkcs11-helper" to LDFLAGS
CFLAGS ?= -O2
-WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra
+WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral
LDFLAGS ?=
# Include public header files from ../include, test-specific header files
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/signature.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/signature.h
index 8abcb11..e785151 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/drivers/signature.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/signature.h
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ typedef struct {
unsigned long hits;
} test_driver_signature_hooks_t;
-#define TEST_DRIVER_SIGNATURE_INIT { NULL, 0, PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, 0 }
+#define TEST_DRIVER_SIGNATURE_INIT { NULL, 0, PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }
static inline test_driver_signature_hooks_t test_driver_signature_hooks_init( void )
{
const test_driver_signature_hooks_t v = TEST_DRIVER_SIGNATURE_INIT;
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index 43742fd..0e81d74 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -1450,7 +1450,17 @@ component_test_psa_crypto_config_basic() {
scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
# Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver
- make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
+ loc_cflags="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -I../tests/include -O2"
+
+ make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$loc_cflags" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
+ unset loc_cflags
msg "test: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG"
make test
@@ -2218,7 +2228,17 @@ component_test_psa_crypto_drivers () {
msg "build: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS w/ driver hooks"
scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS
# Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver
- make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
+ loc_cflags="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -I../tests/include -O2"
+
+ make CC=gcc CFLAGS="${loc_cflags}" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
+ unset loc_cflags
msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS, signature"
make test
diff --git a/tests/src/drivers/signature.c b/tests/src/drivers/signature.c
index cea0351..47c6deb 100644
--- a/tests/src/drivers/signature.c
+++ b/tests/src/drivers/signature.c
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) && defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
+#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h"
+#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
#include "test/drivers/signature.h"
@@ -44,7 +46,7 @@ test_driver_signature_hooks_t test_driver_signature_verify_hooks = TEST_DRIVER_S
psa_status_t test_transparent_signature_sign_hash(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
- const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
@@ -64,85 +66,58 @@ psa_status_t test_transparent_signature_sign_hash(
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- if( alg != PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) )
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
- switch( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+ if( attributes->core.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR )
{
- case PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R1:
- switch( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) )
- {
- case 256:
- grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1;
- break;
- case 384:
- grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1;
- break;
- case 521:
- grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1;
- break;
- default:
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- }
- break;
- default:
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ return( mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_sign_hash(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length ) );
}
+ else
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) ||
+ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) */
- /* Beyond this point, the driver is actually doing the work of
- * calculating the signature. */
-
- status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
- int ret = 0;
- mbedtls_mpi r, s;
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp;
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &ecp );
- size_t curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp.grp.pbits );
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecp.grp, grp_id ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ecp.grp, &ecp.Q,
- key, key_length ) );
-
- /* Code adapted from psa_ecdsa_sign() in psa_crypto.c. */
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
- if( signature_size < 2 * curve_bytes )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) )
{
- status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
- goto cleanup;
+ if(
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
+ PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg )
+#else
+ PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA( alg )
+#endif
+ )
+ {
+ return( mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecdsa_sign_hash(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length ) );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) ||
+ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
+ {
+ (void)attributes;
+ (void)key_buffer;
+ (void)key_buffer_size;
+ (void)alg;
+ (void)hash;
+ (void)hash_length;
+ (void)signature;
+ (void)signature_size;
+ (void)signature_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &ecp.grp, &r, &s, &ecp.d,
- hash, hash_length, md_alg ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &r,
- signature,
- curve_bytes ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &s,
- signature + curve_bytes,
- curve_bytes ) );
-cleanup:
- status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &ecp );
- if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
- *signature_length = 2 * curve_bytes;
-#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) */
- (void) attributes;
- (void) key;
- (void) key_length;
- (void) alg;
- (void) hash;
- (void) hash_length;
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) */
-
- return( status );
}
psa_status_t test_opaque_signature_sign_hash(
@@ -161,12 +136,13 @@ psa_status_t test_opaque_signature_sign_hash(
(void) signature;
(void) signature_size;
(void) signature_length;
+
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
psa_status_t test_transparent_signature_verify_hash(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
- const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
@@ -176,98 +152,52 @@ psa_status_t test_transparent_signature_verify_hash(
if( test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status );
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- if( alg != PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) )
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
- switch( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( attributes->core.type ) )
{
- case PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R1:
- switch( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) )
- {
- case 256:
- grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1;
- break;
- case 384:
- grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1;
- break;
- case 521:
- grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1;
- break;
- default:
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- }
- break;
- default:
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ return( mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_verify_hash(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length ) );
}
+ else
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) ||
+ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) */
- /* Beyond this point, the driver is actually doing the work of
- * calculating the signature. */
-
- status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
- int ret = 0;
- mbedtls_mpi r, s;
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp;
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &ecp );
- mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info;
- memset( &rnd_info, 0x5A, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) );
- size_t curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp.grp.pbits );
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecp.grp, grp_id ) );
-
- /* Code adapted from psa_ecdsa_verify() in psa_crypto.c. */
- if( signature_length < 2 * curve_bytes )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) )
{
- status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
- goto cleanup;
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) )
+ {
+ return( mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecdsa_verify_hash(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length ) );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
}
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &r,
- signature,
- curve_bytes ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &s,
- signature + curve_bytes,
- curve_bytes ) );
-
- if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) ) )
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ecp.grp, &ecp.Q,
- key, key_length ) );
else
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) ||
+ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
{
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ecp.d, key, key_length ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
- mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp.grp, &ecp.Q, &ecp.d, &ecp.grp.G,
- &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
- &rnd_info ) );
- }
+ (void)attributes;
+ (void)key_buffer;
+ (void)key_buffer_size;
+ (void)alg;
+ (void)hash;
+ (void)hash_length;
+ (void)signature;
+ (void)signature_length;
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ecp.grp, hash, hash_length,
- &ecp.Q, &r, &s ) );
-cleanup:
- status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &ecp );
-#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) */
- (void) attributes;
- (void) key;
- (void) key_length;
- (void) alg;
- (void) hash;
- (void) hash_length;
- (void) signature;
- (void) signature_length;
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) */
-
- return( status );
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ }
}
psa_status_t test_opaque_signature_verify_hash(
diff --git a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
index a4f87eb..e7e6863 100644
--- a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
+++ b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_test_psa_key_agreement_with_self(
private_key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes );
key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
public_key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR( private_key_type );
- public_key_length = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_key_type, key_bits );
+ public_key_length = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_key_type, key_bits );
ASSERT_ALLOC( public_key, public_key_length );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_public_key( key, public_key, public_key_length,
&public_key_length ) );
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_test_psa_raw_key_agreement_with_self(
private_key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes );
key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
public_key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR( private_key_type );
- public_key_length = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_key_type, key_bits );
+ public_key_length = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_key_type, key_bits );
ASSERT_ALLOC( public_key, public_key_length );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_public_key( key,
public_key, public_key_length,
@@ -537,6 +537,15 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_test_psa_raw_key_agreement_with_self(
status = psa_raw_key_agreement( alg, key,
public_key, public_key_length,
output, sizeof( output ), &output_length );
+ if ( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_length <=
+ PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE( private_key_type,
+ key_bits ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_length <=
+ PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+ }
+
exit:
/*
* Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes()
@@ -644,6 +653,8 @@ int mbedtls_test_psa_exported_key_sanity_check(
if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, 1, bits / 2 + 1, 0 ) )
goto exit;
TEST_EQUAL( p, end );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
@@ -653,6 +664,8 @@ int mbedtls_test_psa_exported_key_sanity_check(
{
/* Just the secret value */
TEST_EQUAL( exported_length, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ) );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
@@ -677,6 +690,12 @@ int mbedtls_test_psa_exported_key_sanity_check(
if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, 2, bits, 1 ) )
goto exit;
TEST_EQUAL( p, end );
+
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <=
+ PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( type, bits ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <=
+ PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
@@ -684,6 +703,12 @@ int mbedtls_test_psa_exported_key_sanity_check(
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) )
{
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <=
+ PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( type, bits ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <=
+ PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE );
+
if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( type ) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY )
{
/* The representation of an ECC Montgomery public key is
@@ -804,8 +829,8 @@ static int exercise_export_public_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key )
public_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(
psa_get_key_type( &attributes ) );
- exported_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_type,
- psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ) );
+ exported_size = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_type,
+ psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( exported, exported_size );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_public_key( key,
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
index 3824fa0..5e8b490 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@@ -2158,9 +2158,13 @@ depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDT
sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
PSA sign: invalid algorithm for ECC key
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_C
sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+PSA sign: deterministic ECDSA not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824":96:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
PSA sign/verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
sign_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"616263"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index 55b9416..628380e 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -613,7 +613,10 @@ void import_export( data_t *data,
reexported, reexported_length );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key2 ) );
}
- TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( type, psa_get_key_bits( &got_attributes ) ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <=
+ PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( type,
+ psa_get_key_bits( &got_attributes ) ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE );
destroy:
/* Destroy the key */
@@ -674,6 +677,10 @@ void import_export_public_key( data_t *data,
bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
TEST_ASSERT( expected_public_key->len <=
PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_type, bits ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( expected_public_key->len <=
+ PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_type, bits ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( expected_public_key->len <=
+ PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE );
ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_public_key->x, expected_public_key->len,
exported, exported_length );
}
@@ -2403,19 +2410,29 @@ void cipher_encrypt( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ) );
}
- output_buffer_size = ( (size_t) input->len +
- PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) );
+ output_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_buffer_size <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation,
input->x, input->len,
output, output_buffer_size,
&function_output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) );
total_output_length += function_output_length;
+
status = psa_cipher_finish( &operation,
output + total_output_length,
output_buffer_size - total_output_length,
&function_output_length );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
total_output_length += function_output_length;
TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status );
@@ -2471,8 +2488,9 @@ void cipher_encrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ) );
}
- output_buffer_size = ( (size_t) input->len +
- PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) );
+ output_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_buffer_size <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size );
TEST_ASSERT( first_part_size <= input->len );
@@ -2480,7 +2498,12 @@ void cipher_encrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
output, output_buffer_size,
&function_output_length ) );
TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output1_length );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, first_part_size ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( first_part_size) );
total_output_length += function_output_length;
+
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation,
input->x + first_part_size,
input->len - first_part_size,
@@ -2488,11 +2511,22 @@ void cipher_encrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
output_buffer_size - total_output_length,
&function_output_length ) );
TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output2_length );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type,
+ alg,
+ input->len - first_part_size ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) );
total_output_length += function_output_length;
+
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation,
output + total_output_length,
output_buffer_size - total_output_length,
&function_output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
total_output_length += function_output_length;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) );
@@ -2544,8 +2578,9 @@ void cipher_decrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ) );
}
- output_buffer_size = ( (size_t) input->len +
- PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) );
+ output_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_buffer_size <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size );
TEST_ASSERT( first_part_size <= input->len );
@@ -2554,7 +2589,12 @@ void cipher_decrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
output, output_buffer_size,
&function_output_length ) );
TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output1_length );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, first_part_size ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( first_part_size ) );
total_output_length += function_output_length;
+
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation,
input->x + first_part_size,
input->len - first_part_size,
@@ -2562,11 +2602,22 @@ void cipher_decrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
output_buffer_size - total_output_length,
&function_output_length ) );
TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output2_length );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type,
+ alg,
+ input->len - first_part_size ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) );
total_output_length += function_output_length;
+
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation,
output + total_output_length,
output_buffer_size - total_output_length,
&function_output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
total_output_length += function_output_length;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) );
@@ -2615,19 +2666,29 @@ void cipher_decrypt( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ) );
}
- output_buffer_size = ( (size_t) input->len +
- PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) );
+ output_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_buffer_size <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation,
input->x, input->len,
output, output_buffer_size,
&function_output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) );
total_output_length += function_output_length;
+
status = psa_cipher_finish( &operation,
output + total_output_length,
output_buffer_size - total_output_length,
&function_output_length );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
total_output_length += function_output_length;
TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status );
@@ -2686,23 +2747,37 @@ void cipher_verify_output( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
iv, iv_size,
&iv_length ) );
}
- output1_size = ( (size_t) input->len +
- PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) );
+ output1_size = PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output1_size <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output1, output1_size );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation1, input->x, input->len,
output1, output1_size,
&output1_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output1_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output1_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) );
+
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation1,
output1 + output1_length,
output1_size - output1_length,
&function_output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
output1_length += function_output_length;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation1 ) );
output2_size = output1_length;
+ TEST_ASSERT( output2_size <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, output1_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output2_size <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( output1_length ) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output2, output2_size );
if( iv_length > 0 )
@@ -2714,11 +2789,20 @@ void cipher_verify_output( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation2, output1, output1_length,
output2, output2_size,
&output2_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output2_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, output1_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output2_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( output1_length ) );
+
function_output_length = 0;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation2,
output2 + output2_length,
output2_size - output2_length,
&function_output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
output2_length += function_output_length;
@@ -2780,8 +2864,9 @@ void cipher_verify_output_multipart( int alg_arg,
&iv_length ) );
}
- output1_buffer_size = ( (size_t) input->len +
- PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) );
+ output1_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output1_buffer_size <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output1, output1_buffer_size );
TEST_ASSERT( first_part_size <= input->len );
@@ -2789,6 +2874,10 @@ void cipher_verify_output_multipart( int alg_arg,
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation1, input->x, first_part_size,
output1, output1_buffer_size,
&function_output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, first_part_size ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( first_part_size ) );
output1_length += function_output_length;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation1,
@@ -2796,17 +2885,31 @@ void cipher_verify_output_multipart( int alg_arg,
input->len - first_part_size,
output1, output1_buffer_size,
&function_output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type,
+ alg,
+ input->len - first_part_size ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len - first_part_size ) );
output1_length += function_output_length;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation1,
output1 + output1_length,
output1_buffer_size - output1_length,
&function_output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
output1_length += function_output_length;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation1 ) );
output2_buffer_size = output1_length;
+ TEST_ASSERT( output2_buffer_size <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, output1_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output2_buffer_size <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( output1_length ) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output2, output2_buffer_size );
if( iv_length > 0 )
@@ -2818,6 +2921,10 @@ void cipher_verify_output_multipart( int alg_arg,
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation2, output1, first_part_size,
output2, output2_buffer_size,
&function_output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, first_part_size ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( first_part_size ) );
output2_length += function_output_length;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation2,
@@ -2825,12 +2932,22 @@ void cipher_verify_output_multipart( int alg_arg,
output1_length - first_part_size,
output2, output2_buffer_size,
&function_output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type,
+ alg,
+ output1_length - first_part_size ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( output1_length - first_part_size ) );
output2_length += function_output_length;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation2,
output2 + output2_length,
output2_buffer_size - output2_length,
&function_output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length <=
+ PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
output2_length += function_output_length;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation2 ) );
@@ -2913,6 +3030,9 @@ void aead_encrypt_decrypt( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
TEST_EQUAL( input_data->len,
PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( alg, output_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( input_data->len <=
+ PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( output_length ) );
+
TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_decrypt( key, alg,
nonce->x, nonce->len,
additional_data->x,
@@ -2957,6 +3077,8 @@ void aead_encrypt( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
* should be exact. */
TEST_EQUAL( output_size,
PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( alg, input_data->len ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_size <=
+ PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input_data->len ) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output_data, output_size );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
@@ -3016,11 +3138,15 @@ void aead_decrypt( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
output_size = input_data->len - tag_length;
- /* For all currently defined algorithms, PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE
- * should be exact. */
if( expected_result != PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT )
+ {
+ /* For all currently defined algorithms, PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE
+ * should be exact. */
TEST_EQUAL( output_size,
PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( alg, input_data->len ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_size <=
+ PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input_data->len ) );
+ }
ASSERT_ALLOC( output_data, output_size );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
@@ -3389,7 +3515,9 @@ void asymmetric_encrypt( int key_type_arg,
/* Determine the maximum output length */
PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
+
output_size = PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_size <= PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_size );
/* Encrypt the input */
@@ -3461,9 +3589,15 @@ void asymmetric_encrypt_decrypt( int key_type_arg,
/* Determine the maximum ciphertext length */
PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
+
output_size = PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_size <= PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_size );
+
output2_size = input_data->len;
+ TEST_ASSERT( output2_size <=
+ PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output2_size <= PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output2, output2_size );
/* We test encryption by checking that encrypt-then-decrypt gives back
@@ -3511,14 +3645,12 @@ void asymmetric_decrypt( int key_type_arg,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+ size_t key_bits;
unsigned char *output = NULL;
size_t output_size = 0;
size_t output_length = ~0;
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- output_size = expected_data->len;
- ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_size );
-
PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT );
@@ -3528,6 +3660,14 @@ void asymmetric_decrypt( int key_type_arg,
PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
&key ) );
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
+ key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
+
+ /* Determine the maximum ciphertext length */
+ output_size = PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_size <= PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_size );
+
PSA_ASSERT( psa_asymmetric_decrypt( key, alg,
input_data->x, input_data->len,
label->x, label->len,
@@ -3925,6 +4065,14 @@ void derive_output( int alg_arg,
PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes,
inputs[i]->x, inputs[i]->len,
&keys[i] ) );
+
+ if ( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( alg ) )
+ {
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( keys[i], &attributes ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ) ) <=
+ PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE );
+ }
+
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key(
&operation, steps[i], keys[i] ) );
break;
@@ -4310,6 +4458,7 @@ void raw_key_agreement( int alg_arg,
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
unsigned char *output = NULL;
size_t output_length = ~0;
+ size_t key_bits;
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, expected_output->len );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
@@ -4321,12 +4470,19 @@ void raw_key_agreement( int alg_arg,
our_key_data->x, our_key_data->len,
&our_key ) );
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( our_key, &attributes ) );
+ key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
+
PSA_ASSERT( psa_raw_key_agreement( alg, our_key,
peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len,
output, expected_output->len,
&output_length ) );
ASSERT_COMPARE( output, output_length,
expected_output->x, expected_output->len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_length <=
+ PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE( our_key_type, key_bits ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_length <=
+ PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
exit:
mbedtls_free( output );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data
index 14f84c0..8ac27a9 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ sign_hash through transparent driver: calculate in driver
ecdsa_sign:PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0:PSA_SUCCESS
sign_hash through transparent driver: fallback
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA
ecdsa_sign:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0:PSA_SUCCESS
sign_hash through transparent driver: error
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ verify_hash using private key through transparent driver: calculate in driver
ecdsa_verify:PSA_SUCCESS:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS
verify_hash using private key through transparent driver: fallback
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA
ecdsa_verify:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS
verify_hash using private key through transparent driver: error
@@ -23,6 +25,7 @@ verify_hash using public key through transparent driver: calculate in driver
ecdsa_verify:PSA_SUCCESS:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS
verify_hash using public key through transparent driver: fallback
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA
ecdsa_verify:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS
verify_hash using public key through transparent driver: error
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.function
index 330846a..fb9ce07 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.function
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH \
( sizeof( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX ) - 1 + /*prefix without terminating 0*/ \
16 + /*UID (64-bit number in hex)*/ \
+ 16 + /*UID (64-bit number in hex)*/ \
sizeof( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ) - 1 + /*suffix without terminating 0*/ \
1 /*terminating null byte*/ )
#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP \