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author | Dun Tan <dun.tan@intel.com> | 2023-04-20 16:09:15 +0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> | 2023-06-30 11:07:40 +0530 |
commit | ef64ae06f8065eba5981cfcf0817a006933a306a (patch) | |
tree | d1cd4eddf32883f94ad4288be53eed668509a9eb /UefiCpuPkg | |
parent | 7b6e7d009872af68319e9a91725911829cc59fb7 (diff) | |
download | edk2-ef64ae06f8065eba5981cfcf0817a006933a306a.zip edk2-ef64ae06f8065eba5981cfcf0817a006933a306a.tar.gz edk2-ef64ae06f8065eba5981cfcf0817a006933a306a.tar.bz2 |
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Clear CR0.WP before modify page table
Clear CR0.WP before modify smm page table. Currently, there is
an assumption that smm pagetable is always RW before ReadyToLock.
However, when AMD SEV is enabled, FvbServicesSmm driver calls
MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask to clear AddressEncMask bit
in smm page table for this range:
[PcdOvmfFdBaseAddress,PcdOvmfFdBaseAddress+PcdOvmfFirmwareFdSize]
If page slpit happens in this process, new memory for smm page
table is allocated. Then the newly allocated page table memory
is marked as RO in smm page table in this FvbServicesSmm driver,
which may lead to PF if smm code doesn't clear CR0.WP before
modify smm page table when ReadyToLock.
Signed-off-by: Dun Tan <dun.tan@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'UefiCpuPkg')
-rw-r--r-- | UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmCpuMemoryManagement.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c | 5 |
2 files changed, 16 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmCpuMemoryManagement.c b/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmCpuMemoryManagement.c index 8888c26..8ed4940 100644 --- a/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmCpuMemoryManagement.c +++ b/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmCpuMemoryManagement.c @@ -1033,6 +1033,8 @@ SetMemMapAttributes ( IA32_MAP_ENTRY *Map;
UINTN Count;
UINT64 MemoryAttribute;
+ BOOLEAN WpEnabled;
+ BOOLEAN CetEnabled;
SmmGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEdkiiPiSmmMemoryAttributesTableGuid, (VOID **)&MemoryAttributesTable);
if (MemoryAttributesTable == NULL) {
@@ -1077,6 +1079,8 @@ SetMemMapAttributes ( ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (Status);
+ DisableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect (&WpEnabled, &CetEnabled);
+
MemoryMap = MemoryMapStart;
for (Index = 0; Index < MemoryMapEntryCount; Index++) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "SetAttribute: Memory Entry - 0x%lx, 0x%x\n", MemoryMap->PhysicalStart, MemoryMap->NumberOfPages));
@@ -1105,6 +1109,7 @@ SetMemMapAttributes ( MemoryMap = NEXT_MEMORY_DESCRIPTOR (MemoryMap, DescriptorSize);
}
+ EnableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect (WpEnabled, CetEnabled);
FreePool (Map);
PatchSmmSaveStateMap ();
@@ -1411,11 +1416,15 @@ SetUefiMemMapAttributes ( UINTN MemoryMapEntryCount;
UINTN Index;
EFI_MEMORY_DESCRIPTOR *Entry;
+ BOOLEAN WpEnabled;
+ BOOLEAN CetEnabled;
PERF_FUNCTION_BEGIN ();
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SetUefiMemMapAttributes\n"));
+ DisableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect (&WpEnabled, &CetEnabled);
+
if (mUefiMemoryMap != NULL) {
MemoryMapEntryCount = mUefiMemoryMapSize/mUefiDescriptorSize;
MemoryMap = mUefiMemoryMap;
@@ -1494,6 +1503,8 @@ SetUefiMemMapAttributes ( }
}
+ EnableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect (WpEnabled, CetEnabled);
+
//
// Do not free mUefiMemoryAttributesTable, it will be checked in IsSmmCommBufferForbiddenAddress().
//
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c b/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c index ed6e580..8736b52 100644 --- a/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c +++ b/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c @@ -574,6 +574,8 @@ InitPaging ( BOOLEAN Nx;
IA32_CR4 Cr4;
BOOLEAN Enable5LevelPaging;
+ BOOLEAN WpEnabled;
+ BOOLEAN CetEnabled;
PERF_FUNCTION_BEGIN ();
@@ -622,6 +624,7 @@ InitPaging ( NumberOfPdptEntries = 4;
}
+ DisableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect (&WpEnabled, &CetEnabled);
//
// Go through page table and change 2MB-page into 4KB-page.
//
@@ -802,6 +805,8 @@ InitPaging ( } // end for PML4
} // end for PML5
+ EnableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect (WpEnabled, CetEnabled);
+
//
// Flush TLB
//
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