SecurityPkg: INF/DEC file updates to EDK II packages

4. PCD information in DEC file comment blocks are either incomplete or incorrect.  
This includes detailed description, @Prompt, @ValidRange, @ValidList, @Expression, and [Error.<TokenSpaceGuid>] validation error messages.

Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Dong, Guo <guo.dong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao, Liming <liming.gao@intel.com>

git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@15952 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524

1 files changed, 153 insertions, 107 deletions

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
index 1d44095..47a96a9 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
+++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 ## @file  SecurityPkg.dec

-#  This package includes the security drivers, defintions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs  

-#  and library classes) and libraries instances.

+#  Provides security features that conform to TCG/UEFI industry standards

+#

+#  The security features include secure boot, measured boot and user identification.

+#  It also provides the definitions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs and library classes)

+#  and libraries instances, which are used for those features.

 #

 # Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

 # This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under

@@ -16,6 +19,7 @@
 [Defines]

   DEC_SPECIFICATION              = 0x00010005

   PACKAGE_NAME                   = SecurityPkg

+  PACKAGE_UNI_FILE               = SecurityPkg.uni

   PACKAGE_GUID                   = 24369CAC-6AA6-4fb8-88DB-90BF061668AD

   PACKAGE_VERSION                = 0.93

 

@@ -64,10 +68,10 @@
   TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib.h

 

 [Guids]

-  ## Security package token space guid

+  ## Security package token space guid.

   # Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid      = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}

-  

+

   ## Guid acted as the authenticated variable store header's signature, and to specify the variable list entries put in the EFI system table.

   #  Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h

   gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid      = { 0xaaf32c78, 0x947b, 0x439a, { 0xa1, 0x80, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x77, 0x92 } }

@@ -87,7 +91,7 @@
   gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid           = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }

 

   ## GUID used to "VendorKeysNv" variable to record the out of band secure boot keys modification.

-  #  This variable is a read-only NV varaible that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a 

+  #  This variable is a read-only NV variable that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a 

   #  mechanism not defined by the UEFI Specification to transition the system to setup mode or to update secure boot keys.

   #  Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h

   gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid               = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }

@@ -157,150 +161,190 @@
   gTrEEConfigFormSetGuid              = {0xc54b425f, 0xaa79, 0x48b4, { 0x98, 0x1f, 0x99, 0x8b, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x64, 0x1c }}

 

 [Ppis]

-  ## Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h

+  ## The PPI GUID for that TPM physical presence should be locked.

+  # Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h

   gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid    = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }

 

-  ## Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h

+  ## The PPI GUID for that TPM is initialized.

+  # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h

   gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid      = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}

 

   ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcluded.h

   gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcludedPpiGuid = { 0x6e056ff9, 0xc695, 0x4364, { 0x9e, 0x2c, 0x61, 0x26, 0xf5, 0xce, 0xea, 0xae } }

 

-[PcdsFixedAtBuild]

-  ## Pcd for OptionRom.

-  #  Image verification policy settings:

-  #  ALWAYS_EXECUTE                         0x00000000

-  #  NEVER_EXECUTE                          0x00000001

-  #  ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION    0x00000002

-  #  DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION    0x00000003

-  #  DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION     0x00000004

-  #  QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION       0x00000005 

-  #  NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since

-  #  it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.

+#

+# [Error.gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid]

+#   0x80000001 | Invalid value provided.

+#   0x80000002 | Reserved bits must be set to zero.

+#

+

+[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]

+  ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>

+  #  NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>

+  #  0x00000000      Always trust the image.<BR>

+  #  0x00000001      Never trust the image.<BR>

+  #  0x00000002      Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>

+  #  0x00000003      Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>

+  #  0x00000004      Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>

+  #  0x00000005      Query user when there is security violation.<BR>

+  # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.

+  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001

-  

-  ## Pcd for removable media.

-  #  Removable media include CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.

-  #  Image verification policy settings:

-  #  ALWAYS_EXECUTE                         0x00000000

-  #  NEVER_EXECUTE                          0x00000001

-  #  ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION    0x00000002

-  #  DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION    0x00000003

-  #  DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION     0x00000004

-  #  QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION       0x00000005

-  #  NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since

-  #  it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.

+

+  ## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.

+  #  Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>

+  #  NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>

+  #  0x00000000      Always trust the image.<BR>

+  #  0x00000001      Never trust the image.<BR>

+  #  0x00000002      Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>

+  #  0x00000003      Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>

+  #  0x00000004      Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>

+  #  0x00000005      Query user when there is security violation.<BR>

+  # @Prompt Set policy for the image from removable media.

+  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000002

-  

-  ## Pcd for fixed media.

-  #  Fixed media include hard disk.

-  #  Image verification policy settings:

-  #  ALWAYS_EXECUTE                         0x00000000

-  #  NEVER_EXECUTE                          0x00000001

-  #  ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION    0x00000002

-  #  DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION    0x00000003

-  #  DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION     0x00000004

-  #  QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION       0x00000005  

-  #  NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since

-  #  it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.

+

+  ## Image verification policy for fixed media which includes hard disk.

+  #  Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>

+  #  NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>

+  #  0x00000000      Always trust the image.<BR>

+  #  0x00000001      Never trust the image.<BR>

+  #  0x00000002      Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>

+  #  0x00000003      Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>

+  #  0x00000004      Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>

+  #  0x00000005      Query user when there is security violation.<BR>

+  # @Prompt Set policy for the image from fixed media.

+  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005 

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000003

-  

-  ## Defer Image Load policy settings.

-  #  The policy is bitwise. 

-  #  If bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trust when loading.

-  #

-  # IMAGE_UNKNOWN                         0x00000001

-  # IMAGE_FROM_FV                         0x00000002

-  # IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM                 0x00000004

-  # IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA            0x00000008

-  # IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA                0x00000010

-  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004

-  

-  ## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.

-  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005  

 

-  ## This PCD specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip. 

-  #  This PCD is only avaiable when PcdTpmPhysicalPresence is TRUE.

-  #  If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.

-  #  If 1, TCG platform type is server.

-  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006

+  ## Defer Image Load policy settings. The policy is bitwise. 

+  #  If a bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trusted when loading. Or  

+  #  the image will be deferred. The deferred image will be checked after user is identified.<BR><BR>

+  #    BIT0       - Image from unknown device. <BR>

+  #    BIT1       - Image from firmware volume.<BR>

+  #    BIT2       - Image from OptionRom.<BR>

+  #    BIT3       - Image from removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.<BR>

+  #    BIT4       - Image from fixed media device which includes hard disk.<BR>

+  # @Prompt Set policy whether trust image before user identification.

+  # @ValidRange 0x80000002 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F 

+  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004

 

-[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]

   ## Null-terminated Unicode string of the file name that is the default name to save USB credential.

   #  The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.

   # @Prompt File name to save credential.

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName|L"Token.bin"|VOID*|0x00000005

-  

+

+  ## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.

+  #  Note: This PCD is not been used.

+  # @Prompt Max variable size for append operation.

+  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005  

+

+  ## Specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.<BR><BR>

+  #  If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.<BR>

+  #  If 1, TCG platform type is PC server.<BR>

+  # @Prompt Select platform type.

+  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 

+  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006

+

 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]

-  ## This PCD indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator.

+  ## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.

+  #  If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands 

+  #  that required operator physical presence can not run.<BR><BR>

+  #   TRUE  - The platform operator is physically present.<BR>

+  #   FALSE - The platform operator is not physically present.<BR>

+  # @Prompt Physical presence of the platform operator.

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001

 

 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]

-  ## This PCD indicates whether to set TPM physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.

-  #  Once this bit is set, it can not be cleared (It is locked for TPM life time).

+  ## Indicates whether TPM physical presence is locked during platform initialization.  

+  #  Once it is locked, it can not be unlocked for TPM life time.<BR><BR>

+  #   TRUE  - Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>

+  #   FALSE - Not lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>

+  # @Prompt Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceLifetimeLock|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010003

-  

+

 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]

-  ## This PCD is used to specify the default value for physicalPresenceCMDEnable bit when setting physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.

-  #  If PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable is set to TRUE, physicalPresenceCMDEnable bit will be set, else this bit will be cleared.

+  ## Indicates whether the platform supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>

+  #   TRUE  - Supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>

+  #   FALSE - Does not support the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>

+  # @Prompt Enable software method of asserting physical presence.

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010004

-  

+

 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]

-  ## This PCD is used to specify the default value for physicalPresenceHWEnable bit when setting physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.

-  #  If PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable is set to TRUE, physicalPresenceHWEnable bit will be set, else this bit will be cleared.

+  ## Indicates whether the platform supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>

+  #   TRUE  - Supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>

+  #   FALSE - Does not support the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>

+  # @Prompt Enable hardware method of asserting physical presence.

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010005

 

 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]

-  ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists.

+  ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists. <BR><BR>

+  #   TRUE  - Firmware debugger exists.<BR>

+  #   FALSE - Firmware debugger doesn't exist.<BR>

+  # @Prompt Firmware debugger status.

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010009

 

-  ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 initialization policy.

-  #  0: No initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.

-  #  1: Initialization needed.

+  ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>

+  #  If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>

+  #  If 1, initialization needed.<BR>

+  # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device initialization policy.<BR>

+  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000A

 

-  ## This PCD indicates the TPM initialization policy.

-  #  0: No initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.

-  #  1: Initialization needed.

+  ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>

+  #  If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>

+  #  If 1, initialization needed.<BR>

+  # @Prompt TPM 1.2 device initialization policy.

+  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000B

 

-  ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 SelfTest policy.

-  #  0: No SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.

-  #  1: SelfTest needed.

+  ## This PCD indicates the TPM 2.0 SelfTest policy.<BR><BR>

+  #  if 0, no SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.<BR>

+  #  if 1, SelfTest needed.<BR>

+  # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device selftest.

+  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000C

 

-  ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 SCRTM policy.

-  #    0: No SCRTM needed - In this case, it is already done.

-  #    1: SCRTM done by BIOS.

+  ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>

+  #  if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>

+  #  if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>

+  # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 2.0 device.

+  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000D

 

-  ## This PCD indicates the TPM SCRTM policy.

-  #    0: No SCRTM needed - In this case, it is already done.

-  #    1: SCRTM done by BIOS.

+  ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>

+  #  if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>

+  #  if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>

+  # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 1.2 device

+  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000E

 

-  ## Guid name to identify TPM instance

-  #  TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable

-  #  TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM1.2 DTPM

-  #  TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM2 DTPM

+  ## Guid name to identify TPM instance.<BR><BR>

+  #  TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable.<BR>

+  #  TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM 1.2 DTPM.<BR>

+  #  TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM 2.0 DTPM.<BR>

+  # @Prompt TPM device type identifier

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid |{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }|VOID*|0x0001000F

 

-  ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 Hash mask.

-  #    BIT0: SHA1

-  #    BIT1: SHA256

-  #    BIT2: SHA384

-  #    BIT3: SHA512

-  #  If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.

-  #  If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.

-  #  0xFFFFFFFF means extend all.

-  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0xFFFFFFFF|UINT32|0x00010010

-

-  ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.

-  #  0: No auto detection.

-  #  1: Auto detection.

+  ## This PCD indicates Hash mask for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>

+  #  If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.<BR>

+  #  If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.<BR>

+  #    BIT0  -  SHA1.<BR>

+  #    BIT1  -  SHA256.<BR>

+  #    BIT2  -  SHA384.<BR>

+  #    BIT3  -  SHA512.<BR>

+  # @Prompt Hash mask for TPM 2.0

+  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000000F 

+  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0x0000000F|UINT32|0x00010010

+

+  ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.<BR><BR>

+  #  FALSE - No auto detection.<BR>

+  #  TRUE  - Auto detection.<BR>

+  # @Prompt TPM type detection.

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmAutoDetection|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010011

 

-  ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.

+  ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.<BR><BR>

+  # @Prompt TPM device address.

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress|0xFED40000|UINT64|0x00010012

 

   ## Provides one or more SHA 256 Hashes of the RSA 2048 public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images

@@ -308,4 +352,6 @@
   # @Prompt One or more SHA 256 Hashes of RSA 2048 bit public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images

   #

   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRsa2048Sha256PublicKeyBuffer|{0x91, 0x29, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xea, 0x6d, 0xda, 0xb3, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0x50, 0x16, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x3c, 0xd6, 0xdc, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xe6, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xd4, 0xa6, 0x4d}|VOID*|0x00010013

-    
\ No newline at end of file
+  

+[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]

+  SecurityPkgExtra.uni