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authorLiming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>2018-06-27 21:13:09 +0800
committerLiming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>2018-06-28 11:19:50 +0800
commitb3548d32ddb553a9e95503457c66d11462622d16 (patch)
tree58d9148d8298dcc8ea64e5515ada87c433f6be2a /SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated
parent5a702acd3df099307d9bae0725f97b52b4895382 (diff)
downloadedk2-b3548d32ddb553a9e95503457c66d11462622d16.zip
edk2-b3548d32ddb553a9e95503457c66d11462622d16.tar.gz
edk2-b3548d32ddb553a9e95503457c66d11462622d16.tar.bz2
SecurityPkg: Clean up source files
1. Do not use tab characters 2. No trailing white space in one line 3. All files must end with CRLF Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated')
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.c166
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.h22
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/EsalVariableDxeSal.inf14
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/EsalVariableDxeSalExtra.uni6
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/InitVariable.c12
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Reclaim.c10
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.c368
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.h60
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr4
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDriver.c30
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxeExtra.uni6
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c10
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigMisc.c32
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni6
14 files changed, 373 insertions, 373 deletions
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.c
index 490a8b3..8799458 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.c
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable
service in UEFI2.2.
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-This program and the accompanying materials
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
**/
@@ -61,13 +61,13 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
mVariableModuleGlobal->HashContext[Physical] = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);
ASSERT (mVariableModuleGlobal->HashContext[Physical] != NULL);
//
- // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.
- // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
+ // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.
+ // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
//
Status = FindVariable (
- mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableName[Physical][VAR_AUTH_KEY_DB],
- &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
- &Variable,
+ mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableName[Physical][VAR_AUTH_KEY_DB],
+ &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
+ &Variable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical],
mVariableModuleGlobal->FvbInstance
);
@@ -96,10 +96,10 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
// Load database in global variable for cache.
//
Valid = IsValidVariableHeader (
- Variable.CurrPtr,
- Variable.Volatile,
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical],
- mVariableModuleGlobal->FvbInstance,
+ Variable.CurrPtr,
+ Variable.Volatile,
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical],
+ mVariableModuleGlobal->FvbInstance,
&VariableHeader
);
ASSERT (Valid);
@@ -117,23 +117,23 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
}
//
- // Check "SetupMode" variable's existence.
+ // Check "SetupMode" variable's existence.
// If it doesn't exist, check PK database's existence to determine the value.
- // Then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
+ // Then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
//
Status = FindVariable (
- mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableName[Physical][VAR_SETUP_MODE],
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &Variable,
+ mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableName[Physical][VAR_SETUP_MODE],
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &Variable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical],
mVariableModuleGlobal->FvbInstance
);
if (Variable.CurrPtr == 0x0) {
Status = FindVariable (
- mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableName[Physical][VAR_PLATFORM_KEY],
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &Variable,
+ mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableName[Physical][VAR_PLATFORM_KEY],
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &Variable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical],
mVariableModuleGlobal->FvbInstance
);
@@ -169,13 +169,13 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
);
}
//
- // Check "SignatureSupport" variable's existence.
- // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
+ // Check "SignatureSupport" variable's existence.
+ // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
//
Status = FindVariable (
- EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &Variable,
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &Variable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical],
mVariableModuleGlobal->FvbInstance
);
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ VerifyDataPayload (
//
Rsa = RsaNew ();
ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);
- //
+ //
// Set RSA Key Components.
// NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.
//
@@ -380,10 +380,10 @@ VerifyDataPayload (
// Verify the signature.
//
Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (
- Rsa,
- Digest,
- SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
- CertBlock->Signature,
+ Rsa,
+ Digest,
+ SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ CertBlock->Signature,
EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE
);
@@ -419,9 +419,9 @@ UpdatePlatformMode (
UINT32 VarAttr;
Status = FindVariable (
- Global->VariableName[VirtualMode][VAR_SETUP_MODE],
- Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
- &Variable,
+ Global->VariableName[VirtualMode][VAR_SETUP_MODE],
+ Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
+ &Variable,
&Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
Global->FvbInstance
);
@@ -459,8 +459,8 @@ UpdatePlatformMode (
@param[in] IsPk Indicates whether to process pk.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
- @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
- check carried out by the firmware.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
+ check carried out by the firmware.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The variable passed validation successfully.
**/
@@ -507,10 +507,10 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
if (Variable->CurrPtr != 0x0) {
Valid = IsValidVariableHeader (
- Variable->CurrPtr,
- Variable->Volatile,
- &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
- Global->FvbInstance,
+ Variable->CurrPtr,
+ Variable->Volatile,
+ &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
+ Global->FvbInstance,
&VariableHeader
);
ASSERT (Valid);
@@ -526,9 +526,9 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
// Get platform key from variable.
//
Status = FindVariable (
- Global->VariableName[VirtualMode][VAR_PLATFORM_KEY],
- Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
- &PkVariable,
+ Global->VariableName[VirtualMode][VAR_PLATFORM_KEY],
+ Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
+ &PkVariable,
&Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
Global->FvbInstance
);
@@ -548,14 +548,14 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
Status = VerifyDataPayload (VirtualMode, Global, Data, DataSize, OldPkData->SignatureData);
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
Status = UpdateVariable (
- VariableName,
- VendorGuid,
- (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,
- DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,
- Attributes,
- 0,
- CertData->MonotonicCount,
- VirtualMode,
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,
+ DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,
+ Attributes,
+ 0,
+ CertData->MonotonicCount,
+ VirtualMode,
Global,
Variable
);
@@ -596,8 +596,8 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
@param[in] Attributes The attribute value of the variable.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
- @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable did NOT pass the validation
- check carried out by the firmware.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable did NOT pass the validation
+ check carried out by the firmware.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The variable passed validation successfully.
**/
@@ -640,10 +640,10 @@ ProcessVarWithKek (
CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);
if (Variable->CurrPtr != 0x0) {
Valid = IsValidVariableHeader (
- Variable->CurrPtr,
- Variable->Volatile,
- &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
- Global->FvbInstance,
+ Variable->CurrPtr,
+ Variable->Volatile,
+ &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
+ Global->FvbInstance,
&VariableHeader
);
ASSERT (Valid);
@@ -659,9 +659,9 @@ ProcessVarWithKek (
// Get KEK database from variable.
//
Status = FindVariable (
- Global->VariableName[VirtualMode][VAR_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY],
- Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
- &KekVariable,
+ Global->VariableName[VirtualMode][VAR_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY],
+ Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
+ &KekVariable,
&Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
Global->FvbInstance
);
@@ -698,13 +698,13 @@ ProcessVarWithKek (
Status = VerifyDataPayload (VirtualMode, Global, Data, DataSize, CertBlock->PublicKey);
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
Status = UpdateVariable (
- VariableName,
- VendorGuid,
- (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,
- DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,
- Attributes,
- 0,
- CertData->MonotonicCount,
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,
+ DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,
+ Attributes,
+ 0,
+ CertData->MonotonicCount,
VirtualMode,
Global,
Variable
@@ -715,13 +715,13 @@ ProcessVarWithKek (
// If in setup mode, no authentication needed.
//
Status = UpdateVariable (
- VariableName,
- VendorGuid,
- Data,
- DataSize,
- Attributes,
- 0,
- 0,
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ Data,
+ DataSize,
+ Attributes,
+ 0,
+ 0,
VirtualMode,
Global,
Variable
@@ -748,8 +748,8 @@ ProcessVarWithKek (
@retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED The variable is write-protected and needs authentication with
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
- set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation
- check carried out by the firmware.
+ set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation
+ check carried out by the firmware.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The variable is not write-protected, or passed validation successfully.
**/
@@ -789,10 +789,10 @@ VerifyVariable (
ZeroMem (&VariableHeader, sizeof (AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_HEADER));
if (Variable->CurrPtr != 0x0) {
Valid = IsValidVariableHeader (
- Variable->CurrPtr,
- Variable->Volatile,
- &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
- Global->FvbInstance,
+ Variable->CurrPtr,
+ Variable->Volatile,
+ &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
+ Global->FvbInstance,
&VariableHeader
);
ASSERT (Valid);
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ VerifyVariable (
*KeyIndex = VariableHeader.PubKeyIndex;
IsFirstTime = FALSE;
}
- } else if (Valid && (VariableHeader.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
+ } else if (Valid && (VariableHeader.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
//
// If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.
//
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ VerifyVariable (
//
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
- }
+ }
//
// Verify the certificate in Data payload.
//
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.h b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.h
index f3e15f6..9df3020 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.h
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
The internal header file includes the common header files, defines
internal structure and functions used by AuthService module.
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-This program and the accompanying materials
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
**/
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
@retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED The variable is write-protected and needs authentication with
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
- set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation
- check carried out by the firmware.
+ set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation
+ check carried out by the firmware.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The variable is not write-protected, or passed validation successfully.
**/
@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ CryptLibraryInitialize (
@param[in] IsPk Indicates whether to process pk.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
- @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
- check carried out by the firmware.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
+ check carried out by the firmware.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The variable passed validation successfully.
**/
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
@param[in] Attributes The attribute value of the variable.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
- @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
- check carried out by the firmware.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
+ check carried out by the firmware.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The variable passed validation successfully.
**/
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/EsalVariableDxeSal.inf b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/EsalVariableDxeSal.inf
index 16caa30..fcfda3d 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/EsalVariableDxeSal.inf
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/EsalVariableDxeSal.inf
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
# This module installs variable arch protocol and variable write arch protocol to provide
# four EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES: SetVariable, GetVariable, GetNextVariableName and QueryVariableInfo.
#
-# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
# This program and the accompanying materials
# are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
# which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
#
# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IPF
#
-# VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_MAP_CALLBACK = VariableClassAddressChangeEvent
+# VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_MAP_CALLBACK = VariableClassAddressChangeEvent
#
[Sources.common]
@@ -73,13 +73,13 @@
## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"SignatureSupport"
## PRODUCES ## Variable:L"SignatureSupport"
gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
-
+
## PRODUCES ## GUID # Variable store header
## CONSUMES ## GUID # Variable store header
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## HOB
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## SystemTable
gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid
-
+
gEfiEventVirtualAddressChangeGuid ## CONSUMES ## Event
gEfiCertRsa2048Sha256Guid ## CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the format of the CertType.
@@ -94,12 +94,12 @@
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize ## CONSUMES
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVariableStoreSize ## CONSUMES
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHwErrStorageSize ## CONSUMES
-
+
[FeaturePcd.common]
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVariableCollectStatistics ## CONSUMES # statistic the information of variable.
[Depex]
- gEfiExtendedSalFvBlockServicesProtocolGuid AND gEfiFaultTolerantWriteProtocolGuid
+ gEfiExtendedSalFvBlockServicesProtocolGuid AND gEfiFaultTolerantWriteProtocolGuid
[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]
- EsalVariableDxeSalExtra.uni \ No newline at end of file
+ EsalVariableDxeSalExtra.uni
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/EsalVariableDxeSalExtra.uni b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/EsalVariableDxeSalExtra.uni
index cb65895..6b3342c 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/EsalVariableDxeSalExtra.uni
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/EsalVariableDxeSalExtra.uni
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
// /** @file
// EsalVariableDxeSal Localized Strings and Content
//
-// Copyright (c) 2013 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+// Copyright (c) 2013 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
//
// This program and the accompanying materials
// are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
//
// **/
-#string STR_PROPERTIES_MODULE_NAME
-#language en-US
+#string STR_PROPERTIES_MODULE_NAME
+#language en-US
"Esal Authenticated Variable DXE"
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/InitVariable.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/InitVariable.c
index 0f1d645..a9e739d 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/InitVariable.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/InitVariable.c
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
/** @file
Entrypoint of Extended SAL variable service module.
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-This program and the accompanying materials
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
**/
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ EsalVariableCommonEntry (
)
{
SAL_RETURN_REGS ReturnVal;
-
+
ReturnVal.r9 = 0;
ReturnVal.r10 = 0;
ReturnVal.r11 = 0;
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Reclaim.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Reclaim.c
index 1cbf9ac..898974c 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Reclaim.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Reclaim.c
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
Handles non-volatile variable store garbage collection, using FTW
(Fault Tolerant Write) protocol.
-Copyright (c) 2006 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-This program and the accompanying materials
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+Copyright (c) 2006 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
**/
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.c
index dfa8597..b8a0af4 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.c
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
/** @file
The implementation of Extended SAL variable services.
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2016, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-This program and the accompanying materials
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
**/
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ AccessVariableStore (
if ((StartAddress + DataSize) > ((UINTN) ((UINT8 *) VolatileBase + VolatileBase->Size))) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
-
+
//
// For volatile variable, a simple memory copy is enough.
//
@@ -181,13 +181,13 @@ AccessVariableStore (
Status = (EFI_STATUS) EsalCall (
EFI_EXTENDED_SAL_FV_BLOCK_SERVICES_PROTOCOL_GUID_LO,
EFI_EXTENDED_SAL_FV_BLOCK_SERVICES_PROTOCOL_GUID_HI,
- GetPhysicalAddressFunctionId,
- Instance,
- (UINT64) &FvVolHdr,
- 0,
- 0,
- 0,
- 0,
+ GetPhysicalAddressFunctionId,
+ Instance,
+ (UINT64) &FvVolHdr,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ 0,
0
).Status;
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ AccessVariableStore (
if ((StartAddress + DataSize) > ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) ((CHAR8 *)VariableStoreHeader + VariableStoreHeader->Size))) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
-
+
LinearOffset = (UINTN) FwVolHeader;
CurrWritePtr = StartAddress;
CurrWriteSize = DataSize;
@@ -227,26 +227,26 @@ AccessVariableStore (
Status = (EFI_STATUS) EsalCall (
EFI_EXTENDED_SAL_FV_BLOCK_SERVICES_PROTOCOL_GUID_LO,
EFI_EXTENDED_SAL_FV_BLOCK_SERVICES_PROTOCOL_GUID_HI,
- WriteFunctionId,
- Instance,
- LbaNumber,
- (CurrWritePtr - LinearOffset),
- (UINT64) &CurrWriteSize,
- (UINT64) CurrBuffer,
- 0,
+ WriteFunctionId,
+ Instance,
+ LbaNumber,
+ (CurrWritePtr - LinearOffset),
+ (UINT64) &CurrWriteSize,
+ (UINT64) CurrBuffer,
+ 0,
0
).Status;
} else {
Status = (EFI_STATUS) EsalCall (
EFI_EXTENDED_SAL_FV_BLOCK_SERVICES_PROTOCOL_GUID_LO,
EFI_EXTENDED_SAL_FV_BLOCK_SERVICES_PROTOCOL_GUID_HI,
- ReadFunctionId,
- Instance,
- LbaNumber,
- (CurrWritePtr - LinearOffset),
- (UINT64) &CurrWriteSize,
- (UINT64) CurrBuffer,
- 0,
+ ReadFunctionId,
+ Instance,
+ LbaNumber,
+ (CurrWritePtr - LinearOffset),
+ (UINT64) &CurrWriteSize,
+ (UINT64) CurrBuffer,
+ 0,
0
).Status;
}
@@ -260,26 +260,26 @@ AccessVariableStore (
Status = (EFI_STATUS) EsalCall (
EFI_EXTENDED_SAL_FV_BLOCK_SERVICES_PROTOCOL_GUID_LO,
EFI_EXTENDED_SAL_FV_BLOCK_SERVICES_PROTOCOL_GUID_HI,
- WriteFunctionId,
- Instance,
- LbaNumber,
- (CurrWritePtr - LinearOffset),
- (UINT64) &Size,
- (UINT64) CurrBuffer,
- 0,
+ WriteFunctionId,
+ Instance,
+ LbaNumber,
+ (CurrWritePtr - LinearOffset),
+ (UINT64) &Size,
+ (UINT64) CurrBuffer,
+ 0,
0
).Status;
} else {
Status = (EFI_STATUS) EsalCall (
EFI_EXTENDED_SAL_FV_BLOCK_SERVICES_PROTOCOL_GUID_LO,
EFI_EXTENDED_SAL_FV_BLOCK_SERVICES_PROTOCOL_GUID_HI,
- ReadFunctionId,
- Instance,
- LbaNumber,
- (CurrWritePtr - LinearOffset),
- (UINT64) &Size,
- (UINT64) CurrBuffer,
- 0,
+ ReadFunctionId,
+ Instance,
+ LbaNumber,
+ (CurrWritePtr - LinearOffset),
+ (UINT64) &Size,
+ (UINT64) CurrBuffer,
+ 0,
0
).Status;
}
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ GetVarStoreHeader (
Instance,
VarStoreAddress,
sizeof (VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER),
- VarStoreHeader
+ VarStoreHeader
);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
}
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ IsValidVariableHeader (
Instance,
VariableAddress,
sizeof (AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_HEADER),
- &LocalVariableHeader
+ &LocalVariableHeader
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || LocalVariableHeader.StartId != VARIABLE_DATA) {
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ GetVariableNamePtr (
Instance,
Address,
VariableHeader.NameSize,
- VariableName
+ VariableName
);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
}
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ GetVariableDataPtr (
Instance,
Address,
VariableHeader.DataSize,
- VariableData
+ VariableData
);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
}
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ GetNextVariablePtr (
/**
Gets the pointer to the first variable header in given variable store area.
- This function gets the pointer to the first variable header in given variable
+ This function gets the pointer to the first variable header in given variable
store area. The variable store area is given by its start address.
@param[in] VarStoreHeaderAddress Pointer to the header of variable store area.
@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ GetEndPointer (
Instance,
VarStoreHeaderAddress,
sizeof (VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER),
- &VariableStoreHeader
+ &VariableStoreHeader
);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
@@ -685,12 +685,12 @@ GetEndPointer (
/**
Updates variable info entry in EFI system table for statistical information.
- Routine used to track statistical information about variable usage.
+ Routine used to track statistical information about variable usage.
The data is stored in the EFI system table so it can be accessed later.
- VariableInfo.efi can dump out the table. Only Boot Services variable
+ VariableInfo.efi can dump out the table. Only Boot Services variable
accesses are tracked by this code. The PcdVariableCollectStatistics
- build flag controls if this feature is enabled.
- A read that hits in the cache will have Read and Cache true for
+ build flag controls if this feature is enabled.
+ A read that hits in the cache will have Read and Cache true for
the transaction. Data is allocated by this routine, but never
freed.
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ UpdateVariableInfo (
gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid, gVariableInfo);
}
-
+
for (Entry = gVariableInfo; Entry != NULL; Entry = Entry->Next) {
if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &Entry->VendorGuid)) {
if (StrCmp (VariableName, Entry->Name) == 0) {
@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ UpdateVariableCache (
//
for (Index = 0, Entry = mVariableCache; Index < sizeof (mVariableCache)/sizeof (VARIABLE_CACHE_ENTRY); Index++, Entry++) {
if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, Entry->Guid)) {
- if (StrCmp (VariableName, Entry->Name) == 0) {
+ if (StrCmp (VariableName, Entry->Name) == 0) {
Entry->Attributes = Attributes;
if (DataSize == 0) {
//
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ FindVariableInCache (
}
}
}
-
+
return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
}
@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ FindVariable (
Volatile = FALSE;
}
while (IsValidVariableHeader (Variable[Index], Volatile, Global, Instance, &VariableHeader)) {
- if (VariableHeader.State == VAR_ADDED ||
+ if (VariableHeader.State == VAR_ADDED ||
VariableHeader.State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)
) {
if (!EfiAtRuntime () || ((VariableHeader.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) != 0)) {
@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ Reclaim (
//
// Collect VAR_ADDED variables, and variables in delete transition status.
//
- if (VariableHeader.State == VAR_ADDED ||
+ if (VariableHeader.State == VAR_ADDED ||
VariableHeader.State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)
) {
VariableSize = NextVariable - Variable;
@@ -1173,9 +1173,9 @@ Reclaim (
}
//
- // Reserve the 1 Bytes with Oxff to identify the
- // end of the variable buffer.
- //
+ // Reserve the 1 Bytes with Oxff to identify the
+ // end of the variable buffer.
+ //
MaximumBufferSize += 1;
ValidBuffer = AllocatePool (MaximumBufferSize);
if (ValidBuffer == NULL) {
@@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ Reclaim (
//
// Reinstall all ADDED variables
- //
+ //
Variable = GetStartPointer (VariableBase);
while (IsValidVariableHeader (Variable, IsVolatile, VariableGlobal, Instance, &VariableHeader)) {
NextVariable = GetNextVariablePtr (Variable, IsVolatile, VariableGlobal, Instance);
@@ -1210,17 +1210,17 @@ Reclaim (
}
//
// Reinstall in delete transition variables
- //
+ //
Variable = GetStartPointer (VariableBase);
while (IsValidVariableHeader (Variable, IsVolatile, VariableGlobal, Instance, &VariableHeader)) {
NextVariable = GetNextVariablePtr (Variable, IsVolatile, VariableGlobal, Instance);
if (VariableHeader.State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) {
//
- // Buffer has cached all ADDED variable.
+ // Buffer has cached all ADDED variable.
// Per IN_DELETED variable, we have to guarantee that
- // no ADDED one in previous buffer.
- //
+ // no ADDED one in previous buffer.
+ //
FoundAdded = FALSE;
AddedVariable = GetStartPointer ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) ValidBuffer);
while (IsValidVariableHeader (AddedVariable, IsVolatile, VariableGlobal, Instance, &AddedVariableHeader)) {
@@ -1327,7 +1327,7 @@ GetIndexFromSupportedLangCodes(
IN CHAR8 *SupportedLang,
IN CHAR8 *Lang,
IN BOOLEAN Iso639Language
- )
+ )
{
UINTN Index;
UINTN CompareLength;
@@ -1362,8 +1362,8 @@ GetIndexFromSupportedLangCodes(
// Determine the length of the next language code in SupportedLang
//
for (CompareLength = 0; SupportedLang[CompareLength] != '\0' && SupportedLang[CompareLength] != ';'; CompareLength++);
-
- if ((CompareLength == LanguageLength) &&
+
+ if ((CompareLength == LanguageLength) &&
(AsciiStrnCmp (Lang, SupportedLang, CompareLength) == 0)) {
//
// Successfully find the index of Lang string in SupportedLang string.
@@ -1465,10 +1465,10 @@ GetLangFromSupportedLangCodes (
}
/**
- Returns a pointer to an allocated buffer that contains the best matching language
- from a set of supported languages.
-
- This function supports both ISO 639-2 and RFC 4646 language codes, but language
+ Returns a pointer to an allocated buffer that contains the best matching language
+ from a set of supported languages.
+
+ This function supports both ISO 639-2 and RFC 4646 language codes, but language
code types may not be mixed in a single call to this function. This function
supports a variable argument list that allows the caller to pass in a prioritized
list of language codes to test against all the language codes in SupportedLanguages.
@@ -1476,37 +1476,37 @@ GetLangFromSupportedLangCodes (
If SupportedLanguages is NULL, then ASSERT().
@param[in] SupportedLanguages A pointer to a Null-terminated ASCII string that
- contains a set of language codes in the format
+ contains a set of language codes in the format
specified by Iso639Language.
@param[in] Iso639Language If TRUE, then all language codes are assumed to be
in ISO 639-2 format. If FALSE, then all language
codes are assumed to be in RFC 4646 language format.
@param[in] VirtualMode Current calling mode for this function.
- @param[in] ... A variable argument list that contains pointers to
+ @param[in] ... A variable argument list that contains pointers to
Null-terminated ASCII strings that contain one or more
language codes in the format specified by Iso639Language.
The first language code from each of these language
code lists is used to determine if it is an exact or
- close match to any of the language codes in
+ close match to any of the language codes in
SupportedLanguages. Close matches only apply to RFC 4646
language codes, and the matching algorithm from RFC 4647
- is used to determine if a close match is present. If
+ is used to determine if a close match is present. If
an exact or close match is found, then the matching
language code from SupportedLanguages is returned. If
no matches are found, then the next variable argument
- parameter is evaluated. The variable argument list
+ parameter is evaluated. The variable argument list
is terminated by a NULL.
@retval NULL The best matching language could not be found in SupportedLanguages.
- @retval NULL There are not enough resources available to return the best matching
+ @retval NULL There are not enough resources available to return the best matching
language.
- @retval Other A pointer to a Null-terminated ASCII string that is the best matching
+ @retval Other A pointer to a Null-terminated ASCII string that is the best matching
language in SupportedLanguages.
**/
CHAR8 *
VariableGetBestLanguage (
- IN CONST CHAR8 *SupportedLanguages,
+ IN CONST CHAR8 *SupportedLanguages,
IN BOOLEAN Iso639Language,
IN BOOLEAN VirtualMode,
...
@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ VariableGetBestLanguage (
LanguageLength = 0;
} else {
//
- // If RFC 4646 mode, then trim Language from the right to the next '-' character
+ // If RFC 4646 mode, then trim Language from the right to the next '-' character
//
for (LanguageLength--; LanguageLength > 0 && Language[LanguageLength] != '-'; LanguageLength--);
}
@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@ VariableGetBestLanguage (
VA_END (Args);
//
- // No matches were found
+ // No matches were found
//
return NULL;
}
@@ -1664,7 +1664,7 @@ AutoUpdateLangVariable(
ASSERT (Global->PlatformLangCodes[VirtualMode] != NULL);
//
- // PlatformLang holds a single language from PlatformLangCodes,
+ // PlatformLang holds a single language from PlatformLangCodes,
// so the size of PlatformLangCodes is enough for the PlatformLang.
//
if (Global->PlatformLang[VirtualMode] != NULL) {
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ AutoUpdateLangVariable(
ASSERT (Global->LangCodes[VirtualMode] != NULL);
}
- if (SetLanguageCodes
+ if (SetLanguageCodes
&& (Global->PlatformLangCodes[VirtualMode] != NULL)
&& (Global->LangCodes[VirtualMode] != NULL)) {
//
@@ -1732,7 +1732,7 @@ AutoUpdateLangVariable(
(UINTN) &(((AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_HEADER *)Variable.CurrPtr)->DataSize),
sizeof (DataSize),
&DataSize
- );
+ );
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
}
@@ -1811,15 +1811,15 @@ AutoUpdateLangVariable(
FindVariable (PredefinedVariableName[VAR_PLATFORM_LANG], Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode], &Variable, VariableGlobal, Instance);
Status = UpdateVariable (
- PredefinedVariableName[VAR_PLATFORM_LANG],
- Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
- BestPlatformLang,
- AsciiStrSize (BestPlatformLang),
- Attributes,
+ PredefinedVariableName[VAR_PLATFORM_LANG],
+ Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
+ BestPlatformLang,
+ AsciiStrSize (BestPlatformLang),
+ Attributes,
0,
0,
- VirtualMode,
- Global,
+ VirtualMode,
+ Global,
&Variable
);
@@ -1831,7 +1831,7 @@ AutoUpdateLangVariable(
}
/**
- Update the variable region with Variable information. These are the same
+ Update the variable region with Variable information. These are the same
arguments as the EFI Variable services.
@param[in] VariableName Name of variable.
@@ -1840,7 +1840,7 @@ AutoUpdateLangVariable(
@param[in] DataSize Size of data. 0 means delete.
@param[in] Attributes Attributes of the variable.
@param[in] KeyIndex Index of associated public key.
- @param[in] MonotonicCount Value of associated monotonic count.
+ @param[in] MonotonicCount Value of associated monotonic count.
@param[in] VirtualMode Current calling mode for this function.
@param[in] Global Context of this Extended SAL Variable Services Class call.
@param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.
@@ -1856,7 +1856,7 @@ UpdateVariable (
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
IN VOID *Data,
IN UINTN DataSize,
- IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,
+ IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,
IN UINT32 KeyIndex OPTIONAL,
IN UINT64 MonotonicCount OPTIONAL,
IN BOOLEAN VirtualMode,
@@ -1898,11 +1898,11 @@ UpdateVariable (
// Update/Delete existing variable
//
Volatile = Variable->Volatile;
-
- if (EfiAtRuntime ()) {
+
+ if (EfiAtRuntime ()) {
//
- // If EfiAtRuntime and the variable is Volatile and Runtime Access,
- // the volatile is ReadOnly, and SetVariable should be aborted and
+ // If EfiAtRuntime and the variable is Volatile and Runtime Access,
+ // the volatile is ReadOnly, and SetVariable should be aborted and
// return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED.
//
if (Variable->Volatile) {
@@ -1914,14 +1914,14 @@ UpdateVariable (
//
if ((VariableHeader.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0) {
Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- goto Done;
+ goto Done;
}
}
//
// Setting a data variable with no access, or zero DataSize attributes
// specified causes it to be deleted.
//
- if (DataSize == 0 || (Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS)) == 0) {
+ if (DataSize == 0 || (Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS)) == 0) {
State = VariableHeader.State;
State &= VAR_DELETED;
@@ -1933,12 +1933,12 @@ UpdateVariable (
(UINTN) &(((AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_HEADER *)Variable->CurrPtr)->State),
sizeof (UINT8),
&State
- );
+ );
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
UpdateVariableInfo (VariableName, VendorGuid, Volatile, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE);
UpdateVariableCache (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, DataSize, Data);
}
- goto Done;
+ goto Done;
}
//
// Logic comes here to update variable.
@@ -1971,25 +1971,25 @@ UpdateVariable (
(UINTN) &(((AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_HEADER *)Variable->CurrPtr)->State),
sizeof (UINT8),
&State
- );
+ );
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- goto Done;
+ goto Done;
}
- }
+ }
} else {
//
// Create a new variable
- //
-
+ //
+
//
// Make sure we are trying to create a new variable.
- // Setting a data variable with no access, or zero DataSize attributes means to delete it.
+ // Setting a data variable with no access, or zero DataSize attributes means to delete it.
//
if (DataSize == 0 || (Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS)) == 0) {
Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
goto Done;
}
-
+
//
// Only variable have NV|RT attribute can be created in Runtime
//
@@ -1997,7 +1997,7 @@ UpdateVariable (
(((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) == 0) || ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0))) {
Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto Done;
- }
+ }
}
//
@@ -2050,11 +2050,11 @@ UpdateVariable (
// Create a nonvolatile variable
//
Volatile = FALSE;
-
+
GetVarStoreHeader (VariableGlobal->NonVolatileVariableBase, FALSE, VariableGlobal, Instance, &VariableStoreHeader);
- if ((((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) != 0)
+ if ((((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) != 0)
&& ((HEADER_ALIGN (VarSize) + Global->HwErrVariableTotalSize) > PcdGet32(PcdHwErrStorageSize)))
- || (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) == 0)
+ || (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) == 0)
&& ((HEADER_ALIGN (VarSize) + Global->CommonVariableTotalSize) > VariableStoreHeader.Size - sizeof (VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER) - PcdGet32(PcdHwErrStorageSize)))) {
if (EfiAtRuntime ()) {
Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
@@ -2072,9 +2072,9 @@ UpdateVariable (
//
// If still no enough space, return out of resources
//
- if ((((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) != 0)
+ if ((((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) != 0)
&& ((HEADER_ALIGN (VarSize) + Global->HwErrVariableTotalSize) > PcdGet32(PcdHwErrStorageSize)))
- || (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) == 0)
+ || (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) == 0)
&& ((HEADER_ALIGN (VarSize) + Global->CommonVariableTotalSize) > VariableStoreHeader.Size - sizeof (VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER) - PcdGet32(PcdHwErrStorageSize)))) {
Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
goto Done;
@@ -2083,7 +2083,7 @@ UpdateVariable (
//
// Four steps
// 1. Write variable header
- // 2. Set variable state to header valid
+ // 2. Set variable state to header valid
// 3. Write variable data
// 4. Set variable state to valid
//
@@ -2165,7 +2165,7 @@ UpdateVariable (
} else {
//
// Create a volatile variable
- //
+ //
Volatile = TRUE;
if ((UINT32) (HEADER_ALIGN(VarSize) + Global->VolatileLastVariableOffset) >
@@ -2240,22 +2240,22 @@ Done:
This function implements EsalGetVariable function of Extended SAL Variable Services Class.
It is equivalent in functionality to the EFI Runtime Service GetVariable().
-
+
@param[in] VariableName A Null-terminated Unicode string that is the name of
the vendor's variable.
@param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.
- @param[out] Attributes If not NULL, a pointer to the memory location to return the
+ @param[out] Attributes If not NULL, a pointer to the memory location to return the
attributes bitmask for the variable.
@param[in, out] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
data, this value contains the required size.
- @param[out] Data On input, the size in bytes of the return Data buffer.
+ @param[out] Data On input, the size in bytes of the return Data buffer.
On output, the size of data returned in Data.
@param[in] VirtualMode Current calling mode for this function.
@param[in] Global Context of this Extended SAL Variable Services Class call.
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The function completed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The function completed successfully.
@retval EFI_NOT_FOUND The variable was not found.
- @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL DataSize is too small for the result. DataSize has
+ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL DataSize is too small for the result. DataSize has
been updated with the size needed to complete the request.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER VariableName is NULL.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER VendorGuid is NULL.
@@ -2349,7 +2349,7 @@ EsalGetVariable (
*DataSize = VarDataSize;
UpdateVariableInfo (VariableName, VendorGuid, Variable.Volatile, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, FALSE);
UpdateVariableCache (VariableName, VendorGuid, VariableHeader.Attributes, VarDataSize, Data);
-
+
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
goto Done;
} else {
@@ -2371,18 +2371,18 @@ Done:
This function implements EsalGetNextVariableName function of Extended SAL Variable Services Class.
It is equivalent in functionality to the EFI Runtime Service GetNextVariableName().
-
+
@param[in, out] VariableNameSize Size of the variable
@param[in, out] VariableName On input, supplies the last VariableName that was returned by GetNextVariableName().
On output, returns the Null-terminated Unicode string of the current variable.
@param[in, out] VendorGuid On input, supplies the last VendorGuid that was returned by GetNextVariableName().
- On output, returns the VendorGuid of the current variable.
+ On output, returns the VendorGuid of the current variable.
@param[in] VirtualMode Current calling mode for this function.
@param[in] Global Context of this Extended SAL Variable Services Class call.
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The function completed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The function completed successfully.
@retval EFI_NOT_FOUND The next variable was not found.
- @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL VariableNameSize is too small for the result.
+ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL VariableNameSize is too small for the result.
VariableNameSize has been updated with the size needed to complete the request.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER VariableNameSize is NULL.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER VariableName is NULL.
@@ -2512,11 +2512,11 @@ Done:
This function implements EsalSetVariable function of Extended SAL Variable Services Class.
It is equivalent in functionality to the EFI Runtime Service SetVariable().
-
+
@param[in] VariableName A Null-terminated Unicode string that is the name of the vendor's
- variable. Each VariableName is unique for each
- VendorGuid. VariableName must contain 1 or more
- Unicode characters. If VariableName is an empty Unicode
+ variable. Each VariableName is unique for each
+ VendorGuid. VariableName must contain 1 or more
+ Unicode characters. If VariableName is an empty Unicode
string, then EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER is returned.
@param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.
@param[in] Attributes Attributes bitmask to set for the variable.
@@ -2526,9 +2526,9 @@ Done:
@param[in] VirtualMode Current calling mode for this function.
@param[in] Global Context of this Extended SAL Variable Services Class call.
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The firmware has successfully stored the variable and its data as
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The firmware has successfully stored the variable and its data as
defined by the Attributes.
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An invalid combination of attribute bits was supplied, or the
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An invalid combination of attribute bits was supplied, or the
DataSize exceeds the maximum allowed.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER VariableName is an empty Unicode string.
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough storage is available to hold the variable and its data.
@@ -2566,7 +2566,7 @@ EsalSetVariable (
//
if (VariableName == NULL || VariableName[0] == 0 || VendorGuid == NULL) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
+ }
if (DataSize != 0 && Data == NULL) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
@@ -2585,17 +2585,17 @@ EsalSetVariable (
// Try to write Authencated Variable without AuthInfo
//
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
- }
- PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;
+ }
+ PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;
} else {
- PayloadSize = DataSize;
+ PayloadSize = DataSize;
}
-
+
if ((UINTN)(~0) - PayloadSize < StrSize(VariableName)){
//
- // Prevent whole variable size overflow
- //
+ // Prevent whole variable size overflow
+ //
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
@@ -2625,8 +2625,8 @@ EsalSetVariable (
//
if (StrSize (VariableName) + PayloadSize > PcdGet32(PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_HEADER)) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- }
+ }
+ }
AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime(&VariableGlobal->VariableServicesLock);
@@ -2676,31 +2676,31 @@ EsalSetVariable (
// Cut the certificate size before set
//
Status = UpdateVariable (
- VariableName,
- VendorGuid,
- (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,
- DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,
- Attributes,
- KeyIndex,
- MonotonicCount,
- VirtualMode,
- Global,
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,
+ DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,
+ Attributes,
+ KeyIndex,
+ MonotonicCount,
+ VirtualMode,
+ Global,
&Variable
);
} else {
//
- // Update variable as usual
+ // Update variable as usual
//
Status = UpdateVariable (
- VariableName,
- VendorGuid,
- Data,
- DataSize,
- Attributes,
- 0,
- 0,
- VirtualMode,
- Global,
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ Data,
+ DataSize,
+ Attributes,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ VirtualMode,
+ Global,
&Variable
);
}
@@ -2720,19 +2720,19 @@ EsalSetVariable (
@param[in] Attributes Attributes bitmask to specify the type of variables
on which to return information.
- @param[out] MaximumVariableStorageSize On output the maximum size of the storage space available for
- the EFI variables associated with the attributes specified.
- @param[out] RemainingVariableStorageSize Returns the remaining size of the storage space available for EFI
+ @param[out] MaximumVariableStorageSize On output the maximum size of the storage space available for
+ the EFI variables associated with the attributes specified.
+ @param[out] RemainingVariableStorageSize Returns the remaining size of the storage space available for EFI
variables associated with the attributes specified.
- @param[out] MaximumVariableSize Returns the maximum size of an individual EFI variable
+ @param[out] MaximumVariableSize Returns the maximum size of an individual EFI variable
associated with the attributes specified.
@param[in] VirtualMode Current calling mode for this function
@param[in] Global Context of this Extended SAL Variable Services Class call
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Valid answer returned.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An invalid combination of attribute bits was supplied.
- @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The attribute is not supported on this platform, and the
- MaximumVariableStorageSize, RemainingVariableStorageSize,
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The attribute is not supported on this platform, and the
+ MaximumVariableStorageSize, RemainingVariableStorageSize,
MaximumVariableSize are undefined.
**/
EFI_STATUS
@@ -2764,12 +2764,12 @@ EsalQueryVariableInfo (
if(MaximumVariableStorageSize == NULL || RemainingVariableStorageSize == NULL || MaximumVariableSize == NULL || Attributes == 0) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
-
+
if((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD)) == 0) {
//
// Make sure the Attributes combination is supported by the platform.
//
- return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
} else if ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS)) == EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) {
//
// Make sure if runtime bit is set, boot service bit is set also.
@@ -2917,20 +2917,20 @@ ReclaimForOS(
UINTN RemainingHwErrVariableSpace;
VarSize = ((VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *) ((UINTN) mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical].NonVolatileVariableBase))->Size;
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
//
//Allowable max size of common variable storage space
//
CommonVariableSpace = VarSize - sizeof (VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER) - PcdGet32(PcdHwErrStorageSize);
RemainingCommonVariableSpace = CommonVariableSpace - mVariableModuleGlobal->CommonVariableTotalSize;
-
+
RemainingHwErrVariableSpace = PcdGet32 (PcdHwErrStorageSize) - mVariableModuleGlobal->HwErrVariableTotalSize;
//
// If the free area is below a threshold, then performs reclaim operation.
//
if ((RemainingCommonVariableSpace < PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize))
- || ((PcdGet32 (PcdHwErrStorageSize) != 0) &&
+ || ((PcdGet32 (PcdHwErrStorageSize) != 0) &&
(RemainingHwErrVariableSpace < PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize)))){
Status = Reclaim (
mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical].NonVolatileVariableBase,
@@ -3056,7 +3056,7 @@ VariableCommonInitialize (
//
// Note that in EdkII variable driver implementation, Hardware Error Record type variable
// is stored with common variable in the same NV region. So the platform integrator should
- // ensure that the value of PcdHwErrStorageSize is less than or equal to the value of
+ // ensure that the value of PcdHwErrStorageSize is less than or equal to the value of
// PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize.
//
ASSERT (PcdGet32(PcdHwErrStorageSize) <= PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize));
@@ -3133,13 +3133,13 @@ VariableCommonInitialize (
Status = (EFI_STATUS) EsalCall (
EFI_EXTENDED_SAL_FV_BLOCK_SERVICES_PROTOCOL_GUID_LO,
EFI_EXTENDED_SAL_FV_BLOCK_SERVICES_PROTOCOL_GUID_HI,
- GetPhysicalAddressFunctionId,
- Instance,
- (UINT64) &FvVolHdr,
- 0,
- 0,
- 0,
- 0,
+ GetPhysicalAddressFunctionId,
+ Instance,
+ (UINT64) &FvVolHdr,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ 0,
0
).Status;
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
@@ -3237,9 +3237,9 @@ VariableCommonInitialize (
// Register the event handling function to reclaim variable for OS usage.
//
Status = EfiCreateEventReadyToBootEx (
- TPL_NOTIFY,
- ReclaimForOS,
- NULL,
+ TPL_NOTIFY,
+ ReclaimForOS,
+ NULL,
&ReadyToBootEvent
);
} else {
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.h b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.h
index b32ef74..76d4ac5 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.h
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
/** @file
Internal header file for Extended SAL variable service module.
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-This program and the accompanying materials
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
**/
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
#define AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME_SIZE 38
///
-/// The maximum size of the public key database, restricted by maximum individal EFI
+/// The maximum size of the public key database, restricted by maximum individal EFI
/// varible size, and excluding the variable header and name size.
///
#define MAX_KEYDB_SIZE (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_HEADER) - AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME_SIZE)
@@ -191,22 +191,22 @@ VariableClassAddressChangeEvent (
This function implements EsalGetVariable function of Extended SAL Variable Services Class.
It is equivalent in functionality to the EFI Runtime Service GetVariable().
-
+
@param[in] VariableName A Null-terminated Unicode string that is the name of
the vendor's variable.
@param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.
- @param[out] Attributes If not NULL, a pointer to the memory location to return the
+ @param[out] Attributes If not NULL, a pointer to the memory location to return the
attributes bitmask for the variable.
@param[in, out] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
data, this value contains the required size.
- @param[out] Data On input, the size in bytes of the return Data buffer.
+ @param[out] Data On input, the size in bytes of the return Data buffer.
On output, the size of data returned in Data.
@param[in] VirtualMode Current calling mode for this function.
@param[in] Global Context of this Extended SAL Variable Services Class call.
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The function completed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The function completed successfully.
@retval EFI_NOT_FOUND The variable was not found.
- @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL DataSize is too small for the result. DataSize has
+ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL DataSize is too small for the result. DataSize has
been updated with the size needed to complete the request.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER VariableName is NULL.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER VendorGuid is NULL.
@@ -233,18 +233,18 @@ EsalGetVariable (
This function implements EsalGetNextVariableName function of Extended SAL Variable Services Class.
It is equivalent in functionality to the EFI Runtime Service GetNextVariableName().
-
+
@param[in, out] VariableNameSize Size of the variable
@param[in, out] VariableName On input, supplies the last VariableName that was returned by GetNextVariableName().
On output, returns the Null-terminated Unicode string of the current variable.
@param[in, out] VendorGuid On input, supplies the last VendorGuid that was returned by GetNextVariableName().
- On output, returns the VendorGuid of the current variable.
+ On output, returns the VendorGuid of the current variable.
@param[in] VirtualMode Current calling mode for this function.
@param[in] Global Context of this Extended SAL Variable Services Class call.
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The function completed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The function completed successfully.
@retval EFI_NOT_FOUND The next variable was not found.
- @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL VariableNameSize is too small for the result.
+ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL VariableNameSize is too small for the result.
VariableNameSize has been updated with the size needed to complete the request.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER VariableNameSize is NULL.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER VariableName is NULL.
@@ -267,11 +267,11 @@ EsalGetNextVariableName (
This function implements EsalSetVariable function of Extended SAL Variable Services Class.
It is equivalent in functionality to the EFI Runtime Service SetVariable().
-
+
@param[in] VariableName A Null-terminated Unicode string that is the name of the vendor's
- variable. Each VariableName is unique for each
- VendorGuid. VariableName must contain 1 or more
- Unicode characters. If VariableName is an empty Unicode
+ variable. Each VariableName is unique for each
+ VendorGuid. VariableName must contain 1 or more
+ Unicode characters. If VariableName is an empty Unicode
string, then EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER is returned.
@param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.
@param[in] Attributes Attributes bitmask to set for the variable.
@@ -281,9 +281,9 @@ EsalGetNextVariableName (
@param[in] VirtualMode Current calling mode for this function.
@param[in] Global Context of this Extended SAL Variable Services Class call.
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The firmware has successfully stored the variable and its data as
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The firmware has successfully stored the variable and its data as
defined by the Attributes.
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An invalid combination of attribute bits was supplied, or the
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An invalid combination of attribute bits was supplied, or the
DataSize exceeds the maximum allowed.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER VariableName is an empty Unicode string.
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough storage is available to hold the variable and its data.
@@ -314,19 +314,19 @@ EsalSetVariable (
@param[in] Attributes Attributes bitmask to specify the type of variables
on which to return information.
- @param[out] MaximumVariableStorageSize On output the maximum size of the storage space available for
- the EFI variables associated with the attributes specified.
- @param[out] RemainingVariableStorageSize Returns the remaining size of the storage space available for EFI
+ @param[out] MaximumVariableStorageSize On output the maximum size of the storage space available for
+ the EFI variables associated with the attributes specified.
+ @param[out] RemainingVariableStorageSize Returns the remaining size of the storage space available for EFI
variables associated with the attributes specified.
- @param[out] MaximumVariableSize Returns the maximum size of an individual EFI variable
+ @param[out] MaximumVariableSize Returns the maximum size of an individual EFI variable
associated with the attributes specified.
@param[in] VirtualMode Current calling mode for this function
@param[in] Global Context of this Extended SAL Variable Services Class call
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Valid answer returned.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An invalid combination of attribute bits was supplied.
- @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The attribute is not supported on this platform, and the
- MaximumVariableStorageSize, RemainingVariableStorageSize,
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The attribute is not supported on this platform, and the
+ MaximumVariableStorageSize, RemainingVariableStorageSize,
MaximumVariableSize are undefined.
**/
EFI_STATUS
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ DataSizeOfVariable (
);
/**
- Update the variable region with Variable information. These are the same
+ Update the variable region with Variable information. These are the same
arguments as the EFI Variable services.
@param[in] VariableName Name of variable.
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ DataSizeOfVariable (
@param[in] DataSize Size of data. 0 means delete.
@param[in] Attributes Attributes of the variable.
@param[in] KeyIndex Index of associated public key.
- @param[in] MonotonicCount Value of associated monotonic count.
+ @param[in] MonotonicCount Value of associated monotonic count.
@param[in] VirtualMode Current calling mode for this function.
@param[in] Global Context of this Extended SAL Variable Services Class call.
@param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ UpdateVariable (
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
IN VOID *Data,
IN UINTN DataSize,
- IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,
+ IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,
IN UINT32 KeyIndex OPTIONAL,
IN UINT64 MonotonicCount OPTIONAL,
IN BOOLEAN VirtualMode,
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr
index 296b9c9..9abf84a 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/** @file
VFR file used by the SecureBoot configuration component.
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
This program and the accompanying materials
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
@@ -608,4 +608,4 @@ formset
endform;
-endformset; \ No newline at end of file
+endformset;
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDriver.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDriver.c
index 1d6c4ac..a5fa281 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDriver.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDriver.c
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
/** @file
The module entry point for SecureBoot configuration module.
-Copyright (c) 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-This program and the accompanying materials
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
**/
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ SecureBootConfigDriverEntryPoint (
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;
-
+
//
// If already started, return.
//
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ SecureBootConfigDriverEntryPoint (
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return EFI_ALREADY_STARTED;
}
-
+
//
// Create a private data structure.
//
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ SecureBootConfigDriverEntryPoint (
if (PrivateData == NULL) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
-
+
//
// Install SecureBoot configuration form
//
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ SecureBootConfigDriverEntryPoint (
//
// Install private GUID.
- //
+ //
Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
&ImageHandle,
&gEfiCallerIdGuid,
@@ -86,8 +86,8 @@ SecureBootConfigDriverEntryPoint (
ErrorExit:
if (PrivateData != NULL) {
UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);
- }
-
+ }
+
return Status;
}
@@ -113,11 +113,11 @@ SecureBootConfigDriverUnload (
ImageHandle,
&gEfiCallerIdGuid,
(VOID **) &PrivateData
- );
+ );
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return Status;
+ return Status;
}
-
+
ASSERT (PrivateData->Signature == SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE);
gBS->UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ SecureBootConfigDriverUnload (
PrivateData,
NULL
);
-
+
UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);
return EFI_SUCCESS;
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxeExtra.uni b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxeExtra.uni
index 2bc7f3d..8f14272 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxeExtra.uni
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxeExtra.uni
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
// /** @file
// SecureBootConfigDxe Localized Strings and Content
//
-// Copyright (c) 2013 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+// Copyright (c) 2013 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
//
// This program and the accompanying materials
// are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
//
// **/
-#string STR_PROPERTIES_MODULE_NAME
-#language en-US
+#string STR_PROPERTIES_MODULE_NAME
+#language en-US
"Secure Boot Config DXE"
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
index 6123b56..9acaa7b 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/** @file
HII Config Access protocol implementation of SecureBoot configuration module.
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
(C) Copyright 2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
This program and the accompanying materials
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
@@ -1816,7 +1816,7 @@ LoadPeImage (
Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in
PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A
- Notes: PE/COFF image has been checked by BasePeCoffLib PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() in
+ Notes: PE/COFF image has been checked by BasePeCoffLib PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() in
the function LoadPeImage ().
@param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.
@@ -3327,12 +3327,12 @@ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (
}
//
- // Check SecureBootEnable & Pk status, fix the inconsistence.
+ // Check SecureBootEnable & Pk status, fix the inconsistence.
// If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable
// Checkbox.
//
ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = FALSE;
- GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);
//
// Fix Pk, SecureBootEnable inconsistence
@@ -4385,7 +4385,7 @@ SecureBootCallback (
Value->u8 = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_STANDARD;
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
}
- }
+ }
goto EXIT;
}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigMisc.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigMisc.c
index 038707c..22b7cfd 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigMisc.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigMisc.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/** @file
Helper functions for SecureBoot configuration module.
-Copyright (c) 2015 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+Copyright (c) 2015 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
This program and the accompanying materials
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
@@ -15,15 +15,15 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
#include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h"
/**
- Read file content into BufferPtr, the size of the allocate buffer
+ Read file content into BufferPtr, the size of the allocate buffer
is *FileSize plus AddtionAllocateSize.
@param[in] FileHandle The file to be read.
@param[in, out] BufferPtr Pointers to the pointer of allocated buffer.
@param[out] FileSize Size of input file
- @param[in] AddtionAllocateSize Addtion size the buffer need to be allocated.
+ @param[in] AddtionAllocateSize Addtion size the buffer need to be allocated.
In case the buffer need to contain others besides the file content.
-
+
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The file was read into the buffer.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER A parameter was invalid.
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES A memory allocation failed.
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ ReadFileContent (
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto ON_EXIT;
}
-
+
Status = FileHandle->SetPosition (FileHandle, 0);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto ON_EXIT;
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ ReadFileContent (
}
ON_EXIT:
-
+
*BufferPtr = Buffer;
return Status;
}
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ ON_EXIT:
Close an open file handle.
@param[in] FileHandle The file handle to close.
-
+
**/
VOID
CloseFile (
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ CloseFile (
)
{
if (FileHandle != NULL) {
- FileHandle->Close (FileHandle);
+ FileHandle->Close (FileHandle);
}
}
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ CloseFile (
@param[in] Integer Pointer to the nonnegative integer to be converted
@param[in] IntSizeInWords Length of integer buffer in words
- @param[out] OctetString Converted octet string of the specified length
+ @param[out] OctetString Converted octet string of the specified length
@param[in] OSSizeInBytes Intended length of resulting octet string in bytes
Returns:
@@ -138,17 +138,17 @@ Int2OctStr (
Ptr1++, Ptr2--) {
*Ptr2 = *Ptr1;
}
-
+
for (; Ptr1 < (CONST UINT8 *)(Integer + IntSizeInWords) && *Ptr1 == 0; Ptr1++);
-
+
if (Ptr1 < (CONST UINT8 *)(Integer + IntSizeInWords)) {
return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
-
+
if (Ptr2 >= OctetString) {
ZeroMem (OctetString, Ptr2 - OctetString + 1);
}
-
+
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ Int2OctStr (
@param[in] Guid Pointer to GUID to print.
@param[in] Buffer Buffer to print Guid into.
@param[in] BufferSize Size of Buffer.
-
+
@retval Number of characters printed.
**/
@@ -173,9 +173,9 @@ GuidToString (
Size = UnicodeSPrint (
Buffer,
- BufferSize,
+ BufferSize,
L"%08x-%04x-%04x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
- (UINTN)Guid->Data1,
+ (UINTN)Guid->Data1,
(UINTN)Guid->Data2,
(UINTN)Guid->Data3,
(UINTN)Guid->Data4[0],
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni
index bf42598..97f698c 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/** @file
String definitions for Secure Boot Configuration form.
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
This program and the accompanying materials
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
#string STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_PK_FILE #language en-US "Enroll PK Using File"
#string STR_DELETE_PK #language en-US "Delete Pk"
-#string STR_DELETE_PK_HELP #language en-US "Choose to Delete PK, Otherwise keep the PK"
+#string STR_DELETE_PK_HELP #language en-US "Choose to Delete PK, Otherwise keep the PK"
#string STR_ENROLL_PK_TITLE #language en-US "Enroll PK"
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
#string STR_ENROLL_KEK_HELP #language en-US "Enter into Enroll KEK Form"
#string STR_DELETE_KEK #language en-US "Delete KEK"
-#string STR_DELETE_KEK_HELP #language en-US "Enter into Delete KEK Form"
+#string STR_DELETE_KEK_HELP #language en-US "Enter into Delete KEK Form"
#string STR_ENROLL_KEK_TITLE #language en-US "Enroll KEK"
#string STR_DELETE_KEK_TITLE #language en-US "Delete KEK"