diff options
author | Qin Long <qin.long@intel.com> | 2015-06-19 02:45:06 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | qlong <qlong@Edk2> | 2015-06-19 02:45:06 +0000 |
commit | 2d0934995f54a9306cbea7a2fe570bb439f1bc10 (patch) | |
tree | 147a7c91ade475aceb34b5c4befb3cc5e2f00a21 /SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify | |
parent | afeb55e4a67ed42eb1f822d06776166dfd7c4140 (diff) | |
download | edk2-2d0934995f54a9306cbea7a2fe570bb439f1bc10.zip edk2-2d0934995f54a9306cbea7a2fe570bb439f1bc10.tar.gz edk2-2d0934995f54a9306cbea7a2fe570bb439f1bc10.tar.bz2 |
SecurityPkg: Add UEFI-2.5 PKCS7 Verification Protocol Support
This patch adds the support for PKCS7 Verification Protocol which
was defined in UEFI 2.5.
(NOTE: The VerifySignature interface was not supported in this
version, due to openssl interface limitation)
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Qin Long <qin.long@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@17670 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Diffstat (limited to 'SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify')
-rw-r--r-- | SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxe.c | 1047 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxe.inf | 70 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxe.uni | bin | 0 -> 2254 bytes | |||
-rw-r--r-- | SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxeExtra.uni | bin | 0 -> 1342 bytes |
4 files changed, 1117 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxe.c b/SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxe.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6319255 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxe.c @@ -0,0 +1,1047 @@ +/** @file
+ Pkcs7Verify Driver to produce the UEFI PKCS7 Verification Protocol.
+
+ The driver will produce the UEFI PKCS7 Verification Protocol which is used to
+ verify data signed using PKCS7 structure. The PKCS7 data to be verified must
+ be ASN.1 (DER) encoded.
+
+Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseCryptLib.h>
+#include <Protocol/Pkcs7Verify.h>
+
+#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
+
+/**
+ Calculates the hash of the given data based on the specified hash GUID.
+
+ @param[in] Data Pointer to the data buffer to be hashed.
+ @param[in] DataSize The size of data buffer in bytes.
+ @param[in] CertGuid The GUID to identify the hash algorithm to be used.
+ @param[out] HashValue Pointer to a buffer that receives the hash result.
+
+ @retval TRUE Data hash calculation succeeded.
+ @retval FALSE Data hash calculation failed.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+CalculateDataHash (
+ IN VOID *Data,
+ IN UINTN DataSize,
+ IN EFI_GUID *CertGuid,
+ OUT UINT8 *HashValue
+ )
+{
+ BOOLEAN Status;
+ VOID *HashCtx;
+ UINTN CtxSize;
+
+ Status = FALSE;
+ HashCtx = NULL;
+
+ if (CompareGuid (CertGuid, &gEfiCertSha1Guid)) {
+ //
+ // SHA-1 Hash
+ //
+ CtxSize = Sha1GetContextSize ();
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);
+ if (HashCtx == NULL) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+ Status = Sha1Init (HashCtx);
+ Status = Sha1Update (HashCtx, Data, DataSize);
+ Status = Sha1Final (HashCtx, HashValue);
+
+ } else if (CompareGuid (CertGuid, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) {
+ //
+ // SHA256 Hash
+ //
+ CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);
+ if (HashCtx == NULL) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+ Status = Sha256Init (HashCtx);
+ Status = Sha256Update (HashCtx, Data, DataSize);
+ Status = Sha256Final (HashCtx, HashValue);
+
+ } else if (CompareGuid (CertGuid, &gEfiCertSha384Guid)) {
+ //
+ // SHA384 Hash
+ //
+ CtxSize = Sha384GetContextSize ();
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);
+ if (HashCtx == NULL) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+ Status = Sha384Init (HashCtx);
+ Status = Sha384Update (HashCtx, Data, DataSize);
+ Status = Sha384Final (HashCtx, HashValue);
+
+ } else if (CompareGuid (CertGuid, &gEfiCertSha512Guid)) {
+ //
+ // SHA512 Hash
+ //
+ CtxSize = Sha512GetContextSize ();
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);
+ if (HashCtx == NULL) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+ Status = Sha512Init (HashCtx);
+ Status = Sha512Update (HashCtx, Data, DataSize);
+ Status = Sha512Final (HashCtx, HashValue);
+ }
+
+_Exit:
+ if (HashCtx != NULL) {
+ FreePool (HashCtx);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the hash of data content is revoked by the revocation database.
+
+ @param[in] Content Pointer to the content buffer that is searched for.
+ @param[in] ContentSize The size of data content in bytes.
+ @param[in] RevokedDb Pointer to a list of pointers to EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
+ structure which contains list of X.509 certificates
+ of revoked signers and revoked content hashes.
+
+ @return TRUE The matched content hash is found in the revocation database.
+ @return FALSE The matched content hash is not found in the revocation database.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsContentHashRevoked (
+ IN UINT8 *Content,
+ IN UINTN ContentSize,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **RevokedDb
+ )
+{
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigData;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINT8 HashVal[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ UINTN EntryIndex;
+ UINTN EntryCount;
+ BOOLEAN Status;
+
+ if (RevokedDb == NULL) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ Status = FALSE;
+ //
+ // Check if any hash matching content hash can be found in RevokedDB
+ //
+ for (Index = 0; ; Index++) {
+ SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(RevokedDb[Index]);
+
+ //
+ // The list is terminated by a NULL pointer.
+ //
+ if (SigList == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Calculate the digest of supplied data based on the signature hash type.
+ //
+ if (!CalculateDataHash (Content, ContentSize, &SigList->SignatureType, HashVal)) {
+ //
+ // Un-matched Hash GUID or other failure.
+ //
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Search the signature database to search the revoked content hash
+ //
+ SigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) +
+ SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ EntryCount = (SigList->SignatureListSize - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize -
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)) / SigList->SignatureSize;
+ for (EntryIndex = 0; EntryIndex < EntryCount; EntryIndex++) {
+ //
+ // Compare Data Hash with Signature Data
+ //
+ if (CompareMem (SigData->SignatureData, HashVal, (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID))) == 0) {
+ Status = TRUE;
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ SigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigData + SigList->SignatureSize);
+ }
+ }
+
+_Exit:
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the hash of an given certificate is revoked by the revocation database.
+
+ @param[in] Certificate Pointer to the certificate that is searched for.
+ @param[in] CertSize Size of certificate in bytes.
+ @param[in] RevokedDb Pointer to a list of pointers to EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
+ structures which contains list of X.509 certificate
+ of revoked signers and revoked content hashes.
+ @param[out] RevocationTime Return the time that the certificate was revoked.
+
+ @return TRUE The certificate hash is found in the revocation database.
+ @return FALSE The certificate hash is not found in the revocation database.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsCertHashRevoked (
+ IN UINT8 *Certificate,
+ IN UINTN CertSize,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **RevokedDb,
+ OUT EFI_TIME *RevocationTime
+ )
+{
+ BOOLEAN Status;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigData;
+ UINT8 *TBSCert;
+ UINTN TBSCertSize;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINTN EntryIndex;
+ UINTN EntryCount;
+ UINT8 CertHashVal[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+ if ((RevocationTime == NULL) || (RevokedDb == NULL)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Retrieve the TBSCertificate from the X.509 Certificate for hash calculation
+ //
+ if (!X509GetTBSCert (Certificate, CertSize, &TBSCert, &TBSCertSize)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ Status = FALSE;
+ for (Index = 0; ; Index++) {
+
+ SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(RevokedDb[Index]);
+ //
+ // The list is terminated by a NULL pointer.
+ //
+ if (SigList == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Determine Hash Algorithm based on the entry type in revocation database, and
+ // calculate the certificate hash.
+ //
+ if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {
+ Status = CalculateDataHash (TBSCert, TBSCertSize, &gEfiCertSha256Guid, CertHashVal);
+
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {
+ Status = CalculateDataHash (TBSCert, TBSCertSize, &gEfiCertSha384Guid, CertHashVal);
+
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {
+ Status = CalculateDataHash (TBSCert, TBSCertSize, &gEfiCertSha512Guid, CertHashVal);
+
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Un-matched Cert Hash GUID
+ //
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!Status) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ SigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) +
+ SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ EntryCount = (SigList->SignatureListSize - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize -
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)) / SigList->SignatureSize;
+ for (EntryIndex = 0; EntryIndex < EntryCount; Index++) {
+ //
+ // Check if the Certificate Hash is revoked.
+ //
+ if (CompareMem (SigData->SignatureData, CertHashVal,
+ SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID) - sizeof (EFI_TIME)) == 0) {
+ Status = TRUE;
+ //
+ // Return the revocation time of this revoked certificate.
+ //
+ CopyMem (
+ RevocationTime,
+ (EFI_TIME *)((UINT8 *)SigData + SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_TIME)),
+ sizeof (EFI_TIME)
+ );
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ SigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigData + SigList->SignatureSize);
+ }
+ }
+
+_Exit:
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check if the given time value is zero.
+
+ @param[in] Time Pointer of a time value.
+
+ @retval TRUE The Time is Zero.
+ @retval FALSE The Time is not Zero.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsTimeZero (
+ IN EFI_TIME *Time
+ )
+{
+ if ((Time->Year == 0) && (Time->Month == 0) && (Time->Day == 0) &&
+ (Time->Hour == 0) && (Time->Minute == 0) && (Time->Second == 0)) {
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the timestamp is valid by comparing the signing time and the revocation time.
+
+ @param SigningTime Pointer to the signing time.
+ @param RevocationTime Pointer to the revocation time.
+
+ @retval TRUE The SigningTime is not later than the RevocationTime.
+ @retval FALSE The SigningTime is later than the RevocationTime.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+CompareTimestamp (
+ IN EFI_TIME *SigningTime,
+ IN EFI_TIME *RevocationTime
+ )
+{
+ if (SigningTime->Year != RevocationTime->Year) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Year < RevocationTime->Year);
+ } else if (SigningTime->Month != RevocationTime->Month) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Month < RevocationTime->Month);
+ } else if (SigningTime->Day != RevocationTime->Day) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Day < RevocationTime->Day);
+ } else if (SigningTime->Hour != RevocationTime->Hour) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Hour < RevocationTime->Hour);
+ } else if (SigningTime->Minute != RevocationTime->Minute) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Minute < RevocationTime->Minute);
+ }
+
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Second <= RevocationTime->Second);
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the timestamp signature embedded in PKCS7 signedData is valid and
+ the signing time is also earlier than the revocation time.
+
+ @param[in] SignedData Pointer to the PKCS#7 signedData.
+ @param[in] SignedDataSize Size of SignedData in bytes.
+ @param[in] TimeStampDb Pointer to a list of pointers to EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
+ structures which is used to pass a list of X.509
+ certificates of trusted timestamp signers.
+ @param[in] RevocationTime The time that the certificate was revoked.
+
+ @retval TRUE Timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is no later
+ than the revocation time.
+ @retval FALSE Timestamp signature is not valid or the signing time is later
+ than the revocation time.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsValidTimestamp (
+ IN UINT8 *SignedData,
+ IN UINTN SignedDataSize,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **TimeStampDb,
+ IN EFI_TIME *RevocationTime
+ )
+{
+ BOOLEAN Status;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigData;
+ UINT8 *TsaCert;
+ UINTN TsaCertSize;
+ UINTN Index;
+ EFI_TIME SigningTime;
+
+ //
+ // If no supplied database for verification or RevocationTime is zero,
+ // the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.
+ //
+ if ((TimeStampDb == NULL) || (IsTimeZero (RevocationTime))) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ Status = FALSE;
+ //
+ // RevocationTime is non-zero, the certificate should be considered to be revoked
+ // from that time and onwards.
+ //
+ for (Index = 0; ; Index++) {
+ SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (TimeStampDb[Index]);
+
+ //
+ // The list is terminated by a NULL pointer.
+ //
+ if (SigList == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Ignore any non-X509-format entry in the list
+ //
+ if (!CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+
+ SigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) +
+ SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ TsaCert = SigData->SignatureData;
+ TsaCertSize = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
+
+ //
+ // Each TSA Certificate will normally be in a seperate EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
+ // Leverage ImageTimestampVerify interface for Timestamp counterSignature Verification
+ //
+ if (ImageTimestampVerify (SignedData, SignedDataSize, TsaCert, TsaCertSize, &SigningTime)) {
+ //
+ // The signer signature is valid only when the signing time is earlier than revocation time.
+ //
+ if (CompareTimestamp (&SigningTime, RevocationTime)) {
+ Status = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the PKCS7 signedData is revoked by verifying with the revoked
+ certificates database, and if the signedData is timestamped, the embedded timestamp
+ couterSignature will be checked with the supplied timestamp database.
+
+ @param[in] SignedData Pointer to buffer containing ASN.1 DER-encoded PKCS7
+ signature.
+ @param[in] SignedDataSize The size of SignedData buffer in bytes.
+ @param[in] InData Pointer to the buffer containing the raw message data
+ previously signed and to be verified.
+ @param[in] InDataSize The size of InData buffer in bytes.
+ @param[in] RevokedDb Pointer to a list of pointers to EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
+ structure which contains list of X.509 certificates
+ of revoked signers and revoked content hashes.
+ @param[in] TimeStampDb Pointer to a list of pointers to EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
+ structures which is used to pass a list of X.509
+ certificates of trusted timestamp signers.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The PKCS7 signedData is revoked.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Fail to verify the signature in PKCS7 signedData.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER SignedData is NULL or SignedDataSize is zero.
+ AllowedDb is NULL.
+ Content is not NULL and ContentSize is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Content not found because InData is NULL and no
+ content embedded in PKCS7 signedData.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The PKCS7 signedData was not correctly formatted.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+P7CheckRevocation (
+ IN UINT8 *SignedData,
+ IN UINTN SignedDataSize,
+ IN UINT8 *InData,
+ IN UINTN InDataSize,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **RevokedDb,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **TimeStampDb
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigData;
+ UINT8 *RevokedCert;
+ UINTN RevokedCertSize;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINT8 *CertBuffer;
+ UINTN BufferLength;
+ UINT8 *TrustedCert;
+ UINTN TrustedCertLength;
+ UINT8 CertNumber;
+ UINT8 *CertPtr;
+ UINT8 *Cert;
+ UINTN CertSize;
+ EFI_TIME RevocationTime;
+
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ SigData = NULL;
+ RevokedCert = NULL;
+ RevokedCertSize = 0;
+ CertBuffer = NULL;
+ TrustedCert = NULL;
+
+ //
+ // The signedData is revoked if the hash of content existed in RevokedDb
+ //
+ if (IsContentHashRevoked (InData, InDataSize, RevokedDb)) {
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check if the signer's certificate can be found in Revoked database
+ //
+ for (Index = 0; ; Index++) {
+ SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(RevokedDb[Index]);
+
+ //
+ // The list is terminated by a NULL pointer.
+ //
+ if (SigList == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Ignore any non-X509-format entry in the list.
+ //
+ if (!CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ SigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) +
+ SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+
+ RevokedCert = SigData->SignatureData;
+ RevokedCertSize = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
+
+ //
+ // Verifying the PKCS#7 SignedData with the revoked certificate in RevokedDb
+ //
+ if (Pkcs7Verify (SignedData, SignedDataSize, RevokedCert, RevokedCertSize, InData, InDataSize)) {
+ //
+ // The signedData was verified by one entry in Revoked Database
+ //
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // The signedData was revoked, since it was hit by RevokedDb
+ //
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Now we will continue to check the X.509 Certificate Hash & Possible Timestamp
+ //
+ if ((TimeStampDb == NULL) || (*TimeStampDb == NULL)) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ Pkcs7GetSigners (SignedData, SignedDataSize, &CertBuffer, &BufferLength, &TrustedCert, &TrustedCertLength);
+ if ((BufferLength == 0) || (CertBuffer == NULL)) {
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check if any hash of certificates embedded in P7 data is in the revoked database.
+ //
+ CertNumber = (UINT8) (*CertBuffer);
+ CertPtr = CertBuffer + 1;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertNumber; Index++) {
+ //
+ // Retrieve the Certificate data
+ //
+ CertSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) CertPtr);
+ Cert = (UINT8 *)CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32);
+
+ if (IsCertHashRevoked (Cert, CertSize, RevokedDb, &RevocationTime)) {
+ //
+ // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if p7 data can be trusted.
+ //
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ if (IsValidTimestamp (SignedData, SignedDataSize, TimeStampDb, &RevocationTime)) {
+ //
+ // Use EFI_NOT_READY to identify the P7Data is not reovked, because the timestamping
+ // occured prior to the time of certificate revocation.
+ //
+ Status = EFI_NOT_READY;
+ }
+
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ CertPtr = CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32) + CertSize;
+ }
+
+_Exit:
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer);
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert);
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the PKCS7 signedData can be verified by the trusted certificates
+ database, and return the content of the signedData if requested.
+
+ @param[in] SignedData Pointer to buffer containing ASN.1 DER-encoded PKCS7
+ signature.
+ @param[in] SignedDataSize The size of SignedData buffer in bytes.
+ @param[in] InData Pointer to the buffer containing the raw message data
+ previously signed and to be verified.
+ @param[in] InDataSize The size of InData buffer in bytes.
+ @param[in] AllowedDb Pointer to a list of pointers to EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
+ structures which contains lists of X.509 certificates
+ of approved signers.
+ @param[out] Content An optional caller-allocated buffer into which the
+ function will copy the content of PKCS7 signedData.
+ @param[in,out] ContentSize On input, points of the size in bytes of the optional
+ buffer Content previously allocated by caller. On output,
+ the value will contain the actual size of the content
+ extracted from the signedData.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The PKCS7 signedData is trusted.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Fail to verify the signature in PKCS7 signedData.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER SignedData is NULL or SignedDataSize is zero.
+ AllowedDb is NULL.
+ Content is not NULL and ContentSize is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Content not found because InData is NULL and no
+ content embedded in PKCS7 signedData.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The PKCS7 signedData was not correctly formatted.
+ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of buffer indicated by ContentSize is too
+ small to hold the content. ContentSize updated to
+ the required size.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+P7CheckTrust (
+ IN UINT8 *SignedData,
+ IN UINTN SignedDataSize,
+ IN UINT8 *InData,
+ IN UINTN InDataSize,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **AllowedDb
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigData;
+ UINT8 *TrustCert;
+ UINTN TrustCertSize;
+ UINTN Index;
+
+ Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ SigData = NULL;
+ TrustCert = NULL;
+ TrustCertSize = 0;
+
+ if (AllowedDb == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Build Certificate Stack with all valid X509 certificates in the supplied
+ // Signature List for PKCS7 Verification.
+ //
+ for (Index = 0; ; Index++) {
+ SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(AllowedDb[Index]);
+
+ //
+ // The list is terminated by a NULL pointer.
+ //
+ if (SigList == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Ignore any non-X509-format entry in the list.
+ //
+ if (!CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ SigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) +
+ SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+
+ TrustCert = SigData->SignatureData;
+ TrustCertSize = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
+
+ //
+ // Verifying the PKCS#7 SignedData with the trusted certificate from AllowedDb
+ //
+ if (Pkcs7Verify (SignedData, SignedDataSize, TrustCert, TrustCertSize, InData, InDataSize)) {
+ //
+ // The SignedData was verified successfully by one entry in Trusted Database
+ //
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Processes a buffer containing binary DER-encoded PKCS7 signature.
+ The signed data content may be embedded within the buffer or separated. Function
+ verifies the signature of the content is valid and signing certificate was not
+ revoked and is contained within a list of trusted signers.
+
+ @param[in] This Pointer to EFI_PKCS7_VERIFY_PROTOCOL instance.
+ @param[in] SignedData Points to buffer containing ASN.1 DER-encoded PKCS7
+ signature.
+ @param[in] SignedDataSize The size of SignedData buffer in bytes.
+ @param[in] InData In case of detached signature, InData points to
+ buffer containing the raw message data previously
+ signed and to be verified by function. In case of
+ SignedData containing embedded data, InData must be
+ NULL.
+ @param[in] InDataSize When InData is used, the size of InData buffer in
+ bytes. When InData is NULL. This parameter must be
+ 0.
+ @param[in] AllowedDb Pointer to a list of pointers to EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
+ structures. The list is terminated by a null
+ pointer. The EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST structures contain
+ lists of X.509 certificates of approved signers.
+ Function recognizes signer certificates of type
+ EFI_CERT_X509_GUID. Any hash certificate in AllowedDb
+ list is ignored by this function. Function returns
+ success if signer of the buffer is within this list
+ (and not within RevokedDb). This parameter is
+ required.
+ @param[in] RevokedDb Optional pointer to a list of pointers to
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST structures. The list is terminated
+ by a null pointer. List of X.509 certificates of
+ revoked signers and revoked file hashes. Except as
+ noted in description of TimeStampDb signature
+ verification will always fail if the signer of the
+ file or the hash of the data component of the buffer
+ is in RevokedDb list. This list is optional and
+ caller may pass Null or pointer to NULL if not
+ required.
+ @param[in] TimeStampDb Optional pointer to a list of pointers to
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST structures. The list is terminated
+ by a null pointer. This parameter can be used to pass
+ a list of X.509 certificates of trusted time stamp
+ signers. This list is optional and caller must pass
+ Null or pointer to NULL if not required.
+ @param[out] Content On input, points to an optional caller-allocated
+ buffer into which the function will copy the content
+ portion of the file after verification succeeds.
+ This parameter is optional and if NULL, no copy of
+ content from file is performed.
+ @param[in,out] ContentSize On input, points to the size in bytes of the optional
+ buffer Content previously allocated by caller. On
+ output, if the verification succeeds, the value
+ referenced by ContentSize will contain the actual
+ size of the content from signed file. If ContentSize
+ indicates the caller-allocated buffer is too small
+ to contain content, an error is returned, and
+ ContentSize will be updated with the required size.
+ This parameter must be 0 if Content is Null.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Content signature was verified against hash of
+ content, the signer's certificate was not found in
+ RevokedDb, and was found in AllowedDb or if in signer
+ is found in both AllowedDb and RevokedDb, the
+ signing was allowed by reference to TimeStampDb as
+ described above, and no hash matching content hash
+ was found in RevokedDb.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The SignedData buffer was correctly formatted but
+ signer was in RevokedDb or not in AllowedDb. Also
+ returned if matching content hash found in RevokedDb.
+ @retval EFI_COMPROMISED_DATA Calculated hash differs from signed hash.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER SignedData is NULL or SignedDataSize is zero.
+ AllowedDb is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Content is not NULL and ContentSize is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_ABORTED Unsupported or invalid format in TimeStampDb,
+ RevokedDb or AllowedDb list contents was detected.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Content not found because InData is NULL and no
+ content embedded in SignedData.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The SignedData buffer was not correctly formatted
+ for processing by the function.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Signed data embedded in SignedData but InData is not
+ NULL.
+ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of buffer indicated by ContentSize is too
+ small to hold the content. ContentSize updated to
+ required size.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+VerifyBuffer (
+ IN EFI_PKCS7_VERIFY_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN VOID *SignedData,
+ IN UINTN SignedDataSize,
+ IN VOID *InData OPTIONAL,
+ IN UINTN InDataSize,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **AllowedDb,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **RevokedDb OPTIONAL,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **TimeStampDb OPTIONAL,
+ OUT VOID *Content OPTIONAL,
+ IN OUT UINTN *ContentSize
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT8 *AttachedData;
+ UINTN AttachedDataSize;
+ UINT8 *DataPtr;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+
+ //
+ // Parameters Checking
+ //
+ if ((SignedData == NULL) || (SignedDataSize == 0) || (AllowedDb == NULL)) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ if ((Content != NULL) && (ContentSize == NULL)) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Try to retrieve the attached content from PKCS7 signedData
+ //
+ AttachedData = NULL;
+ AttachedDataSize = 0;
+ if (!Pkcs7GetAttachedContent (
+ SignedData,
+ SignedDataSize,
+ (VOID **)&AttachedData,
+ &AttachedDataSize)) {
+ //
+ // The SignedData buffer was not correctly formatted for processing
+ //
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+ if (AttachedData != NULL) {
+ //
+ // PKCS7-formatted signedData with attached content; Use the embedded
+ // content for verification
+ //
+ DataPtr = AttachedData;
+ DataSize = AttachedDataSize;
+
+ } else if (InData != NULL) {
+ //
+ // PKCS7-formatted signedData with detached content; Use the user-supplied
+ // input data for verification
+ //
+ DataPtr = (UINT8 *)InData;
+ DataSize = InDataSize;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Content not found because InData is NULL and no content attached in SignedData
+ //
+ Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+ //
+ // Verify PKCS7 SignedData with Revoked database
+ //
+ if (RevokedDb != NULL) {
+ Status = P7CheckRevocation (
+ SignedData,
+ SignedDataSize,
+ DataPtr,
+ DataSize,
+ RevokedDb,
+ TimeStampDb
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // The PKCS7 SignedData is reovked
+ //
+ Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Verify PKCS7 SignedData with AllowedDB
+ //
+ Status = P7CheckTrust (
+ SignedData,
+ SignedDataSize,
+ DataPtr,
+ DataSize,
+ AllowedDb
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // Verification failed with AllowedDb
+ //
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Copy the content portion after verification succeeds
+ //
+ if (Content != NULL) {
+ if (*ContentSize < DataSize) {
+ //
+ // Caller-allocated buffer is too small to contain content
+ //
+ *ContentSize = DataSize;
+ Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ } else {
+ *ContentSize = DataSize;
+ CopyMem (Content, DataPtr, DataSize);
+ }
+ }
+
+_Exit:
+ if (AttachedData != NULL) {
+ FreePool (AttachedData);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Processes a buffer containing binary DER-encoded detached PKCS7 signature.
+ The hash of the signed data content is calculated and passed by the caller. Function
+ verifies the signature of the content is valid and signing certificate was not revoked
+ and is contained within a list of trusted signers.
+
+ @param[in] This Pointer to EFI_PKCS7_VERIFY_PROTOCOL instance.
+ @param[in] Signature Points to buffer containing ASN.1 DER-encoded PKCS
+ detached signature.
+ @param[in] SignatureSize The size of Signature buffer in bytes.
+ @param[in] InHash InHash points to buffer containing the caller
+ calculated hash of the data. The parameter may not
+ be NULL.
+ @param[in] InHashSize The size in bytes of InHash buffer.
+ @param[in] AllowedDb Pointer to a list of pointers to EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
+ structures. The list is terminated by a null
+ pointer. The EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST structures contain
+ lists of X.509 certificates of approved signers.
+ Function recognizes signer certificates of type
+ EFI_CERT_X509_GUID. Any hash certificate in AllowedDb
+ list is ignored by this function. Function returns
+ success if signer of the buffer is within this list
+ (and not within RevokedDb). This parameter is
+ required.
+ @param[in] RevokedDb Optional pointer to a list of pointers to
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST structures. The list is terminated
+ by a null pointer. List of X.509 certificates of
+ revoked signers and revoked file hashes. Signature
+ verification will always fail if the signer of the
+ file or the hash of the data component of the buffer
+ is in RevokedDb list. This parameter is optional
+ and caller may pass Null if not required.
+ @param[in] TimeStampDb Optional pointer to a list of pointers to
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST structures. The list is terminated
+ by a null pointer. This parameter can be used to pass
+ a list of X.509 certificates of trusted time stamp
+ counter-signers.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Signed hash was verified against caller-provided
+ hash of content, the signer's certificate was not
+ found in RevokedDb, and was found in AllowedDb or
+ if in signer is found in both AllowedDb and
+ RevokedDb, the signing was allowed by reference to
+ TimeStampDb as described above, and no hash matching
+ content hash was found in RevokedDb.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The SignedData buffer was correctly formatted but
+ signer was in RevokedDb or not in AllowedDb. Also
+ returned if matching content hash found in RevokedDb.
+ @retval EFI_COMPROMISED_DATA Caller provided hash differs from signed hash. Or,
+ caller and encrypted hash are different sizes.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Signature is NULL or SignatureSize is zero. InHash
+ is NULL or InHashSize is zero. AllowedDb is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_ABORTED Unsupported or invalid format in TimeStampDb,
+ RevokedDb or AllowedDb list contents was detected.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The Signature buffer was not correctly formatted
+ for processing by the function.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+VerifySignature (
+ IN EFI_PKCS7_VERIFY_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN VOID *Signature,
+ IN UINTN SignatureSize,
+ IN VOID *InHash,
+ IN UINTN InHashSize,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **AllowedDb,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **RevokedDb OPTIONAL,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **TimeStampDb OPTIONAL
+ )
+{
+ //
+ // NOTE: Current EDKII-OpenSSL interface cannot support VerifySignature
+ // directly. EFI_UNSUPPORTED is returned in this version.
+ //
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+//
+// The PKCS7 Verification Protocol
+//
+EFI_PKCS7_VERIFY_PROTOCOL mPkcs7Verify = {
+ VerifyBuffer,
+ VerifySignature
+};
+
+/**
+ The user Entry Point for the PKCS7 Verification driver.
+
+ @param[in] ImageHandle The firmware allocated handle for the EFI image.
+ @param[in] SystemTable A pointer to the EFI System Table.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The entry point is executed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_SUPPORTED Platform does not support PKCS7 Verification.
+ @retval Other Some error occurs when executing this entry point.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+Pkcs7VerifyDriverEntry (
+ IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
+ IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_HANDLE Handle;
+
+ //
+ // Install UEFI Pkcs7 Verification Protocol
+ //
+ Handle = NULL;
+ Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
+ &Handle,
+ &gEfiPkcs7VerifyProtocolGuid,
+ &mPkcs7Verify,
+ NULL
+ );
+
+ return Status;
+}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxe.inf b/SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxe.inf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e0c7a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxe.inf @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +## @file
+# Produces the UEFI PKCS7 Verification protocol.
+#
+# PKCS7 is a general-purpose Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard (defined by
+# RFC2315, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315). This module will produce the
+# UEFI PKCS7 Verification Protocol which is used to verify data signed using PKCS7
+# structure.
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+# This program and the accompanying materials
+# are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+# which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+#
+# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+#
+##
+
+[Defines]
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010005
+ BASE_NAME = Pkcs7VerifyDxe
+ FILE_GUID = D681A765-6AE9-5E3A-6F3A-770429EDF09
+ MODULE_TYPE = DXE_DRIVER
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
+ ENTRY_POINT = Pkcs7VerifyDriverEntry
+ MODULE_UNI_FILE = Pkcs7VerifyDxe.uni
+
+#
+# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools.
+#
+# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64
+#
+
+[Sources.common]
+ Pkcs7VerifyDxe.c
+
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+ CryptoPkg/CryptoPkg.dec
+ SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
+
+[LibraryClasses]
+ UefiLib
+ UefiBootServicesTableLib
+ BaseLib
+ BaseMemoryLib
+ MemoryAllocationLib
+ DebugLib
+ UefiDriverEntryPoint
+ BaseCryptLib
+
+[Protocols]
+ gEfiPkcs7VerifyProtocolGuid ## PRODUCES
+
+[Guids]
+ gEfiCertX509Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the signature.
+ gEfiCertSha1Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the signature.
+ gEfiCertSha256Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the signature.
+ gEfiCertSha384Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the signature.
+ gEfiCertSha512Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the signature.
+ gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the signature.
+ gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the signature.
+ gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the signature.
+
+[Depex]
+ TRUE
+
+[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]
+ Pkcs7VerifyDxeExtra.uni
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxe.uni b/SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxe.uni Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..42d6e07 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxe.uni diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxeExtra.uni b/SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxeExtra.uni Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..2ce097b --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Pkcs7Verify/Pkcs7VerifyDxe/Pkcs7VerifyDxeExtra.uni |