diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'target/arm/tcg/hflags.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | target/arm/tcg/hflags.c | 198 |
1 files changed, 190 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/target/arm/tcg/hflags.c b/target/arm/tcg/hflags.c index 8d79b8b..5c9b9be 100644 --- a/target/arm/tcg/hflags.c +++ b/target/arm/tcg/hflags.c @@ -9,9 +9,13 @@ #include "cpu.h" #include "internals.h" #include "cpu-features.h" -#include "exec/helper-proto.h" +#include "exec/translation-block.h" +#include "accel/tcg/cpu-ops.h" #include "cpregs.h" +#define HELPER_H "tcg/helper.h" +#include "exec/helper-proto.h.inc" + static inline bool fgt_svc(CPUARMState *env, int el) { /* @@ -210,6 +214,31 @@ static CPUARMTBFlags rebuild_hflags_a32(CPUARMState *env, int fp_el, return rebuild_hflags_common_32(env, fp_el, mmu_idx, flags); } +/* + * Return the exception level to which exceptions should be taken for ZT0. + * C.f. the ARM pseudocode function CheckSMEZT0Enabled, after the ZA check. + */ +static int zt0_exception_el(CPUARMState *env, int el) +{ +#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY + if (el <= 1 + && !el_is_in_host(env, el) + && !FIELD_EX64(env->vfp.smcr_el[1], SMCR, EZT0)) { + return 1; + } + if (el <= 2 + && arm_is_el2_enabled(env) + && !FIELD_EX64(env->vfp.smcr_el[2], SMCR, EZT0)) { + return 2; + } + if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_EL3) + && !FIELD_EX64(env->vfp.smcr_el[3], SMCR, EZT0)) { + return 3; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + static CPUARMTBFlags rebuild_hflags_a64(CPUARMState *env, int el, int fp_el, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) { @@ -229,6 +258,11 @@ static CPUARMTBFlags rebuild_hflags_a64(CPUARMState *env, int el, int fp_el, DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, TBII, tbii); DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, TBID, tbid); + /* E2H is used by both VHE and NV2. */ + if (hcr & HCR_E2H) { + DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, E2H, 1); + } + if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_sve, env_archcpu(env))) { int sve_el = sve_exception_el(env, el); @@ -265,7 +299,14 @@ static CPUARMTBFlags rebuild_hflags_a64(CPUARMState *env, int el, int fp_el, DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, PSTATE_SM, 1); DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, SME_TRAP_NONSTREAMING, !sme_fa64(env, el)); } - DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, PSTATE_ZA, FIELD_EX64(env->svcr, SVCR, ZA)); + + if (FIELD_EX64(env->svcr, SVCR, ZA)) { + DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, PSTATE_ZA, 1); + if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_sme2, env_archcpu(env))) { + int zt0_el = zt0_exception_el(env, el); + DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, ZT0EXC_EL, zt0_el); + } + } } sctlr = regime_sctlr(env, stage1); @@ -354,9 +395,6 @@ static CPUARMTBFlags rebuild_hflags_a64(CPUARMState *env, int el, int fp_el, } if (hcr & HCR_NV2) { DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, NV2, 1); - if (hcr & HCR_E2H) { - DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, NV2_MEM_E20, 1); - } if (env->cp15.sctlr_el[2] & SCTLR_EE) { DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, NV2_MEM_BE, 1); } @@ -413,6 +451,44 @@ static CPUARMTBFlags rebuild_hflags_a64(CPUARMState *env, int el, int fp_el, DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, TCMA, aa64_va_parameter_tcma(tcr, mmu_idx)); } + if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_gcs, env_archcpu(env))) { + /* C.f. GCSEnabled */ + if (env->cp15.gcscr_el[el] & GCSCR_PCRSEL) { + switch (el) { + default: + if (!el_is_in_host(env, el) + && !(arm_hcrx_el2_eff(env) & HCRX_GCSEN)) { + break; + } + /* fall through */ + case 2: + if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_EL3) + && !(env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_GCSEN)) { + break; + } + /* fall through */ + case 3: + DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, GCS_EN, 1); + break; + } + } + + /* C.f. GCSReturnValueCheckEnabled */ + if (env->cp15.gcscr_el[el] & GCSCR_RVCHKEN) { + DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, GCS_RVCEN, 1); + } + + /* C.f. CheckGCSSTREnabled */ + if (!(env->cp15.gcscr_el[el] & GCSCR_STREN)) { + DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, GCSSTR_EL, el ? el : 1); + } else if (el == 1 + && EX_TBFLAG_ANY(flags, FGT_ACTIVE) + && !FIELD_EX64(env->cp15.fgt_exec[FGTREG_HFGITR], + HFGITR_EL2, NGCSSTR_EL1)) { + DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, GCSSTR_EL, 2); + } + } + if (env->vfp.fpcr & FPCR_AH) { DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, AH, 1); } @@ -498,7 +574,7 @@ void HELPER(rebuild_hflags_a64)(CPUARMState *env, int el) env->hflags = rebuild_hflags_a64(env, el, fp_el, mmu_idx); } -void assert_hflags_rebuild_correctly(CPUARMState *env) +static void assert_hflags_rebuild_correctly(CPUARMState *env) { #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_TCG CPUARMTBFlags c = env->hflags; @@ -506,10 +582,116 @@ void assert_hflags_rebuild_correctly(CPUARMState *env) if (unlikely(c.flags != r.flags || c.flags2 != r.flags2)) { fprintf(stderr, "TCG hflags mismatch " - "(current:(0x%08x,0x" TARGET_FMT_lx ")" - " rebuilt:(0x%08x,0x" TARGET_FMT_lx ")\n", + "(current:(0x%08x,0x%016" PRIx64 ")" + " rebuilt:(0x%08x,0x%016" PRIx64 ")\n", c.flags, c.flags2, r.flags, r.flags2); abort(); } #endif } + +static bool mve_no_pred(CPUARMState *env) +{ + /* + * Return true if there is definitely no predication of MVE + * instructions by VPR or LTPSIZE. (Returning false even if there + * isn't any predication is OK; generated code will just be + * a little worse.) + * If the CPU does not implement MVE then this TB flag is always 0. + * + * NOTE: if you change this logic, the "recalculate s->mve_no_pred" + * logic in gen_update_fp_context() needs to be updated to match. + * + * We do not include the effect of the ECI bits here -- they are + * tracked in other TB flags. This simplifies the logic for + * "when did we emit code that changes the MVE_NO_PRED TB flag + * and thus need to end the TB?". + */ + if (cpu_isar_feature(aa32_mve, env_archcpu(env))) { + return false; + } + if (env->v7m.vpr) { + return false; + } + if (env->v7m.ltpsize < 4) { + return false; + } + return true; +} + +TCGTBCPUState arm_get_tb_cpu_state(CPUState *cs) +{ + CPUARMState *env = cpu_env(cs); + CPUARMTBFlags flags; + vaddr pc; + + assert_hflags_rebuild_correctly(env); + flags = env->hflags; + + if (EX_TBFLAG_ANY(flags, AARCH64_STATE)) { + pc = env->pc; + if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_bti, env_archcpu(env))) { + DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, BTYPE, env->btype); + } + } else { + pc = env->regs[15]; + + if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) { + if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) && + FIELD_EX32(env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S], V7M_FPCCR, S) + != env->v7m.secure) { + DP_TBFLAG_M32(flags, FPCCR_S_WRONG, 1); + } + + if ((env->v7m.fpccr[env->v7m.secure] & R_V7M_FPCCR_ASPEN_MASK) && + (!(env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK) || + (env->v7m.secure && + !(env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_SFPA_MASK)))) { + /* + * ASPEN is set, but FPCA/SFPA indicate that there is no + * active FP context; we must create a new FP context before + * executing any FP insn. + */ + DP_TBFLAG_M32(flags, NEW_FP_CTXT_NEEDED, 1); + } + + bool is_secure = env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_S_MASK; + if (env->v7m.fpccr[is_secure] & R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPACT_MASK) { + DP_TBFLAG_M32(flags, LSPACT, 1); + } + + if (mve_no_pred(env)) { + DP_TBFLAG_M32(flags, MVE_NO_PRED, 1); + } + } else { + /* Note that VECLEN+VECSTRIDE are RES0 for M-profile. */ + DP_TBFLAG_A32(flags, VECLEN, env->vfp.vec_len); + DP_TBFLAG_A32(flags, VECSTRIDE, env->vfp.vec_stride); + if (env->vfp.xregs[ARM_VFP_FPEXC] & (1 << 30)) { + DP_TBFLAG_A32(flags, VFPEN, 1); + } + } + + DP_TBFLAG_AM32(flags, THUMB, env->thumb); + DP_TBFLAG_AM32(flags, CONDEXEC, env->condexec_bits); + } + + /* + * The SS_ACTIVE and PSTATE_SS bits correspond to the state machine + * states defined in the ARM ARM for software singlestep: + * SS_ACTIVE PSTATE.SS State + * 0 x Inactive (the TB flag for SS is always 0) + * 1 0 Active-pending + * 1 1 Active-not-pending + * SS_ACTIVE is set in hflags; PSTATE__SS is computed every TB. + */ + if (EX_TBFLAG_ANY(flags, SS_ACTIVE) && (env->pstate & PSTATE_SS)) { + DP_TBFLAG_ANY(flags, PSTATE__SS, 1); + } + + return (TCGTBCPUState){ + .pc = pc, + .flags = flags.flags, + .cs_base = flags.flags2, + }; +} |