1 files changed, 0 insertions, 99 deletions
diff --git a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 02dc4e5..0000000
--- a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * QEMU Confidential Guest support
- *   This interface describes the common pieces between various
- *   schemes for protecting guest memory or other state against a
- *   compromised hypervisor.  This includes memory encryption (AMD's
- *   SEV and Intel's MKTME) or special protection modes (PEF on POWER,
- *   or PV on s390x).
- *
- * Copyright Red Hat.
- *
- * Authors:
- *  David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
- *
- * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
- * later.  See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
- *
- */
-#ifndef QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H
-#define QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H
-
-#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
-
-#include "qom/object.h"
-
-#define TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT "confidential-guest-support"
-OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport,
-                    ConfidentialGuestSupportClass,
-                    CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
-
-
-struct ConfidentialGuestSupport {
-    Object parent;
-
-    /*
-     * True if the machine should use guest_memfd for RAM.
-     */
-    bool require_guest_memfd;
-
-    /*
-     * ready: flag set by CGS initialization code once it's ready to
-     *        start executing instructions in a potentially-secure
-     *        guest
-     *
-     * The definition here is a bit fuzzy, because this is essentially
-     * part of a self-sanity-check, rather than a strict mechanism.
-     *
-     * It's not feasible to have a single point in the common machine
-     * init path to configure confidential guest support, because
-     * different mechanisms have different interdependencies requiring
-     * initialization in different places, often in arch or machine
-     * type specific code.  It's also usually not possible to check
-     * for invalid configurations until that initialization code.
-     * That means it would be very easy to have a bug allowing CGS
-     * init to be bypassed entirely in certain configurations.
-     *
-     * Silently ignoring a requested security feature would be bad, so
-     * to avoid that we check late in init that this 'ready' flag is
-     * set if CGS was requested.  If the CGS init hasn't happened, and
-     * so 'ready' is not set, we'll abort.
-     */
-    bool ready;
-};
-
-typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
-    ObjectClass parent;
-
-    int (*kvm_init)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
-    int (*kvm_reset)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
-} ConfidentialGuestSupportClass;
-
-static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
-                                              Error **errp)
-{
-    ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass;
-
-    klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(cgs);
-    if (klass->kvm_init) {
-        return klass->kvm_init(cgs, errp);
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_reset(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
-                                               Error **errp)
-{
-    ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass;
-
-    klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(cgs);
-    if (klass->kvm_reset) {
-        return klass->kvm_reset(cgs, errp);
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* !CONFIG_USER_ONLY */
-
-#endif /* QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H */