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| author | Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> | 2022-05-12 19:57:46 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> | 2022-05-13 07:57:26 -0400 |
| commit | d792199de55ca5cb5334016884039c740290b5c7 (patch) | |
| tree | e13d31c6c1434e1cb85b25b310b95bfaed640b2f /hw/virtio | |
| parent | 1c82fdfef8a227518ffecae9d419bcada995c202 (diff) | |
| download | qemu-d792199de55ca5cb5334016884039c740290b5c7.zip qemu-d792199de55ca5cb5334016884039c740290b5c7.tar.gz qemu-d792199de55ca5cb5334016884039c740290b5c7.tar.bz2 | |
hw/virtio: Replace g_memdup() by g_memdup2()
Per https://discourse.gnome.org/t/port-your-module-from-g-memdup-to-g-memdup2-now/5538
The old API took the size of the memory to duplicate as a guint,
whereas most memory functions take memory sizes as a gsize. This
made it easy to accidentally pass a gsize to g_memdup(). For large
values, that would lead to a silent truncation of the size from 64
to 32 bits, and result in a heap area being returned which is
significantly smaller than what the caller expects. This can likely
be exploited in various modules to cause a heap buffer overflow.
Replace g_memdup() by the safer g_memdup2() wrapper.
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220512175747.142058-6-eperezma@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'hw/virtio')
| -rw-r--r-- | hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c index dcd80b9..0e31e3c 100644 --- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c +++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void virtio_crypto_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq) } out_num = elem->out_num; - out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num); + out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num); out_iov = out_iov_copy; in_num = elem->in_num; @@ -605,11 +605,11 @@ virtio_crypto_handle_request(VirtIOCryptoReq *request) } out_num = elem->out_num; - out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num); + out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num); out_iov = out_iov_copy; in_num = elem->in_num; - in_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num); + in_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num); in_iov = in_iov_copy; if (unlikely(iov_to_buf(out_iov, out_num, 0, &req, sizeof(req)) |