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authorFabiano Rosas <farosas@suse.de>2024-08-05 17:20:41 -0300
committerPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2024-10-03 19:33:23 +0200
commit0701abbf9880b5ab1cf44e0caa6ad173aec840e7 (patch)
tree991fa1924207d42f17e47f36e248c2a9ae7899fc /hw/ppc
parent67388078da1cf6dac89e5a7c748cca3444d49690 (diff)
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target/i386: Expose IBPB-BRTYPE and SBPB CPUID bits to the guest
According to AMD's Speculative Return Stack Overflow whitepaper (link below), the hypervisor should synthesize the value of IBPB_BRTYPE and SBPB CPUID bits to the guest. Support for this is already present in the kernel with commit e47d86083c66 ("KVM: x86: Add SBPB support") and commit 6f0f23ef76be ("KVM: x86: Add IBPB_BRTYPE support"). Add support in QEMU to expose the bits to the guest OS. host: # cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_rstack_overflow Mitigation: Safe RET before (guest): $ cpuid -l 0x80000021 -1 -r 0x80000021 0x00: eax=0x00000045 ebx=0x00000000 ecx=0x00000000 edx=0x00000000 ^ $ cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_rstack_overflow Vulnerable: Safe RET, no microcode after (guest): $ cpuid -l 0x80000021 -1 -r 0x80000021 0x00: eax=0x18000045 ebx=0x00000000 ecx=0x00000000 edx=0x00000000 ^ $ cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_rstack_overflow Mitigation: Safe RET Reported-by: Fabian Vogt <fvogt@suse.de> Link: https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/corporate/cr/speculative-return-stack-overflow-whitepaper.pdf Signed-off-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240805202041.5936-1-farosas@suse.de Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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