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authorGreg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>2017-02-26 23:44:46 +0100
committerGreg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>2017-02-28 11:21:15 +0100
commit38771613ea6759f499645afd709aa422161eb27e (patch)
treeac69164fab339a162ead32200cd19c512c225d21 /hw/9pfs
parentd369f20763a857eac544a5289a046d0285a91df8 (diff)
downloadqemu-38771613ea6759f499645afd709aa422161eb27e.zip
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9pfs: local: symlink: don't follow symlinks
The local_symlink() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it calls: (1) symlink() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the rightmost one (2) open(O_NOFOLLOW) which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the rightmost one (3) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all path elements (4) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path elements but the rightmost one This patch converts local_symlink() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and symlinkat() to fix (1), openat(O_NOFOLLOW) to fix (2), as well as local_set_xattrat() and local_set_mapped_file_attrat() to fix (3) and (4) respectively. This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602. Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'hw/9pfs')
-rw-r--r--hw/9pfs/9p-local.c81
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 56 deletions
diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
index 2cd3962..fab9bee 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
@@ -978,23 +978,22 @@ static int local_symlink(FsContext *fs_ctx, const char *oldpath,
V9fsPath *dir_path, const char *name, FsCred *credp)
{
int err = -1;
- int serrno = 0;
- char *newpath;
- V9fsString fullname;
- char *buffer = NULL;
+ int dirfd;
- v9fs_string_init(&fullname);
- v9fs_string_sprintf(&fullname, "%s/%s", dir_path->data, name);
- newpath = fullname.data;
+ dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(fs_ctx, dir_path->data);
+ if (dirfd == -1) {
+ return -1;
+ }
/* Determine the security model */
- if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED) {
+ if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED ||
+ fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE) {
int fd;
ssize_t oldpath_size, write_size;
- buffer = rpath(fs_ctx, newpath);
- fd = open(buffer, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR|O_NOFOLLOW, SM_LOCAL_MODE_BITS);
+
+ fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_RDWR,
+ SM_LOCAL_MODE_BITS);
if (fd == -1) {
- err = fd;
goto out;
}
/* Write the oldpath (target) to the file. */
@@ -1002,78 +1001,48 @@ static int local_symlink(FsContext *fs_ctx, const char *oldpath,
do {
write_size = write(fd, (void *)oldpath, oldpath_size);
} while (write_size == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+ close_preserve_errno(fd);
if (write_size != oldpath_size) {
- serrno = errno;
- close(fd);
- err = -1;
goto err_end;
}
- close(fd);
/* Set cleint credentials in symlink's xattr */
- credp->fc_mode = credp->fc_mode|S_IFLNK;
- err = local_set_xattr(buffer, credp);
- if (err == -1) {
- serrno = errno;
- goto err_end;
- }
- } else if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE) {
- int fd;
- ssize_t oldpath_size, write_size;
- buffer = rpath(fs_ctx, newpath);
- fd = open(buffer, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR|O_NOFOLLOW, SM_LOCAL_MODE_BITS);
- if (fd == -1) {
- err = fd;
- goto out;
- }
- /* Write the oldpath (target) to the file. */
- oldpath_size = strlen(oldpath);
- do {
- write_size = write(fd, (void *)oldpath, oldpath_size);
- } while (write_size == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+ credp->fc_mode = credp->fc_mode | S_IFLNK;
- if (write_size != oldpath_size) {
- serrno = errno;
- close(fd);
- err = -1;
- goto err_end;
+ if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED) {
+ err = local_set_xattrat(dirfd, name, credp);
+ } else {
+ err = local_set_mapped_file_attrat(dirfd, name, credp);
}
- close(fd);
- /* Set cleint credentials in symlink's xattr */
- credp->fc_mode = credp->fc_mode|S_IFLNK;
- err = local_set_mapped_file_attr(fs_ctx, newpath, credp);
if (err == -1) {
- serrno = errno;
goto err_end;
}
- } else if ((fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_PASSTHROUGH) ||
- (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_NONE)) {
- buffer = rpath(fs_ctx, newpath);
- err = symlink(oldpath, buffer);
+ } else if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_PASSTHROUGH ||
+ fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_NONE) {
+ err = symlinkat(oldpath, dirfd, name);
if (err) {
goto out;
}
- err = lchown(buffer, credp->fc_uid, credp->fc_gid);
+ err = fchownat(dirfd, name, credp->fc_uid, credp->fc_gid,
+ AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
if (err == -1) {
/*
* If we fail to change ownership and if we are
* using security model none. Ignore the error
*/
if ((fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SEC_MASK) != V9FS_SM_NONE) {
- serrno = errno;
goto err_end;
- } else
+ } else {
err = 0;
+ }
}
}
goto out;
err_end:
- remove(buffer);
- errno = serrno;
+ unlinkat_preserve_errno(dirfd, name, 0);
out:
- g_free(buffer);
- v9fs_string_free(&fullname);
+ close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
return err;
}