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authorStefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>2020-10-08 09:55:34 +0100
committerDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>2020-10-26 18:35:32 +0000
commit06844584b62a43384642f7243b0fc01c9fff0fc7 (patch)
tree969594181ec3954c7ea04dad346117c077ada794 /block/snapshot.c
parent800ad114f10d0bf94e49b1441e1a13064a45a967 (diff)
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virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o sandbox=chroot option
virtiofsd cannot run in a container because CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to create namespaces. Introduce a weaker sandbox mode that is sufficient in container environments because the container runtime already sets up namespaces. Use chroot to restrict path traversal to the shared directory. virtiofsd loses the following: 1. Mount namespace. The process chroots to the shared directory but leaves the mounts in place. Seccomp rejects mount(2)/umount(2) syscalls. 2. Pid namespace. This should be fine because virtiofsd is the only process running in the container. 3. Network namespace. This should be fine because seccomp already rejects the connect(2) syscall, but an additional layer of security is lost. Container runtime-specific network security policies can be used drop network traffic (except for the vhost-user UNIX domain socket). Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20201008085534.16070-1-stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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