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author | Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> | 2017-02-26 23:44:46 +0100 |
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committer | Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> | 2017-02-28 11:21:15 +0100 |
commit | 38771613ea6759f499645afd709aa422161eb27e (patch) | |
tree | ac69164fab339a162ead32200cd19c512c225d21 /VERSION | |
parent | d369f20763a857eac544a5289a046d0285a91df8 (diff) | |
download | qemu-38771613ea6759f499645afd709aa422161eb27e.zip qemu-38771613ea6759f499645afd709aa422161eb27e.tar.gz qemu-38771613ea6759f499645afd709aa422161eb27e.tar.bz2 |
9pfs: local: symlink: don't follow symlinks
The local_symlink() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) symlink() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) open(O_NOFOLLOW) which follows symbolic links for all path elements but
the rightmost one
(3) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
path elements
(4) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
elements but the rightmost one
This patch converts local_symlink() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
symlinkat() to fix (1), openat(O_NOFOLLOW) to fix (2), as well as
local_set_xattrat() and local_set_mapped_file_attrat() to fix (3) and
(4) respectively.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'VERSION')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions