aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorStefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>2025-01-09 08:39:31 -0500
committerStefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>2025-01-09 08:39:32 -0500
commitbc6afa1c711da5b4f37c9685a812c77b114d84cb (patch)
treee3001416d45824009c11ab359b76ae939bb26191
parentc10ed2fac295d77370c4c81091af5deb3859e35d (diff)
parentb6014c5089a313ac84fe74970eee56e3fc87b49b (diff)
downloadqemu-bc6afa1c711da5b4f37c9685a812c77b114d84cb.zip
qemu-bc6afa1c711da5b4f37c9685a812c77b114d84cb.tar.gz
qemu-bc6afa1c711da5b4f37c9685a812c77b114d84cb.tar.bz2
Merge tag 'pull-xenfv-20250109-1' of https://gitlab.com/dwmw2/qemu into staging
Xen emulation fixes # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQJGBAABCAAwFiEEMUsIrNDeSBEzpfKGm+mA/QrAFUQFAmd/qNYSHGR3bXdAYW1h # em9uLmNvLnVrAAoJEJvpgP0KwBVEtHsP/1qdpeVDCW1LAdGsOl9vixBXTR5/85G4 # m1KilpAPyxla8WfChRIagIdSAYGP5gN+yzbZ74AGb8HxumqJdl0bj6Gtqms2r8EQ # 4T7IU1iNONDkncApkHdQW9BdKg4Atq3dY8dEaN1UxzCfRjHC/KS5vHPN3OzGKqJ1 # tAk8wOcDtp7cfW+utw2ssjVR14cfJLQCR7/ehBfeFkC0DSd8p/yTJ31bFnLyPpBn # vh03MrslqV+h47D0uQxKwx5rtvNQhhIc/eRR/RymY3BSzAqRiyed/hTvsrRy4y/Z # EXB8ACQ6U2Ikrj//VXimSTx5aQDeGIU8nD6zvNRWZ1rTmTtD3n5dOxL2U9U5DBHb # TtlYhyochV6zO76mbINyjkSkGdj8ZZgF+5w5IIEhjazfHdWDuMdG0IjcRxl0r2Qz # 4jaoVjxMUT/MLI4noSVYFF29/aWYxsk/nsYCPOM2X4WuzK4/ragIWbpZZqOIFn4X # NyEc7xD2z9iL3MZe0Ygsa1eRpi/Gak0ih6W/u6ngON2EGESdF4T+CI+zTp6I4xtp # jOrAGltp6012pRJibHrKKdpnTYuQCRj3kSFAEP+JhNSBDUhbZ5lJWTnxiW7BkBO4 # BujmX3TMFsdt4jDqNQzht84Tgf4JEAYbGCks9msFcoYdZovKcyG3kgfZyAVfEap2 # kvCgGk7JMz1A # =5kvA # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Thu 09 Jan 2025 05:45:42 EST # gpg: using RSA key 314B08ACD0DE481133A5F2869BE980FD0AC01544 # gpg: issuer "dwmw@amazon.co.uk" # gpg: Good signature from "David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>" [unknown] # gpg: aka "David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.com>" [unknown] # gpg: WARNING: The key's User ID is not certified with a trusted signature! # gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. # Primary key fingerprint: 314B 08AC D0DE 4811 33A5 F286 9BE9 80FD 0AC0 1544 * tag 'pull-xenfv-20250109-1' of https://gitlab.com/dwmw2/qemu: hw/xen: Check if len is 0 before memcpy() hw/i386/pc: Fix level interrupt sharing for Xen event channel GSI Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
-rw-r--r--hw/i386/kvm/xen_evtchn.c60
-rw-r--r--hw/i386/kvm/xen_evtchn.h2
-rw-r--r--hw/i386/kvm/xen_xenstore.c4
-rw-r--r--hw/i386/x86-common.c32
4 files changed, 73 insertions, 25 deletions
diff --git a/hw/i386/kvm/xen_evtchn.c b/hw/i386/kvm/xen_evtchn.c
index bd2a3cb..58484f3 100644
--- a/hw/i386/kvm/xen_evtchn.c
+++ b/hw/i386/kvm/xen_evtchn.c
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ struct XenEvtchnState {
uint64_t callback_param;
bool evtchn_in_kernel;
+ bool setting_callback_gsi;
+ int extern_gsi_level;
uint32_t callback_gsi;
QEMUBH *gsi_bh;
@@ -431,9 +433,22 @@ void xen_evtchn_set_callback_level(int level)
}
if (s->callback_gsi && s->callback_gsi < s->nr_callback_gsis) {
- qemu_set_irq(s->callback_gsis[s->callback_gsi], level);
- if (level) {
- /* Ensure the vCPU polls for deassertion */
+ /*
+ * Ugly, but since we hold the BQL we can set this flag so that
+ * xen_evtchn_set_gsi() can tell the difference between this code
+ * setting the GSI, and an external device (PCI INTx) doing so.
+ */
+ s->setting_callback_gsi = true;
+ /* Do not deassert the line if an external device is asserting it. */
+ qemu_set_irq(s->callback_gsis[s->callback_gsi],
+ level || s->extern_gsi_level);
+ s->setting_callback_gsi = false;
+
+ /*
+ * If the callback GSI is the only one asserted, ensure the status
+ * is polled for deassertion in kvm_arch_post_run().
+ */
+ if (level && !s->extern_gsi_level) {
kvm_xen_set_callback_asserted();
}
}
@@ -1596,7 +1611,7 @@ static int allocate_pirq(XenEvtchnState *s, int type, int gsi)
return pirq;
}
-bool xen_evtchn_set_gsi(int gsi, int level)
+bool xen_evtchn_set_gsi(int gsi, int *level)
{
XenEvtchnState *s = xen_evtchn_singleton;
int pirq;
@@ -1608,16 +1623,35 @@ bool xen_evtchn_set_gsi(int gsi, int level)
}
/*
- * Check that that it *isn't* the event channel GSI, and thus
- * that we are not recursing and it's safe to take s->port_lock.
- *
- * Locking aside, it's perfectly sane to bail out early for that
- * special case, as it would make no sense for the event channel
- * GSI to be routed back to event channels, when the delivery
- * method is to raise the GSI... that recursion wouldn't *just*
- * be a locking issue.
+ * For the callback_gsi we need to implement a logical OR of the event
+ * channel GSI and the external input (e.g. from PCI INTx), because
+ * QEMU itself doesn't support shared level interrupts via demux or
+ * resamplers.
*/
if (gsi && gsi == s->callback_gsi) {
+ /* Remember the external state of the GSI pin (e.g. from PCI INTx) */
+ if (!s->setting_callback_gsi) {
+ s->extern_gsi_level = *level;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't allow the external device to deassert the line if the
+ * eveht channel GSI should still be asserted.
+ */
+ if (!s->extern_gsi_level) {
+ struct vcpu_info *vi = kvm_xen_get_vcpu_info_hva(0);
+ if (vi && vi->evtchn_upcall_pending) {
+ /* Need to poll for deassertion */
+ kvm_xen_set_callback_asserted();
+ *level = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The event channel GSI cannot be routed to PIRQ, as that would make
+ * no sense. It could also deadlock on s->port_lock, if we proceed.
+ * So bail out now.
+ */
return false;
}
@@ -1628,7 +1662,7 @@ bool xen_evtchn_set_gsi(int gsi, int level)
return false;
}
- if (level) {
+ if (*level) {
int port = s->pirq[pirq].port;
s->pirq_gsi_set |= (1U << gsi);
diff --git a/hw/i386/kvm/xen_evtchn.h b/hw/i386/kvm/xen_evtchn.h
index b740acf..0521ebc 100644
--- a/hw/i386/kvm/xen_evtchn.h
+++ b/hw/i386/kvm/xen_evtchn.h
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ void xen_evtchn_set_callback_level(int level);
int xen_evtchn_set_port(uint16_t port);
-bool xen_evtchn_set_gsi(int gsi, int level);
+bool xen_evtchn_set_gsi(int gsi, int *level);
void xen_evtchn_snoop_msi(PCIDevice *dev, bool is_msix, unsigned int vector,
uint64_t addr, uint32_t data, bool is_masked);
void xen_evtchn_remove_pci_device(PCIDevice *dev);
diff --git a/hw/i386/kvm/xen_xenstore.c b/hw/i386/kvm/xen_xenstore.c
index 5969105..17802aa 100644
--- a/hw/i386/kvm/xen_xenstore.c
+++ b/hw/i386/kvm/xen_xenstore.c
@@ -532,6 +532,10 @@ static void xs_read(XenXenstoreState *s, unsigned int req_id,
return;
}
+ if (!len) {
+ return;
+ }
+
memcpy(&rsp_data[rsp->len], data->data, len);
rsp->len += len;
}
diff --git a/hw/i386/x86-common.c b/hw/i386/x86-common.c
index a7d46c3..97b4f7d 100644
--- a/hw/i386/x86-common.c
+++ b/hw/i386/x86-common.c
@@ -450,8 +450,27 @@ static long get_file_size(FILE *f)
void gsi_handler(void *opaque, int n, int level)
{
GSIState *s = opaque;
+ bool bypass_ioapic = false;
trace_x86_gsi_interrupt(n, level);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_EMU
+ /*
+ * Xen delivers the GSI to the Legacy PIC (not that Legacy PIC
+ * routing actually works properly under Xen). And then to
+ * *either* the PIRQ handling or the I/OAPIC depending on whether
+ * the former wants it.
+ *
+ * Additionally, this hook allows the Xen event channel GSI to
+ * work around QEMU's lack of support for shared level interrupts,
+ * by keeping track of the externally driven state of the pin and
+ * implementing a logical OR with the state of the evtchn GSI.
+ */
+ if (xen_mode == XEN_EMULATE) {
+ bypass_ioapic = xen_evtchn_set_gsi(n, &level);
+ }
+#endif
+
switch (n) {
case 0 ... ISA_NUM_IRQS - 1:
if (s->i8259_irq[n]) {
@@ -460,18 +479,9 @@ void gsi_handler(void *opaque, int n, int level)
}
/* fall through */
case ISA_NUM_IRQS ... IOAPIC_NUM_PINS - 1:
-#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_EMU
- /*
- * Xen delivers the GSI to the Legacy PIC (not that Legacy PIC
- * routing actually works properly under Xen). And then to
- * *either* the PIRQ handling or the I/OAPIC depending on
- * whether the former wants it.
- */
- if (xen_mode == XEN_EMULATE && xen_evtchn_set_gsi(n, level)) {
- break;
+ if (!bypass_ioapic) {
+ qemu_set_irq(s->ioapic_irq[n], level);
}
-#endif
- qemu_set_irq(s->ioapic_irq[n], level);
break;
case IO_APIC_SECONDARY_IRQBASE
... IO_APIC_SECONDARY_IRQBASE + IOAPIC_NUM_PINS - 1: