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authorIan Lance Taylor <ian@gcc.gnu.org>2015-10-31 00:59:47 +0000
committerIan Lance Taylor <ian@gcc.gnu.org>2015-10-31 00:59:47 +0000
commitaf146490bb04205107cb23e301ec7a8ff927b5fc (patch)
tree13beeaed3698c61903fe93fb1ce70bd9b18d4e7f /libgo/go/crypto/ecdsa
parent725e1be3406315d9bcc8195d7eef0a7082b3c7cc (diff)
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runtime: Remove now unnecessary pad field from ParFor.
It is not needed due to the removal of the ctx field. Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/16525 From-SVN: r229616
Diffstat (limited to 'libgo/go/crypto/ecdsa')
-rw-r--r--libgo/go/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.go61
-rw-r--r--libgo/go/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.go72
2 files changed, 131 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/libgo/go/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.go b/libgo/go/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.go
index d613553..8d66477 100644
--- a/libgo/go/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.go
+++ b/libgo/go/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.go
@@ -4,22 +4,33 @@
// Package ecdsa implements the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, as
// defined in FIPS 186-3.
+//
+// This implementation derives the nonce from an AES-CTR CSPRNG keyed by
+// ChopMD(256, SHA2-512(priv.D || entropy || hash)). The CSPRNG key is IRO by
+// a result of Coron; the AES-CTR stream is IRO under standard assumptions.
package ecdsa
// References:
// [NSA]: Suite B implementer's guide to FIPS 186-3,
// http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/ecdsa.pdf
// [SECG]: SECG, SEC1
-// http://www.secg.org/download/aid-780/sec1-v2.pdf
+// http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf
import (
"crypto"
+ "crypto/aes"
+ "crypto/cipher"
"crypto/elliptic"
+ "crypto/sha512"
"encoding/asn1"
"io"
"math/big"
)
+const (
+ aesIV = "IV for ECDSA CTR"
+)
+
// PublicKey represents an ECDSA public key.
type PublicKey struct {
elliptic.Curve
@@ -123,6 +134,38 @@ func fermatInverse(k, N *big.Int) *big.Int {
// pair of integers. The security of the private key depends on the entropy of
// rand.
func Sign(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash []byte) (r, s *big.Int, err error) {
+ // Get max(log2(q) / 2, 256) bits of entropy from rand.
+ entropylen := (priv.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 16
+ if entropylen > 32 {
+ entropylen = 32
+ }
+ entropy := make([]byte, entropylen)
+ _, err = io.ReadFull(rand, entropy)
+ if err != nil {
+ return
+ }
+
+ // Initialize an SHA-512 hash context; digest ...
+ md := sha512.New()
+ md.Write(priv.D.Bytes()) // the private key,
+ md.Write(entropy) // the entropy,
+ md.Write(hash) // and the input hash;
+ key := md.Sum(nil)[:32] // and compute ChopMD-256(SHA-512),
+ // which is an indifferentiable MAC.
+
+ // Create an AES-CTR instance to use as a CSPRNG.
+ block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, nil, err
+ }
+
+ // Create a CSPRNG that xors a stream of zeros with
+ // the output of the AES-CTR instance.
+ csprng := cipher.StreamReader{
+ R: zeroReader,
+ S: cipher.NewCTR(block, []byte(aesIV)),
+ }
+
// See [NSA] 3.4.1
c := priv.PublicKey.Curve
N := c.Params().N
@@ -130,7 +173,7 @@ func Sign(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash []byte) (r, s *big.Int, err err
var k, kInv *big.Int
for {
for {
- k, err = randFieldElement(c, rand)
+ k, err = randFieldElement(c, csprng)
if err != nil {
r = nil
return
@@ -187,3 +230,17 @@ func Verify(pub *PublicKey, hash []byte, r, s *big.Int) bool {
x.Mod(x, N)
return x.Cmp(r) == 0
}
+
+type zr struct {
+ io.Reader
+}
+
+// Read replaces the contents of dst with zeros.
+func (z *zr) Read(dst []byte) (n int, err error) {
+ for i := range dst {
+ dst[i] = 0
+ }
+ return len(dst), nil
+}
+
+var zeroReader = &zr{}
diff --git a/libgo/go/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.go b/libgo/go/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.go
index 0c06431..169944d 100644
--- a/libgo/go/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.go
+++ b/libgo/go/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.go
@@ -72,6 +72,78 @@ func TestSignAndVerify(t *testing.T) {
testSignAndVerify(t, elliptic.P521(), "p521")
}
+func testNonceSafety(t *testing.T, c elliptic.Curve, tag string) {
+ priv, _ := GenerateKey(c, rand.Reader)
+
+ hashed := []byte("testing")
+ r0, s0, err := Sign(zeroReader, priv, hashed)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Errorf("%s: error signing: %s", tag, err)
+ return
+ }
+
+ hashed = []byte("testing...")
+ r1, s1, err := Sign(zeroReader, priv, hashed)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Errorf("%s: error signing: %s", tag, err)
+ return
+ }
+
+ if s0.Cmp(s1) == 0 {
+ // This should never happen.
+ t.Errorf("%s: the signatures on two different messages were the same")
+ }
+
+ if r0.Cmp(r1) == 0 {
+ t.Errorf("%s: the nonce used for two diferent messages was the same")
+ }
+}
+
+func TestNonceSafety(t *testing.T) {
+ testNonceSafety(t, elliptic.P224(), "p224")
+ if testing.Short() {
+ return
+ }
+ testNonceSafety(t, elliptic.P256(), "p256")
+ testNonceSafety(t, elliptic.P384(), "p384")
+ testNonceSafety(t, elliptic.P521(), "p521")
+}
+
+func testINDCCA(t *testing.T, c elliptic.Curve, tag string) {
+ priv, _ := GenerateKey(c, rand.Reader)
+
+ hashed := []byte("testing")
+ r0, s0, err := Sign(rand.Reader, priv, hashed)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Errorf("%s: error signing: %s", tag, err)
+ return
+ }
+
+ r1, s1, err := Sign(rand.Reader, priv, hashed)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Errorf("%s: error signing: %s", tag, err)
+ return
+ }
+
+ if s0.Cmp(s1) == 0 {
+ t.Errorf("%s: two signatures of the same message produced the same result")
+ }
+
+ if r0.Cmp(r1) == 0 {
+ t.Errorf("%s: two signatures of the same message produced the same nonce")
+ }
+}
+
+func TestINDCCA(t *testing.T) {
+ testINDCCA(t, elliptic.P224(), "p224")
+ if testing.Short() {
+ return
+ }
+ testINDCCA(t, elliptic.P256(), "p256")
+ testINDCCA(t, elliptic.P384(), "p384")
+ testINDCCA(t, elliptic.P521(), "p521")
+}
+
func fromHex(s string) *big.Int {
r, ok := new(big.Int).SetString(s, 16)
if !ok {