gcc: Introduce -fhardened

In <https://gcc.gnu.org/pipermail/gcc-patches/2023-August/628748.html>
I proposed -fhardened, a new umbrella option that enables a reasonable set
of hardening flags.  The read of the room seems to be that the option
would be useful.  So here's a patch implementing that option.

Currently, -fhardened enables:

  -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3 (or =2 for older glibcs)
  -D_GLIBCXX_ASSERTIONS
  -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero
  -fPIE  -pie  -Wl,-z,relro,-z,now
  -fstack-protector-strong
  -fstack-clash-protection
  -fcf-protection=full (x86 GNU/Linux only)

-fhardened will not override options that were specified on the command line
(before or after -fhardened).  For example,

     -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 -fhardened

means that _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 will be used.  Similarly,

      -fhardened -fstack-protector

will not enable -fstack-protector-strong.

Currently, -fhardened is only supported on GNU/Linux.

In DW_AT_producer it is reflected only as -fhardened; it doesn't expand
to anything.  This patch provides -Whardened, enabled by default, which
warns when -fhardened couldn't enable a particular option.  I think most
often it will say that _FORTIFY_SOURCE wasn't enabled because optimization
were not enabled.

gcc/c-family/ChangeLog:

	* c-opts.cc: Include "target.h".
	(c_finish_options): Maybe cpp_define _FORTIFY_SOURCE
	and _GLIBCXX_ASSERTIONS.

gcc/ChangeLog:

	* common.opt (Whardened, fhardened): New options.
	* config.in: Regenerate.
	* config/bpf/bpf.cc: Include "opts.h".
	(bpf_option_override): If flag_stack_protector_set_by_fhardened_p, do
	not inform that -fstack-protector does not work.
	* config/i386/i386-options.cc (ix86_option_override_internal): When
	-fhardened, maybe enable -fcf-protection=full.
	* config/linux-protos.h (linux_fortify_source_default_level): Declare.
	* config/linux.cc (linux_fortify_source_default_level): New.
	* config/linux.h (TARGET_FORTIFY_SOURCE_DEFAULT_LEVEL): Redefine.
	* configure: Regenerate.
	* configure.ac: Check if the linker supports '-z now' and '-z relro'.
	Check if -fhardened is supported on $target_os.
	* doc/invoke.texi: Document -fhardened and -Whardened.
	* doc/tm.texi: Regenerate.
	* doc/tm.texi.in (TARGET_FORTIFY_SOURCE_DEFAULT_LEVEL): Add.
	* gcc.cc (driver_handle_option): Remember if any link options or -static
	were specified on the command line.
	(process_command): When -fhardened, maybe enable -pie and
	-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now.
	* opts.cc (flag_stack_protector_set_by_fhardened_p): New global.
	(finish_options): When -fhardened, enable
	-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero and -fstack-protector-strong.
	(print_help_hardened): New.
	(print_help): Call it.
	* opts.h (flag_stack_protector_set_by_fhardened_p): Declare.
	* target.def (fortify_source_default_level): New target hook.
	* targhooks.cc (default_fortify_source_default_level): New.
	* targhooks.h (default_fortify_source_default_level): Declare.
	* toplev.cc (process_options): When -fhardened, enable
	-fstack-clash-protection.  If flag_stack_protector_set_by_fhardened_p,
	do not warn that -fstack-protector not supported for this target.
	Don't enable -fhardened when !HAVE_FHARDENED_SUPPORT.

gcc/testsuite/ChangeLog:

	* gcc.misc-tests/help.exp: Test -fhardened.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-1.S: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-1.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-10.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-11.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-12.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-13.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-14.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-15.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-2.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-3.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-4.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-5.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-6.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-7.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-8.c: New test.
	* c-c++-common/fhardened-9.c: New test.
	* gcc.target/i386/cf_check-6.c: New test.

1 files changed, 23 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/gcc/toplev.cc b/gcc/toplev.cc
index 8c3fcd3..85450d9 100644
--- a/gcc/toplev.cc
+++ b/gcc/toplev.cc
@@ -1568,6 +1568,13 @@ process_options ()
       flag_associative_math = 0;
     }
 
+  if (flag_hardened && !HAVE_FHARDENED_SUPPORT)
+    {
+      warning_at (UNKNOWN_LOCATION, 0,
+		  "%<-fhardened%> not supported for this target");
+      flag_hardened = 0;
+    }
+
   /* -fstack-clash-protection is not currently supported on targets
      where the stack grows up.  */
   if (flag_stack_clash_protection && !STACK_GROWS_DOWNWARD)
@@ -1577,6 +1584,19 @@ process_options ()
 		  "where the stack grows from lower to higher addresses");
       flag_stack_clash_protection = 0;
     }
+  else if (flag_hardened)
+    {
+      if (!flag_stack_clash_protection
+	   /* Don't enable -fstack-clash-protection when -fstack-check=
+	      is used: it would result in confusing errors.  */
+	   && flag_stack_check == NO_STACK_CHECK)
+	flag_stack_clash_protection = 1;
+      else if (flag_stack_check != NO_STACK_CHECK)
+	warning_at (UNKNOWN_LOCATION, OPT_Whardened,
+		    "%<-fstack-clash-protection%> is not enabled by "
+		    "%<-fhardened%> because %<-fstack-check%> was "
+		    "specified on the command line");
+    }
 
   /* We cannot support -fstack-check= and -fstack-clash-protection at
      the same time.  */
@@ -1592,8 +1612,9 @@ process_options ()
      target already uses a soft frame pointer, the transition is trivial.  */
   if (!FRAME_GROWS_DOWNWARD && flag_stack_protect)
     {
-      warning_at (UNKNOWN_LOCATION, 0,
-		  "%<-fstack-protector%> not supported for this target");
+      if (!flag_stack_protector_set_by_fhardened_p)
+	warning_at (UNKNOWN_LOCATION, 0,
+		    "%<-fstack-protector%> not supported for this target");
       flag_stack_protect = 0;
     }
   if (!flag_stack_protect)