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author | Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 2024-03-18 17:45:56 -0400 |
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committer | Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 2024-04-23 17:35:25 +0200 |
commit | 08b2d15cdd0d3fbbe37ce23bf192b770db3a7539 (patch) | |
tree | 1de106fb1e6aad474bc9b6db5dbed5a250784c8a /scripts/shaderinclude.py | |
parent | ab0c7fb22b56523f24d6e127cd4d10ecff67bf85 (diff) | |
download | qemu-08b2d15cdd0d3fbbe37ce23bf192b770db3a7539.zip qemu-08b2d15cdd0d3fbbe37ce23bf192b770db3a7539.tar.gz qemu-08b2d15cdd0d3fbbe37ce23bf192b770db3a7539.tar.bz2 |
runstate: skip initial CPU reset if reset is not actually possible
Right now, the system reset is concluded by a call to
cpu_synchronize_all_post_reset() in order to sync any changes
that the machine reset callback applied to the CPU state.
However, for VMs with encrypted state such as SEV-ES guests (currently
the only case of guests with non-resettable CPUs) this cannot be done,
because guest state has already been finalized by machine-init-done notifiers.
cpu_synchronize_all_post_reset() does nothing on these guests, and actually
we would like to make it fail if called once guest has been encrypted.
So, assume that boards that support non-resettable CPUs do not touch
CPU state and that all such setup is done before, at the time of
cpu_synchronize_all_post_init().
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/shaderinclude.py')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions