deps: various quic patches from akamai/openssl

Add support for BoringSSL QUIC APIs

This is a cherry-pick of 2a4b03a306439307e0b822b17eda3bdabddfbb68
on the master-quic-support2 branch (2019-10-07)
Which was a rebase/squash of master-quic-support:

* 5aa62ce Add support for more secrets - Todd Short/Todd Short (master-quic-support)
* 58e0643 Tweeks to quic_change_cipher_state() - Todd Short/Todd Short
* 8169702 Move QUIC code out of tls13_change_cipher_state() - Todd Short/Todd Short
* a08cfe6 Correctly disable middlebox compat - Todd Short/Todd Short
* 3a9eabf Add OPENSSL_NO_QUIC wrapper - Todd Short/Todd Short
* f550eca Add client early traffic secret storage - Todd Short/Todd Short
* 1b787ae Quick fix: s2c to c2s for early secret - Todd Short/Todd Short
* f97e6a9 Don't process an incomplete message - Todd Short/Todd Short
* 81f0ce2 Reset init state in SSL_process_quic_post_handshake() - Todd Short/Todd Short
* 5d59cf9 Fix quic_transport constructors/parsers - Todd Short/Todd Short
* 5e5f91c Fix INSTALL nit. - Todd Short/Todd Short
* bd290ab Fix duplicate word in docs - Todd Short/Todd Short
* 699590b fixup! Handle partial handshake messages - Todd Short/Todd Short
* a472a8d Handle partial handshake messages - Todd Short/Todd Short
* 363cf3d fixup! Use proper secrets for handshake - Todd Short/Todd Short
* b03fee6 Use proper secrets for handshake - Todd Short/Todd Short
* 2ab1aa0 Move QUIC transport params to encrypted extensions - Todd Short/Todd Short
* 0d16af9 Make temp secret names less confusing - Todd Short/Todd Short
* abb6f39 New method to get QUIC secret length - Todd Short/Todd Short
* 05fdae9 Add support for BoringSSL QUIC APIs - Todd Short/Todd Short

This adds a compatible API for BoringSSL's QUIC support, based
on the current |draft-ietf-quic-tls|.

Based on BoringSSL commit 3c034b2cf386b3131f75520705491871a2e0cafe
Based on BoringSSL commit c8e0f90f83b9ec38ea833deb86b5a41360b62b6a
Based on BoringSSL commit 3cbb0299a28a8bd0136257251a78b91a96c5eec8
Based on BoringSSL commit cc9d935256539af2d3b7f831abf57c0d685ffd81
Based on BoringSSL commit e6eef1ca16a022e476bbaedffef044597cfc8f4b
Based on BoringSSL commit 6f733791148cf8a076bf0e95498235aadbe5926d
Based on BoringSSL commit 384d0eaf1930af1ebc47eda751f0c78dfcba1c03
Based on BoringSSL commit a0373182eb5cc7b81d49f434596b473c7801c942
Based on BoringSSL commit b1b76aee3cb43ce11889403c5334283d951ebd37

New method to get QUIC secret length

Make temp secret names less confusing

Move QUIC transport params to encrypted extensions

Use proper secrets for handshake

fixup! Use proper secrets for handshake

Handle partial handshake messages

fixup! Handle partial handshake messages

Fix duplicate word in docs

Fix INSTALL nit.

Fix quic_transport constructors/parsers

Reset init state in SSL_process_quic_post_handshake()

Don't process an incomplete message

Quick fix: s2c to c2s for early secret

Add client early traffic secret storage

Add OPENSSL_NO_QUIC wrapper

Correctly disable middlebox compat

Move QUIC code out of tls13_change_cipher_state()

Create quic_change_cipher_state() that does the minimal required
to generate the QUIC secrets. (e.g. encryption contexts are not
initialized).

Tweeks to quic_change_cipher_state()

Add support for more secrets

Fix resumption secret

(cherry picked from commit 16fafdf4e0ec6cddd5705f407e5dca26cb30914d)

QUIC: Handle EndOfEarlyData and MaxEarlyData

QUIC: Increase HKDF_MAXBUF to 2048

Fall-through for 0RTT

Some cleanup for the main QUIC changes

Try to reduce unneeded whitespace changes and wrap new code to 80 columns.
Reword documentation to attempt to improve clarity.
Add some more sanity checks and clarifying comments to the code.
Update referenced I-D versions.

Prevent KeyUpdate for QUIC

QUIC does not use the TLS KeyUpdate message/mechanism, and indeed
it is an error to generate or receive such a message.  Add the
necessary checks (noting that the check for receipt should be
redundant since SSL_provide_quic_data() is the only way to provide
input to the TLS layer for a QUIC connection).

Test KeyUpdate rejection

For now, just test that we don't generate any, since we don't really
expose the mechanics for encrypting one and the QUIC API is not
integrated into the TLSProxy setup.

Fix out-of-bounds read when TLS msg is split up into multiple chunks

Previously, SSL_provide_quic_data tried to handle this kind of
situation, but it failed when the length of input data is less than
SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH.  If that happens, the code might get wrong
message length by reading value from out-of-bounds region.

Revert "Fix out-of-bounds read when TLS msg is split up into multiple chunks"

This reverts commit 18f993cbdae498111c94a075fd9b115bd8367574.

Test HKDF with empty IKM

Add an extra EVP test that provides empty input key material.
It currently fails, since attempting to set a zero-length key
on an EVP_PKEY_CTX results in a call to OPENSSL_memdup() with
length zero, which returns NULL and is detected as failure.

Allow zero-length HKDF keys

When making a copy to keep in the EVP_PKEY_CTX, allocate a single
byte for the cached key instead of letting memdup return NULL
and cause the call to fail.  The length still gets set to zero
properly, so we don't end up inspecting the allocated byte, but
it's important to have a non-NULL pointer set.

Buffer all provided quic data

Make all data supplied via SSL_provide_quic_data() pass through an
internal buffer, so that we can handle data supplied with arbitrary
framing and only parse complete TLS records onto the list of QUIC_DATA
managed by quic_input_data_head/quic_input_data_tail.

This lets us remove the concept of "incomplete" QUIC_DATA structures,
and the 'offset' field needed to support them.

However, we've already moved the provided data onto the buffer by
the time we can check for KeyUpdate messages, so defer that check
to quic_get_message() (where it is adjacent to the preexisting
ChangeCipherSpec check).

To avoid extra memory copies, we also make the QUIC_DATA structures
just store offsets into the consolidated buffer instead of having copies
of the TLS handshake messages themselves.

enforce consistent encryption level for handshake messages

The QUIC-TLS spec requires that TLS handshake messages do not cross
encryption level boundaries, but we were not previously enforcing this.

PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/36520


Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <rlau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Beth Griggs <bgriggs@redhat.com>