- Apr 29, 2010
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Stephen Smalley authored
On Tue, 2010-04-27 at 11:47 -0700, David Miller wrote: > From: "Tom \"spot\" Callaway" <tcallawa@redhat.com> > Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 14:20:21 -0400 > > > [root@apollo ~]$ cat /proc/2174/maps > > 00010000-00014000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 15466577 > > /sbin/mingetty > > 00022000-00024000 rwxp 00002000 fd:00 15466577 > > /sbin/mingetty > > 00024000-00046000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 > > [heap] > > SELINUX probably barfs on the executable heap, the PLT is in the HEAP > just like powerpc32 and that's why VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS has to set > both executable and writable. > > You also can't remove the CONFIG_PPC32 ifdefs in selinux, since > because of the VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS setting used still in that arch, > the heap will always have executable permission, just like sparc does. > You have to support those binaries forever, whether you like it or not. > > Let's just replace the CONFIG_PPC32 ifdef in SELINUX with CONFIG_PPC32 > || CONFIG_SPARC as in Tom's original patch and let's be done with > this. > > In fact I would go through all the arch/ header files and check the > VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS settings and add the necessary new ifdefs to the > SELINUX code so that other platforms don't have the pain of having to > go through this process too. To avoid maintaining per-arch ifdefs, it seems that we could just directly use (VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC) as the basis for deciding whether to enable or disable these checks. VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS isn't constant on some architectures but instead depends on current->personality, but we want this applied uniformly. So we'll just use the initial task state to determine whether or not to enable these checks. Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- Apr 28, 2010
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Eric Paris authored
Most of the LSM common audit work uses LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* for the naming. This was not so for LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT which means the generic initializer cannot be used. This patch just renames the flag so the generic initializer can be used. Signed-off-by:
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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- Apr 27, 2010
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Serge E. Hallyn authored
Change the credentials documentation to make it clear that the RCU read lock must be explicitly held when accessing credentials pointers in some other task than current. Holding a spinlock does not implicitly hold the RCU read lock. Signed-off-by:
Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
Don't #include Ext2 headers into Smack unnecessarily. Signed-off-by:
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by:
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- Apr 23, 2010
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Justin P. Mattock authored
Whitespace coding style fixes. Signed-off-by:
Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
Redirecting directly to lsm, here's the patch discussed on lkml: http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/4/22/219 The mmap_min_addr value is useful information for an admin to see without being root ("is my system vulnerable to kernel NULL pointer attacks?") and its setting is trivially easy for an attacker to determine by calling mmap() in PAGE_SIZE increments starting at 0, so trying to keep it private has no value. Only require CAP_SYS_RAWIO if changing the value, not reading it. Comment from Serge : Me, I like to write my passwords with light blue pen on dark blue paper, pasted on my window - if you're going to get my password, you're gonna get a headache. Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Eric Paris authored
As an example IMA emits a warning when it can't find a TPM chip: "No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!" This patch prefaces that message with IMA so we know what subsystem is bypassing the TPM. Do this for all pr_info and pr_err messages. Signed-off-by:
Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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- Apr 21, 2010
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Eric Paris authored
integrity_audit_msg() uses "integrity:" in the audit message. This violates the (loosely defined) audit system requirements that everything be a key=value pair and it doesn't provide additional information. This can be obviously gleaned from the message type. Just drop it. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Convert all of the places IMA calls audit_log_format with %s into audit_log_untrusted_string(). This is going to cause them all to get quoted, but it should make audit log injection harder. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
IMA policy load parser will reject any policies with a comment. This patch will allow the parser to just ignore lines which start with a #. This is not very robust. # can ONLY be used at the very beginning of a line. Inline comments are not allowed. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by:
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Eric Paris authored
IMA parser will fail if whitespace is used in any way other than a single space. Using a tab or even using 2 spaces in a row will result in a policy being rejected. This patch makes the kernel ignore whitespace a bit better. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Currently the ima policy load code will print what it doesn't understand but really I think it should reject any policy it doesn't understand. This patch makes it so! Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
ima_parse_rule currently sets entry->action = -1 and then later tests if (entry->action == UNKNOWN). It is true that UNKNOWN == -1 but actually setting it to UNKNOWN makes a lot more sense in case things change in the future. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
IMA will accept rules which specify things twice and will only pay attention to the last one. We should reject such rules. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Currently IMA will only accept one rule per write(). This patch allows IMA to accept writes which contain multiple rules but only processes one rule per write. \n is used as the delimiter between rules. IMA will return a short write indicating that it only accepted up to the first \n. This allows simple userspace utilities like cat to be used to load an IMA policy instead of needing a special userspace utility that understood 'one write per rule' Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
policy load failure always return EINVAL even if the failure was for some other reason (usually ENOMEM). This patch passes error codes back up the stack where they will make their way to userspace. This might help in debugging future problems with policy load. Signed-off-by:
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- Apr 20, 2010
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wzt.wzt@gmail.com authored
In the comment of cap_file_mmap(), replace mmap_min_addr to be dac_mmap_min_addr. Signed-off-by:
Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com> Acked-by:
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- Apr 12, 2010
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Unused hook. Remove it. Signed-off-by:
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- Apr 09, 2010
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wzt.wzt@gmail.com authored
Fix coding style in security/ Signed-off-by:
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- Apr 08, 2010
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Eric Paris authored
This is an unused hook in SMACK so remove it. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
trying to grep everything that messes with a sk_security_struct isn't easy since we don't always call it sksec. Just rename everything sksec. Signed-off-by:
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- Mar 31, 2010
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James Morris authored
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Linus Torvalds authored
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David Howells authored
Add a MAINTAINERS record for the key management facility. Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- Mar 30, 2010
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Linus Torvalds authored
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: CRED: Fix memory leak in error handling
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joern/logfsLinus Torvalds authored
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joern/logfs: [LogFS] Erase new journal segments [LogFS] Move reserved segments with journal [LogFS] Clear PagePrivate when moving journal Simplify and fix pad_wbuf Prevent data corruption in logfs_rewrite_block() Use deactivate_locked_super Fix logfs_get_sb_final error path Write out both superblocks on mismatch Prevent schedule while atomic in __logfs_readdir Plug memory leak in writeseg_end_io Limit max_pages for insane devices Open segment file before using it
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Linus Torvalds authored
Merge branch 'x86-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'x86-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: x86: Do not free zero sized per cpu areas x86: Make sure free_init_pages() frees pages on page boundary x86: Make smp_locks end with page alignment
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Mathieu Desnoyers authored
Fix a memory leak on an OOM condition in prepare_usermodehelper_creds(). Signed-off-by:
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by:
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