Commit c2a28fdb authored by Eric Biggers's avatar Eric Biggers Committed by Herbert Xu
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crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - use clearer variable names



The new convention for akcipher_alg::verify makes it unclear which
values are the lengths of the signature and digest.  Add local variables
to make it clearer what is going on.

Also rename the digest_size variable in pkcs1pad_sign(), as it is
actually the digest *info* size, not the digest size which is different.

Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
parent a24611ea
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+16 −15
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -385,15 +385,15 @@ static int pkcs1pad_sign(struct akcipher_request *req)
	struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
	const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info = ictx->digest_info;
	int err;
	unsigned int ps_end, digest_size = 0;
	unsigned int ps_end, digest_info_size = 0;

	if (!ctx->key_size)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (digest_info)
		digest_size = digest_info->size;
		digest_info_size = digest_info->size;

	if (req->src_len + digest_size > ctx->key_size - 11)
	if (req->src_len + digest_info_size > ctx->key_size - 11)
		return -EOVERFLOW;

	if (req->dst_len < ctx->key_size) {
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_sign(struct akcipher_request *req)
	if (!req_ctx->in_buf)
		return -ENOMEM;

	ps_end = ctx->key_size - digest_size - req->src_len - 2;
	ps_end = ctx->key_size - digest_info_size - req->src_len - 2;
	req_ctx->in_buf[0] = 0x01;
	memset(req_ctx->in_buf + 1, 0xff, ps_end - 1);
	req_ctx->in_buf[ps_end] = 0x00;
@@ -441,6 +441,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
	struct akcipher_instance *inst = akcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
	struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
	const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info = ictx->digest_info;
	const unsigned int sig_size = req->src_len;
	const unsigned int digest_size = req->dst_len;
	unsigned int dst_len;
	unsigned int pos;
	u8 *out_buf;
@@ -487,20 +489,19 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)

	err = 0;

	if (req->dst_len != dst_len - pos) {
	if (digest_size != dst_len - pos) {
		err = -EKEYREJECTED;
		req->dst_len = dst_len - pos;
		goto done;
	}
	/* Extract appended digest. */
	sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src,
			   sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
					    req->src_len + req->dst_len),
			   sg_nents_for_len(req->src, sig_size + digest_size),
			   req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size,
			   req->dst_len, req->src_len);
			   digest_size, sig_size);
	/* Do the actual verification step. */
	if (memcmp(req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, out_buf + pos,
		   req->dst_len) != 0)
		   digest_size) != 0)
		err = -EKEYREJECTED;
done:
	kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
@@ -536,14 +537,15 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
	struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
	struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
	const unsigned int sig_size = req->src_len;
	const unsigned int digest_size = req->dst_len;
	int err;

	if (WARN_ON(req->dst) ||
	    WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) ||
	    !ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size)
	if (WARN_ON(req->dst) || WARN_ON(!digest_size) ||
	    !ctx->key_size || sig_size != ctx->key_size)
		return -EINVAL;

	req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);
	req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!req_ctx->out_buf)
		return -ENOMEM;

@@ -556,8 +558,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)

	/* Reuse input buffer, output to a new buffer */
	akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req->src,
				   req_ctx->out_sg, req->src_len,
				   ctx->key_size);
				   req_ctx->out_sg, sig_size, ctx->key_size);

	err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(&req_ctx->child_req);
	if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY)