diff options
author | Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com> | 2023-08-05 22:11:04 -0400 |
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committer | Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com> | 2023-08-05 22:11:04 -0400 |
commit | b1a8ef746f6c1a152ec41a747a06cbfbeb051a3e (patch) | |
tree | 7ccb97798b64cf66de600ffd501672c4cc2e858d | |
parent | fd13001d138e27f967c38d5d538fbe1cf9bb88ae (diff) | |
parent | 48d4c0a85d6f7fdb46dddcaa8a5f5b5c4290819f (diff) | |
download | u-boot-WIP/05Aug2023.zip u-boot-WIP/05Aug2023.tar.gz u-boot-WIP/05Aug2023.tar.bz2 |
Merge tag 'dm-pull-5aug23' of https://source.denx.de/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-dmWIP/05Aug2023
binman support for Xilinx signing
buildman minor fixes
-rw-r--r-- | common/event.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/binman/bintools.rst | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/binman/btool/bootgen.py | 137 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/binman/entries.rst | 75 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/binman/etype/xilinx_bootgen.py | 225 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/binman/ftest.py | 81 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/binman/test/307_xilinx_bootgen_sign.dts | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/binman/test/308_xilinx_bootgen_sign_enc.dts | 24 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/binman/test/309_template_phandle.dts (renamed from tools/binman/test/291_template_phandle.dts) | 0 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/binman/test/310_template_phandle_dup.dts (renamed from tools/binman/test/292_template_phandle_dup.dts) | 0 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/buildman/boards.py | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/buildman/control.py | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/buildman/func_test.py | 9 |
13 files changed, 569 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/common/event.c b/common/event.c index 20720c5..3224e28 100644 --- a/common/event.c +++ b/common/event.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ const char *const type_name[] = { "test", /* Events related to driver model */ - "dm_post_init", + "dm_post_init_f", "dm_pre_probe", "dm_post_probe", "dm_pre_remove", diff --git a/tools/binman/bintools.rst b/tools/binman/bintools.rst index 20ee243..1336f4d 100644 --- a/tools/binman/bintools.rst +++ b/tools/binman/bintools.rst @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ Using `fdt_add_pubkey` the key can be injected to the SPL independent of Bintool: bootgen: Sign ZynqMP FSBL image ---------------------------------------------- +---------------------------------------- This bintool supports running `bootgen` in order to sign a SPL for ZynqMP devices. diff --git a/tools/binman/btool/bootgen.py b/tools/binman/btool/bootgen.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2ca552 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/binman/btool/bootgen.py @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +# Copyright (C) 2023 Weidmüller Interface GmbH & Co. KG +# Lukas Funke <lukas.funke@weidmueller.com> +# +"""Bintool implementation for bootgen + +bootgen allows creating bootable SPL for Zynq(MP) + +Documentation is available via: +https://www.xilinx.com/support/documents/sw_manuals/xilinx2022_1/ug1283-bootgen-user-guide.pdf + +Source code is available at: +https://github.com/Xilinx/bootgen + +""" + +from binman import bintool +from u_boot_pylib import tools + +# pylint: disable=C0103 +class Bintoolbootgen(bintool.Bintool): + """Generate bootable fsbl image for zynq/zynqmp + + This bintools supports running Xilinx "bootgen" in order + to generate a bootable, authenticated image form an SPL. + + """ + def __init__(self, name): + super().__init__(name, 'Xilinx Bootgen', + version_regex=r'^\*\*\*\*\*\* *Xilinx Bootgen *(.*)', + version_args='-help') + + # pylint: disable=R0913 + def sign(self, arch, spl_elf_fname, pmufw_elf_fname, + psk_fname, ssk_fname, fsbl_config, auth_params, keysrc_enc, + output_fname): + """Sign SPL elf file and bundle it with PMU firmware into an image + + The method bundels the SPL together with a 'Platform Management Unit' + (PMU)[1] firmware into a single bootable image. The image in turn is + signed with the provided 'secondary secret key' (ssk), which in turn is + signed with the 'primary secret key' (psk). In order to verify the + authenticity of the ppk, it's hash has to be fused into the device + itself. + + In Xilinx terms the SPL is usually called 'FSBL' + (First Stage Boot Loader). The jobs of the SPL and the FSBL are mostly + the same: load bitstream, bootstrap u-boot. + + Args: + arch (str): Xilinx SoC architecture. Currently only 'zynqmp' is + supported. + spl_elf_fname (str): Filename of SPL ELF file. The filename must end + with '.elf' in order for bootgen to recognized it as an ELF + file. Otherwise the start address field is missinterpreted. + pmufw_elf_fname (str): Filename PMU ELF firmware. + psk_fname (str): Filename of the primary secret key (psk). The psk + is a .pem file which holds the RSA private key used for signing + the secondary secret key. + ssk_fname (str): Filename of the secondary secret key. The ssk + is a .pem file which holds the RSA private key used for signing + the actual boot firmware. + fsbl_config (str): FSBL config options. A string list of fsbl config + options. Valid values according to [2] are: + "bh_auth_enable": Boot Header Authentication Enable: RSA + authentication of the bootimage is done + excluding the verification of PPK hash and SPK ID. This is + useful for debugging before bricking a device. + "auth_only": Boot image is only RSA signed. FSBL should not be + decrypted. See the + Zynq UltraScale+ Device Technical Reference Manual (UG1085) + for more information. + There are more options which relate to PUF (physical unclonable + functions). Please refer to Xilinx manuals for further info. + auth_params (str): Authentication parameter. A semicolon separated + list of authentication parameters. Valid values according to [3] + are: + "ppk_select=<0|1>" - Select which ppk to use + "spk_id=<32-bit spk id>" - Specifies which SPK can be + used or revoked, default is 0x0 + "spk_select=<spk-efuse/user-efuse>" - To differentiate spk and + user efuses. + "auth_header" - To authenticate headers when no partition + is authenticated. + keysrc_enc (str): This specifies the Key source for encryption. + Valid values according to [3] are: + "bbram_red_key" - RED key stored in BBRAM + "efuse_red_key" - RED key stored in eFUSE + "efuse_gry_key" - Grey (Obfuscated) Key stored in eFUSE. + "bh_gry_key" - Grey (Obfuscated) Key stored in boot header + "bh_blk_key" - Black Key stored in boot header + "efuse_blk_key" - Black Key stored in eFUSE + "kup_key" - User Key + + output_fname (str): Filename where bootgen should write the result + + Returns: + str: Bootgen output from stdout + + [1] https://xilinx-wiki.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/A/pages/18841724/PMU+Firmware + [2] https://docs.xilinx.com/r/en-US/ug1283-bootgen-user-guide/fsbl_config + [3] https://docs.xilinx.com/r/en-US/ug1283-bootgen-user-guide/auth_params + [4] https://docs.xilinx.com/r/en-US/ug1283-bootgen-user-guide/keysrc_encryption + """ + + _fsbl_config = f"[fsbl_config] {fsbl_config}" if fsbl_config else "" + _auth_params = f"[auth_params] {auth_params}" if auth_params else "" + _keysrc_enc = f"[keysrc_encryption] {keysrc_enc}" if keysrc_enc else "" + + bif_template = f"""u_boot_spl_aes_rsa: {{ + [pskfile] {psk_fname} + [sskfile] {ssk_fname} + {_keysrc_enc} + {_fsbl_config} + {_auth_params} + [ bootloader, + authentication = rsa, + destination_cpu=a53-0] {spl_elf_fname} + [pmufw_image] {pmufw_elf_fname} + }}""" + args = ["-arch", arch] + + bif_fname = tools.get_output_filename('bootgen-in.sign.bif') + tools.write_file(bif_fname, bif_template, False) + args += ["-image", bif_fname, '-w', '-o', output_fname] + return self.run_cmd(*args) + + def fetch(self, method): + """Fetch bootgen from git""" + if method != bintool.FETCH_BUILD: + return None + + result = self.build_from_git( + 'https://github.com/Xilinx/bootgen', + 'all', + 'bootgen') + return result diff --git a/tools/binman/entries.rst b/tools/binman/entries.rst index f237693..e7dfe6b 100644 --- a/tools/binman/entries.rst +++ b/tools/binman/entries.rst @@ -2667,3 +2667,78 @@ may be used instead. +.. _etype_xilinx_bootgen: + +Entry: xilinx-bootgen: Signed SPL boot image for Xilinx ZynqMP devices +---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Properties / Entry arguments: + - auth-params: (Optional) Authentication parameters passed to bootgen + - fsbl-config: (Optional) FSBL parameters passed to bootgen + - keysrc-enc: (Optional) Key source when using decryption engine + - pmufw-filename: Filename of PMU firmware. Default: pmu-firmware.elf + - psk-key-name-hint: Name of primary secret key to use for signing the + secondardy public key. Format: .pem file + - ssk-key-name-hint: Name of secondardy secret key to use for signing + the boot image. Format: .pem file + +The etype is used to create a boot image for Xilinx ZynqMP +devices. + +Information for signed images: + +In AMD/Xilinx SoCs, two pairs of public and secret keys are used +- primary and secondary. The function of the primary public/secret key pair +is to authenticate the secondary public/secret key pair. +The function of the secondary key is to sign/verify the boot image. [1] + +AMD/Xilinx uses the following terms for private/public keys [1]: + + PSK = Primary Secret Key (Used to sign Secondary Public Key) + PPK = Primary Public Key (Used to verify Secondary Public Key) + SSK = Secondary Secret Key (Used to sign the boot image/partitions) + SPK = Used to verify the actual boot image + +The following example builds a signed boot image. The fuses of +the primary public key (ppk) should be fused together with the RSA_EN flag. + +Example node:: + + spl { + filename = "boot.signed.bin"; + + xilinx-bootgen { + psk-key-name-hint = "psk0"; + ssk-key-name-hint = "ssk0"; + auth-params = "ppk_select=0", "spk_id=0x00000000"; + + u-boot-spl-nodtb { + }; + u-boot-spl-pubkey-dtb { + algo = "sha384,rsa4096"; + required = "conf"; + key-name-hint = "dev"; + }; + }; + }; + +For testing purposes, e.g. if no RSA_EN should be fused, one could add +the "bh_auth_enable" flag in the fsbl-config field. This will skip the +verification of the ppk fuses and boot the image, even if ppk hash is +invalid. + +Example node:: + + xilinx-bootgen { + psk-key-name-hint = "psk0"; + psk-key-name-hint = "ssk0"; + ... + fsbl-config = "bh_auth_enable"; + ... + }; + +[1] https://docs.xilinx.com/r/en-US/ug1283-bootgen-user-guide/Using-Authentication + + + + diff --git a/tools/binman/etype/xilinx_bootgen.py b/tools/binman/etype/xilinx_bootgen.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..70a4b2e --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/binman/etype/xilinx_bootgen.py @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +# Copyright (c) 2023 Weidmueller GmbH +# Written by Lukas Funke <lukas.funke@weidmueller.com> +# +# Entry-type module for Zynq(MP) boot images (boot.bin) +# + +import tempfile + +from collections import OrderedDict + +from binman import elf +from binman.etype.section import Entry_section + +from dtoc import fdt_util + +from u_boot_pylib import tools +from u_boot_pylib import command + +# pylint: disable=C0103 +class Entry_xilinx_bootgen(Entry_section): + """Signed SPL boot image for Xilinx ZynqMP devices + + Properties / Entry arguments: + - auth-params: (Optional) Authentication parameters passed to bootgen + - fsbl-config: (Optional) FSBL parameters passed to bootgen + - keysrc-enc: (Optional) Key source when using decryption engine + - pmufw-filename: Filename of PMU firmware. Default: pmu-firmware.elf + - psk-key-name-hint: Name of primary secret key to use for signing the + secondardy public key. Format: .pem file + - ssk-key-name-hint: Name of secondardy secret key to use for signing + the boot image. Format: .pem file + + The etype is used to create a boot image for Xilinx ZynqMP + devices. + + Information for signed images: + + In AMD/Xilinx SoCs, two pairs of public and secret keys are used + - primary and secondary. The function of the primary public/secret key pair + is to authenticate the secondary public/secret key pair. + The function of the secondary key is to sign/verify the boot image. [1] + + AMD/Xilinx uses the following terms for private/public keys [1]: + + PSK = Primary Secret Key (Used to sign Secondary Public Key) + PPK = Primary Public Key (Used to verify Secondary Public Key) + SSK = Secondary Secret Key (Used to sign the boot image/partitions) + SPK = Used to verify the actual boot image + + The following example builds a signed boot image. The fuses of + the primary public key (ppk) should be fused together with the RSA_EN flag. + + Example node:: + + spl { + filename = "boot.signed.bin"; + + xilinx-bootgen { + psk-key-name-hint = "psk0"; + ssk-key-name-hint = "ssk0"; + auth-params = "ppk_select=0", "spk_id=0x00000000"; + + u-boot-spl-nodtb { + }; + u-boot-spl-pubkey-dtb { + algo = "sha384,rsa4096"; + required = "conf"; + key-name-hint = "dev"; + }; + }; + }; + + For testing purposes, e.g. if no RSA_EN should be fused, one could add + the "bh_auth_enable" flag in the fsbl-config field. This will skip the + verification of the ppk fuses and boot the image, even if ppk hash is + invalid. + + Example node:: + + xilinx-bootgen { + psk-key-name-hint = "psk0"; + psk-key-name-hint = "ssk0"; + ... + fsbl-config = "bh_auth_enable"; + ... + }; + + [1] https://docs.xilinx.com/r/en-US/ug1283-bootgen-user-guide/Using-Authentication + + """ + def __init__(self, section, etype, node): + super().__init__(section, etype, node) + self._auth_params = None + self._entries = OrderedDict() + self._filename = None + self._fsbl_config = None + self._keysrc_enc = None + self._pmufw_filename = None + self._psk_key_name_hint = None + self._ssk_key_name_hint = None + self.align_default = None + self.bootgen = None + self.required_props = ['pmufw-filename', + 'psk-key-name-hint', + 'ssk-key-name-hint'] + + def ReadNode(self): + """Read properties from the xilinx-bootgen node""" + super().ReadNode() + self._auth_params = fdt_util.GetStringList(self._node, + 'auth-params') + self._filename = fdt_util.GetString(self._node, 'filename') + self._fsbl_config = fdt_util.GetStringList(self._node, + 'fsbl-config') + self._keysrc_enc = fdt_util.GetString(self._node, + 'keysrc-enc') + self._pmufw_filename = fdt_util.GetString(self._node, 'pmufw-filename') + self._psk_key_name_hint = fdt_util.GetString(self._node, + 'psk-key-name-hint') + self._ssk_key_name_hint = fdt_util.GetString(self._node, + 'ssk-key-name-hint') + self.ReadEntries() + + @classmethod + def _ToElf(cls, data, output_fname): + """Convert SPL object file to bootable ELF file + + Args: + data (bytearray): u-boot-spl-nodtb + u-boot-spl-pubkey-dtb obj file + data + output_fname (str): Filename of converted FSBL ELF file + """ + platform_elfflags = {"aarch64": + ["-B", "aarch64", "-O", "elf64-littleaarch64"], + # amd64 support makes no sense for the target + # platform, but we include it here to enable + # testing on hosts + "x86_64": + ["-B", "i386", "-O", "elf64-x86-64"] + } + + gcc, args = tools.get_target_compile_tool('cc') + args += ['-dumpmachine'] + stdout = command.output(gcc, *args) + # split target machine triplet (arch, vendor, os) + arch, _, _ = stdout.split('-') + + spl_elf = elf.DecodeElf(tools.read_file( + tools.get_input_filename('spl/u-boot-spl')), 0) + + # Obj file to swap data and text section (rename-section) + with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(prefix="u-boot-spl-pubkey-", + suffix=".o.tmp", + dir=tools.get_output_dir())\ + as tmp_obj: + input_objcopy_fname = tmp_obj.name + # Align packed content to 4 byte boundary + pad = bytearray(tools.align(len(data), 4) - len(data)) + tools.write_file(input_objcopy_fname, data + pad) + # Final output elf file which contains a valid start address + with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(prefix="u-boot-spl-pubkey-elf-", + suffix=".o.tmp", + dir=tools.get_output_dir())\ + as tmp_elf_obj: + input_ld_fname = tmp_elf_obj.name + objcopy, args = tools.get_target_compile_tool('objcopy') + args += ["--rename-section", ".data=.text", + "-I", "binary"] + args += platform_elfflags[arch] + args += [input_objcopy_fname, input_ld_fname] + command.run(objcopy, *args) + + ld, args = tools.get_target_compile_tool('ld') + args += [input_ld_fname, '-o', output_fname, + "--defsym", f"_start={hex(spl_elf.entry)}", + "-Ttext", hex(spl_elf.entry)] + command.run(ld, *args) + + def BuildSectionData(self, required): + """Pack node content, and create bootable, signed ZynqMP boot image + + The method collects the content of this node (usually SPL + dtb) and + converts them to an ELF file. The ELF file is passed to the + Xilinx bootgen tool which packs the SPL ELF file together with + Platform Management Unit (PMU) firmware into a bootable image + for ZynqMP devices. The image is signed within this step. + + The result is a bootable, signed SPL image for Xilinx ZynqMP devices. + """ + data = super().BuildSectionData(required) + bootbin_fname = self._filename if self._filename else \ + tools.get_output_filename( + f'boot.{self.GetUniqueName()}.bin') + + pmufw_elf_fname = tools.get_input_filename(self._pmufw_filename) + psk_fname = tools.get_input_filename(self._psk_key_name_hint + ".pem") + ssk_fname = tools.get_input_filename(self._ssk_key_name_hint + ".pem") + fsbl_config = ";".join(self._fsbl_config) if self._fsbl_config else None + auth_params = ";".join(self._auth_params) if self._auth_params else None + + spl_elf_fname = tools.get_output_filename('u-boot-spl-pubkey.dtb.elf') + + # We need to convert to node content (see above) into an ELF + # file in order to be processed by bootgen. + self._ToElf(bytearray(data), spl_elf_fname) + + # Call Bootgen in order to sign the SPL + if self.bootgen.sign('zynqmp', spl_elf_fname, pmufw_elf_fname, + psk_fname, ssk_fname, fsbl_config, + auth_params, self._keysrc_enc, bootbin_fname) is None: + # Bintool is missing; just use empty data as the output + self.record_missing_bintool(self.bootgen) + data = tools.get_bytes(0, 1024) + else: + data = tools.read_file(bootbin_fname) + + self.SetContents(data) + + return data + + # pylint: disable=C0116 + def AddBintools(self, btools): + super().AddBintools(btools) + self.bootgen = self.AddBintool(btools, 'bootgen') diff --git a/tools/binman/ftest.py b/tools/binman/ftest.py index 36428ec..1293e9d 100644 --- a/tools/binman/ftest.py +++ b/tools/binman/ftest.py @@ -6974,7 +6974,7 @@ fdt fdtmap Extract the devicetree blob from the fdtmap entry_args = { 'atf-bl31-path': 'bl31.elf', } - data = self._DoReadFileDtb('291_template_phandle.dts', + data = self._DoReadFileDtb('309_template_phandle.dts', entry_args=entry_args) fname = tools.get_output_filename('image.bin') out = tools.run('dumpimage', '-l', fname) @@ -6990,7 +6990,7 @@ fdt fdtmap Extract the devicetree blob from the fdtmap 'atf-bl31-path': 'bl31.elf', } with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as e: - self._DoReadFileDtb('292_template_phandle_dup.dts', + self._DoReadFileDtb('310_template_phandle_dup.dts', entry_args=entry_args) self.assertIn( 'Duplicate phandle 1 in nodes /binman/image/fit/images/atf/atf-bl31 and /binman/image-2/fit/images/atf/atf-bl31', @@ -7139,5 +7139,82 @@ fdt fdtmap Extract the devicetree blob from the fdtmap self.assertEqual(fdt_util.GetString(key_node, "key-name-hint"), "key") + def testXilinxBootgenSigning(self): + """Test xilinx-bootgen etype""" + bootgen = bintool.Bintool.create('bootgen') + self._CheckBintool(bootgen) + data = tools.read_file(self.TestFile("key.key")) + self._MakeInputFile("psk.pem", data) + self._MakeInputFile("ssk.pem", data) + self._SetupPmuFwlElf() + self._SetupSplElf() + self._DoReadFileRealDtb('307_xilinx_bootgen_sign.dts') + image_fname = tools.get_output_filename('image.bin') + + # Read partition header table and check if authentication is enabled + bootgen_out = bootgen.run_cmd("-arch", "zynqmp", + "-read", image_fname, "pht").splitlines() + attributes = {"authentication": None, + "core": None, + "encryption": None} + + for l in bootgen_out: + for a in attributes.keys(): + if a in l: + m = re.match(fr".*{a} \[([^]]+)\]", l) + attributes[a] = m.group(1) + + self.assertTrue(attributes['authentication'] == "rsa") + self.assertTrue(attributes['core'] == "a53-0") + self.assertTrue(attributes['encryption'] == "no") + + def testXilinxBootgenSigningEncryption(self): + """Test xilinx-bootgen etype""" + bootgen = bintool.Bintool.create('bootgen') + self._CheckBintool(bootgen) + data = tools.read_file(self.TestFile("key.key")) + self._MakeInputFile("psk.pem", data) + self._MakeInputFile("ssk.pem", data) + self._SetupPmuFwlElf() + self._SetupSplElf() + self._DoReadFileRealDtb('308_xilinx_bootgen_sign_enc.dts') + image_fname = tools.get_output_filename('image.bin') + + # Read boot header in order to verify encryption source and + # encryption parameter + bootgen_out = bootgen.run_cmd("-arch", "zynqmp", + "-read", image_fname, "bh").splitlines() + attributes = {"auth_only": + {"re": r".*auth_only \[([^]]+)\]", "value": None}, + "encryption_keystore": + {"re": r" *encryption_keystore \(0x28\) : (.*)", + "value": None}, + } + + for l in bootgen_out: + for a in attributes.keys(): + if a in l: + m = re.match(attributes[a]['re'], l) + attributes[a] = m.group(1) + + # Check if fsbl-attribute is set correctly + self.assertTrue(attributes['auth_only'] == "true") + # Check if key is stored in efuse + self.assertTrue(attributes['encryption_keystore'] == "0xa5c3c5a3") + + def testXilinxBootgenMissing(self): + """Test that binman still produces an image if bootgen is missing""" + data = tools.read_file(self.TestFile("key.key")) + self._MakeInputFile("psk.pem", data) + self._MakeInputFile("ssk.pem", data) + self._SetupPmuFwlElf() + self._SetupSplElf() + with test_util.capture_sys_output() as (_, stderr): + self._DoTestFile('307_xilinx_bootgen_sign.dts', + force_missing_bintools='bootgen') + err = stderr.getvalue() + self.assertRegex(err, + "Image 'image'.*missing bintools.*: bootgen") + if __name__ == "__main__": unittest.main() diff --git a/tools/binman/test/307_xilinx_bootgen_sign.dts b/tools/binman/test/307_xilinx_bootgen_sign.dts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02acf86 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/binman/test/307_xilinx_bootgen_sign.dts @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + +/dts-v1/; + +/ { + #address-cells = <1>; + #size-cells = <1>; + + binman { + xilinx-bootgen { + auth-params = "ppk_select=0", "spk_id=0x00000000"; + pmufw-filename = "pmu-firmware.elf"; + psk-key-name-hint = "psk"; + ssk-key-name-hint = "ssk"; + + u-boot-spl-nodtb { + }; + u-boot-spl-dtb { + }; + }; + }; +}; diff --git a/tools/binman/test/308_xilinx_bootgen_sign_enc.dts b/tools/binman/test/308_xilinx_bootgen_sign_enc.dts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d7ce4c --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/binman/test/308_xilinx_bootgen_sign_enc.dts @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + +/dts-v1/; + +/ { + #address-cells = <1>; + #size-cells = <1>; + + binman { + xilinx-bootgen { + auth-params = "ppk_select=0", "spk_id=0x00000000"; + fsbl-config = "auth_only"; + keysrc-enc = "efuse_red_key"; + pmufw-filename = "pmu-firmware.elf"; + psk-key-name-hint = "psk"; + ssk-key-name-hint = "ssk"; + + u-boot-spl-nodtb { + }; + u-boot-spl-dtb { + }; + }; + }; +}; diff --git a/tools/binman/test/291_template_phandle.dts b/tools/binman/test/309_template_phandle.dts index c4ec1dd..c4ec1dd 100644 --- a/tools/binman/test/291_template_phandle.dts +++ b/tools/binman/test/309_template_phandle.dts diff --git a/tools/binman/test/292_template_phandle_dup.dts b/tools/binman/test/310_template_phandle_dup.dts index dc86f06..dc86f06 100644 --- a/tools/binman/test/292_template_phandle_dup.dts +++ b/tools/binman/test/310_template_phandle_dup.dts diff --git a/tools/buildman/boards.py b/tools/buildman/boards.py index 83adbf1..eef3f19 100644 --- a/tools/buildman/boards.py +++ b/tools/buildman/boards.py @@ -377,16 +377,9 @@ class MaintainersDatabase: Args: linenum (int): Current line number """ - added = False if targets: for target in targets: self.database[target] = (status, maintainers) - added = True - if not added and (status != '-' and maintainers): - leaf = fname[len(srcdir) + 1:] - if leaf != 'MAINTAINERS': - self.warnings.append( - f'WARNING: orphaned defconfig in {leaf} ending at line {linenum + 1}') targets = [] maintainers = [] diff --git a/tools/buildman/control.py b/tools/buildman/control.py index 5c57200..f2ffb7f 100644 --- a/tools/buildman/control.py +++ b/tools/buildman/control.py @@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ def do_buildman(args, toolchains=None, make_func=None, brds=None, toolchains = get_toolchains(toolchains, col, args.override_toolchain, args.fetch_arch, args.list_tool_chains, args.verbose) + if isinstance(toolchains, int): + return toolchains + output_dir = setup_output_dir( args.output_dir, args.work_in_output, args.branch, args.no_subdirs, col, clean_dir) diff --git a/tools/buildman/func_test.py b/tools/buildman/func_test.py index 3115700..55dd494 100644 --- a/tools/buildman/func_test.py +++ b/tools/buildman/func_test.py @@ -926,10 +926,7 @@ Active aarch64 armv8 - armltd total_compute board2 tools.write_file(main, data, binary=False) params_list, warnings = self._boards.build_board_list(config_dir, src) self.assertEquals(2, len(params_list)) - self.assertEquals( - ["WARNING: no maintainers for 'board0'", - 'WARNING: orphaned defconfig in boards/board0/MAINTAINERS ending at line 4', - ], warnings) + self.assertEquals(["WARNING: no maintainers for 'board0'"], warnings) # Mark a board as orphaned - this should give a warning lines = ['S: Orphaned' if line.startswith('S') else line @@ -969,9 +966,7 @@ Active aarch64 armv8 - armltd total_compute board2 tools.write_file(main, both_data + extra, binary=False) params_list, warnings = self._boards.build_board_list(config_dir, src) self.assertEquals(2, len(params_list)) - self.assertEquals( - ['WARNING: orphaned defconfig in boards/board0/MAINTAINERS ending at line 16'], - warnings) + self.assertFalse(warnings) # Add another TARGET to the Kconfig tools.write_file(main, both_data, binary=False) |