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When we load a flash resource during OPAL init, STB calls trusted measure
to measure the given resource. There is a situation when a flash gets loaded
before STB initialization then trusted measure cannot measure properly.
So this patch fixes this issue by calling trusted measure only if the
corresponding trusted init was done.
The ideal fix is to make sure STB init done at the first place during init
and then do the loading of flash resources, by that way STB can properly
verify and measure the all resources.
Signed-off-by: Pridhiviraj Paidipeddi <ppaidipe@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Currently libstb logs the verify and hash caluculation messages in
PR_INFO level. So when there is a secure boot enforcement happens
in loading last flash resource(Ex: BOOTKERNEL), the previous verify
and measure messages are not logged to console, which is not clear
to the end user which resource is verified and measured.
So this patch fixes this by increasing the log level to PR_NOTICE.
Signed-off-by: Pridhiviraj Paidipeddi <ppaidipe@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The stb_final() primary goal is to measure the event EV_SEPARATOR
into PCR[0-7] when trusted boot is about to exit the boot services.
This imports the stb_final() from stb.c into trustedboot.c, but making
the following changes:
- Rename it to trustedboot_exit_boot_services().
- As specified in the TCG PC Client spec, EV_SEPARATOR events must be
logged with the name 0xFFFFFF.
- Remove the rom driver clean-up call.
- Don't allow code to be measured in skiboot after
trustedboot_exit_boot_services() is called.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This imports tb_measure() from stb.c, but now it calls the CVC sha512
wrapper to calculate the sha512 hash of the firmware image provided.
In trustedboot.c, the tb_measure() is renamed to trustedboot_measure().
The new function, trustedboot_measure(), no longer checks if the
container payload hash calculated at boot time matches with the hash
found in the container header. A few reasons:
- If the system admin wants the container header to be
checked/validated, the secure boot jumper must be set. Otherwise,
the container header information may not be reliable.
- The container layout is expected to change over time. Skiboot
would need to maintain a parser for each container layout
change.
- Skiboot could be checking the hash against a container version that
is not supported by the Container-Verification-Code (CVC).
The tb_measure() calls are updated to trustedboot_measure() in a
subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This imports stb_init() from stb.c, but breaking it into multiple files
in order to make the code easier to read and to maintain. New files
created: secureboot.c, trustedboot.c and cvc.c.
The secureboot_init() in secureboot.c also initializes the hardware key
hash and the hardware key hash size, which are used to call the CVC
verify wrapper. These variables were initialized in the romcode_probe()
function, libstb/drivers/romcode.c.
The cvc_init() in cvc.c is slightly modified from what exists in
stb_init(). Now it calls cvc_register() and cvc_service_register().
Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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