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2020-11-03skiboot v6.7 release notesv6.7Oliver O'Halloran1-0/+37
Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-11-02phb4: Finish removing P9 DD1 workaround on LSIsCédric Le Goater2-5/+1
Commit ad7e9a67c4e4 ("xive/p9: obsolete OPAL_XIVE_IRQ_SHIFT_BUG flags") forgot to remove the internal flag. Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-11-02platform/mowgli: modify slot_nameLuluTHSu1-5/+5
Since Mowgli has only one slot, modify the names of other slots to avoid confusion. Cc: skiboot-stable@lists.ozlabs.org Signed-off-by: LuluTHSu <Lulu_Su@wistron.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-11-02mowgli: Limit slot1 to Gen3 by defaultLuluTHSu3-0/+38
Refer to the spec. of mowgli, limit the slot to Gen3 speed. For mowgli platform spec. Cc: skiboot-stable@lists.ozlabs.org Signed-off-by: LuluTHSu <Lulu_Su@wistron.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-23skiboot v6.6.4 release notesVasant Hegde1-0/+18
Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-23skiboot 5.4.12 release notesVasant Hegde1-0/+14
Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-21external/pci-scripts: Add PHB error parsing scriptOliver O'Halloran2-0/+686
A very hacky, but very useful script that parses the PowerNV EEH register dump from the kernel log, and the verbose EEH dump from the opal message log and renders it into something mostly readable. Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-21FSP/NVRAM: Do not assert in vNVRAM statistics callVasant Hegde1-2/+1
`msg` is valid pointer here. I don't recall why I added assert here :-( This is not correct. We shouldn't call assert here. Also we are not using `msg`. Hence convert it to `__unused`. Fixes: 19d4f98e ('FSP/NVRAM: Handle "get vNVRAM statistics" command') Cc: skiboot-stable@lists.ozlabs.org # v5.4.x + Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-15platform/mowgli: modify VPD to export correct data to system VPD EEPROMLuluTHSu1-0/+20
Hostboot doesn't export the correct data for the system VPD EEPROM for this system. So add vpd_dt_fixup(). Cc: skiboot-stable@lists.ozlabs.org Signed-off-by: LuluTHSu <Lulu_Su@wistron.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-15opal-prd: handle devtmpfs mounted with noexecGeorgy Yakovlev1-2/+34
On systems using recent versions of systemd /dev (devtmpfs) is mounted with noexec option. Such mount prevents mapping HBRT image code region as RWX from /dev. This commit, as suggested in github PR linked below, attempts to work around the situation by copying HBRT image to anon mmaped memory region and sets mprotect rwx on it, allowing opal-prd to sucessfully execute the code region. Having memory region set as RWX is not ideal for security, but fixing that is a separate and hard to solve problem. Original code also mmaped region as RWX, so this PR does not make things worse at least. Closes: https://github.com/open-power/skiboot/issues/258 Signed-off-by: Georgy Yakovlev <gyakovlev@gentoo.org> Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com> [oliver: whitespace fix, add a comment, reflow commit message] Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-15mowgli: Enable secvar support for Host OS Secure BootNayna Jain1-0/+6
Secure variable support is needed for Host OS Secure Boot key management. This needs to be enabled for each platform, as each platform needs to select the storage and backend drivers to use. This patch adds secure variable support to the mowgli platform. Test Results: After applying the patch, sysfs and device-tree shows secvar entries correctly. # cd /sys/firmware/secvar/ # ls format vars # cat format ibm,edk2-compat-v1 # cd vars # ls KEK PK TS db dbx # cat PK/size 0 # cat KEK/size 0 # cat TS/size 64 # cat db/size 0 # cat dbx/size 0 # ls /proc/device-tree/ibm,secureboot/ compatible hw-key-hash-size name secure-enabled hw-key-hash ibm,cvc phandle trusted-enabled # ls /proc/device-tree/ibm,opal/secvar/status /proc/device-tree/ibm,opal/secvar/status # ls /proc/device-tree/ibm,opal/secvar/ compatible max-var-key-len name status format max-var-size phandle update-status # cat /proc/device-tree/ibm,opal/secvar/status okay# # cat /proc/device-tree/ibm,opal/secvar/format ibm,edk2-compat-v1# Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Klaus Heinrich Kiwi <klaus@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-02test: Skip qemu tests if skiboot.lid is too largeOliver O'Halloran2-0/+14
With the addition of the secvar patches the GCOV enabled builds now produce a skiboot.lid that greater than 4MB. This is larger than the historical max firmware image size supported by the PowerNV Qemu model so we need to skip the Qemu boot tests in that case. Non-GCOV builds are still well under the limit (2.3MB or so) and mambo tests are not affected, so this shouldn't be a big deal. If the Qemu happens to support a larger image size this should continue to work without issues. Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-02secvar/test: use mbedtls cflags when building the test binariesEric Richter2-2/+4
The edk2 test file includes some mbedtls files directly, make sure that those also include the correct mbedtls config file. Without this, the default config file is used, which conflicts with the version we build as part of skiboot. As host libc includes a SIZE_MAX macro, this also changes the SIZE_MAX macro defined in mbedtls_config.h (needed for some mbedtls functions) to only be defined if it isn't already. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-02secvar/test: use vendored mbedtls instead of hostEric Richter2-7/+10
Linking against the host mbedtls introduces problems if the host does not have the library, or if the host has a different version installed. This patch changes the tests to instead build mbedtls from the version included in skiboot using the host compiler, removing the dependency on external mbedtls. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar: Clean up makefiles and fix out of tree buildsOliver O'Halloran4-19/+13
The secvar makefiles use $(SRC) in a few places they shouldn't and don't use it in a few places they should. Also drop the _SRCS rules and the pattern substuituion that turns them into _OBJS rules because chaining dependent rules is infuriating at the best of times. Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar/test: Remove broken initalizersOliver O'Halloran1-2/+2
Some versions of GCC complain about this. That and since it's a static global it goes in the BSS and is initialized to zero anyway. Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01skiboot.lds.S: Move BSS start up a bit to accommodate a larger .dataOliver O'Halloran2-5/+5
Witht addition of libtss and mbedtls the .data section now overlaps the start of the .bss section. Adding a few MB to the offset doesn't hurt. Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01ci: Add mbedtls development files as a dependencyOliver O'Halloran9-10/+11
Needed for the secvar unit tests. Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar/backend: improve edk2 driver unit testcasesNayna Jain2-37/+387
This patch adds following more unit test cases and improve comments. * Check for successful processing of queued updates * Check for queued updates when one update fail, especially when PK is added. * Check for queued updates when one update fail, especially when PK is deleted. * Check hw-key-hash addition/deleting/verification. * Update dbxcert file * Update rc checks against specific failure error return codes. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar/backend: Bugfixes in edk2 driverNayna Jain3-14/+37
This patch fixes following bugs. Additionally, it improves logs. * Failure in adding/deleting PK as part of failure of processing any subsequential update in the queue didn't reset the global variable setup_mode to the original value. This patch adds the fix to always set the value of setup_mode as per final contents in variable_bank before existing process(). * Deletion of HWKH as part of deleting PK was only updating the value of the variable to be zero. However, this didn't deallocate the variable from the bank and was getting exposed via sysfs. * The mismatch in verification of hw-key-hash, was also clearing staging bank, which isn't initialized in this case. Fix the cleanup tag to only clear update_bank. * Fixes a memory leak in validate_esl_list(). * Convert signature verification error code from mbedtls into opal error code as OPAL_PERMISSION. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secboot_tpm.c: increase tpmnv vars index sizeEric Richter3-6/+6
The TPM NV index size for storing the PK was originally set to 1024, which was determined to be a "smallest maximum" size that we determined to be enough to store the PK. However with overhead, this only allowed for about ~912 bytes, which is far too small to store a certificate, as it only permits about ~10 characters in the x509 subject field. This patch increases the TPM NV Vars index to 2048 bytes, which is the largest size a single NV index can be on the Nuvoton npct650 chip. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01tssskiboot.c: chunk reads/writes in 1024-sized buffers to support larger nv ↵Eric Richter1-28/+54
indices The Nuvoton npct650 chip has a command buffer max size of 1024. Attempting to read or write from an NV index larger than this value would return an error. This patch changes the tss_nv_read and tss_nv_write commands to chunk their operations in 1024-byte batches to allow support for larger NV indices. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01witherspoon: enable secvar for witherspoon platformEric Richter1-0/+7
Secure variable support needs to be enabled for each platform, and each platform needs to select which storage and backend drivers to use (or alternatively implement their own). This patch adds secure variable support to the witherspoon platform. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar/test: add edk2-compat driver test and test dataEric Richter17-2/+2448
This patch contains a set of tests to exercise the edk2 driver using actual properly (and in some cases, improperly) signed binary data. Due to the excessive size of the binary data included in the header files, this test was split into its own patch. Co-developed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar/backend: add edk2 derived key updates processingNayna Jain9-2/+1549
As part of secureboot key management, the scheme for handling key updates is derived from tianocore reference implementation[1]. The wrappers for holding the signed update is the Authentication Header and for holding the public key certificate is ESL (EFI Signature List), both derived from tianocore reference implementation[1]. This patch adds the support to process update queue. This involves: 1. Verification of the update signature using the key authorized as per the key hierarchy 2. Handling addition/deletion of the keys 3. Support for dbx (blacklisting of hashes) 4. Validation checks for the updates 5. Supporting multiple ESLs for single variable both for update/verification 6. Timestamp check 7. Allowing only single PK 8. Failure Handling 9. Resetting keystore if the hardware key hash changes [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging.git Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01crypto: add out-of-tree mbedtls pkcs7 parserNayna Jain6-1/+848
This patch adds a pkcs7 parser for mbedtls that hasn't yet gone upstream. Once/if that implementation is accepted, this patch can be removed. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar/storage: add utility tool to generate NV public name hashesEric Richter2-0/+110
This patch adds a small userspace utility to locally generate the expected hash returned by a TSS_NV_ReadPublic command for the NV indices as defined by the secboot_tpm storage driver. This removes the need for manually copying in the hash from the ReadPublic output if for some reason the set of attributes used when defining the NV indices changes in the future. As this is an auxiliary tool, it is not built by default and must be manually built using `make gen_tpmnv_public_name`. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar/test: add secboot_tpm storage driver test casesEric Richter2-1/+146
This patch adds some simple unit cases to exercise the storage driver, using the fake TPM NV implementation. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar/storage/fakenv: add fake tpm operations for testingEric Richter2-0/+178
The secboot_tpm storage driver heavily relies on the TPM to ensure data integrity, which makes it difficult to test in userspace or on hardware without a TPM. This patch adds a bunch of functions that implement the tssskiboot interface, and simulates the expected TPM behavior utilizing PNOR space instead. THIS IS NOT INTENDED FOR PRODUCTION USE. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar/storage: add secvar storage driver for pnor-based p9Eric Richter7-4/+994
This patch implements the platform specific logic for persisting the secure variable storage banks across reboots via the SECBOOT PNOR partition. For POWER 9, all secure variables and updates are stored in the in the SECBOOT PNOR partition. The partition is split into three sections: two variable bank sections, and a section for storing updates. The driver alternates writes between the two variable sections, so that the final switch from one set of variables to the next can be as atomic as possible by flipping an "active bit" stored in TPM NV. PNOR space provides no lock protection, so prior to writing the variable bank, a sha256 hash is calculated and stored in TPM NV. This hash is compared against the hash of the variables loaded from PNOR to ensure consistency -- otherwise a failure is reported, no keys are loaded (which should cause skiroot to refuse to boot if secure boot support is enabled). Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01core/flash.c: add SECBOOT read and write supportClaudio Carvalho2-0/+129
In secure boot enabled systems, the petitboot linux kernel verifies the OS kernel against x509 certificates that are wrapped in secure variables controlled by OPAL. These secure variables are stored in the PNOR SECBOOT partition, as well as the updates submitted for them using userspace tools. This patch adds read and write support to the PNOR SECBOOT partition in a similar fashion to that of NVRAM, so that OPAL can handle the secure variables. Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01doc/secvar: add document detailing secvar driver APIEric Richter1-0/+312
This patch adds a reference document that explains the intended use for each of the secvar driver API functions to aid in future secvar driver implementations. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar_devtree: add physical presence mode helperEric Richter2-0/+17
This patch adds a simple function to detect whether or not physical presence has been asserted. In the current implementation, all physical presence assertion modes are treated the same. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01hdata/spira: add physical presence flagsNayna Jain3-1/+34
This patch reads the hdata bits to check for physical presence assertion, and creates device tree entries to be consumed later in the boot. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar/test: update API tests for new secvar structEric Richter3-39/+14
This patch adjusts the API unit tests to use the secvar struct rather than the old secvar_node. Where applicable, some manual allocations have also been replaced with the util functions. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar: overhaul secvar struct by removing static sized fieldsEric Richter3-97/+88
Originally, the secvar struct was intended to contain all the variable information seperate from the linked list/etc metadata, so that copying and serialization/deserialization could be handled by a single memcpy(). This is fragile, potentially compiler dependent, and doesn't account for endianness. Therefore, this patch removes the static allocation for key, now allocates a buffer for data, and completely removes the now unnecessary secvar_node struct. As a side effect, some of the secvar_util functionality has been tweaked where it makes sense. Most notably alloc_secvar now takes in an extra argument as it now has to allocate the key Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar_util: add new helper functionsEric Richter2-3/+65
This patch adds the following helper functions: - dealloc_secvar() - new_secvar() - copy_bank_list() dealloc_secvar() frees a whole secvar_node reference including its children allocations. This also updates the clear_bank_list() helper function to use this destructor. new_secvar() allocates a secvar_node, and fills it with data provided via arguments. copy_bank_list() creates a deep copy of a secvar bank list Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar: change backend hook interface to take in bank referencesNayna Jain2-8/+20
Previously, backends were implicitly expected to operate on global references to the variable and update banks. This patch changes the interface for this driver to instead take the banks in as an argument. This removes the implict dependency on these references, makes the design consistent with the storage driver, and also will simplify unit testing of these functions. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01secvar_main: rework secvar_main error flow, make storage locking explicitEric Richter1-14/+67
This patch adjusts the behavior of secvar_main to actually halt the boot in some form if there is an issue initializing secure variables. The secvar storage driver contains the secure boot state, and therefore if that fails to initialize, we immediately need to halt the boot. For all other cases we enforce secure boot in the bootloader by setting the secure mode flag, but booting with an empty keyring (and thus, cannot verify a kexec image). Previously, the storage driver was expected to handle any locking procedures implicitly as part of the write operation. This patch uses the new lockdown hook which makes locking explicit and part of the secvar_main flow. The storage driver is now locked unconditionally when exiting secvar_main, and the lockdown() call should halt the boot if it encounters any sign of struggle. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01include/secvar.h: add .lockdown() hook to secvar storage driverEric Richter1-3/+4
Previously, it was implied that the storage driver would lock itself after performing a write action. As this behavior is not particularly clear when reviewing the main secvar flow, this action instead has been made explicit. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01libstb/secureboot: OS Secure Boot is enabled only if FW secureboot is enabledNayna Jain3-1/+7
OS Secure Boot establishes a chain of trust from firmware to the OS. However, OS Secure Boot can only be secure if the chain of trust beneath it - from hardware to firmware - has been established by Firmware Secure Boot. This patch ensures that OS Secure Boot is enabled only if Firmware Secure Boot is enabled. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01libstb/secureboot: expose secureboot_enforce for later use in secvarEric Richter2-1/+2
This patch exposes the secureboot_enforce() function to unify any system-halting behavior enacted by either firmware or OS secure boot. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01libstb: Set TPM platform auth to random passwordRyan Grimm1-0/+1
Set in core/init.c before trustedboot_exit_boot_services. Signed-off-by: Ryan Grimm <grimm@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro S. M. Rodrigues <maurosr@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01libstb/tss: Remove old tss implementationMauro S. M. Rodrigues11-3730/+0
This is being removed in favor of using a standard TSS library which offers a more broad implementation that is required for the new necessities of trusted and secure boot. Signed-off-by: Mauro S. M. Rodrigues <maurosr@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01libstb/tss2: Switch to new implementation of PCR Read/Extend and EventlogMauro S. M. Rodrigues7-68/+69
The new implementation of PCR_Read, PCR_Extend and Eventlog uses the recently introduced standard TSS library. Old TSS implementation will be removed in the following commit. Signed-off-by: Mauro S. M. Rodrigues <maurosr@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01libstb/trustedboot: Introduce new eventlog implementationMauro S. M. Rodrigues2-0/+156
This new implementation uses the recently introduced standard TSS library, reducing maintenance burden in skiboot side. We have yet to switch over this new implementation and to remove the old one in future commits. Signed-off-by: Mauro S. M. Rodrigues <maurosr@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01libstb/tss2: Add TSS wrapping functionsMauro S. M. Rodrigues2-0/+753
In this commit we add some fundamental TSS operations: - tss_nv_read_public - tss_nv_read - tss_nv_write - tss_nv_write_lock - tss_nv_define_space - tss_nv_undefine_space - tss_get_defined_nv_indices - tss_pcr_extend - tss_pcr_read - tss_get_random_number - tss_set_platform_auth Co-authored-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Co-authored-by: Ryan Grimm <grimm@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro S. M. Rodrigues <maurosr@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro S. M. Rodrigues <maurosr@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01TPM/TSS: Register TPM chip for further use within TSSMauro S. M. Rodrigues2-0/+2
TSS will know which device and transmit handler to use through this registration, and the equivalent unregistering process. Signed-off-by: Mauro S. M. Rodrigues <maurosr@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01libstb/tss2: Add basic Build infrastructure for tss2Mauro S. M. Rodrigues5-1/+84
Co-authored-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro S. M. Rodrigues <maurosr@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
2020-10-01libstb: remove old mbedtls filesEric Richter4-633/+0
Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
generated by cgit v1.1 at 2024-07-16 21:36:45 +0000