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authorSimon Butcher <simon.butcher@arm.com>2019-03-01 12:46:07 +0000
committerSimon Butcher <simon.butcher@arm.com>2019-03-01 12:46:07 +0000
commit535ee4a35b9c4ddd059451b8fa5b201bfc89fbcf (patch)
tree2113af75febc4211c25f9b34971989549d38e52c /library/ssl_tls.c
parent195bddebcce6ebdf7acc486271d563ed696711af (diff)
parent84d9d2734f2e40205943e21b44e3b20023ccebeb (diff)
downloadmbedtls-archive/mbedtls-2.17.zip
mbedtls-archive/mbedtls-2.17.tar.gz
mbedtls-archive/mbedtls-2.17.tar.bz2
Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2421' into developmentarchive/mbedtls-2.17
* public/pr/2421: (68 commits) Fix unused variable warning in ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate() Add missing compile time guard in ssl_client2 Update programs/ssl/query_config.c ssl_client2: Reset peer CRT info string on reconnect Add further debug statements on assertion failures Fix typo in documentation of ssl_parse_certificate_chain() Add debug output in case of assertion failure Fix typo in SSL ticket documentation Add config sanity check for !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE ssl_client2: Zeroize peer CRT info buffer when reconnecting Reintroduce numerous ssl-opt.sh tests if !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERT ssl_client2: Extract peer CRT info from verification callback Improve documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() Improve documentation of MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE Fix indentation of Doxygen comment in ssl_internal.h Set peer CRT length only after successful allocation Remove question in comment about verify flags on cli vs. server Remove misleading and redundant guard around restartable ECC field Add test for !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE to all.sh Free peer CRT chain immediately after verifying it ...
Diffstat (limited to 'library/ssl_tls.c')
-rw-r--r--library/ssl_tls.c804
1 files changed, 497 insertions, 307 deletions
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 4c23f0e..660d548 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -279,13 +279,15 @@ static unsigned int ssl_mfl_code_to_length( int mfl )
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
-static int ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, const mbedtls_ssl_session *src )
+int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst,
+ const mbedtls_ssl_session *src )
{
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( dst );
memcpy( dst, src, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
if( src->peer_cert != NULL )
{
int ret;
@@ -304,6 +306,21 @@ static int ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, const mbedtls_ssl_session
return( ret );
}
}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ if( src->peer_cert_digest != NULL )
+ {
+ dst->peer_cert_digest =
+ mbedtls_calloc( 1, src->peer_cert_digest_len );
+ if( dst->peer_cert_digest == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+
+ memcpy( dst->peer_cert_digest, src->peer_cert_digest,
+ src->peer_cert_digest_len );
+ dst->peer_cert_digest_type = src->peer_cert_digest_type;
+ dst->peer_cert_digest_len = src->peer_cert_digest_len;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
@@ -319,7 +336,6 @@ static int ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, const mbedtls_ssl_session
return( 0 );
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
@@ -5554,16 +5570,33 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
return( 0 );
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+static void ssl_clear_peer_cert( mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ if( session->peer_cert != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert );
+ mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert );
+ session->peer_cert = NULL;
+ }
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL )
+ {
+ /* Zeroization is not necessary. */
+ mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert_digest );
+ session->peer_cert_digest = NULL;
+ session->peer_cert_digest_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+ session->peer_cert_digest_len = 0;
+ }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
/*
* Handshake functions
*/
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
/* No certificate support -> dummy functions */
int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
@@ -5571,10 +5604,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) );
- if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
+ if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
@@ -5591,10 +5621,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) );
- if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
+ if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
@@ -5605,7 +5632,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
-#else
+#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
/* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */
int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
@@ -5617,10 +5644,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) );
- if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
+ if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
@@ -5725,6 +5749,8 @@ write_msg:
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *crt_buf,
size_t crt_buf_len )
@@ -5739,65 +5765,51 @@ static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
return( memcmp( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, crt_buf_len ) );
}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *crt_buf,
+ size_t crt_buf_len )
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned char const * const peer_cert_digest =
+ ssl->session->peer_cert_digest;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t const peer_cert_digest_type =
+ ssl->session->peer_cert_digest_type;
+ mbedtls_md_info_t const * const digest_info =
+ mbedtls_md_info_from_type( peer_cert_digest_type );
+ unsigned char tmp_digest[MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN];
+ size_t digest_len;
+
+ if( peer_cert_digest == NULL || digest_info == NULL )
+ return( -1 );
+
+ digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( digest_info );
+ if( digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN )
+ return( -1 );
+
+ ret = mbedtls_md( digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( -1 );
+
+ return( memcmp( tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len ) );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
/*
* Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and
* perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller
*/
-static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *chain )
{
int ret;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ int crt_cnt=0;
+#endif
size_t i, n;
uint8_t alert;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
- /*
- * Check if the client sent an empty certificate
- */
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
- {
- if( ssl->in_msglen == 2 &&
- ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
- ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "SSLv3 client has no certificate" ) );
-
- /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send
- one. The client should know what's going on, so we
- don't send an alert. */
- ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING;
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
- {
- if( ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) &&
- ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE &&
- memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) );
-
- /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send
- one. The client should know what's going on, so we
- don't send an alert. */
- ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING;
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
-
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
@@ -5834,14 +5846,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/* Make &ssl->in_msg[i] point to the beginning of the CRT chain. */
i += 3;
- /* In case we tried to reuse a session but it failed */
- if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
- mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
- ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = NULL;
- }
-
/* Iterate through and parse the CRTs in the provided chain. */
while( i < ssl->in_hslen )
{
@@ -5879,66 +5883,40 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
/* Check if we're handling the first CRT in the chain. */
- if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ if( crt_cnt++ == 0 &&
+ ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
+ ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
{
/* During client-side renegotiation, check that the server's
* end-CRTs hasn't changed compared to the initial handshake,
* mitigating the triple handshake attack. On success, reuse
* the original end-CRT instead of parsing it again. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
- ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation" ) );
- if( ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( ssl,
- &ssl->in_msg[i],
- n ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
- }
-
- /* Move CRT chain structure to new session instance. */
- ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = ssl->session->peer_cert;
- ssl->session->peer_cert = NULL;
-
- /* Delete all remaining CRTs from the original CRT chain. */
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free(
- ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->next );
- mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->next );
- ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->next = NULL;
-
- i += n;
- continue;
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
-
- /* Outside of client-side renegotiation, create a fresh X.509 CRT
- * instance to parse the end-CRT into. */
-
- ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert =
- mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );
- if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation" ) );
+ if( ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( ssl,
+ &ssl->in_msg[i],
+ n ) != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed",
- sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
- mbedtls_x509_crt_init( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
-
- /* Intentional fall through */
+ /* Now we can safely free the original chain. */
+ ssl_clear_peer_cert( ssl->session );
}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
/* Parse the next certificate in the chain. */
- ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
- ssl->in_msg + i, n );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n );
+#else
+ /* If we don't need to store the CRT chain permanently, parse
+ * it in-place from the input buffer instead of making a copy. */
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
switch( ret )
{
case 0: /*ok*/
@@ -5966,60 +5944,316 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
i += n;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", chain );
return( 0 );
}
-int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+static int ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info =
- ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
- const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET
- ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode
- : ssl->conf->authmode;
-#else
- const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
-#endif
- void *rs_ctx = NULL;
+ if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
+ return( -1 );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
+ /*
+ * Check if the client sent an empty certificate
+ */
+ if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
+ {
+ if( ssl->in_msglen == 2 &&
+ ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT &&
+ ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
+ ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "SSLv3 client has no certificate" ) );
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ return( -1 );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
- if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+ if( ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) &&
+ ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
+ ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE &&
+ memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
- ssl->state++;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) );
return( 0 );
}
+ return( -1 );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+/* Check if a certificate message is expected.
+ * Return either
+ * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED, or
+ * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP
+ * indicating whether a Certificate message is expected or not.
+ */
+#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED 0
+#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP 1
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int authmode )
+{
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
+
+ if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) )
+ return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP );
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
+ if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
- ssl->state++;
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
+ return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP );
+
+ if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
+ {
+ ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result =
+ MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY;
+ return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP );
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ ((void) authmode);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+ return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED );
+}
+
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int authmode,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ void *rs_ctx )
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
+
+ if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
return( 0 );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL )
+ {
+ ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
+ ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
+ ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Main check: verify certificate
+ */
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(
+ chain,
+ ca_chain, ca_crl,
+ ssl->conf->cert_profile,
+ ssl->hostname,
+ &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
+ ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy, rs_ctx );
+
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret );
}
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS );
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
{
- ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
+ const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk;
- ssl->state++;
- return( 0 );
+ /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK */
+ if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 )
+ {
+ ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) );
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
+ }
}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( chain,
+ ciphersuite_info,
+ ! ssl->conf->endpoint,
+ &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) );
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
+ }
+
+ /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a
+ * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED,
+ * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds
+ * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy
+ * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of
+ * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */
+ if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
+ ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
+ ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) )
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ if( ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) );
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
+ }
+
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ uint8_t alert;
+
+ /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
+ Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
+ may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA;
+ else
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN;
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ alert );
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %x",
+ ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *start, size_t len )
+{
+ int ret;
+ /* Remember digest of the peer's end-CRT. */
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest =
+ mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN );
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed",
+ sizeof( MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN ) ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type(
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE ),
+ start, len,
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest );
+
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_type =
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE;
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_len =
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN;
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *start, size_t len )
+{
+ unsigned char *end = start + len;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Make a copy of the peer's raw public key. */
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey );
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &start, end,
+ &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ /* We should have parsed the public key before. */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int crt_expected;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET
+ ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode
+ : ssl->conf->authmode;
+#else
+ const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
#endif
+ void *rs_ctx = NULL;
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *chain = NULL;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) );
+
+ crt_expected = ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( ssl, authmode );
+ if( crt_expected == SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
+ goto exit;
+ }
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify )
{
+ chain = ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert;
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = NULL;
goto crt_verify;
}
#endif
@@ -6029,22 +6263,44 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We
let it decide whether to alert. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
- return( ret );
+ goto exit;
}
- if( ( ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE &&
- authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL )
- {
+ if( ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification( ssl ) == 0 )
+ {
+ ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING;
+
+ if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL )
ret = 0;
- }
-#endif
+ else
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
- ssl->state++;
- return( ret );
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+ /* Clear existing peer CRT structure in case we tried to
+ * reuse a session but it failed, and allocate a new one. */
+ ssl_clear_peer_cert( ssl->session_negotiate );
+
+ chain = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );
+ if( chain == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed",
+ sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
}
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_init( chain );
+
+ ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain( ssl, chain );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled)
@@ -6055,154 +6311,71 @@ crt_verify:
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx;
#endif
- if( authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
- mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
- if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL )
- {
- ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
- ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl;
- }
- else
-#endif
- {
- ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
- ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
- }
-
- /*
- * Main check: verify certificate
- */
- ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(
- ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
- ca_chain, ca_crl,
- ssl->conf->cert_profile,
- ssl->hostname,
- &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
- ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy, rs_ctx );
-
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret );
- }
+ ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl, authmode,
+ chain, rs_ctx );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS );
-#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ {
+ unsigned char *crt_start, *pk_start;
+ size_t crt_len, pk_len;
- /*
- * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
- */
+ /* We parse the CRT chain without copying, so
+ * these pointers point into the input buffer,
+ * and are hence still valid after freeing the
+ * CRT chain. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
- {
- const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
+ crt_start = chain->raw.p;
+ crt_len = chain->raw.len;
- /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK */
- if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) &&
- mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 )
- {
- ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
+ pk_start = chain->pk_raw.p;
+ pk_len = chain->pk_raw.len;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) );
- if( ret == 0 )
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+ /* Free the CRT structures before computing
+ * digest and copying the peer's public key. */
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( chain );
+ mbedtls_free( chain );
+ chain = NULL;
- if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
- ciphersuite_info,
- ! ssl->conf->endpoint,
- &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) );
- if( ret == 0 )
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
- }
+ ret = ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( ssl, crt_start, crt_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
- /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a
- * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED,
- * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds
- * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy
- * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of
- * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */
- if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
- ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
- ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) )
- {
- ret = 0;
- }
+ ret = ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( ssl, pk_start, pk_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ /* Pass ownership to session structure. */
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = chain;
+ chain = NULL;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
- if( ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) );
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
- }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- uint8_t alert;
+exit:
- /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
- Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
- may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
- if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA;
- else
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN;
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- alert );
- }
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ ssl->state++;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
- if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %x",
- ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) );
- }
- else
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
+ {
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = chain;
+ chain = NULL;
}
+#endif
- ssl->state++;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) );
+ if( chain != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( chain );
+ mbedtls_free( chain );
+ }
return( ret );
}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
- !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
- !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED
- !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
- !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
- !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
- !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
@@ -7065,6 +7238,11 @@ static void ssl_handshake_params_init( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET;
#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &handshake->peer_pubkey );
+#endif
}
static void ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
@@ -7614,7 +7792,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
- if( ( ret = ssl_session_copy( ssl->session_negotiate, session ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( ssl->session_negotiate,
+ session ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
@@ -8533,12 +8712,17 @@ const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ss
if( ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL )
return( NULL );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
return( ssl->session->peer_cert );
+#else
+ return( NULL );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
-int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session *dst )
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *dst )
{
if( ssl == NULL ||
dst == NULL ||
@@ -8548,7 +8732,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
- return( ssl_session_copy( dst, ssl->session ) );
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( dst, ssl->session ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
@@ -9402,8 +9586,18 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( &handshake->ecrs_ctx );
+ if( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert );
+ mbedtls_free( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert );
+ }
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &handshake->peer_pubkey );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
mbedtls_free( handshake->verify_cookie );
ssl_flight_free( handshake->flight );
@@ -9425,11 +9619,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
return;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
- if( session->peer_cert != NULL )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert );
- mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert );
- }
+ ssl_clear_peer_cert( session );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)