From 8e7edbbf5d6d169eab0dc57fdeb3cfa835e5641d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Lendacky, Thomas" Date: Thu, 29 Apr 2021 12:12:13 -0500 Subject: OvmfPkg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei: Mark TPM MMIO range as unencrypted for SEV-ES MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3345 During PEI, the MMIO range for the TPM is marked as encrypted when running as an SEV guest. While this isn't an issue for an SEV guest because of the way the nested page fault is handled, it does result in an SEV-ES guest terminating because of a mitigation check in the #VC handler to prevent MMIO to an encrypted address. For an SEV-ES guest, this range must be marked as unencrypted. Create a new x86 PEIM for TPM support that will map the TPM MMIO range as unencrypted when SEV-ES is active. The gOvmfTpmMmioAccessiblePpiGuid PPI will be unconditionally installed before exiting. The PEIM will exit with the EFI_ABORTED status so that the PEIM does not stay resident. This new PEIM will depend on the installation of the permanent PEI RAM, by PlatformPei, so that in case page table splitting is required during the clearing of the encryption bit, the new page table(s) will be allocated from permanent PEI RAM. Update all OVMF Ia32 and X64 build packages to include this new PEIM. Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Jordan Justen Cc: Brijesh Singh Cc: Erdem Aktas Cc: James Bottomley Cc: Jiewen Yao Cc: Min Xu Cc: Marc-André Lureau Cc: Stefan Berger Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Message-Id: <42794cec1f9d5bc24cbfb9dcdbe5e281ef259ef5.1619716333.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> [lersek@redhat.com: refresh subject line] Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek --- OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 1 + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf | 1 + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 1 + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf | 1 + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 1 + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf | 1 + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 1 + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 1 + .../TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf | 40 ++++++++++ .../TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPeim.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 135 insertions(+) create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPeim.c diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc index cdb29d5..66bbbc8 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc @@ -626,6 +626,7 @@ OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE + OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf { diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf index c009850..dd0030d 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE +INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc index 1730b65..33fbd76 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc @@ -706,6 +706,7 @@ UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE + OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf { diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf index f400c84..b3c8b56 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf @@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ INF OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccessPei.inf INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE +INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc index 78a559d..b13e5cf 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc @@ -719,6 +719,7 @@ UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE + OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf { diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf index d055552..86592c2 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf @@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ INF OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccessPei.inf INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE +INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc index a7d747f..999738d 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc @@ -718,6 +718,7 @@ UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE + OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf { diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf index d519f85..d6be798 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ INF OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccessPei.inf INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE +INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..51ad6d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +## @file +# Map TPM MMIO range unencrypted when SEV-ES is active. +# Install gOvmfTpmMmioAccessiblePpiGuid unconditionally. +# +# Copyright (C) 2021, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +## + +[Defines] + INF_VERSION = 1.29 + BASE_NAME = TpmMmioSevDecryptPei + FILE_GUID = F12F698A-E506-4A1B-B32E-6920E55DA1C4 + MODULE_TYPE = PEIM + VERSION_STRING = 1.0 + ENTRY_POINT = TpmMmioSevDecryptPeimEntryPoint + +[Sources] + TpmMmioSevDecryptPeim.c + +[Packages] + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec + SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec + +[LibraryClasses] + DebugLib + MemEncryptSevLib + PcdLib + PeimEntryPoint + PeiServicesLib + +[Ppis] + gOvmfTpmMmioAccessiblePpiGuid ## PRODUCES + +[FixedPcd] + gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress ## CONSUMES + +[Depex] + gEfiPeiMemoryDiscoveredPpiGuid diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPeim.c b/OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPeim.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df2ad62 --- /dev/null +++ b/OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPeim.c @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/** @file + Map TPM MMIO range unencrypted when SEV-ES is active. + Install gOvmfTpmMmioAccessiblePpiGuid unconditionally. + + Copyright (C) 2021, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +**/ + + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +STATIC CONST EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR mTpmMmioRangeAccessible = { + EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_PPI | EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_TERMINATE_LIST, + &gOvmfTpmMmioAccessiblePpiGuid, + NULL +}; + +/** + The entry point for TPM MMIO range mapping driver. + + @param[in] FileHandle Handle of the file being invoked. + @param[in] PeiServices Describes the list of possible PEI Services. + + @retval EFI_ABORTED No need to keep this PEIM resident +**/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +TpmMmioSevDecryptPeimEntryPoint ( + IN EFI_PEI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle, + IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices + ) +{ + RETURN_STATUS DecryptStatus; + EFI_STATUS Status; + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a\n", __FUNCTION__)); + + // + // If SEV is active, MMIO succeeds against an encrypted physical address + // because the nested page fault (NPF) that occurs on access does not + // include the encryption bit in the guest physical address provided to the + // hypervisor. + // + // If SEV-ES is active, MMIO would succeed against an encrypted physical + // address because the #VC handler uses the virtual address (which is an + // identity mapped physical address without the encryption bit) as the guest + // physical address of the MMIO target in the VMGEXIT. + // + // However, if SEV-ES is active, before performing the actual MMIO, an + // additional MMIO mitigation check is performed in the #VC handler to ensure + // that MMIO is being done to/from an unencrypted address. To prevent guest + // termination in this scenario, mark the range unencrypted ahead of access. + // + if (MemEncryptSevEsIsEnabled ()) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, + "%a: mapping TPM MMIO address range unencrypted\n", + __FUNCTION__)); + + DecryptStatus = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask ( + 0, + FixedPcdGet64 (PcdTpmBaseAddress), + EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES ((UINTN) 0x5000), + FALSE + ); + + if (RETURN_ERROR (DecryptStatus)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, + "%a: failed to map TPM MMIO address range unencrypted\n", + __FUNCTION__)); + ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (DecryptStatus); + } + } + + // + // MMIO range available + // + Status = PeiServicesInstallPpi (&mTpmMmioRangeAccessible); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + return EFI_ABORTED; +} -- cgit v1.1