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It's a UINT8 (enum) PCD telling where the PcdVideoHorizontalResolution
and PcdVideoVerticalResolution values are coming from. It can be:
0 (unset aka default from dsc file), or
1 (from PlatformConfig), or
2 (set by Video Driver).
It will be used by video drivers to avoid overriding PlatformConfig
values, or override each others values in case multiple display devices
are present.
The underlying problem this tries to solve is that the GOP protocol has
no way to indicate the preferred video mode. On physical hardware this
isn't much of a problem because using the highest resolution available
works just fine as that is typically the native display resolution
But in a virtual machine you don't want come up with a huge 4k window by
default just because the virtual vga is able to handle that. Cutting
down the video mode list isn't a great solution either as that would
also remove the modes from the platform configuration so the user
wouldn't be able to pick a resolution higher than the default any more.
So with patch drivers can use use PcdVideoHorizontalResolution and
PcdVideoVerticalResolution to indicate what the preferred display
resolution is, without overwriting the user preferences from
PlatformConfig if present.
A possible alternative approach would be to extend the GOP protocol, but
I'm not sure this is a good plan given this is mostly a problem for
virtual machines and using PCDs allows to keep this local to OvmfPkg.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
Now that both the secrets and cpuid pages are reserved in the HOB,
extract the location details through fixed PCD and make it available
to the guest OS through the configuration table.
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
The VMM launch sequence should have pre-validated all the data pages used
in the Reset vector. The range does not cover the data pages used during
the SEC phase (mainly PEI and DXE firmware volume decompression memory).
When SEV-SNP is active, the memory must be pre-validated before the access.
Add support to pre-validate the memory range from SnpSecPreValidatedStart
to SnpSecPreValidatedEnd. This should be sufficent to enter into the PEI
phase.
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
Platform features and capabilities are traditionally discovered via the
CPUID instruction. Hypervisors typically trap and emulate the CPUID
instruction for a variety of reasons. There are some cases where incorrect
CPUID information can potentially lead to a security issue. The SEV-SNP
firmware provides a feature to filter the CPUID results through the PSP.
The filtered CPUID values are saved on a special page for the guest to
consume. Reserve a page in MEMFD that will contain the results of
filtered CPUID values.
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
During the SNP guest launch sequence, a special secrets page needs to be
inserted by the VMM. The PSP will populate the page; it will contain the
VM Platform Communication Key (VMPCKs) used by the guest to send and
receive secure messages to the PSP.
The purpose of the secrets page in the SEV-SNP is different from the one
used in SEV guests. In SEV, the secrets page contains the guest owner's
private data after the remote attestation.
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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RFC： https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3429
In TDX when host VMM creates a new guest TD, some initial set of
TD-private pages are added using the TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD function. These
pages typically contain Virtual BIOS code and data along with some clear
pages for stacks and heap. In the meanwhile, some configuration data
need be measured by host VMM. Tdx Metadata is designed for this purpose
to indicate host VMM how to do the above tasks.
More detailed information of Metadata is in [TDVF] Section 11.
Tdx Metadata describes the information about the image for VMM use.
For example, the base address and length of the TdHob, Bfv, Cfv, etc.
The offset of the Metadata is stored in a GUID-ed structure which is
appended in the GUID-ed chain from a fixed GPA (0xffffffd0).
In this commit there are 2 new definitions of BFV & CFV.
Tdx Virtual Firmware (TDVF) includes one Firmware Volume (FV) known
as the Boot Firmware Volume (BFV). The FV format is defined in the
UEFI Platform Initialization (PI) spec. BFV includes all TDVF
components required during boot.
TDVF also include a configuration firmware volume (CFV) that is
separated from the BFV. The reason is because the CFV is measured in
RTMR, while the BFV is measured in MRTD.
In practice BFV is the code part of Ovmf image (OVMF_CODE.fd). CFV is
the vars part of Ovmf image (OVMF_VARS.fd).
Since AMD SEV has already defined some SEV specific memory region in
MEMFD. TDX re-uses some of the memory regions defined by SEV.
- MailBox : PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupBase|PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupSize
- TdHob : PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase|PcdOvmfSecGhcbSize
[TDVF] https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/
documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.pdf
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
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SEC checks in IsSevGuest if the PCD defined WorkAreaHeader size
matches the size of the WorkAreaHeader struct definition. Set a
default value for the PCD to avoid unnecessary DSC/FDF file
changes in all OVMF DSC/FDF files.
Signed-off-by: Corvin Köhne <c.koehne@beckhoff.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
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BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3429
Both the TDX and SEV support needs to reserve a page in MEMFD as a work
area. The page will contain meta data specific to the guest type.
Currently, the SEV-ES support reserves a page in MEMFD
(PcdSevEsWorkArea) for the work area. This page can be reused as a TDX
work area when Intel TDX is enabled.
Based on the discussion [1], it was agreed to rename the SevEsWorkArea
to the OvmfWorkArea, and add a header that can be used to indicate the
work area type.
[1] https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/78262?p=,,,20,0,0,0::\
created,0,SNP,20,2,0,84476064
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
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Moving LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID to MdePkg, remove it from OvmfPkg.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Brasen <jbrasen@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Split the existing 4KB page reserved for SEV launch secrets into two
parts: first 3KB for SEV launch secrets and last 1KB for firmware
config hashes.
The area of the firmware config hashes will be attested (measured) by
the PSP and thus the untrusted VMM can't pass in different files from
what the guest owner allows.
Declare this in the Reset Vector table using GUID
7255371f-3a3b-4b04-927b-1da6efa8d454 and a uint32_t table of a base
and size value (similar to the structure used to declare the launch
secret block).
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457
Co-developed-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
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BlobVerifierLib will be used to verify blobs fetching them from QEMU's
firmware config (fw_cfg) in platforms that enable such verification.
The null implementation BlobVerifierLibNull treats all blobs as valid.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
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Define a new PPI GUID that is to be used as a signal of when it is safe
to access the TPM MMIO range. This is needed so that, when SEV is active,
the MMIO range can be mapped unencrypted before it is accessed.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <03e292339273721724c8b14605cfe9d7bbe45a71.1619716333.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Define CPU_HOT_EJECT_DATA and add PCD PcdCpuHotEjectDataAddress, which
will be used to share CPU ejection state between OvmfPkg/CpuHotPlugSmm
and PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Aaron Young <aaron.young@oracle.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3132
Signed-off-by: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20210312062656.2477515-6-ankur.a.arora@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Introduce a new PciHostBridgeUtilityLib class to share duplicate code
between OvmfPkg and ArmVirtPkg.
Extract function PciHostBridgeUtilityResourceConflict from
PciHostBridgeResourceConflict in OvmfPkg/PciHostBridgeLib.
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3059
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiahui Cen <cenjiahui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yubo Miao <miaoyubo@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210119011302.10908-2-cenjiahui@huawei.com>
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BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
In order to be able to issue messages or make interface calls that cause
another #VC (e.g. GetLocalApicBaseAddress () issues RDMSR), add support
for nested #VCs.
In order to support nested #VCs, GHCB backup pages are required. If a #VC
is received while currently processing a #VC, a backup of the current GHCB
content is made. This allows the #VC handler to continue processing the
new #VC. Upon completion of the new #VC, the GHCB is restored from the
backup page. The #VC recursion level is tracked in the per-vCPU variable
area.
Support is added to handle up to one nested #VC (or two #VCs total). If
a second nested #VC is encountered, an ASSERT will be issued and the vCPU
will enter CpuDeadLoop ().
For SEC, the GHCB backup pages are reserved in the OvmfPkgX64.fdf memory
layout, with two new fixed PCDs to provide the address and size of the
backup area.
For PEI/DXE, the GHCB backup pages are allocated as boot services pages
using the memory allocation library.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <ac2e8203fc41a351b43f60d68bdad6b57c4fb106.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
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It is anticipated that this part of the code will work for both Intel
TDX and AMD SEV, so remove the SEV specific naming and change to
ConfidentialComputing as a more architecture neutral prefix. Apart
from the symbol rename, there are no code changes.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Message-Id: <20201216014146.2229-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Now that the secret area is protected by a boot time HOB, extract its
location details into a configuration table referenced by
gSevLaunchSecretGuid so the boot loader or OS can locate it before a
call to ExitBootServices().
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-7-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: fix indentation of InstallConfigurationTable() args]
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SEV needs an area to place an injected secret where OVMF can find it
and pass it up as a ConfigurationTable. This patch implements the
area itself as an addition to the SEV enhanced reset vector table using
an additional guid (4c2eb361-7d9b-4cc3-8081-127c90d3d294).
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-5-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: fix typo in "ResetVectorVtf0.asm" comments]
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This is used to package up the grub bootloader into a firmware volume
where it can be executed as a shell like the UEFI Shell. Grub itself
is built as a minimal entity into a Fv and then added as a boot
option. By default the UEFI shell isn't built but for debugging
purposes it can be enabled and will then be presented as a boot option
(This should never be allowed for secure boot in an external data
centre but may be useful for local debugging). Finally all other boot
options except grub and possibly the shell are stripped and the boot
timeout forced to 0 so the system will not enter a setup menu and will
only boot to grub. This is done by copying the
Library/PlatformBootManagerLib into Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub
and then customizing it.
Boot failure is fatal to try to prevent secret theft.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-4-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: replace local variable initialization with assignment]
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: squash 'OvmfPkg: add "gGrubFileGuid=Grub" to
GuidCheck.IgnoreDuplicates', reviewed stand-alone by Phil (msgid
<e6eae551-8563-ccfb-5547-7a97da6d46e5@redhat.com>) and Ard (msgid
<10aeda37-def6-d9a4-6e02-4c66c1492f57@arm.com>)]
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BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198
A GHCB page is needed during the Sec phase, so this new page must be
created. Since the #VC exception handler routines assume that a per-CPU
variable area is immediately after the GHCB, this per-CPU variable area
must also be created. Since the GHCB must be marked as an un-encrypted,
or shared, page, an additional pagetable page is required to break down
the 2MB region where the GHCB page lives into 4K pagetable entries.
Create a new entry in the OVMF memory layout for the new page table
page and for the SEC GHCB and per-CPU variable pages. After breaking down
the 2MB page, update the GHCB page table entry to remove the encryption
mask.
The GHCB page will be used by the SEC #VC exception handler. The #VC
exception handler will fill in the necessary fields of the GHCB and exit
to the hypervisor using the VMGEXIT instruction. The hypervisor then
accesses the GHCB in order to perform the requested function.
Four new fixed PCDs are needed to support the SEC GHCB page:
- PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase UINT32 value that is the base address of the
GHCB used during the SEC phase.
- PcdOvmfSecGhcbSize UINT32 value that is the size, in bytes, of the
GHCB area used during the SEC phase.
- PcdOvmfSecGhcbPageTableBase UINT32 value that is address of a page
table page used to break down the 2MB page into
512 4K pages.
- PcdOvmfSecGhcbPageTableSize UINT32 value that is the size, in bytes,
of the page table page.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Sean reports that having two DEC files under OvmfPkg violates the DEC
spec:
> An EDK II Package (directory) is a directory that contains an EDK II
> package declaration (DEC) file. Only one DEC file is permitted per
> directory. EDK II Packages cannot be nested within other EDK II
> Packages.
This issue originates from commit 656419f922c0 ("Add BhyvePkg, to support
the bhyve hypervisor", 2020-07-31).
Remedy the problem as follows. (Note that these steps are not split to
multiple patches in order to keep Bhyve buildable across the transition.)
(1) Delete "OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyvePkg.dec".
(2) Point the [Packages] sections of the Bhyve-specific AcpiPlatformDxe,
BhyveRfbDxe, and BhyveFwCtlLib INF files to "OvmfPkg.dec".
(3) Migrate the artifacts that "BhyvePkg.dec" used to have on top of
"OvmfPkg.dec" as follows:
(3a) Merge the copyright notices from Rebecca Cran and Pluribus Networks
into "OvmfPkg.dec".
(3b) Merge the "BhyveFwCtlLib" class header definition into "OvmfPkg.dec".
(3c) Merge value 0x2F8 for the fixed PcdDebugIoPort into
"BhyvePkgX64.dsc".
(4) Unnest the the Include/Library/ and Library/ subtrees from under
OvmfPkg/Bhyve to the corresponding, preexistent subtrees in OvmfPkg.
The goal is to keep the [Includes] section in the "OvmfPkg.dec" file
unchanged, plus simplify references in "BhyvePkgX64.dsc". Non-library
modules remain under "OvmfPkg/Bhyve/".
(4a) The BhyveFwCtlLib class header, and sole instance, are already
uniquely named, so their movements need not involve file renames.
(4b) Rename the Bhyve-specific PlatformBootManagerLib instance to
PlatformBootManagerLibBhyve, in additon to moving it, for
distinguishing it from OvmfPkg's preexistent lib instance. Apply the
name change to all three of the lib instance directory name, the INF
file, and the BASE_NAME define in the INF file.
(4c) Update lib class resolutions in "BhyvePkgX64.dsc" accordingly.
(5) Replace the "ACPI table storage" FILE_GUID in
"OvmfPkg/Bhyve/AcpiTables/AcpiTables.inf" with a new GUID, and
open-code the "ACPI table storage" GUID in the "ACPITABLE" FDF rule
instead, replacing $(NAMED_GUID). This step is necessary because CI
requires unique FILE_GUIDs over all INF files, and OVMF's original
"AcpiTables.inf" already uses the "ACPI table storage" GUID as
FILE_GUID.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Sean Brogan <spbrogan@outlook.com>
Fixes: 656419f922c047a3c48bd3f4ecea7d8e87d0b761
Reported-by: Sean Brogan <spbrogan@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200801155024.16439-1-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
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This is the second part of LsiScsiPassThru(). LsiScsiProcessRequest() is
added to translate the SCSI Request Packet into the LSI 53C895A
commands. This function utilizes the so-called Script buffer to transmit
a series of commands to the chip and then polls the DMA Status (DSTAT)
register until the Scripts Interrupt Instruction Received (SIR) bit
sets. Once the script is done, the SCSI Request Packet will be modified
to reflect the result of the script. The Cumulative SCSI Byte Count
(CSBC) register is fetched before and after the script to calculate the
transferred bytes and update InTransferLength/OutTransferLength if
necessary.
v3:
- Set DStat, SIst0, and SIst1 to 0 before using them
- Amend the if statements for the DMA data instruction and add the
assertions for the data direction
- Also set SenseDataLength to 0 on the error path
- Fix typos and amend comments
- Amend the error handling of the calculation of transferred bytes
v2:
- Use the BITx macros for the most of LSI_* constants
- Fix a typo: contorller => controller
- Add SeaBIOS lsi-scsi driver as one of the references of the script
- Cast the result of sizeof to UINT32 for the instructions of the
script
- Drop the backslashes
- Replace LSI_SCSI_DMA_ADDR_LOW with LSI_SCSI_DMA_ADDR since we
already removed DUAL_ADDRESS_CYCLE
- Add more comments for the script
- Fix the check of the script size at the end of the script
- Always set SenseDataLength to 0 to avoid the caller to access
SenseData
- Improve the error handling in LsiScsiProcessRequest()
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Message-Id: <20200717061130.8881-11-glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Implement LsiScsiGetNextTargetLun(), LsiScsiBuildDevicePath(),
LsiScsiGetTargetLun(), and LsiScsiGetNextTarget() to report Targets and
LUNs and build the device path.
This commit also introduces two PCD value: PcdLsiScsiMaxTargetLimit and
PcdLsiScsiMaxLunLimit as the limits for Targets and LUNs.
v3:
- Update the range of LUN in the assertioin
- Squash the spurious newline into the previous commit
v2:
- Zero out (*Target) in LsiScsiGetTargetLun()
- Use CopyMem() instead of the one-byte shortcut to copy target from
ScsiDevicePath->Pun
- Add asserts for PcdLsiScsiMaxTargetLimit and PcdLsiScsiMaxLunLimit
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Message-Id: <20200717061130.8881-7-glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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The token value of PcdMptScsiStallPerPollUsec should be 0x3a since the
previous token value is 0x39.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Message-Id: <20200715082031.30978-1-glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: clarify subject, fix typos in commit message]
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Machines should be able to boot after this commit. Tested with different
Linux distributions (Ubuntu, CentOS) and different Windows
versions (Windows 7, Windows 10, Server 2016).
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2390
Signed-off-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200504210607.144434-12-nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: MPT_SCSI_DMA_ADDR_HIGH: drop redundant space char]
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The controller supports up to 8 targets in practice (Not reported by the
controller, but based on the implementation of the virtual device),
report them in GetNextTarget and GetNextTargetLun. The firmware will
then try to communicate with them and create a block device for each one
that responds.
Support for multiple LUNs will be implemented in another series.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2390
Signed-off-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200504210607.144434-7-nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
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We already parse some boolean and integer values from named fw_cfg files
(usually into PCDs), and we're going to cover more. Add a dedicated
library for centralizing the parsing logic.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Per Sundstrom <per_sundstrom@yahoo.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2681
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200424075353.8489-2-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
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List the header files in the OvmfPkg DEC file for the following lib
classes:
- MemEncryptSevLib (one instance: BaseMemEncryptSevLib)
- PlatformFvbLib (two instances: EmuVariableFvbLib, PlatformFvbLibNull)
- VirtioLib (one instance: VirtioLib)
- VirtioMmioDeviceLib (one instance: VirtioMmioDeviceLib)
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2662
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200407100545.25406-1-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
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Implement EXT_SCSI_PASS_THRU.PassThru().
Machines should be able to boot after this commit.
Tested with Ubuntu 16.04 guest.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2567
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20200328200100.60786-16-liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Implement EXT_SCSI_PASS_THRU.GetNextTarget() and
EXT_SCSI_PASS_THRU.GetNextTargetLun().
ScsiBusDxe scans all MaxTarget * MaxLun possible devices.
This can take unnecessarily long for large number of targets.
To deal with this, VirtioScsiDxe has defined PCDs to limit the
MaxTarget & MaxLun to desired values which gives sufficient
performance. It is very important in virtio-scsi as it can have
very big MaxTarget & MaxLun.
Even though a common PVSCSI device has a default MaxTarget=64 and
MaxLun=0, we implement similar mechanism as virtio-scsi for completeness.
This may be useful in the future when PVSCSI will have bigger values
for MaxTarget and MaxLun.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2567
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20200328200100.60786-7-liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
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In preparation of moving the legacy x86 loading to an implementation
of the QEMU load image library class, introduce a protocol header
and GUID that we will use to identify legacy loaded x86 Linux kernels
in the protocol database.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Introduce the QemuLoadImageLib library class that we will instantiate
to load the kernel image passed via the QEMU command line using the
standard LoadImage boot service.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2566
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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In an upcoming patch, we will introduce a separate DXE driver that
exposes the virtual SimpleFileSystem implementation that carries the
kernel and initrd passed via the QEMU command line, and a separate
library that consumes it, to be incorporated into the boot manager.
Since the GUID used for the SimpleFileSystem implementation's device
path will no longer be for internal use only, create a well defined
GUID to identify the media device path.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2566
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Add LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID to our collection of GUID definitions,
it can be used in a media device path to specify a Linux style initrd
that can be loaded by the OS using the LoadFile2 protocol.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2564
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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On ARM systems, the TPM does not live at a fixed address, and so we
need the platform to discover it first. So introduce a PPI that signals
that the TPM address has been discovered and recorded in the appropriate
PCD, and make Tcg2ConfigPei depex on it when built for ARM or AARCH64.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2560
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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In the DXE phase and later, it is possible for a module to dynamically
determine whether a CSM is enabled. An example can be seen in commit
855743f71774 ("OvmfPkg: prevent 64-bit MMIO BAR degradation if there is no
CSM", 2016-05-25).
SEC and PEI phase modules cannot check the Legacy BIOS Protocol however.
For their sake, introduce a new feature PCD that simply reflects the
CSM_ENABLE build flag.
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-11-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
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For supporting VCPU hotplug with SMM enabled/required, QEMU offers the
(dynamically detectable) feature called "SMRAM at default SMBASE". When
the feature is enabled, the firmware can lock down the 128 KB range
starting at the default SMBASE; that is, the [0x3_0000, 0x4_FFFF]
interval. The goal is to shield the very first SMI handler of the
hotplugged VCPU from OS influence.
Multiple modules in OVMF will have to inter-operate for locking down this
range. Introduce a dynamic PCD that will reflect the feature (to be
negotiated by PlatformPei), for coordination between drivers.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-2-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
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Introduce PcdXenGrantFrames to replace a define in XenBusDxe and allow
the same value to be used in a different module.
The reason for the number of page to be 4 doesn't exist anymore, so
simply remove the comment.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190813113119.14804-33-anthony.perard@citrix.com>
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The purpose of XenPlatformLib is to regroup the few functions that are
used in several places to detect if Xen is detected, and to get the
XenInfo HOB.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1689
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190813113119.14804-14-anthony.perard@citrix.com>
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As described in the Xen PVH documentation [1], "ebx: contains the
physical memory address where the loader has placed the boot start info
structure". To have this pointer saved to be able to use it later in the
PEI phase, we allocate some space in the MEMFD for it. We use 'XPVH' as
a signature (for "Xen PVH").
[1] https://xenbits.xenproject.org/docs/unstable/misc/pvh.html
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1689
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190813113119.14804-8-anthony.perard@citrix.com>
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REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1811
This commit will add the PCD definitions consumed by the duplicated
drivers:
* VideoDxe
* LegacyBiosDxe
into the OvmfPkg DEC file.
Please note that, instead of adding these PCDs under section:
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx, PcdsPatchableInModule]
as in IntelFrameworkModulePkg.dec file, they are added in section:
[PcdsFixedAtBuild]
in OvmfPkg.dec instead.
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1811
The previous file-duplication commit has put all the CSM related header
files within folder: OvmfPkg/Csm/Inclue.
This commit will update the DEC file to add that folder under the
'[Include]' section.
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1811
This commit will add the Guid definitions of the duplicated CSM-related
Guids and Protocols from IntelFramework[Module]Pkg.
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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For the EnrollDefaultKeys application, the hypervisor is expected to add a
string entry to the "OEM Strings" (Type 11) SMBIOS table, with the
following format:
4e32566d-8e9e-4f52-81d3-5bb9715f9727:<Base64 X509 cert for PK and first KEK>
The string representation of the GUID at the front is the "application
prefix", in terms of QEMU commit
<https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=2d6dcbf93fb0>.
Introduce this GUID in the usual manner.
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1747
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
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The GUID
77FA9ABD-0359-4D32-BD60-28F4E78F784B
is specified in MSDN, at
<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/ie/dn932805(v=vs.94)>, therefore it
deserves an entry in the package DEC file, and a header file under
"Include/Guid".
(Arguably, this GUID declaration / definition could even live under
SecurityPkg, but the edk2 tradition has been to hoist GUIDs,
protocols/PPIs, and lib classes from OvmfPkg to a core package only when
dependent C code is added to the core package.)
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1747
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
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REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1496
According to the DEC file in PcAtChipsetPkg, this commit adds the two
8259-driver-related PCDs into the OvmfPkg DEC file.
Please note that, instead of adding the two PCDs under section:
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx, PcdsPatchableInModule]
as in PcAtChipsetPkg.dec file, they are added in section:
[PcdsFixedAtBuild]
in OvmfPkg.dec instead.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1496
This commit copies the exact Legacy8259 protocol header file from
IntelFrameworkPkg to OvmfPkg. Also, the protocol GUID definition is
duplicated in the OvmfPkg DEC file.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1373
Replace BSD 2-Clause License with BSD+Patent License. This change is
based on the following emails:
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-February/036260.html
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2018-October/030385.html
RFCs with detailed process for the license change:
V3: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/038116.html
V2: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/037669.html
V1: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/037500.html
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Introduce the Platform Boot Manager Print Status Code Library (for short,
PlatformBmPrintScLib) class for catching and printing the LoadImage() /
StartImage() preparations, and return statuses, that are reported by
UefiBootManagerLib.
In the primary library instance, catch only such status codes that
UefiBootManagerLib reports from the same module that contains
PlatformBmPrintScLib. The intent is to establish a reporting-printing
channel within BdsDxe, between UefiBootManagerLib and
PlatformBmPrintScLib. Ignore status codes originating elsewhence, e.g.
from UiApp's copy of UefiBootManagerLib.
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1515418
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
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Add GUID header file for the QemuRamfbDxe driver.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
