Sync patches r13990, r14038, r14042, r14050 and r14085 from main trunk.

1. Add a NULL string to the Image Execution Information Table if the Name is NULL in function AddImageExeInfo().
2. Add the TPL raise/restore code for VariableSmmRuntimeDxe to avoid variable services reentry.
3. Set the secure boot state to Standard Mode when user leaving secure boot setup page.
4. Add 'Current SecureBoot State' field to reflect current secure boot status of the platform.
5. Fix the issue that RuntimeServiceQueryVariableInfo() in VariableSmmRuntimeDxe always return EFI_SUCCESS.
6. Variables with state VAR_ADDED&VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION should be considered as valid variables if there is no duplicated ones with VAR_ADDED state.

git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/branches/UDK2010.SR1@14234 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524

10 files changed, 428 insertions, 106 deletions

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/Pei/Variable.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/Pei/Variable.c
index 5040f82..10ad3f5 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/Pei/Variable.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/Pei/Variable.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
   Implement ReadOnly Variable Services required by PEIM and install

   PEI ReadOnly Varaiable2 PPI. These services operates the non volatile storage space.

 

-Copyright (c) 2006 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+Copyright (c) 2006 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

 This program and the accompanying materials

 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License

 which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at

@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ FindVariableEx (
   UINTN                   Index;

   UINTN                   Offset;

   BOOLEAN                 StopRecord;

+  VARIABLE_HEADER         *InDeletedVariable;

 

   if (VariableStoreHeader == NULL) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

@@ -446,6 +447,8 @@ FindVariableEx (
   PtrTrack->StartPtr = GetStartPointer (VariableStoreHeader);

   PtrTrack->EndPtr   = GetEndPointer   (VariableStoreHeader);

 

+  InDeletedVariable = NULL;

+

   //

   // No Variable Address equals zero, so 0 as initial value is safe.

   //

@@ -461,15 +464,20 @@ FindVariableEx (
       Offset   += IndexTable->Index[Index];

       MaxIndex  = (VARIABLE_HEADER *) ((UINT8 *) IndexTable->StartPtr + Offset);

       if (CompareWithValidVariable (MaxIndex, VariableName, VendorGuid, PtrTrack) == EFI_SUCCESS) {

-        return EFI_SUCCESS;

+        if (PtrTrack->CurrPtr->State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) {

+          InDeletedVariable = PtrTrack->CurrPtr;

+        } else {

+          return EFI_SUCCESS;

+        }

       }

     }

 

     if (IndexTable->GoneThrough != 0) {

       //

-      // If the table has all the existing variables indexed and we still cannot find it.

+      // If the table has all the existing variables indexed, return.

       //

-      return EFI_NOT_FOUND;

+      PtrTrack->CurrPtr = InDeletedVariable;

+      return (PtrTrack->CurrPtr == NULL) ? EFI_NOT_FOUND : EFI_SUCCESS;

     }

   }

 

@@ -490,11 +498,11 @@ FindVariableEx (
   }

 

   //

-  // Find the variable by walk through non-volatile variable store

+  // Find the variable by walk through variable store

   //

   StopRecord = FALSE;

   while ((Variable < PtrTrack->EndPtr) && IsValidVariableHeader (Variable)) {

-    if (Variable->State == VAR_ADDED) {

+    if (Variable->State == VAR_ADDED || Variable->State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) {

       //

       // Record Variable in VariableIndex HOB

       //

@@ -513,7 +521,11 @@ FindVariableEx (
       }

 

       if (CompareWithValidVariable (Variable, VariableName, VendorGuid, PtrTrack) == EFI_SUCCESS) {

-        return EFI_SUCCESS;

+        if (PtrTrack->CurrPtr->State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) {

+          InDeletedVariable = PtrTrack->CurrPtr;

+        } else {

+          return EFI_SUCCESS;

+        }

       }

     }

 

@@ -526,9 +538,9 @@ FindVariableEx (
     IndexTable->GoneThrough = 1;

   }

 

-  PtrTrack->CurrPtr = NULL;

+  PtrTrack->CurrPtr = InDeletedVariable;

 

-  return EFI_NOT_FOUND;

+  return (PtrTrack->CurrPtr == NULL) ? EFI_NOT_FOUND : EFI_SUCCESS;

 }

 

 /**

@@ -691,6 +703,8 @@ PeiGetNextVariableName (
   VARIABLE_STORE_TYPE     Type;

   VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK  Variable;

   VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK  VariableInHob;

+  VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK  VariablePtrTrack;

+  VARIABLE_INDEX_TABLE    *IndexTable;

   UINTN                   VarNameSize;

   EFI_STATUS              Status;

   VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER   *VariableStoreHeader[VariableStoreTypeMax];

@@ -752,7 +766,32 @@ PeiGetNextVariableName (
       Variable.CurrPtr  = Variable.StartPtr;

     }

 

-    if (Variable.CurrPtr->State == VAR_ADDED) {

+    if (Variable.CurrPtr->State == VAR_ADDED || Variable.CurrPtr->State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) {

+      if (Variable.CurrPtr->State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) {

+        //

+        // If it is a IN_DELETED_TRANSITION variable,

+        // and there is also a same ADDED one at the same time,

+        // don't return it.

+        //

+        for (Type = (VARIABLE_STORE_TYPE) 0; Type < VariableStoreTypeMax; Type++) {

+          if ((VariableStoreHeader[Type] != NULL) && (Variable.StartPtr == GetStartPointer (VariableStoreHeader[Type]))) {

+            break;

+          }

+        }

+        ASSERT (Type < VariableStoreTypeMax);

+        GetVariableStore (Type, &IndexTable);

+        Status = FindVariableEx (

+                   VariableStoreHeader[Type],

+                   IndexTable,

+                   GetVariableNamePtr (Variable.CurrPtr),

+                   &Variable.CurrPtr->VendorGuid,

+                   &VariablePtrTrack

+                   );

+        if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && VariablePtrTrack.CurrPtr->State == VAR_ADDED) {

+          Variable.CurrPtr = GetNextVariablePtr (Variable.CurrPtr);

+          continue;

+        }

+      }

 

       //

       // Don't return NV variable when HOB overrides it

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c
index 442fe1d..2a59ac1 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
   and volatile storage space and install variable architecture protocol

   based on SMM variable module.

 

-Copyright (c) 2010 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+Copyright (c) 2010 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

 This program and the accompanying materials                          

 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License         

 which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at        

@@ -42,7 +42,51 @@ EFI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL  *mSmmCommunication          = NULL;
 UINT8                           *mVariableBuffer            = NULL;

 UINT8                           *mVariableBufferPhysical    = NULL;

 UINTN                            mVariableBufferSize;

+EFI_LOCK                         mVariableServicesLock;

 

+/**

+  Acquires lock only at boot time. Simply returns at runtime.

+

+  This is a temperary function that will be removed when

+  EfiAcquireLock() in UefiLib can handle the call in UEFI

+  Runtimer driver in RT phase.

+  It calls EfiAcquireLock() at boot time, and simply returns

+  at runtime.

+

+  @param  Lock         A pointer to the lock to acquire.

+

+**/

+VOID

+AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime (

+  IN EFI_LOCK                             *Lock

+  )

+{

+  if (!EfiAtRuntime ()) {

+    EfiAcquireLock (Lock);

+  }

+}

+

+/**

+  Releases lock only at boot time. Simply returns at runtime.

+

+  This is a temperary function which will be removed when

+  EfiReleaseLock() in UefiLib can handle the call in UEFI

+  Runtimer driver in RT phase.

+  It calls EfiReleaseLock() at boot time and simply returns

+  at runtime.

+

+  @param  Lock         A pointer to the lock to release.

+

+**/

+VOID

+ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (

+  IN EFI_LOCK                             *Lock

+  )

+{

+  if (!EfiAtRuntime ()) {

+    EfiReleaseLock (Lock);

+  }

+}

 

 /**

   Initialize the communicate buffer using DataSize and Function.

@@ -153,15 +197,17 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
   if ((*DataSize != 0) && (Data == NULL)) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

-  

+

+  AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime(&mVariableServicesLock);

+

   //

   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

-  // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize + DataSize.

+  // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize.

   //

   PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + StrSize (VariableName) + *DataSize;

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmVariableHeader, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

   ASSERT (SmmVariableHeader != NULL);

 

@@ -189,11 +235,13 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
   }

 

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

 

   CopyMem (Data, (UINT8 *)SmmVariableHeader->Name + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize, SmmVariableHeader->DataSize);

 

+Done:

+  ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mVariableServicesLock);

   return Status;

 }

 

@@ -226,7 +274,9 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   if (VariableNameSize == NULL || VariableName == NULL || VendorGuid == NULL) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

-  

+

+  AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime(&mVariableServicesLock);

+

   //

   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

   // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize.

@@ -234,7 +284,7 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name) + *VariableNameSize; 

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmGetNextVariableName, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

   ASSERT (SmmGetNextVariableName != NULL);

 

@@ -252,12 +302,14 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   //

   *VariableNameSize = SmmGetNextVariableName->NameSize;    

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

   

   CopyGuid (VendorGuid, &SmmGetNextVariableName->Guid);

   CopyMem (VariableName, SmmGetNextVariableName->Name, SmmGetNextVariableName->NameSize);  

 

+Done:

+  ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mVariableServicesLock);

   return Status;

 }

 

@@ -302,7 +354,9 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
   if (DataSize != 0 && Data == NULL) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

-  

+

+  AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime(&mVariableServicesLock);

+ 

   //

   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

   // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize.

@@ -310,7 +364,7 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
   PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + StrSize (VariableName) + DataSize;

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmVariableHeader, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

   ASSERT (SmmVariableHeader != NULL);

 

@@ -325,7 +379,9 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
   // Send data to SMM.

   //

   Status = SendCommunicateBuffer (PayloadSize);

- 

+

+Done:

+  ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mVariableServicesLock);

   return Status;

 }

 

@@ -363,7 +419,9 @@ RuntimeServiceQueryVariableInfo (
   if(MaximumVariableStorageSize == NULL || RemainingVariableStorageSize == NULL || MaximumVariableSize == NULL || Attributes == 0) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

-  

+

+  AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime(&mVariableServicesLock);

+

   //

   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

   // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize;

@@ -371,7 +429,7 @@ RuntimeServiceQueryVariableInfo (
   PayloadSize = sizeof (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO);

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmQueryVariableInfo, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

   ASSERT (SmmQueryVariableInfo != NULL);

 

@@ -382,7 +440,7 @@ RuntimeServiceQueryVariableInfo (
   //

   Status = SendCommunicateBuffer (PayloadSize);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

 

   //

@@ -391,8 +449,10 @@ RuntimeServiceQueryVariableInfo (
   *MaximumVariableSize          = SmmQueryVariableInfo->MaximumVariableSize;

   *MaximumVariableStorageSize   = SmmQueryVariableInfo->MaximumVariableStorageSize;

   *RemainingVariableStorageSize = SmmQueryVariableInfo->RemainingVariableStorageSize; 

- 

-  return EFI_SUCCESS;

+

+Done:

+  ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mVariableServicesLock);

+  return Status;

 }

 

 

@@ -589,7 +649,9 @@ VariableSmmRuntimeInitialize (
   VOID                                      *SmmVariableWriteRegistration;

   EFI_EVENT                                 OnReadyToBootEvent;

   EFI_EVENT                                 ExitBootServiceEvent;

-  

+

+  EfiInitializeLock (&mVariableServicesLock, TPL_NOTIFY);

+

   //

   // Smm variable service is ready

   //

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index c41a379..3b4fc57 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -715,14 +715,15 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
 

   if (Name != NULL) {

     NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);

+  } else {

+    NameStringLen = sizeof (CHAR16);

   }

 

-  ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;

   EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);

   if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {

     //

     // The table has been found!

-    // We must enlarge the table to accmodate the new exe info entry.

+    // We must enlarge the table to accomodate the new exe info entry.

     //

     ImageExeInfoTableSize = GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable);

   } else {

@@ -755,6 +756,8 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
 

   if (Name != NULL) {

     CopyMem ((UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32), Name, NameStringLen);

+  } else {

+    ZeroMem ((UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32), sizeof (CHAR16));

   }

   CopyMem (

     (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen,

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/Pei/Variable.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/Pei/Variable.c
index d27f679..38b9170 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/Pei/Variable.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/Pei/Variable.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
   ReadOnly Varaiable2 PPI. These services operates the non-volatile 

   storage space.

 

-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

 This program and the accompanying materials 

 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License 

 which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at 

@@ -428,6 +428,7 @@ FindVariableEx (
   UINTN                   Index;

   UINTN                   Offset;

   BOOLEAN                 StopRecord;

+  VARIABLE_HEADER         *InDeletedVariable;

 

   if (VariableStoreHeader == NULL) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

@@ -444,6 +445,8 @@ FindVariableEx (
   PtrTrack->StartPtr = GetStartPointer (VariableStoreHeader);

   PtrTrack->EndPtr   = GetEndPointer   (VariableStoreHeader);

 

+  InDeletedVariable = NULL;

+

   //

   // No Variable Address equals zero, so 0 as initial value is safe.

   //

@@ -459,15 +462,20 @@ FindVariableEx (
       Offset   += IndexTable->Index[Index];

       MaxIndex  = (VARIABLE_HEADER *) ((UINT8 *) IndexTable->StartPtr + Offset);

       if (CompareWithValidVariable (MaxIndex, VariableName, VendorGuid, PtrTrack) == EFI_SUCCESS) {

-        return EFI_SUCCESS;

+        if (PtrTrack->CurrPtr->State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) {

+          InDeletedVariable = PtrTrack->CurrPtr;

+        } else {

+          return EFI_SUCCESS;

+        }

       }

     }

 

     if (IndexTable->GoneThrough != 0) {

       //

-      // If the table has all the existing variables indexed and we still cannot find it.

+      // If the table has all the existing variables indexed, return.

       //

-      return EFI_NOT_FOUND;

+      PtrTrack->CurrPtr = InDeletedVariable;

+      return (PtrTrack->CurrPtr == NULL) ? EFI_NOT_FOUND : EFI_SUCCESS;

     }

   }

 

@@ -488,11 +496,11 @@ FindVariableEx (
   }

 

   //

-  // Find the variable by walk through non-volatile variable store

+  // Find the variable by walk through variable store

   //

   StopRecord = FALSE;

   while ((Variable < PtrTrack->EndPtr) && IsValidVariableHeader (Variable)) {

-    if (Variable->State == VAR_ADDED) {

+    if (Variable->State == VAR_ADDED || Variable->State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) {

       //

       // Record Variable in VariableIndex HOB

       //

@@ -511,7 +519,11 @@ FindVariableEx (
       }

 

       if (CompareWithValidVariable (Variable, VariableName, VendorGuid, PtrTrack) == EFI_SUCCESS) {

-        return EFI_SUCCESS;

+        if (PtrTrack->CurrPtr->State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) {

+          InDeletedVariable = PtrTrack->CurrPtr;

+        } else {

+          return EFI_SUCCESS;

+        }

       }

     }

 

@@ -524,9 +536,9 @@ FindVariableEx (
     IndexTable->GoneThrough = 1;

   }

 

-  PtrTrack->CurrPtr = NULL;

+  PtrTrack->CurrPtr = InDeletedVariable;

 

-  return EFI_NOT_FOUND;

+  return (PtrTrack->CurrPtr == NULL) ? EFI_NOT_FOUND : EFI_SUCCESS;

 }

 

 /**

@@ -689,6 +701,8 @@ PeiGetNextVariableName (
   VARIABLE_STORE_TYPE     Type;

   VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK  Variable;

   VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK  VariableInHob;

+  VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK  VariablePtrTrack;

+  VARIABLE_INDEX_TABLE    *IndexTable;

   UINTN                   VarNameSize;

   EFI_STATUS              Status;

   VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER   *VariableStoreHeader[VariableStoreTypeMax];

@@ -750,7 +764,32 @@ PeiGetNextVariableName (
       Variable.CurrPtr  = Variable.StartPtr;

     }

 

-    if (Variable.CurrPtr->State == VAR_ADDED) {

+    if (Variable.CurrPtr->State == VAR_ADDED || Variable.CurrPtr->State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) {

+      if (Variable.CurrPtr->State == (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) {

+        //

+        // If it is a IN_DELETED_TRANSITION variable,

+        // and there is also a same ADDED one at the same time,

+        // don't return it.

+        //

+        for (Type = (VARIABLE_STORE_TYPE) 0; Type < VariableStoreTypeMax; Type++) {

+          if ((VariableStoreHeader[Type] != NULL) && (Variable.StartPtr == GetStartPointer (VariableStoreHeader[Type]))) {

+            break;

+          }

+        }

+        ASSERT (Type < VariableStoreTypeMax);

+        GetVariableStore (Type, &IndexTable);

+        Status = FindVariableEx (

+                   VariableStoreHeader[Type],

+                   IndexTable,

+                   GetVariableNamePtr (Variable.CurrPtr),

+                   &Variable.CurrPtr->VendorGuid,

+                   &VariablePtrTrack

+                   );

+        if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && VariablePtrTrack.CurrPtr->State == VAR_ADDED) {

+          Variable.CurrPtr = GetNextVariablePtr (Variable.CurrPtr);

+          continue;

+        }

+      }

 

       //

       // Don't return NV variable when HOB overrides it

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c
index 6576e68..0f3304a 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c
@@ -356,30 +356,23 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
   DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));

 

   //

-  // Check "CustomMode" variable's existence.

+  // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.

   //

   FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);

-  if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {

-    CustomMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));

-  } else {

-    //

-    // "CustomMode" not exist, initialize it in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.

-    //

-    CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;

-    Status = UpdateVariable (

-               EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,

-               &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,

-               &CustomMode,

-               sizeof (UINT8),

-               EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,

-               0,

-               0,

-               &Variable,

-               NULL

-               );

-    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-      return Status;

-    }

+  CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;

+  Status = UpdateVariable (

+             EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,

+             &CustomMode,

+             sizeof (UINT8),

+             EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,

+             0,

+             0,

+             &Variable,

+             NULL

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    return Status;

   }

   

   DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c
index 2ef44e3..a785476 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 

   InitCommunicateBuffer() is really function to check the variable data size.

 

-Copyright (c) 2010 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+Copyright (c) 2010 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

 This program and the accompanying materials 

 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License 

 which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at 

@@ -52,7 +52,51 @@ EFI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL  *mSmmCommunication          = NULL;
 UINT8                           *mVariableBuffer            = NULL;

 UINT8                           *mVariableBufferPhysical    = NULL;

 UINTN                            mVariableBufferSize;

+EFI_LOCK                         mVariableServicesLock;

 

+/**

+  Acquires lock only at boot time. Simply returns at runtime.

+

+  This is a temperary function that will be removed when

+  EfiAcquireLock() in UefiLib can handle the call in UEFI

+  Runtimer driver in RT phase.

+  It calls EfiAcquireLock() at boot time, and simply returns

+  at runtime.

+

+  @param  Lock         A pointer to the lock to acquire.

+

+**/

+VOID

+AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime (

+  IN EFI_LOCK                             *Lock

+  )

+{

+  if (!EfiAtRuntime ()) {

+    EfiAcquireLock (Lock);

+  }

+}

+

+/**

+  Releases lock only at boot time. Simply returns at runtime.

+

+  This is a temperary function which will be removed when

+  EfiReleaseLock() in UefiLib can handle the call in UEFI

+  Runtimer driver in RT phase.

+  It calls EfiReleaseLock() at boot time and simply returns

+  at runtime.

+

+  @param  Lock         A pointer to the lock to release.

+

+**/

+VOID

+ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (

+  IN EFI_LOCK                             *Lock

+  )

+{

+  if (!EfiAtRuntime ()) {

+    EfiReleaseLock (Lock);

+  }

+}

 

 /**

   Initialize the communicate buffer using DataSize and Function.

@@ -169,15 +213,17 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
   if ((*DataSize != 0) && (Data == NULL)) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

-  

+

+  AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime(&mVariableServicesLock);

+

   //

   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

-  // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize + DataSize.

+  // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize.

   //

   PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + StrSize (VariableName) + *DataSize;

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmVariableHeader, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

   ASSERT (SmmVariableHeader != NULL);

 

@@ -205,11 +251,13 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
   }

 

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

 

   CopyMem (Data, (UINT8 *)SmmVariableHeader->Name + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize, SmmVariableHeader->DataSize);

 

+Done:

+  ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mVariableServicesLock);

   return Status;

 }

 

@@ -242,7 +290,9 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   if (VariableNameSize == NULL || VariableName == NULL || VendorGuid == NULL) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

-  

+

+  AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime(&mVariableServicesLock);

+

   //

   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

   // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize.

@@ -250,7 +300,7 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name) + *VariableNameSize; 

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmGetNextVariableName, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

   ASSERT (SmmGetNextVariableName != NULL);

 

@@ -268,12 +318,14 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   //

   *VariableNameSize = SmmGetNextVariableName->NameSize;    

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

   

   CopyGuid (VendorGuid, &SmmGetNextVariableName->Guid);

   CopyMem (VariableName, SmmGetNextVariableName->Name, SmmGetNextVariableName->NameSize);  

 

+Done:

+  ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mVariableServicesLock);

   return Status;

 }

 

@@ -321,7 +373,9 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
   if (DataSize != 0 && Data == NULL) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

-  

+

+  AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime(&mVariableServicesLock);

+ 

   //

   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

   // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize.

@@ -329,7 +383,7 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
   PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + StrSize (VariableName) + DataSize;

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmVariableHeader, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

   ASSERT (SmmVariableHeader != NULL);

 

@@ -344,7 +398,9 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
   // Send data to SMM.

   //

   Status = SendCommunicateBuffer (PayloadSize);

- 

+

+Done:

+  ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mVariableServicesLock);

   return Status;

 }

 

@@ -382,7 +438,9 @@ RuntimeServiceQueryVariableInfo (
   if(MaximumVariableStorageSize == NULL || RemainingVariableStorageSize == NULL || MaximumVariableSize == NULL || Attributes == 0) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

-  

+

+  AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime(&mVariableServicesLock);

+

   //

   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

   // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize;

@@ -390,7 +448,7 @@ RuntimeServiceQueryVariableInfo (
   PayloadSize = sizeof (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO);

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmQueryVariableInfo, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

   ASSERT (SmmQueryVariableInfo != NULL);

 

@@ -401,7 +459,7 @@ RuntimeServiceQueryVariableInfo (
   //

   Status = SendCommunicateBuffer (PayloadSize);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

+    goto Done;

   }

 

   //

@@ -410,8 +468,10 @@ RuntimeServiceQueryVariableInfo (
   *MaximumVariableSize          = SmmQueryVariableInfo->MaximumVariableSize;

   *MaximumVariableStorageSize   = SmmQueryVariableInfo->MaximumVariableStorageSize;

   *RemainingVariableStorageSize = SmmQueryVariableInfo->RemainingVariableStorageSize; 

- 

-  return EFI_SUCCESS;

+

+Done:

+  ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mVariableServicesLock);

+  return Status;

 }

 

 

@@ -608,7 +668,9 @@ VariableSmmRuntimeInitialize (
   VOID                                      *SmmVariableWriteRegistration;

   EFI_EVENT                                 OnReadyToBootEvent;

   EFI_EVENT                                 ExitBootServiceEvent;

-  

+

+  EfiInitializeLock (&mVariableServicesLock, TPL_NOTIFY);

+

   //

   // Smm variable service is ready

   //

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr
index df7ff37..ae4b71b 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /** @file

   VFR file used by the SecureBoot configuration component.

 

-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

 This program and the accompanying materials 

 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License 

 which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at 

@@ -32,7 +32,12 @@ formset
     title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECUREBOOT_TITLE);

 

     subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);

-    

+

+    text

+      help   = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_HELP),

+      text   = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_PROMPT),

+        text   = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT);

+        

     //

     // Define of Check Box: Attempt Secure Boot

     //

@@ -47,7 +52,7 @@ formset
     // Display of Check Box: Attempt Secure Boot

     //

     grayoutif ideqval SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.HideSecureBoot == 1;

-    checkbox varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.SecureBootState,

+    checkbox varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.AttemptSecureBoot,

           questionid = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE,

           prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_PROMPT),

           help   = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_HELP),

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
index c56a311..7df6885 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /** @file

   HII Config Access protocol implementation of SecureBoot configuration module.

 

-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

 This program and the accompanying materials

 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License

 which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at

@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ DeleteVariable (
   if (Variable == NULL) {

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

+  FreePool (Variable);

 

   Data     = NULL;

   DataSize = 0;

@@ -279,6 +280,31 @@ DeleteVariable (
 }

 

 /**

+

+  Set the platform secure boot mode into "Custom" or "Standard" mode.

+

+  @param[in]   SecureBootMode        New secure boot mode: STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE or

+                                     CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.

+  

+  @return EFI_SUCCESS                The platform has switched to the special mode successfully.

+  @return other                      Fail to operate the secure boot mode.

+  

+**/

+EFI_STATUS

+SetSecureBootMode (

+  IN     UINT8         SecureBootMode

+  )

+{

+  return gRT->SetVariable (                          

+                EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,

+                &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,

+                EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,

+                sizeof (UINT8),

+                &SecureBootMode

+                );

+}

+

+/**

   Generate the PK signature list from the X509 Certificate storing file (.cer)

 

   @param[in]   X509File              FileHandle of X509 Certificate storing file.

@@ -380,6 +406,11 @@ EnrollPlatformKey (
 

   PkCert = NULL;

 

+  Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    return Status;

+  }

+

   //

   // Parse the file's postfix. Only support DER encoded X.509 certificate files.

   //

@@ -457,6 +488,11 @@ DeletePlatformKey (
 {

   EFI_STATUS Status;

 

+  Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    return Status;

+  }

+

   Status = DeleteVariable (

              EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,

              &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid

@@ -766,11 +802,17 @@ EnrollKeyExchangeKey (
   ) 

 {

   UINT16*     FilePostFix;

+  EFI_STATUS  Status;

   

   if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

 

+  Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    return Status;

+  }

+

   //

   // Parse the file's postfix. Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate, 

   // and .pbk as RSA public key file.

@@ -1508,11 +1550,17 @@ EnrollSignatureDatabase (
   ) 

 {

   UINT16*      FilePostFix;

+  EFI_STATUS   Status;

 

   if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

 

+  Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    return Status;

+  }

+  

   //

   // Parse the file's postfix. 

   //

@@ -1756,6 +1804,11 @@ DeleteKeyExchangeKey (
   Cert            = NULL;

   Attr            = 0;   

   DeleteKekIndex  = QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID;

+

+  Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    return Status;

+  }

   

   //

   // Get original KEK variable.

@@ -1944,6 +1997,11 @@ DeleteSignature (
   Cert            = NULL;

   Attr            = 0; 

 

+  Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    return Status;

+  }

+

   //

   // Get original signature list data.

   //                           

@@ -2103,23 +2161,25 @@ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (
 {

   UINT8   *SecureBootEnable;

   UINT8   *SetupMode;

-  UINT8   *SecureBoot;

   UINT8   *SecureBootMode;

 

   SecureBootEnable = NULL;

   SetupMode        = NULL;

-  SecureBoot       = NULL;

   SecureBootMode   = NULL;

   

   //

   // If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable

   // Checkbox.

   //

+  ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = FALSE;

   GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);

   if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) {

     ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE;

   } else {

     ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;

+    if ((*SecureBootEnable) == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) {

+      ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = TRUE;

+    }

   }

   

   //

@@ -2140,16 +2200,6 @@ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (
   } else  {

     ConfigData->HasPk = TRUE;

   }

-  

-  //

-  // If the value of SecureBoot variable is 1, the platform is operating in secure boot mode.

-  //

-  GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);

-  if (SecureBoot != NULL && *SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {

-    ConfigData->SecureBootState = TRUE;

-  } else {

-    ConfigData->SecureBootState = FALSE;

-  }

 

   //

   // Get the SecureBootMode from CustomMode variable.

@@ -2160,7 +2210,16 @@ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (
   } else {

     ConfigData->SecureBootMode = *(SecureBootMode);

   }

-  

+

+  if (SecureBootEnable != NULL) {

+    FreePool (SecureBootEnable);

+  }

+  if (SetupMode != NULL) {

+    FreePool (SetupMode);

+  }

+  if (SecureBootMode != NULL) {

+    FreePool (SecureBootMode);

+  }

 }

 

 /**

@@ -2206,6 +2265,7 @@ SecureBootExtractConfig (
   EFI_STRING                        ConfigRequestHdr;

   SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA    *PrivateData;

   BOOLEAN                           AllocatedRequest;

+  UINT8                             *SecureBoot;

 

   if (Progress == NULL || Results == NULL) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

@@ -2215,6 +2275,7 @@ SecureBootExtractConfig (
   ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;

   ConfigRequest    = NULL;

   Size             = 0;

+  SecureBoot       = NULL;

   

   ZeroMem (&Configuration, sizeof (Configuration));

   PrivateData      = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);

@@ -2228,6 +2289,19 @@ SecureBootExtractConfig (
   // Get Configuration from Variable.

   //

   SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (&Configuration);

+

+  //

+  // Update current secure boot state.

+  //

+  GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);

+  if (SecureBoot != NULL && *SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {

+    HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Enabled", NULL);

+  } else {

+    HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Disabled", NULL);

+  }

+  if (SecureBoot != NULL) {

+    FreePool (SecureBoot);

+  }

   

   BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);

   ConfigRequest = Request;

@@ -2355,15 +2429,21 @@ SecureBootCallback (
   SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION        *IfrNvData;

   UINT16                          LabelId;

   UINT8                           *SecureBootEnable;

+  UINT8                           *SecureBootMode;

+  UINT8                           *SetupMode;

   CHAR16                          PromptString[100];

 

   SecureBootEnable = NULL;

+  SecureBootMode   = NULL;

+  SetupMode        = NULL;

 

   if ((This == NULL) || (Value == NULL) || (ActionRequest == NULL)) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

 

-  if ((Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) && (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING)) {

+  if ((Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) &&

+      (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) &&

+      (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_CLOSE)) {

     return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;

   }

   

@@ -2388,6 +2468,7 @@ SecureBootCallback (
     case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:

       GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);

       if (NULL != SecureBootEnable) {

+        FreePool (SecureBootEnable);

         if (EFI_ERROR (SaveSecureBootVariable (Value->u8))) {

           CreatePopUp (

             EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,

@@ -2400,11 +2481,10 @@ SecureBootCallback (
           CreatePopUp (

             EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,

             &Key,

-            L"Secure boot configuration is changed, please reset the platform to take effect!",

+            L"Configuration changed, please reset the platform to take effect!",

             NULL

             );

         }

-        *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY; 

       }

       break;

 

@@ -2461,10 +2541,26 @@ SecureBootCallback (
       break;

 

     case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK: 

-        if (Value->u8) {

+      if (Value->u8) {

+        CreatePopUp (

+          EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,

+          &Key,

+          L"Are you sure you want to delete PK? Secure boot will be disabled!",

+          L"Press 'Y' to delete PK and exit, 'N' to discard change and return",

+          NULL

+          );

+        if (Key.UnicodeChar == 'y' || Key.UnicodeChar == 'Y') {

           Status = DeletePlatformKey ();

-          *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;

+          if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+            CreatePopUp (

+              EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,

+              &Key,

+              L"Only Physical Presence User could delete PK in custom mode!",

+              NULL

+              );

+          }

         }

+      }

       break;

 

     case KEY_DELETE_KEK:

@@ -2547,7 +2643,7 @@ SecureBootCallback (
   } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) {

     switch (QuestionId) {

     case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:

-      *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT;      

+      *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;

       break;  

     case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:

       Status = EnrollPlatformKey (Private);

@@ -2588,8 +2684,8 @@ SecureBootCallback (
       break;

       

     case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE:

-      GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);

-      if (NULL != SecureBootEnable) {

+      GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL);

+      if (NULL != SecureBootMode) {

         Status = gRT->SetVariable (                          

                         EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,

                         &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,

@@ -2599,6 +2695,7 @@ SecureBootCallback (
                         );

         *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;

         IfrNvData->SecureBootMode = Value->u8;

+        FreePool (SecureBootMode);

       }        

       break;

 

@@ -2619,11 +2716,33 @@ SecureBootCallback (
       break;

 

     case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK:

-      if (Value->u8) {

+      GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL);

+      if (SetupMode == NULL || (*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE) {

+        IfrNvData->DeletePk = TRUE;

+        IfrNvData->HasPk    = FALSE;

         *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT;

+      } else  {

+        IfrNvData->DeletePk = FALSE;

+        IfrNvData->HasPk    = TRUE;

+        *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;

+      }

+      if (SetupMode != NULL) {

+        FreePool (SetupMode);

       }

       break;  

     }

+  } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_CLOSE) {

+    //

+    // Force the platform back to Standard Mode once user leave the setup screen.

+    //

+    GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL);

+    if (NULL != SecureBootMode && *SecureBootMode == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {

+      IfrNvData->SecureBootMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;

+      SetSecureBootMode(STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);

+    }

+    if (SecureBootMode != NULL) {

+      FreePool (SecureBootMode);

+    }

   }

   

   if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigNvData.h b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigNvData.h
index 6015dd6..ea43192 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigNvData.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigNvData.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /** @file

   Header file for NV data structure definition.

 

-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

 This program and the accompanying materials 

 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License 

 which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at 

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
 // Nv Data structure referenced by IFR

 //

 typedef struct {

-  BOOLEAN SecureBootState; //Secure Boot Disable/Enable;

+  BOOLEAN AttemptSecureBoot;  //Attempt to enable/disable Secure Boot.

   BOOLEAN HideSecureBoot;  //Hiden Attempt Secure Boot

   CHAR16  SignatureGuid[SECURE_BOOT_GUID_STORAGE_SIZE];

   BOOLEAN PhysicalPresent; //If a Physical Present User;

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni
index ed4db13..8a4cb36 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni