Sync patches r14276, r14305 and r14317 from main trunk.

1. Fix SMM Variable driver stack GetVariable return INVALID_PARAMETER when DataSize is bigger than SMM communication buffer. 
2. Fix potential overflow for SetVariable interface.
3. Use the check IsAddressValid() to prevent SMM communication buffer overflow in SmmVariable, FtwSmm, FpdtSmm, SmmCorePerformance and SmmBaseHelper, and add check to prevent InfoSize overflows in SmmVariableHandler.
4. Add check to make sure the input VariableName is A Null-terminated string.
5. Use local variable to hold StrSize (VariableName) to avoid duplicated StrSize calculation.

git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/branches/UDK2010.SR1@14322 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524

13 files changed, 452 insertions, 88 deletions

diff --git a/EdkCompatibilityPkg/Compatibility/SmmBaseHelper/SmmBaseHelper.c b/EdkCompatibilityPkg/Compatibility/SmmBaseHelper/SmmBaseHelper.c
index 193ab19..a2d89ea 100644
--- a/EdkCompatibilityPkg/Compatibility/SmmBaseHelper/SmmBaseHelper.c
+++ b/EdkCompatibilityPkg/Compatibility/SmmBaseHelper/SmmBaseHelper.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 

   SmmHandlerEntry() will receive untrusted input and do validation.

 

-  Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+  Copyright (c) 2009 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

   This program and the accompanying materials

   are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License

   which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at

@@ -732,6 +732,33 @@ IsAddressInSmram (
   return FALSE;

 }

 

+/**

+  This function check if the address refered by Buffer and Length is valid.

+

+  @param Buffer  the buffer address to be checked.

+  @param Length  the buffer length to be checked.

+

+  @retval TRUE  this address is valid.

+  @retval FALSE this address is NOT valid.

+**/

+BOOLEAN

+IsAddressValid (

+  IN UINTN                 Buffer,

+  IN UINTN                 Length

+  )

+{

+  if (Buffer > (MAX_ADDRESS - Length)) {

+    //

+    // Overflow happen

+    //

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+  if (IsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)Buffer, (UINT64)Length)) {

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+  return TRUE;

+}

+

 /** 

   Thunk service of EFI_SMM_BASE_PROTOCOL.Register().

 

@@ -1068,7 +1095,7 @@ SmmHandlerEntry (
   ASSERT (CommBufferSize != NULL);

 

   if (*CommBufferSize == sizeof (SMMBASE_FUNCTION_DATA) &&

-      !IsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

+      IsAddressValid ((UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

     FunctionData = (SMMBASE_FUNCTION_DATA *)CommBuffer;

 

     switch (FunctionData->Function) {

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmCorePerformanceLib/SmmCorePerformanceLib.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmCorePerformanceLib/SmmCorePerformanceLib.c
index 314d46d..5755f2a 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmCorePerformanceLib/SmmCorePerformanceLib.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmCorePerformanceLib/SmmCorePerformanceLib.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 

  SmmPerformanceHandlerEx(), SmmPerformanceHandler() will receive untrusted input and do basic validation.

 

-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

 This program and the accompanying materials

 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License

 which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at

@@ -478,6 +478,33 @@ IsAddressInSmram (
 }

 

 /**

+  This function check if the address refered by Buffer and Length is valid.

+

+  @param Buffer  the buffer address to be checked.

+  @param Length  the buffer length to be checked.

+

+  @retval TRUE  this address is valid.

+  @retval FALSE this address is NOT valid.

+**/

+BOOLEAN

+IsAddressValid (

+  IN UINTN                 Buffer,

+  IN UINTN                 Length

+  )

+{

+  if (Buffer > (MAX_ADDRESS - Length)) {

+    //

+    // Overflow happen

+    //

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+  if (IsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)Buffer, (UINT64)Length)) {

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+  return TRUE;

+}

+

+/**

   Communication service SMI Handler entry.

 

   This SMI handler provides services for the performance wrapper driver.

@@ -527,8 +554,8 @@ SmmPerformanceHandlerEx (
     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

 

-  if (IsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

-    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communcation data buffer is in SMRAM!\n"));

+  if (!IsAddressValid ((UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

+    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communcation data buffer in SMRAM or overflow!\n"));

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

   

@@ -551,8 +578,8 @@ SmmPerformanceHandlerEx (
        // Sanity check

        //

        DataSize = SmmPerfCommData->NumberOfEntries * sizeof(GAUGE_DATA_ENTRY_EX);

-       if (IsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)SmmPerfCommData->GaugeDataEx, DataSize)) {

-         DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM Performance Data buffer is in SMRAM!\n"));

+       if (!IsAddressValid ((UINTN)SmmPerfCommData->GaugeDataEx, DataSize)) {

+         DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM Performance Data buffer in SMRAM or overflow!\n"));

          Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

          break;

        }

@@ -628,8 +655,8 @@ SmmPerformanceHandler (
     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

 

-  if (IsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

-    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communcation data buffer is in SMRAM!\n"));

+  if (!IsAddressValid ((UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

+    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communcation data buffer in SMRAM or overflow!\n"));

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

 

@@ -652,8 +679,8 @@ SmmPerformanceHandler (
        // Sanity check

        //

        DataSize = SmmPerfCommData->NumberOfEntries * sizeof(GAUGE_DATA_ENTRY);

-       if (IsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)SmmPerfCommData->GaugeData, DataSize)) {

-         DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM Performance Data buffer is in SMRAM!\n"));

+       if (!IsAddressValid ((UINTN)SmmPerfCommData->GaugeData, DataSize)) {

+         DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM Performance Data buffer in SMRAM or overflow!\n"));

          Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

          break;

        }

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/FirmwarePerformanceDataTableSmm/FirmwarePerformanceSmm.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/FirmwarePerformanceDataTableSmm/FirmwarePerformanceSmm.c
index e7a1e59..132864f 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/FirmwarePerformanceDataTableSmm/FirmwarePerformanceSmm.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/FirmwarePerformanceDataTableSmm/FirmwarePerformanceSmm.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 

   FpdtSmiHandler() will receive untrusted input and do basic validation.

 

-  Copyright (c) 2011 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+  Copyright (c) 2011 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

   This program and the accompanying materials

   are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License

   which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at

@@ -206,6 +206,33 @@ InternalIsAddressInSmram (
 }

 

 /**

+  This function check if the address refered by Buffer and Length is valid.

+

+  @param Buffer  the buffer address to be checked.

+  @param Length  the buffer length to be checked.

+

+  @retval TRUE  this address is valid.

+  @retval FALSE this address is NOT valid.

+**/

+BOOLEAN

+InternalIsAddressValid (

+  IN UINTN                 Buffer,

+  IN UINTN                 Length

+  )

+{

+  if (Buffer > (MAX_ADDRESS - Length)) {

+    //

+    // Overflow happen

+    //

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+  if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)Buffer, (UINT64)Length)) {

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+  return TRUE;

+}

+

+/**

   Communication service SMI Handler entry.

 

   This SMI handler provides services for report SMM boot records. 

@@ -252,8 +279,8 @@ FpdtSmiHandler (
     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

   

-  if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

-    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication data buffer is in SMRAM!\n"));

+  if (!InternalIsAddressValid ((UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

+    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication data buffer in SMRAM or overflow!\n"));

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

 

@@ -276,8 +303,8 @@ FpdtSmiHandler (
        // Sanity check

        //

        SmmCommData->BootRecordSize = mBootRecordSize;

-       if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)SmmCommData->BootRecordData, mBootRecordSize)) {

-         DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM Data buffer is in SMRAM!\n"));

+       if (!InternalIsAddressValid ((UINTN)SmmCommData->BootRecordData, mBootRecordSize)) {

+         DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM Data buffer in SMRAM or overflow!\n"));

          Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

          break;

        }

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteSmm.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteSmm.c
index 13c7096..8b88ae4 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteSmm.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteSmm.c
@@ -99,6 +99,32 @@ InternalIsAddressInSmram (
   return FALSE;

 }

 

+/**

+  This function check if the address refered by Buffer and Length is valid.

+

+  @param Buffer  the buffer address to be checked.

+  @param Length  the buffer length to be checked.

+

+  @retval TRUE  this address is valid.

+  @retval FALSE this address is NOT valid.

+**/

+BOOLEAN

+InternalIsAddressValid (

+  IN UINTN                 Buffer,

+  IN UINTN                 Length

+  )

+{

+  if (Buffer > (MAX_ADDRESS - Length)) {

+    //

+    // Overflow happen

+    //

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+  if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)Buffer, (UINT64)Length)) {

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+  return TRUE;

+}

 

 /**

   Retrive the SMM FVB protocol interface by HANDLE.

@@ -356,8 +382,8 @@ SmmFaultTolerantWriteHandler (
     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

 

-  if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

-    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication buffer size is in SMRAM!\n"));

+  if (!InternalIsAddressValid ((UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

+    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication buffer in SMRAM or overflow!\n"));

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

 

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/LockBox/SmmLockBox/SmmLockBox.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/LockBox/SmmLockBox/SmmLockBox.c
index e8b831e..7a0d6d2 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/LockBox/SmmLockBox/SmmLockBox.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/LockBox/SmmLockBox/SmmLockBox.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
   SmmLockBoxHandler(), SmmLockBoxRestore(), SmmLockBoxUpdate(), SmmLockBoxSave()

   will receive untrusted input and do basic validation.

 

-Copyright (c) 2010 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+Copyright (c) 2010 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

 

 This program and the accompanying materials

 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions

@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ SmmLockBoxSave (
   // Sanity check

   //

   if (!IsAddressValid ((UINTN)LockBoxParameterSave->Buffer, (UINTN)LockBoxParameterSave->Length)) {

-    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SmmLockBox Save address in SMRAM!\n"));

+    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SmmLockBox Save address in SMRAM or buffer overflow!\n"));

     LockBoxParameterSave->Header.ReturnStatus = (UINT64)EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

     return ;

   }

@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ SmmLockBoxUpdate (
   // Sanity check

   //

   if (!IsAddressValid ((UINTN)LockBoxParameterUpdate->Buffer, (UINTN)LockBoxParameterUpdate->Length)) {

-    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SmmLockBox Update address in SMRAM!\n"));

+    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SmmLockBox Update address in SMRAM or buffer overflow!\n"));

     LockBoxParameterUpdate->Header.ReturnStatus = (UINT64)EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

     return ;

   }

@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ SmmLockBoxRestore (
   // Sanity check

   //

   if (!IsAddressValid ((UINTN)LockBoxParameterRestore->Buffer, (UINTN)LockBoxParameterRestore->Length)) {

-    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SmmLockBox Restore address in SMRAM!\n"));

+    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SmmLockBox Restore address in SMRAM or buffer overflow!\n"));

     LockBoxParameterRestore->Header.ReturnStatus = (UINT64)EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

     return ;

   }

@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ SmmLockBoxHandler (
     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

   if (!IsAddressValid ((UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

-    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SmmLockBox Command Buffer in SMRAM!\n"));

+    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SmmLockBox Command Buffer in SMRAM or overflow!\n"));

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

 

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/EmuRuntimeDxe/EmuVariable.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/EmuRuntimeDxe/EmuVariable.c
index 84d22d8..ae31e3a 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/EmuRuntimeDxe/EmuVariable.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/EmuRuntimeDxe/EmuVariable.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
   Emulation Variable services operate on the runtime volatile memory.

   The nonvolatile variable space doesn't exist.

 

-Copyright (c) 2006 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+Copyright (c) 2006 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

 This program and the accompanying materials

 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License

 which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at

@@ -1397,14 +1397,22 @@ EmuSetVariable (
   if ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS)) == EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

+

+  

+  if ((UINTN)(~0) - DataSize < StrSize(VariableName)){

+    //

+    // Prevent whole variable size overflow 

+    // 

+    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

+  }

+

   //

   //  The size of the VariableName, including the Unicode Null in bytes plus

   //  the DataSize is limited to maximum size of PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize)

   //  bytes for HwErrRec, and PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) bytes for the others.

   //

   if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) == EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) {

-    if ((DataSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize)) ||                                                       

-        (sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) + StrSize (VariableName) + DataSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize))) {

+    if (StrSize (VariableName) + DataSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER)) {

       return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

     }

     //

@@ -1418,8 +1426,7 @@ EmuSetVariable (
   //  The size of the VariableName, including the Unicode Null in bytes plus

   //  the DataSize is limited to maximum size of PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) bytes.

   //

-    if ((DataSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize)) ||

-        (sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) + StrSize (VariableName) + DataSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize))) {

+    if (StrSize (VariableName) + DataSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER)) {

       return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

     }  

   }

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c
index f21ed58..46e81a0 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c
@@ -2110,14 +2110,20 @@ VariableServiceSetVariable (
     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

 

+  if ((UINTN)(~0) - DataSize < StrSize(VariableName)){

+    //

+    // Prevent whole variable size overflow 

+    // 

+    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

+  }

+

   //

   //  The size of the VariableName, including the Unicode Null in bytes plus

   //  the DataSize is limited to maximum size of PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize)

   //  bytes for HwErrRec, and PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) bytes for the others.

   //

   if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) == EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) {

-    if ((DataSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize)) ||

-        (sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) + StrSize (VariableName) + DataSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize))) {

+    if ( StrSize (VariableName) + DataSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER)) {

       return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

     }

     if (!IsHwErrRecVariable(VariableName, VendorGuid)) {

@@ -2128,8 +2134,7 @@ VariableServiceSetVariable (
     //  The size of the VariableName, including the Unicode Null in bytes plus

     //  the DataSize is limited to maximum size of PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) bytes.

     //

-    if ((DataSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize)) ||

-        (sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) + StrSize (VariableName) + DataSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize))) {

+    if (StrSize (VariableName) + DataSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER)) {

       return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

     }  

   }

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c
index 1fbdde5..828a8e8 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c
@@ -93,6 +93,32 @@ InternalIsAddressInSmram (
   return FALSE;

 }

 

+/**

+  This function check if the address refered by Buffer and Length is valid.

+

+  @param Buffer  the buffer address to be checked.

+  @param Length  the buffer length to be checked.

+

+  @retval TRUE  this address is valid.

+  @retval FALSE this address is NOT valid.

+**/

+BOOLEAN

+InternalIsAddressValid (

+  IN UINTN                 Buffer,

+  IN UINTN                 Length

+  )

+{

+  if (Buffer > (MAX_ADDRESS - Length)) {

+    //

+    // Overflow happen

+    //

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+  if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)Buffer, (UINT64)Length)) {

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+  return TRUE;

+}

 

 /**

   Initializes a basic mutual exclusion lock.

@@ -418,6 +444,7 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
   SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO     *QueryVariableInfo;

   VARIABLE_INFO_ENTRY                              *VariableInfo;

   UINTN                                            InfoSize;

+  UINTN                                            NameBufferSize;

 

   //

   // If input is invalid, stop processing this SMI

@@ -430,8 +457,8 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

 

-  if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

-    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication buffer size is in SMRAM!\n"));

+  if (!InternalIsAddressValid ((UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

+    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication buffer in SMRAM or overflow!\n"));

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

 

@@ -439,6 +466,14 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
   switch (SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Function) {

     case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE:

       SmmVariableHeader = (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE *) SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Data;

+      if (((UINTN)(~0) - SmmVariableHeader->DataSize < OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name)) ||

+         ((UINTN)(~0) - SmmVariableHeader->NameSize < OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + SmmVariableHeader->DataSize)) {

+        //

+        // Prevent InfoSize overflow happen

+        //

+        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+        goto EXIT;

+      }

       InfoSize = OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) 

                  + SmmVariableHeader->DataSize + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize;

 

@@ -451,6 +486,14 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
         goto EXIT;

       }

 

+      if (SmmVariableHeader->NameSize < sizeof (CHAR16) || SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1] != L'\0') {

+        //

+        // Make sure VariableName is A Null-terminated string.

+        //

+        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+        goto EXIT;

+      }

+

       Status = VariableServiceGetVariable (

                  SmmVariableHeader->Name,

                  &SmmVariableHeader->Guid,

@@ -462,6 +505,13 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
       

     case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME:

       GetNextVariableName = (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME *) SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Data;

+      if ((UINTN)(~0) - GetNextVariableName->NameSize < OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name)) {

+        //

+        // Prevent InfoSize overflow happen

+        //

+        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+        goto EXIT;

+      }

       InfoSize = OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name) + GetNextVariableName->NameSize;

 

       //

@@ -473,6 +523,15 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
         goto EXIT;

       }

 

+      NameBufferSize = *CommBufferSize - SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE -  OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name);

+      if (NameBufferSize < sizeof (CHAR16) || GetNextVariableName->Name[NameBufferSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1] != L'\0') {

+        //

+        // Make sure input VariableName is A Null-terminated string.

+        //

+        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+        goto EXIT;

+      }

+

       Status = VariableServiceGetNextVariableName (

                  &GetNextVariableName->NameSize,

                  GetNextVariableName->Name,

@@ -482,6 +541,14 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
       

     case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:

       SmmVariableHeader = (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE *) SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Data;

+      if (((UINTN)(~0) - SmmVariableHeader->DataSize < OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name)) ||

+         ((UINTN)(~0) - SmmVariableHeader->NameSize < OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + SmmVariableHeader->DataSize)) {

+        //

+        // Prevent InfoSize overflow happen

+        //

+        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+        goto EXIT;

+      }

       InfoSize = OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name)

                  + SmmVariableHeader->DataSize + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize;

 

@@ -495,6 +562,14 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
         goto EXIT;

       }

 

+      if (SmmVariableHeader->NameSize < sizeof (CHAR16) || SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1] != L'\0') {

+        //

+        // Make sure VariableName is A Null-terminated string.

+        //

+        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+        goto EXIT;

+      }

+

       Status = VariableServiceSetVariable (

                  SmmVariableHeader->Name,

                  &SmmVariableHeader->Guid,

@@ -549,7 +624,7 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
       //

      

       if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)CommBufferSize, sizeof(UINTN))) {

-        DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication buffer size is in SMRAM!\n"));

+        DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication buffer in SMRAM!\n"));

         Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

         goto EXIT;

       }  

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c
index c85d12d..e76600e 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c
@@ -189,6 +189,9 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
   EFI_STATUS                                Status;

   UINTN                                     PayloadSize;

   SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE  *SmmVariableHeader;

+  UINTN                                     SmmCommBufPayloadSize;

+  UINTN                                     TempDataSize;

+  UINTN                                     VariableNameSize;

 

   if (VariableName == NULL || VendorGuid == NULL || DataSize == NULL) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

@@ -198,13 +201,17 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

 

-  if (*DataSize >= mVariableBufferSize) {

-    //

-    // DataSize may be near MAX_ADDRESS incorrectly, this can cause the computed PayLoadSize to

-    // overflow to a small value and pass the check in InitCommunicateBuffer().

-    // To protect against this vulnerability, return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER if DataSize is >= mVariableBufferSize.

-    // And there will be further check to ensure the total size is also not > mVariableBufferSize.

-    //

+  //

+  // SMM Communication Buffer max payload size

+  //

+  SmmCommBufPayloadSize = mVariableBufferSize - (SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE);

+  TempDataSize          = *DataSize;

+  VariableNameSize      = StrSize (VariableName);

+

+  //

+  // If VariableName exceeds SMM payload limit. Return failure

+  //

+  if (VariableNameSize > SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name)) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

 

@@ -214,7 +221,14 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

   // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize.

   //

-  PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + StrSize (VariableName) + *DataSize;

+  if (TempDataSize > SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) - VariableNameSize) {

+    //

+    // If output data buffer exceed SMM payload limit. Trim output buffer to SMM payload size

+    //

+    TempDataSize = SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) - VariableNameSize;

+  }

+  PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + VariableNameSize + TempDataSize;

+

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmVariableHeader, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

     goto Done;

@@ -222,8 +236,8 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
   ASSERT (SmmVariableHeader != NULL);

 

   CopyGuid (&SmmVariableHeader->Guid, VendorGuid);

-  SmmVariableHeader->DataSize   = *DataSize;

-  SmmVariableHeader->NameSize   = StrSize (VariableName);

+  SmmVariableHeader->DataSize   = TempDataSize;

+  SmmVariableHeader->NameSize   = VariableNameSize;

   if (Attributes == NULL) {

     SmmVariableHeader->Attributes = 0;

   } else {

@@ -239,7 +253,13 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
   //

   // Get data from SMM.

   //

-  *DataSize = SmmVariableHeader->DataSize;

+  if (Status == EFI_SUCCESS || Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {

+    //

+    // SMM CommBuffer DataSize can be a trimed value

+    // Only update DataSize when needed

+    //

+    *DataSize = SmmVariableHeader->DataSize;

+  }

   if (Attributes != NULL) {

     *Attributes = SmmVariableHeader->Attributes;

   }

@@ -281,6 +301,8 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   UINTN                                           PayloadSize;

   SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME *SmmGetNextVariableName;

   UINTN                                           SmmCommBufPayloadSize;

+  UINTN                                           OutVariableNameSize;

+  UINTN                                           InVariableNameSize;

 

   if (VariableNameSize == NULL || VariableName == NULL || VendorGuid == NULL) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

@@ -290,11 +312,13 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   // SMM Communication Buffer max payload size

   //

   SmmCommBufPayloadSize = mVariableBufferSize - (SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE);

+  OutVariableNameSize   = *VariableNameSize;

+  InVariableNameSize    = StrSize (VariableName);

 

   //

   // If input string exceeds SMM payload limit. Return failure

   //

-  if (StrSize (VariableName) > SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name)) {

+  if (InVariableNameSize > SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name)) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

 

@@ -304,16 +328,16 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

   // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize.

   //

-  if (*VariableNameSize > SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name)) {

+  if (OutVariableNameSize > SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name)) {

     //

     // If output buffer exceed SMM payload limit. Trim output buffer to SMM payload size

     //

-    *VariableNameSize = SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name);

+    OutVariableNameSize = SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name);

   }

   //

   // Payload should be Guid + NameSize + MAX of Input & Output buffer

   //

-  PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name) + MAX (*VariableNameSize, StrSize (VariableName));

+  PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name) + MAX (OutVariableNameSize, InVariableNameSize);

 

 

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmGetNextVariableName, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME);

@@ -325,13 +349,16 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   //

   // SMM comm buffer->NameSize is buffer size for return string

   //

-  SmmGetNextVariableName->NameSize = *VariableNameSize;

+  SmmGetNextVariableName->NameSize = OutVariableNameSize;

 

   CopyGuid (&SmmGetNextVariableName->Guid, VendorGuid);

   //

   // Copy whole string

   //

-  CopyMem (SmmGetNextVariableName->Name, VariableName, StrSize (VariableName));

+  CopyMem (SmmGetNextVariableName->Name, VariableName, InVariableNameSize);

+  if (OutVariableNameSize > InVariableNameSize) {

+    ZeroMem ((UINT8 *) SmmGetNextVariableName->Name + InVariableNameSize, OutVariableNameSize - InVariableNameSize);

+  }

 

   //

   // Send data to SMM

@@ -341,7 +368,13 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   //

   // Get data from SMM.

   //

-  *VariableNameSize = SmmGetNextVariableName->NameSize;    

+  if (Status == EFI_SUCCESS || Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {

+    //

+    // SMM CommBuffer NameSize can be a trimed value

+    // Only update VariableNameSize when needed

+    //

+    *VariableNameSize = SmmGetNextVariableName->NameSize;

+  }

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

     goto Done;

   }

@@ -384,6 +417,7 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
   EFI_STATUS                                Status;

   UINTN                                     PayloadSize; 

   SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE  *SmmVariableHeader;

+  UINTN                                     VariableNameSize;

     

   //

   // Check input parameters.

@@ -405,6 +439,14 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
     //

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

+  VariableNameSize      = StrSize (VariableName);

+

+  if ((UINTN)(~0) - VariableNameSize < OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + DataSize) {

+    //

+    // Prevent PayloadSize overflow

+    //

+    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

+  }

 

   AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime(&mVariableServicesLock);

  

@@ -412,7 +454,7 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

   // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize.

   //

-  PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + StrSize (VariableName) + DataSize;

+  PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + VariableNameSize + DataSize;

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmVariableHeader, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

     goto Done;

@@ -421,7 +463,7 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
 

   CopyGuid ((EFI_GUID *) &SmmVariableHeader->Guid, VendorGuid);

   SmmVariableHeader->DataSize   = DataSize;

-  SmmVariableHeader->NameSize   = StrSize (VariableName);

+  SmmVariableHeader->NameSize   = VariableNameSize;

   SmmVariableHeader->Attributes = Attributes;

   CopyMem (SmmVariableHeader->Name, VariableName, SmmVariableHeader->NameSize);

   CopyMem ((UINT8 *) SmmVariableHeader->Name + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize, Data, DataSize);

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.c
index d0269c9..e098c81 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/Variable.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /** @file

   The implementation of Extended SAL variable services.

 

-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

 This program and the accompanying materials 

 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License 

 which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at 

@@ -2591,6 +2591,14 @@ EsalSetVariable (
     PayloadSize = DataSize; 

   }

 

+  

+  if ((UINTN)(~0) - PayloadSize < StrSize(VariableName)){

+    //

+    // Prevent whole variable size overflow 

+    // 

+    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

+  }

+

   VariableGlobal = &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode];

   Instance = Global->FvbInstance;

 

@@ -2599,8 +2607,7 @@ EsalSetVariable (
     // For variable for hardware error record, the size of the VariableName, including the Unicode Null

     // in bytes plus the DataSize is limited to maximum size of PcdGet32(PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize) bytes.

     //

-    if ((PayloadSize > PcdGet32(PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize)) ||                                                       

-        (sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) + StrSize (VariableName) + PayloadSize > PcdGet32(PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize))) {

+    if (StrSize (VariableName) + PayloadSize > PcdGet32(PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER)) {

       return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

     }

     //

@@ -2616,8 +2623,7 @@ EsalSetVariable (
     // For variable not for hardware error record, the size of the VariableName, including the

     // Unicode Null in bytes plus the DataSize is limited to maximum size of PcdGet32(PcdMaxVariableSize) bytes.

     //

-    if ((PayloadSize > PcdGet32(PcdMaxVariableSize)) ||

-        (sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) + StrSize (VariableName) + PayloadSize > PcdGet32(PcdMaxVariableSize))) {

+    if (StrSize (VariableName) + PayloadSize > PcdGet32(PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER)) {

       return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

     }  

   }  

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c
index 6d00513..e464a7f 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c
@@ -2318,14 +2318,20 @@ VariableServiceSetVariable (
     PayloadSize = DataSize;

   }

 

+  if ((UINTN)(~0) - PayloadSize < StrSize(VariableName)){

+    //

+    // Prevent whole variable size overflow 

+    // 

+    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

+  }

+

   //

   //  The size of the VariableName, including the Unicode Null in bytes plus

   //  the DataSize is limited to maximum size of PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize)

   //  bytes for HwErrRec, and PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) bytes for the others.

   //

   if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) == EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD) {

-    if ((PayloadSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize)) ||

-        (sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) + StrSize (VariableName) + PayloadSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize))) {

+    if (StrSize (VariableName) + PayloadSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER)) {

       return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

     }

     if (!IsHwErrRecVariable(VariableName, VendorGuid)) {

@@ -2336,8 +2342,7 @@ VariableServiceSetVariable (
     //  The size of the VariableName, including the Unicode Null in bytes plus

     //  the DataSize is limited to maximum size of PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) bytes.

     //

-    if ((PayloadSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize)) ||

-        (sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) + StrSize (VariableName) + PayloadSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize))) {

+    if (StrSize (VariableName) + PayloadSize > PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER)) {

       return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

     }

   }

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c
index 01c605f..07fd8f3 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c
@@ -93,6 +93,32 @@ InternalIsAddressInSmram (
   return FALSE;

 }

 

+/**

+  This function check if the address refered by Buffer and Length is valid.

+

+  @param Buffer  the buffer address to be checked.

+  @param Length  the buffer length to be checked.

+

+  @retval TRUE  this address is valid.

+  @retval FALSE this address is NOT valid.

+**/

+BOOLEAN

+InternalIsAddressValid (

+  IN UINTN                 Buffer,

+  IN UINTN                 Length

+  )

+{

+  if (Buffer > (MAX_ADDRESS - Length)) {

+    //

+    // Overflow happen

+    //

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+  if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)Buffer, (UINT64)Length)) {

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+  return TRUE;

+}

 

 /**

   Initializes a basic mutual exclusion lock.

@@ -423,6 +449,7 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
   SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO     *QueryVariableInfo;

   VARIABLE_INFO_ENTRY                              *VariableInfo;

   UINTN                                            InfoSize;

+  UINTN                                            NameBufferSize;

 

   //

   // If input is invalid, stop processing this SMI

@@ -435,8 +462,8 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

 

-  if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

-    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication buffer size is in SMRAM!\n"));

+  if (!InternalIsAddressValid ((UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {

+    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication buffer in SMRAM or overflow!\n"));

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

   

@@ -445,6 +472,14 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
   switch (SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Function) {

     case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE:

       SmmVariableHeader = (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE *) SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Data;

+      if (((UINTN)(~0) - SmmVariableHeader->DataSize < OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name)) ||

+         ((UINTN)(~0) - SmmVariableHeader->NameSize < OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + SmmVariableHeader->DataSize)) {

+        //

+        // Prevent InfoSize overflow happen

+        //

+        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+        goto EXIT;

+      }

       InfoSize = OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) 

                  + SmmVariableHeader->DataSize + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize;

 

@@ -457,6 +492,14 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
         goto EXIT;

       }

 

+      if (SmmVariableHeader->NameSize < sizeof (CHAR16) || SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1] != L'\0') {

+        //

+        // Make sure VariableName is A Null-terminated string.

+        //

+        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+        goto EXIT;

+      }

+

       Status = VariableServiceGetVariable (

                  SmmVariableHeader->Name,

                  &SmmVariableHeader->Guid,

@@ -468,6 +511,13 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
       

     case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME:

       GetNextVariableName = (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME *) SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Data;

+      if ((UINTN)(~0) - GetNextVariableName->NameSize < OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name)) {

+        //

+        // Prevent InfoSize overflow happen

+        //

+        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+        goto EXIT;

+      }

       InfoSize = OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name) + GetNextVariableName->NameSize;

 

       //

@@ -479,6 +529,15 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
         goto EXIT;

       }

 

+      NameBufferSize = *CommBufferSize - SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE -  OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name);

+      if (NameBufferSize < sizeof (CHAR16) || GetNextVariableName->Name[NameBufferSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1] != L'\0') {

+        //

+        // Make sure input VariableName is A Null-terminated string.

+        //

+        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+        goto EXIT;

+      }

+

       Status = VariableServiceGetNextVariableName (

                  &GetNextVariableName->NameSize,

                  GetNextVariableName->Name,

@@ -488,6 +547,14 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
       

     case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:

       SmmVariableHeader = (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE *) SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Data;

+      if (((UINTN)(~0) - SmmVariableHeader->DataSize < OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name)) ||

+         ((UINTN)(~0) - SmmVariableHeader->NameSize < OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + SmmVariableHeader->DataSize)) {

+        //

+        // Prevent InfoSize overflow happen

+        //

+        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+        goto EXIT;

+      }

       InfoSize = OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name)

                  + SmmVariableHeader->DataSize + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize;

 

@@ -501,6 +568,14 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
         goto EXIT;

       }

 

+      if (SmmVariableHeader->NameSize < sizeof (CHAR16) || SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1] != L'\0') {

+        //

+        // Make sure VariableName is A Null-terminated string.

+        //

+        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+        goto EXIT;

+      }

+

       Status = VariableServiceSetVariable (

                  SmmVariableHeader->Name,

                  &SmmVariableHeader->Guid,

@@ -555,7 +630,7 @@ SmmVariableHandler (
       //

      

       if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)CommBufferSize, sizeof(UINTN))) {

-        DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication buffer size is in SMRAM!\n"));

+        DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication buffer in SMRAM!\n"));

         Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

         goto EXIT;

       }  

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c
index f1111b3..cdd407d 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c
@@ -205,6 +205,9 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
   EFI_STATUS                                Status;

   UINTN                                     PayloadSize;

   SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE  *SmmVariableHeader;

+  UINTN                                     SmmCommBufPayloadSize;

+  UINTN                                     TempDataSize;

+  UINTN                                     VariableNameSize;

 

   if (VariableName == NULL || VendorGuid == NULL || DataSize == NULL) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

@@ -214,13 +217,17 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

 

-  if (*DataSize >= mVariableBufferSize) {

-    //

-    // DataSize may be near MAX_ADDRESS incorrectly, this can cause the computed PayLoadSize to

-    // overflow to a small value and pass the check in InitCommunicateBuffer().

-    // To protect against this vulnerability, return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER if DataSize is >= mVariableBufferSize.

-    // And there will be further check to ensure the total size is also not > mVariableBufferSize.

-    //

+  //

+  // SMM Communication Buffer max payload size

+  //

+  SmmCommBufPayloadSize = mVariableBufferSize - (SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE);

+  TempDataSize          = *DataSize;

+  VariableNameSize      = StrSize (VariableName);

+

+  //

+  // If VariableName exceeds SMM payload limit. Return failure

+  //

+  if (VariableNameSize > SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name)) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

 

@@ -230,7 +237,14 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

   // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize.

   //

-  PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + StrSize (VariableName) + *DataSize;

+  if (TempDataSize > SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) - VariableNameSize) {

+    //

+    // If output data buffer exceed SMM payload limit. Trim output buffer to SMM payload size

+    //

+    TempDataSize = SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) - VariableNameSize;

+  }

+  PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + VariableNameSize + TempDataSize;

+

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmVariableHeader, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

     goto Done;

@@ -238,8 +252,8 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
   ASSERT (SmmVariableHeader != NULL);

 

   CopyGuid (&SmmVariableHeader->Guid, VendorGuid);

-  SmmVariableHeader->DataSize   = *DataSize;

-  SmmVariableHeader->NameSize   = StrSize (VariableName);

+  SmmVariableHeader->DataSize   = TempDataSize;

+  SmmVariableHeader->NameSize   = VariableNameSize;

   if (Attributes == NULL) {

     SmmVariableHeader->Attributes = 0;

   } else {

@@ -255,7 +269,13 @@ RuntimeServiceGetVariable (
   //

   // Get data from SMM.

   //

-  *DataSize = SmmVariableHeader->DataSize;

+  if (Status == EFI_SUCCESS || Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {

+    //

+    // SMM CommBuffer DataSize can be a trimed value

+    // Only update DataSize when needed

+    //

+    *DataSize = SmmVariableHeader->DataSize;

+  }

   if (Attributes != NULL) {

     *Attributes = SmmVariableHeader->Attributes;

   }

@@ -297,6 +317,8 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   UINTN                                           PayloadSize;

   SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME *SmmGetNextVariableName;

   UINTN                                           SmmCommBufPayloadSize;

+  UINTN                                           OutVariableNameSize;

+  UINTN                                           InVariableNameSize;

 

   if (VariableNameSize == NULL || VariableName == NULL || VendorGuid == NULL) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

@@ -306,11 +328,13 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   // SMM Communication Buffer max payload size

   //

   SmmCommBufPayloadSize = mVariableBufferSize - (SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE);

+  OutVariableNameSize   = *VariableNameSize;

+  InVariableNameSize    = StrSize (VariableName);

 

   //

   // If input string exceeds SMM payload limit. Return failure

   //

-  if (StrSize (VariableName) > SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name)) {

+  if (InVariableNameSize > SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name)) {

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

 

@@ -320,16 +344,16 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

   // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize.

   //

-  if (*VariableNameSize > SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name)) {

+  if (OutVariableNameSize > SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name)) {

     //

     // If output buffer exceed SMM payload limit. Trim output buffer to SMM payload size

     //

-    *VariableNameSize = SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name);

+    OutVariableNameSize = SmmCommBufPayloadSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name);

   }

   //

   // Payload should be Guid + NameSize + MAX of Input & Output buffer

   //

-  PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name) + MAX (*VariableNameSize, StrSize (VariableName));

+  PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name) + MAX (OutVariableNameSize, InVariableNameSize);

 

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmGetNextVariableName, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

@@ -340,13 +364,16 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   //

   // SMM comm buffer->NameSize is buffer size for return string

   //

-  SmmGetNextVariableName->NameSize = *VariableNameSize;

+  SmmGetNextVariableName->NameSize = OutVariableNameSize;

 

   CopyGuid (&SmmGetNextVariableName->Guid, VendorGuid);

   //

   // Copy whole string

   //

-  CopyMem (SmmGetNextVariableName->Name, VariableName, StrSize (VariableName));

+  CopyMem (SmmGetNextVariableName->Name, VariableName, InVariableNameSize);

+  if (OutVariableNameSize > InVariableNameSize) {

+    ZeroMem ((UINT8 *) SmmGetNextVariableName->Name + InVariableNameSize, OutVariableNameSize - InVariableNameSize);

+  }

 

   //

   // Send data to SMM

@@ -356,7 +383,13 @@ RuntimeServiceGetNextVariableName (
   //

   // Get data from SMM.

   //

-  *VariableNameSize = SmmGetNextVariableName->NameSize;    

+  if (Status == EFI_SUCCESS || Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {

+    //

+    // SMM CommBuffer NameSize can be a trimed value

+    // Only update VariableNameSize when needed

+    //

+    *VariableNameSize = SmmGetNextVariableName->NameSize;

+  }

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

     goto Done;

   }

@@ -402,6 +435,7 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
   EFI_STATUS                                Status;

   UINTN                                     PayloadSize; 

   SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE  *SmmVariableHeader;

+  UINTN                                     VariableNameSize;

     

   //

   // Check input parameters.

@@ -423,14 +457,22 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
     //

     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

+  VariableNameSize      = StrSize (VariableName);

+

+  if ((UINTN)(~0) - VariableNameSize < OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + DataSize) {

+    //

+    // Prevent PayloadSize overflow

+    //

+    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

+  }

 

   AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime(&mVariableServicesLock);

- 

+

   //

   // Init the communicate buffer. The buffer data size is:

   // SMM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER_SIZE + PayloadSize.

   //

-  PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + StrSize (VariableName) + DataSize;

+  PayloadSize = OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name) + VariableNameSize + DataSize;

   Status = InitCommunicateBuffer ((VOID **)&SmmVariableHeader, PayloadSize, SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE);

   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

     goto Done;

@@ -439,7 +481,7 @@ RuntimeServiceSetVariable (
 

   CopyGuid ((EFI_GUID *) &SmmVariableHeader->Guid, VendorGuid);

   SmmVariableHeader->DataSize   = DataSize;

-  SmmVariableHeader->NameSize   = StrSize (VariableName);

+  SmmVariableHeader->NameSize   = VariableNameSize;

   SmmVariableHeader->Attributes = Attributes;

   CopyMem (SmmVariableHeader->Name, VariableName, SmmVariableHeader->NameSize);

   CopyMem ((UINT8 *) SmmVariableHeader->Name + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize, Data, DataSize);