From 8d127aa866a42b36ec6391b025999059dd47cbfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:05 +0100 Subject: Add support for etc/hardware-info fw_cfg file edk2 looks for the etc/hardware-info fw_cfg file to discover hardware which can not easily be found in other ways. Entries consist of a header with hardware type and entry size (HARDWARE_INFO_HEADER), followed by the actual hardware description (which is type specific). The file can have multiple entries. This patch adds the infrastructure to add entries to the file and an entry struct for simple devices (HARDWARE_INFO_SIMPLE_DEVICE) which have an mmio address only. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-2-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/hardware-info.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ hw/uefi/meson.build | 1 + 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/hardware-info.c create mode 100644 hw/uefi/meson.build (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/hardware-info.c b/hw/uefi/hardware-info.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..930502a --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/hardware-info.c @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * pass hardware information to uefi + * + * see OvmfPkg/Library/HardwareInfoLib/ in edk2 + */ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" + +#include "hw/nvram/fw_cfg.h" +#include "hw/uefi/hardware-info.h" + +static void *blob; +static uint64_t blobsize; + +void hardware_info_register(HARDWARE_INFO_TYPE type, void *info, uint64_t infosize) +{ + HARDWARE_INFO_HEADER hdr = { + .type.value = cpu_to_le64(type), + .size = cpu_to_le64(infosize), + }; + + blob = g_realloc(blob, blobsize + sizeof(hdr) + infosize); + memcpy(blob + blobsize, &hdr, sizeof(hdr)); + blobsize += sizeof(hdr); + memcpy(blob + blobsize, info, infosize); + blobsize += infosize; + + fw_cfg_modify_file(fw_cfg_find(), "etc/hardware-info", blob, blobsize); +} diff --git a/hw/uefi/meson.build b/hw/uefi/meson.build new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a8b1689 --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/meson.build @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +system_ss.add(files('hardware-info.c')) -- cgit v1.1 From 231b6c9ee8d4cf4ebaae4e4da31ff73c2ec8e6e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:09 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add var-service-guid.c Add variables for a bunch of UEFI GUIDs we will need. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-6-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/var-service-guid.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 99 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/var-service-guid.c (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-guid.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-guid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eba3655 --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-guid.c @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * uefi vars device - GUIDs + */ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "system/dma.h" + +#include "hw/uefi/var-service.h" + +/* variable namespaces */ + +const QemuUUID EfiGlobalVariable = { + .data = UUID_LE(0x8be4df61, 0x93ca, 0x11d2, 0xaa, 0x0d, + 0x00, 0xe0, 0x98, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x8c) +}; + +const QemuUUID EfiImageSecurityDatabase = { + .data = UUID_LE(0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, + 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f) +}; + +const QemuUUID EfiCustomModeEnable = { + .data = UUID_LE(0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, 0xa0, 0x72, + 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f) +}; + +const QemuUUID EfiSecureBootEnableDisable = { + .data = UUID_LE(0xf0a30bc7, 0xaf08, 0x4556, 0x99, 0xc4, + 0x0, 0x10, 0x9, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0x44) +}; + +/* signatures */ + +const QemuUUID EfiCertSha256Guid = { + .data = UUID_LE(0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, + 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28) +}; + +const QemuUUID EfiCertSha384Guid = { + .data = UUID_LE(0xff3e5307, 0x9fd0, 0x48c9, 0x85, 0xf1, + 0x8a, 0xd5, 0x6c, 0x70, 0x1e, 0x1) +}; + +const QemuUUID EfiCertSha512Guid = { + .data = UUID_LE(0x93e0fae, 0xa6c4, 0x4f50, 0x9f, 0x1b, + 0xd4, 0x1e, 0x2b, 0x89, 0xc1, 0x9a) +}; + +const QemuUUID EfiCertRsa2048Guid = { + .data = UUID_LE(0x3c5766e8, 0x269c, 0x4e34, 0xaa, 0x14, + 0xed, 0x77, 0x6e, 0x85, 0xb3, 0xb6) +}; + +const QemuUUID EfiCertX509Guid = { + .data = UUID_LE(0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, + 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72) +}; + +const QemuUUID EfiCertTypePkcs7Guid = { + .data = UUID_LE(0x4aafd29d, 0x68df, 0x49ee, 0x8a, 0xa9, + 0x34, 0x7d, 0x37, 0x56, 0x65, 0xa7) +}; + +/* + * mm_header.guid values that the guest DXE/BDS phases use for + * sending requests to management mode + */ + +const QemuUUID EfiSmmVariableProtocolGuid = { + .data = UUID_LE(0xed32d533, 0x99e6, 0x4209, 0x9c, 0xc0, + 0x2d, 0x72, 0xcd, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xa7) +}; + +const QemuUUID VarCheckPolicyLibMmiHandlerGuid = { + .data = UUID_LE(0xda1b0d11, 0xd1a7, 0x46c4, 0x9d, 0xc9, + 0xf3, 0x71, 0x48, 0x75, 0xc6, 0xeb) +}; + +/* + * mm_header.guid values that the guest DXE/BDS phases use for + * reporting event groups being signaled to management mode + */ + +const QemuUUID EfiEndOfDxeEventGroupGuid = { + .data = UUID_LE(0x02ce967a, 0xdd7e, 0x4FFc, 0x9e, 0xe7, + 0x81, 0x0c, 0xF0, 0x47, 0x08, 0x80) +}; + +const QemuUUID EfiEventReadyToBootGuid = { + .data = UUID_LE(0x7ce88Fb3, 0x4bd7, 0x4679, 0x87, 0xa8, + 0xa8, 0xd8, 0xde, 0xe5, 0x0d, 0x2b) +}; + +const QemuUUID EfiEventExitBootServicesGuid = { + .data = UUID_LE(0x27abF055, 0xb1b8, 0x4c26, 0x80, 0x48, + 0x74, 0x8F, 0x37, 0xba, 0xa2, 0xdF) +}; -- cgit v1.1 From 1ebc319c8ca7ad8af350026662ae18fdcb8b0dac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:10 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add var-service-utils.c Add utility functions. Helpers for UEFI (ucs2) string handling. Helpers for readable trace messages. Compare UEFI time stamps. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-7-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/var-service-utils.c | 241 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 241 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/var-service-utils.c (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-utils.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-utils.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c9ef465 --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-utils.c @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * uefi vars device - helper functions for ucs2 strings and tracing + */ +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "system/dma.h" + +#include "hw/uefi/var-service.h" + +#include "trace/trace-hw_uefi.h" + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ + +/* + * string helper functions. + * + * Most of the time uefi ucs2 strings are NULL-terminated, except + * sometimes when they are not (for example in variable policies). + */ + +gboolean uefi_str_is_valid(const uint16_t *str, size_t len, + gboolean must_be_null_terminated) +{ + size_t pos = 0; + + for (;;) { + if (pos == len) { + if (must_be_null_terminated) { + return false; + } else { + return true; + } + } + switch (str[pos]) { + case 0: + /* end of string */ + return true; + case 0xd800 ... 0xdfff: + /* reject surrogates */ + return false; + default: + /* char is good, check next */ + break; + } + pos++; + } +} + +size_t uefi_strlen(const uint16_t *str, size_t len) +{ + size_t pos = 0; + + for (;;) { + if (pos == len) { + return pos; + } + if (str[pos] == 0) { + return pos; + } + pos++; + } +} + +gboolean uefi_str_equal_ex(const uint16_t *a, size_t alen, + const uint16_t *b, size_t blen, + gboolean wildcards_in_a) +{ + size_t pos = 0; + + alen = alen / 2; + blen = blen / 2; + for (;;) { + if (pos == alen && pos == blen) { + return true; + } + if (pos == alen && b[pos] == 0) { + return true; + } + if (pos == blen && a[pos] == 0) { + return true; + } + if (pos == alen || pos == blen) { + return false; + } + if (a[pos] == 0 && b[pos] == 0) { + return true; + } + + if (wildcards_in_a && a[pos] == '#') { + if (!isxdigit(b[pos])) { + return false; + } + } else { + if (a[pos] != b[pos]) { + return false; + } + } + pos++; + } +} + +gboolean uefi_str_equal(const uint16_t *a, size_t alen, + const uint16_t *b, size_t blen) +{ + return uefi_str_equal_ex(a, alen, b, blen, false); +} + +char *uefi_ucs2_to_ascii(const uint16_t *ucs2, uint64_t ucs2_size) +{ + char *str = g_malloc0(ucs2_size / 2 + 1); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i * 2 < ucs2_size; i++) { + if (ucs2[i] == 0) { + break; + } + if (ucs2[i] < 128) { + str[i] = ucs2[i]; + } else { + str[i] = '?'; + } + } + str[i] = 0; + return str; +} + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ +/* time helper functions */ + +int uefi_time_compare(efi_time *a, efi_time *b) +{ + if (a->year < b->year) { + return -1; + } + if (a->year > b->year) { + return 1; + } + + if (a->month < b->month) { + return -1; + } + if (a->month > b->month) { + return 1; + } + + if (a->day < b->day) { + return -1; + } + if (a->day > b->day) { + return 1; + } + + if (a->hour < b->hour) { + return -1; + } + if (a->hour > b->hour) { + return 1; + } + + if (a->minute < b->minute) { + return -1; + } + if (a->minute > b->minute) { + return 1; + } + + if (a->second < b->second) { + return -1; + } + if (a->second > b->second) { + return 1; + } + + if (a->nanosecond < b->nanosecond) { + return -1; + } + if (a->nanosecond > b->nanosecond) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ +/* tracing helper functions */ + +void uefi_trace_variable(const char *action, QemuUUID guid, + const uint16_t *name, uint64_t name_size) +{ + QemuUUID be = qemu_uuid_bswap(guid); + char *str_uuid = qemu_uuid_unparse_strdup(&be); + char *str_name = uefi_ucs2_to_ascii(name, name_size); + + trace_uefi_variable(action, str_name, name_size, str_uuid); + + g_free(str_name); + g_free(str_uuid); +} + +void uefi_trace_status(const char *action, efi_status status) +{ + switch (status) { + case EFI_SUCCESS: + trace_uefi_status(action, "success"); + break; + case EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER: + trace_uefi_status(action, "invalid parameter"); + break; + case EFI_UNSUPPORTED: + trace_uefi_status(action, "unsupported"); + break; + case EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE: + trace_uefi_status(action, "bad buffer size"); + break; + case EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + trace_uefi_status(action, "buffer too small"); + break; + case EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED: + trace_uefi_status(action, "write protected"); + break; + case EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES: + trace_uefi_status(action, "out of resources"); + break; + case EFI_NOT_FOUND: + trace_uefi_status(action, "not found"); + break; + case EFI_ACCESS_DENIED: + trace_uefi_status(action, "access denied"); + break; + case EFI_ALREADY_STARTED: + trace_uefi_status(action, "already started"); + break; + case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION: + trace_uefi_status(action, "security violation"); + break; + default: + trace_uefi_status(action, "unknown error"); + break; + } +} -- cgit v1.1 From db1ecfb473ac58f2bd065ca6f2a50c6294ff9169 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:11 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add var-service-vars.c This is the uefi variable service (EfiSmmVariableProtocol), providing functions for listing, reading and updating variables. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-8-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/var-service-vars.c | 725 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 725 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/var-service-vars.c (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-vars.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-vars.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f98d77 --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-vars.c @@ -0,0 +1,725 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * uefi vars device - EfiSmmVariableProtocol implementation + */ +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "qemu/error-report.h" +#include "system/dma.h" +#include "migration/vmstate.h" + +#include "hw/uefi/var-service.h" +#include "hw/uefi/var-service-api.h" +#include "hw/uefi/var-service-edk2.h" + +#include "trace/trace-hw_uefi.h" + +#define EFI_VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_SUPPORTED \ + (EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | \ + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | \ + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | \ + EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD | \ + EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | \ + EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) + + +const VMStateDescription vmstate_uefi_time = { + .name = "uefi-time", + .fields = (VMStateField[]) { + VMSTATE_UINT16(year, efi_time), + VMSTATE_UINT8(month, efi_time), + VMSTATE_UINT8(day, efi_time), + VMSTATE_UINT8(hour, efi_time), + VMSTATE_UINT8(minute, efi_time), + VMSTATE_UINT8(second, efi_time), + VMSTATE_UINT32(nanosecond, efi_time), + VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST() + }, +}; + +const VMStateDescription vmstate_uefi_variable = { + .name = "uefi-variable", + .fields = (VMStateField[]) { + VMSTATE_UINT8_ARRAY_V(guid.data, uefi_variable, sizeof(QemuUUID), 0), + VMSTATE_UINT32(name_size, uefi_variable), + VMSTATE_UINT32(data_size, uefi_variable), + VMSTATE_UINT32(attributes, uefi_variable), + VMSTATE_VBUFFER_ALLOC_UINT32(name, uefi_variable, 0, NULL, name_size), + VMSTATE_VBUFFER_ALLOC_UINT32(data, uefi_variable, 0, NULL, data_size), + VMSTATE_STRUCT(time, uefi_variable, 0, vmstate_uefi_time, efi_time), + VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST() + }, +}; + +uefi_variable *uefi_vars_find_variable(uefi_vars_state *uv, QemuUUID guid, + const uint16_t *name, uint64_t name_size) +{ + uefi_variable *var; + + QTAILQ_FOREACH(var, &uv->variables, next) { + if (!uefi_str_equal(var->name, var->name_size, + name, name_size)) { + continue; + } + if (!qemu_uuid_is_equal(&var->guid, &guid)) { + continue; + } + if (!var->data_size) { + /* in process of being created/updated */ + continue; + } + return var; + } + return NULL; +} + +static uefi_variable *add_variable(uefi_vars_state *uv, QemuUUID guid, + const uint16_t *name, uint64_t name_size, + uint32_t attributes) +{ + uefi_variable *var; + + var = g_new0(uefi_variable, 1); + var->guid = guid; + var->name = g_malloc(name_size); + memcpy(var->name, name, name_size); + var->name_size = name_size; + var->attributes = attributes; + + var->attributes &= ~EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE; + + QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&uv->variables, var, next); + return var; +} + +static void del_variable(uefi_vars_state *uv, uefi_variable *var) +{ + if (!var) { + return; + } + + QTAILQ_REMOVE(&uv->variables, var, next); + g_free(var->data); + g_free(var->name); + g_free(var->digest); + g_free(var); +} + +static size_t variable_size(uefi_variable *var) +{ + size_t size; + + size = sizeof(*var); + size += var->name_size; + size += var->data_size; + size += var->digest_size; + return size; +} + +void uefi_vars_set_variable(uefi_vars_state *uv, QemuUUID guid, + const uint16_t *name, uint64_t name_size, + uint32_t attributes, + void *data, uint64_t data_size) +{ + uefi_variable *old_var, *new_var; + + uefi_trace_variable(__func__, guid, name, name_size); + + old_var = uefi_vars_find_variable(uv, guid, name, name_size); + if (old_var) { + uv->used_storage -= variable_size(old_var); + del_variable(uv, old_var); + } + + new_var = add_variable(uv, guid, name, name_size, attributes); + new_var->data = g_malloc(data_size); + new_var->data_size = data_size; + memcpy(new_var->data, data, data_size); + uv->used_storage += variable_size(new_var); +} + +void uefi_vars_clear_volatile(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + uefi_variable *var, *n; + + QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, &uv->variables, next, n) { + if (var->attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) { + continue; + } + uv->used_storage -= variable_size(var); + del_variable(uv, var); + } +} + +void uefi_vars_clear_all(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + uefi_variable *var, *n; + + QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, &uv->variables, next, n) { + del_variable(uv, var); + } + uv->used_storage = 0; +} + +void uefi_vars_update_storage(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + uefi_variable *var; + + uv->used_storage = 0; + QTAILQ_FOREACH(var, &uv->variables, next) { + uv->used_storage += variable_size(var); + } +} + +static gboolean check_access(uefi_vars_state *uv, uefi_variable *var) +{ + if (!uv->exit_boot_service) { + if (!(var->attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS)) { + return false; + } + } else { + if (!(var->attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) { + return false; + } + } + return true; +} + +static efi_status check_update(uefi_vars_state *uv, uefi_variable *old_var, + uefi_variable *new_var) +{ + efi_status status; + + if (old_var) { + if (!check_access(uv, old_var)) { + return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + } + + if (new_var) { + if (new_var->attributes & ~EFI_VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_SUPPORTED) { + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + if (!check_access(uv, new_var)) { + return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + } + + if (old_var && new_var) { + if (old_var->attributes != new_var->attributes) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + } + + if (new_var) { + /* create + update */ + status = uefi_vars_policy_check(uv, new_var, old_var == NULL); + } else { + /* delete */ + g_assert(old_var); + status = uefi_vars_policy_check(uv, old_var, false); + } + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = uefi_vars_check_secure_boot(uv, new_var ?: old_var); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +static void append_write(uefi_variable *old_var, + uefi_variable *new_var) +{ + uefi_vars_siglist siglist; + uint64_t size; + void *data; + + uefi_vars_siglist_init(&siglist); + uefi_vars_siglist_parse(&siglist, old_var->data, old_var->data_size); + uefi_vars_siglist_parse(&siglist, new_var->data, new_var->data_size); + + size = uefi_vars_siglist_blob_size(&siglist); + data = g_malloc(size); + uefi_vars_siglist_blob_generate(&siglist, data, size); + + g_free(new_var->data); + new_var->data = data; + new_var->data_size = size; + + uefi_vars_siglist_free(&siglist); +} + +static size_t uefi_vars_mm_error(mm_header *mhdr, mm_variable *mvar, + uint64_t status) +{ + mvar->status = status; + return sizeof(*mvar); +} + +static size_t uefi_vars_mm_get_variable(uefi_vars_state *uv, mm_header *mhdr, + mm_variable *mvar, void *func) +{ + mm_variable_access *va = func; + uint16_t *name; + void *data; + uefi_variable *var; + uint64_t length; + + length = sizeof(*mvar) + sizeof(*va); + if (mhdr->length < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + if (va->name_size > uv->max_storage || + va->data_size > uv->max_storage) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES); + } + + name = func + sizeof(*va); + if (uadd64_overflow(length, va->name_size, &length)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + if (mhdr->length < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + if (!uefi_str_is_valid(name, va->name_size, true)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + uefi_trace_variable(__func__, va->guid, name, va->name_size); + + var = uefi_vars_find_variable(uv, va->guid, name, va->name_size); + if (!var) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_NOT_FOUND); + } + + /* check permissions etc. */ + if (!check_access(uv, var)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_ACCESS_DENIED); + } + + data = func + sizeof(*va) + va->name_size; + if (uadd64_overflow(length, va->data_size, &length)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + if (uv->buf_size < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + va->attributes = var->attributes; + if (va->data_size < var->data_size) { + va->data_size = var->data_size; + length -= va->data_size; + mvar->status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } else { + va->data_size = var->data_size; + memcpy(data, var->data, var->data_size); + mvar->status = EFI_SUCCESS; + } + return length; +} + +static size_t +uefi_vars_mm_get_next_variable(uefi_vars_state *uv, mm_header *mhdr, + mm_variable *mvar, void *func) +{ + mm_next_variable *nv = func; + uefi_variable *var; + uint16_t *name; + uint64_t length; + + length = sizeof(*mvar) + sizeof(*nv); + if (mhdr->length < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + if (nv->name_size > uv->max_storage) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES); + } + + name = func + sizeof(*nv); + if (uadd64_overflow(length, nv->name_size, &length)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + if (mhdr->length < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + if (!uefi_str_is_valid(name, nv->name_size, true)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + if (uefi_strlen(name, nv->name_size) == 0) { + /* empty string -> first */ + var = QTAILQ_FIRST(&uv->variables); + if (!var) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_NOT_FOUND); + } + } else { + var = uefi_vars_find_variable(uv, nv->guid, name, nv->name_size); + if (!var) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + do { + var = QTAILQ_NEXT(var, next); + } while (var && !check_access(uv, var)); + if (!var) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_NOT_FOUND); + } + } + + length = sizeof(*mvar) + sizeof(*nv) + var->name_size; + if (uv->buf_size < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + nv->guid = var->guid; + nv->name_size = var->name_size; + memcpy(name, var->name, var->name_size); + mvar->status = EFI_SUCCESS; + return length; +} + +static bool uefi_vars_mm_digest_compare(uefi_variable *old_var, + uefi_variable *new_var) +{ + if (!old_var->digest || + !new_var->digest || + !old_var->digest_size || + !new_var->digest_size) { + /* should not happen */ + trace_uefi_vars_security_violation("inconsistent authvar digest state"); + return false; + } + if (old_var->digest_size != new_var->digest_size) { + trace_uefi_vars_security_violation("authvar digest size mismatch"); + return false; + } + if (memcmp(old_var->digest, new_var->digest, + old_var->digest_size) != 0) { + trace_uefi_vars_security_violation("authvar digest data mismatch"); + return false; + } + return true; +} + +static size_t uefi_vars_mm_set_variable(uefi_vars_state *uv, mm_header *mhdr, + mm_variable *mvar, void *func) +{ + mm_variable_access *va = func; + uint32_t attributes = 0; + uint16_t *name; + void *data; + uefi_variable *old_var, *new_var; + uint64_t length; + size_t new_storage; + efi_status status; + + length = sizeof(*mvar) + sizeof(*va); + if (mhdr->length < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + if (va->name_size > uv->max_storage || + va->data_size > uv->max_storage) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES); + } + + name = func + sizeof(*va); + if (uadd64_overflow(length, va->name_size, &length)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + if (mhdr->length < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + data = func + sizeof(*va) + va->name_size; + if (uadd64_overflow(length, va->data_size, &length)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + if (mhdr->length < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + g_assert(va->name_size < G_MAXUINT32); + g_assert(va->data_size < G_MAXUINT32); + + if (!uefi_str_is_valid(name, va->name_size, true)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + uefi_trace_variable(__func__, va->guid, name, va->name_size); + + old_var = uefi_vars_find_variable(uv, va->guid, name, va->name_size); + if (va->data_size) { + new_var = add_variable(uv, va->guid, name, va->name_size, + va->attributes); + if (va->attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) { + /* not implemented (deprecated in uefi spec) */ + warn_report("%s: AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS", __func__); + mvar->status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + goto rollback; + } else if (va->attributes & + EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) { + status = uefi_vars_check_auth_2(uv, new_var, va, data); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + mvar->status = status; + goto rollback; + } + if (old_var && new_var) { + if (uefi_time_compare(&old_var->time, &new_var->time) > 0) { + trace_uefi_vars_security_violation("time check failed"); + mvar->status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; + goto rollback; + } + if (old_var->digest_size || new_var->digest_size) { + if (!uefi_vars_mm_digest_compare(old_var, new_var)) { + mvar->status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; + goto rollback; + } + } + } + } else { + new_var->data = g_malloc(va->data_size); + memcpy(new_var->data, data, va->data_size); + new_var->data_size = va->data_size; + } + if (!new_var->data) { + /* we land here when deleting authenticated variables */ + del_variable(uv, new_var); + new_var = NULL; + } + } else { + new_var = NULL; + } + + if (!old_var && !new_var) { + /* delete non-existing variable -> nothing to do */ + mvar->status = EFI_SUCCESS; + return sizeof(*mvar); + } + + /* check permissions etc. */ + status = check_update(uv, old_var, new_var); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + mvar->status = status; + goto rollback; + } + + if (va->attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE && old_var && new_var) { + /* merge signature databases */ + if (!uefi_vars_is_sb_any(new_var)) { + mvar->status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + goto rollback; + } + append_write(old_var, new_var); + } + + /* check storage space */ + new_storage = uv->used_storage; + if (old_var) { + new_storage -= variable_size(old_var); + } + if (new_var) { + new_storage += variable_size(new_var); + } + if (new_storage > uv->max_storage) { + mvar->status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + goto rollback; + } + + attributes = new_var + ? new_var->attributes + : old_var->attributes; + + /* all good, commit */ + del_variable(uv, old_var); + uv->used_storage = new_storage; + + if (attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) { + uefi_vars_json_save(uv); + } + + if (new_var && uefi_vars_is_sb_pk(new_var)) { + uefi_vars_auth_init(uv); + } + + mvar->status = EFI_SUCCESS; + return sizeof(*mvar); + +rollback: + del_variable(uv, new_var); + return sizeof(*mvar); +} + +static size_t uefi_vars_mm_variable_info(uefi_vars_state *uv, mm_header *mhdr, + mm_variable *mvar, void *func) +{ + mm_variable_info *vi = func; + uint64_t length; + + length = sizeof(*mvar) + sizeof(*vi); + if (uv->buf_size < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + vi->max_storage_size = uv->max_storage; + vi->free_storage_size = uv->max_storage - uv->used_storage; + vi->max_variable_size = uv->max_storage >> 2; + vi->attributes = 0; + + mvar->status = EFI_SUCCESS; + return length; +} + +static size_t +uefi_vars_mm_get_payload_size(uefi_vars_state *uv, mm_header *mhdr, + mm_variable *mvar, void *func) +{ + mm_get_payload_size *ps = func; + uint64_t length; + + length = sizeof(*mvar) + sizeof(*ps); + if (uv->buf_size < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + ps->payload_size = uv->buf_size; + mvar->status = EFI_SUCCESS; + return length; +} + +static size_t +uefi_vars_mm_lock_variable(uefi_vars_state *uv, mm_header *mhdr, + mm_variable *mvar, void *func) +{ + mm_lock_variable *lv = func; + variable_policy_entry *pe; + uint16_t *name, *dest; + uint64_t length; + + length = sizeof(*mvar) + sizeof(*lv); + if (mhdr->length < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + name = func + sizeof(*lv); + if (uadd64_overflow(length, lv->name_size, &length)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + if (mhdr->length < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + uefi_trace_variable(__func__, lv->guid, name, lv->name_size); + + pe = g_malloc0(sizeof(*pe) + lv->name_size); + pe->version = VARIABLE_POLICY_ENTRY_REVISION; + pe->size = sizeof(*pe) + lv->name_size; + pe->offset_to_name = sizeof(*pe); + pe->namespace = lv->guid; + pe->min_size = 0; + pe->max_size = UINT32_MAX; + pe->attributes_must_have = 0; + pe->attributes_cant_have = 0; + pe->lock_policy_type = VARIABLE_POLICY_TYPE_LOCK_NOW; + + dest = (void *)pe + pe->offset_to_name; + memcpy(dest, name, lv->name_size); + + uefi_vars_add_policy(uv, pe); + g_free(pe); + + mvar->status = EFI_SUCCESS; + return length; +} + +uint32_t uefi_vars_mm_vars_proto(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + static const char *fnames[] = { + "zero", + "get-variable", + "get-next-variable-name", + "set-variable", + "query-variable-info", + "ready-to-boot", + "exit-boot-service", + "get-statistics", + "lock-variable", + "var-check-prop-set", + "var-check-prop-get", + "get-payload-size", + "init-runtime-cache-contect", + "sync-runtime-cache", + "get-runtime-cache-info", + }; + const char *fname; + uint64_t length; + + mm_header *mhdr = (mm_header *) uv->buffer; + mm_variable *mvar = (mm_variable *) (uv->buffer + sizeof(*mhdr)); + void *func = (uv->buffer + sizeof(*mhdr) + sizeof(*mvar)); + + if (mhdr->length < sizeof(*mvar)) { + return UEFI_VARS_STS_ERR_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; + } + + fname = mvar->function < ARRAY_SIZE(fnames) + ? fnames[mvar->function] + : "unknown"; + trace_uefi_vars_proto_cmd(fname); + + switch (mvar->function) { + case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE: + length = uefi_vars_mm_get_variable(uv, mhdr, mvar, func); + break; + + case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME: + length = uefi_vars_mm_get_next_variable(uv, mhdr, mvar, func); + break; + + case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE: + length = uefi_vars_mm_set_variable(uv, mhdr, mvar, func); + break; + + case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO: + length = uefi_vars_mm_variable_info(uv, mhdr, mvar, func); + break; + + case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_LOCK_VARIABLE: + length = uefi_vars_mm_lock_variable(uv, mhdr, mvar, func); + break; + + case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_PAYLOAD_SIZE: + length = uefi_vars_mm_get_payload_size(uv, mhdr, mvar, func); + break; + + case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_READY_TO_BOOT: + trace_uefi_event("ready-to-boot"); + uv->ready_to_boot = true; + length = 0; + break; + + case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICE: + trace_uefi_event("exit-boot-service"); + uv->exit_boot_service = true; + length = 0; + break; + + default: + length = uefi_vars_mm_error(mhdr, mvar, EFI_UNSUPPORTED); + break; + } + + if (mhdr->length < length) { + mvar->status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + uefi_trace_status(__func__, mvar->status); + return UEFI_VARS_STS_SUCCESS; +} -- cgit v1.1 From f1488fac0584cc095865e4d4d987f01f4e97fbe5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:12 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add var-service-auth.c This implements authenticated variable handling (see AuthVariableLib in edk2). The by far most common use case for auth variables is secure boot. The secure boot certificate databases ('PK', 'KEK', 'db' and 'dbx') are authenticated variables, with update rules being specified in the UEFI specification. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-9-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/var-service-auth.c | 361 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 361 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/var-service-auth.c (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-auth.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-auth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fba5a09 --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-auth.c @@ -0,0 +1,361 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * uefi vars device - AuthVariableLib + */ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "qemu/error-report.h" +#include "system/dma.h" + +#include "hw/uefi/var-service.h" + +static const uint16_t name_pk[] = u"PK"; +static const uint16_t name_kek[] = u"KEK"; +static const uint16_t name_db[] = u"db"; +static const uint16_t name_dbx[] = u"dbx"; +static const uint16_t name_setup_mode[] = u"SetupMode"; +static const uint16_t name_sigs_support[] = u"SignatureSupport"; +static const uint16_t name_sb[] = u"SecureBoot"; +static const uint16_t name_sb_enable[] = u"SecureBootEnable"; +static const uint16_t name_custom_mode[] = u"CustomMode"; +static const uint16_t name_vk[] = u"VendorKeys"; +static const uint16_t name_vk_nv[] = u"VendorKeysNv"; + +static const uint32_t sigdb_attrs = + EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | + EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; + +static void set_secure_boot(uefi_vars_state *uv, uint8_t sb) +{ + uefi_vars_set_variable(uv, EfiGlobalVariable, + name_sb, sizeof(name_sb), + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, + &sb, sizeof(sb)); +} + +static void set_secure_boot_enable(uefi_vars_state *uv, uint8_t sbe) +{ + uefi_vars_set_variable(uv, EfiSecureBootEnableDisable, + name_sb_enable, sizeof(name_sb_enable), + EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS, + &sbe, sizeof(sbe)); +} + +static void set_setup_mode(uefi_vars_state *uv, uint8_t sm) +{ + uefi_vars_set_variable(uv, EfiGlobalVariable, + name_setup_mode, sizeof(name_setup_mode), + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, + &sm, sizeof(sm)); +} + +static void set_custom_mode(uefi_vars_state *uv, uint8_t cm) +{ + uefi_vars_set_variable(uv, EfiCustomModeEnable, + name_custom_mode, sizeof(name_custom_mode), + EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS, + &cm, sizeof(cm)); +} + +static void set_signature_support(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + QemuUUID sigs_support[5]; + + sigs_support[0] = EfiCertSha256Guid; + sigs_support[1] = EfiCertSha384Guid; + sigs_support[2] = EfiCertSha512Guid; + sigs_support[3] = EfiCertRsa2048Guid; + sigs_support[4] = EfiCertX509Guid; + + uefi_vars_set_variable(uv, EfiGlobalVariable, + name_sigs_support, sizeof(name_sigs_support), + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, + sigs_support, sizeof(sigs_support)); +} + +static bool setup_mode_is_active(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + uefi_variable *var; + uint8_t *value; + + var = uefi_vars_find_variable(uv, EfiGlobalVariable, + name_setup_mode, sizeof(name_setup_mode)); + if (var) { + value = var->data; + if (value[0] == SETUP_MODE) { + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +static bool custom_mode_is_active(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + uefi_variable *var; + uint8_t *value; + + var = uefi_vars_find_variable(uv, EfiCustomModeEnable, + name_custom_mode, sizeof(name_custom_mode)); + if (var) { + value = var->data; + if (value[0] == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) { + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +bool uefi_vars_is_sb_pk(uefi_variable *var) +{ + if (qemu_uuid_is_equal(&var->guid, &EfiGlobalVariable) && + uefi_str_equal(var->name, var->name_size, name_pk, sizeof(name_pk))) { + return true; + } + return false; +} + +static bool uefi_vars_is_sb_kek(uefi_variable *var) +{ + if (qemu_uuid_is_equal(&var->guid, &EfiGlobalVariable) && + uefi_str_equal(var->name, var->name_size, name_kek, sizeof(name_kek))) { + return true; + } + return false; +} + +static bool uefi_vars_is_sb_db(uefi_variable *var) +{ + if (!qemu_uuid_is_equal(&var->guid, &EfiImageSecurityDatabase)) { + return false; + } + if (uefi_str_equal(var->name, var->name_size, name_db, sizeof(name_db))) { + return true; + } + if (uefi_str_equal(var->name, var->name_size, name_dbx, sizeof(name_dbx))) { + return true; + } + return false; +} + +bool uefi_vars_is_sb_any(uefi_variable *var) +{ + if (uefi_vars_is_sb_pk(var) || + uefi_vars_is_sb_kek(var) || + uefi_vars_is_sb_db(var)) { + return true; + } + return false; +} + +static uefi_variable *uefi_vars_find_siglist(uefi_vars_state *uv, + uefi_variable *var) +{ + if (uefi_vars_is_sb_pk(var)) { + return uefi_vars_find_variable(uv, EfiGlobalVariable, + name_pk, sizeof(name_pk)); + } + if (uefi_vars_is_sb_kek(var)) { + return uefi_vars_find_variable(uv, EfiGlobalVariable, + name_pk, sizeof(name_pk)); + } + if (uefi_vars_is_sb_db(var)) { + return uefi_vars_find_variable(uv, EfiGlobalVariable, + name_kek, sizeof(name_kek)); + } + + return NULL; +} + +static efi_status uefi_vars_check_auth_2_sb(uefi_vars_state *uv, + uefi_variable *var, + mm_variable_access *va, + void *data, + uint64_t data_offset) +{ + variable_auth_2 *auth = data; + uefi_variable *siglist; + + if (custom_mode_is_active(uv)) { + /* no authentication in custom mode */ + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + + if (setup_mode_is_active(uv) && !uefi_vars_is_sb_pk(var)) { + /* no authentication in setup mode (except PK) */ + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + + if (auth->hdr_length == 24) { + /* no signature (auth->cert_data is empty) */ + return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; + } + + siglist = uefi_vars_find_siglist(uv, var); + if (!siglist && setup_mode_is_active(uv) && uefi_vars_is_sb_pk(var)) { + /* check PK is self-signed */ + uefi_variable tmp = { + .guid = EfiGlobalVariable, + .name = (uint16_t *)name_pk, + .name_size = sizeof(name_pk), + .attributes = sigdb_attrs, + .data = data + data_offset, + .data_size = va->data_size - data_offset, + }; + return uefi_vars_check_pkcs7_2(&tmp, NULL, NULL, va, data); + } + + return uefi_vars_check_pkcs7_2(siglist, NULL, NULL, va, data); +} + +efi_status uefi_vars_check_auth_2(uefi_vars_state *uv, uefi_variable *var, + mm_variable_access *va, void *data) +{ + variable_auth_2 *auth = data; + uint64_t data_offset; + efi_status status; + + if (va->data_size < sizeof(*auth)) { + return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; + } + if (uadd64_overflow(sizeof(efi_time), auth->hdr_length, &data_offset)) { + return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; + } + if (va->data_size < data_offset) { + return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; + } + + if (auth->hdr_revision != 0x0200 || + auth->hdr_cert_type != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID || + !qemu_uuid_is_equal(&auth->guid_cert_type, &EfiCertTypePkcs7Guid)) { + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + if (uefi_vars_is_sb_any(var)) { + /* secure boot variables */ + status = uefi_vars_check_auth_2_sb(uv, var, va, data, data_offset); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } else { + /* other authenticated variables */ + status = uefi_vars_check_pkcs7_2(NULL, + &var->digest, &var->digest_size, + va, data); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + /* checks passed, set variable data */ + var->time = auth->timestamp; + if (va->data_size - data_offset > 0) { + var->data = g_malloc(va->data_size - data_offset); + memcpy(var->data, data + data_offset, va->data_size - data_offset); + var->data_size = va->data_size - data_offset; + } + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +efi_status uefi_vars_check_secure_boot(uefi_vars_state *uv, uefi_variable *var) +{ + uint8_t *value = var->data; + + if (uefi_vars_is_sb_any(var)) { + if (var->attributes != sigdb_attrs) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + } + + /* reject SecureBootEnable updates if force_secure_boot is set */ + if (qemu_uuid_is_equal(&var->guid, &EfiSecureBootEnableDisable) && + uefi_str_equal(var->name, var->name_size, + name_sb_enable, sizeof(name_sb_enable)) && + uv->force_secure_boot && + value[0] != SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) { + return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED; + } + + /* reject CustomMode updates if disable_custom_mode is set */ + if (qemu_uuid_is_equal(&var->guid, &EfiCustomModeEnable) && + uefi_str_equal(var->name, var->name_size, + name_custom_mode, sizeof(name_custom_mode)) && + uv->disable_custom_mode) { + return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED; + } + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/* AuthVariableLibInitialize */ +void uefi_vars_auth_init(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + uefi_variable *pk_var, *sbe_var; + uint8_t platform_mode, sb, sbe, vk; + + /* SetupMode */ + pk_var = uefi_vars_find_variable(uv, EfiGlobalVariable, + name_pk, sizeof(name_pk)); + if (!pk_var) { + platform_mode = SETUP_MODE; + } else { + platform_mode = USER_MODE; + } + set_setup_mode(uv, platform_mode); + + /* SignatureSupport */ + set_signature_support(uv); + + /* SecureBootEnable */ + sbe = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE; + sbe_var = uefi_vars_find_variable(uv, EfiSecureBootEnableDisable, + name_sb_enable, sizeof(name_sb_enable)); + if (sbe_var) { + if (platform_mode == USER_MODE) { + sbe = ((uint8_t *)sbe_var->data)[0]; + } + } else if (platform_mode == USER_MODE) { + sbe = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE; + set_secure_boot_enable(uv, sbe); + } + + if (uv->force_secure_boot && sbe != SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) { + sbe = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE; + set_secure_boot_enable(uv, sbe); + } + + /* SecureBoot */ + if ((sbe == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) && (platform_mode == USER_MODE)) { + sb = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE; + } else { + sb = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE; + } + set_secure_boot(uv, sb); + + /* CustomMode */ + set_custom_mode(uv, STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); + + vk = 0; + uefi_vars_set_variable(uv, EfiGlobalVariable, + name_vk_nv, sizeof(name_vk_nv), + EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | + EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, + &vk, sizeof(vk)); + uefi_vars_set_variable(uv, EfiGlobalVariable, + name_vk, sizeof(name_vk), + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, + &vk, sizeof(vk)); + + /* flush to disk */ + uefi_vars_json_save(uv); +} -- cgit v1.1 From 034cb968ca8fc562ea11de516828228eeb146944 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:13 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add var-service-policy.c Implement variable policies (Edk2VariablePolicyProtocol). This EFI protocol allows to define restrictions for variables. It also allows to lock down variables (disallow write access). Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-10-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/var-service-policy.c | 370 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 370 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/var-service-policy.c (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-policy.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-policy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b1155f --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-policy.c @@ -0,0 +1,370 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * uefi vars device - VarCheckPolicyLibMmiHandler implementation + * + * variable policy specs: + * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/MdeModulePkg/Library/VariablePolicyLib/ReadMe.md + */ +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "system/dma.h" +#include "migration/vmstate.h" + +#include "hw/uefi/var-service.h" +#include "hw/uefi/var-service-api.h" +#include "hw/uefi/var-service-edk2.h" + +#include "trace/trace-hw_uefi.h" + +static void calc_policy(uefi_var_policy *pol); + +static int uefi_var_policy_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id) +{ + uefi_var_policy *pol = opaque; + + calc_policy(pol); + return 0; +} + +const VMStateDescription vmstate_uefi_var_policy = { + .name = "uefi-var-policy", + .post_load = uefi_var_policy_post_load, + .fields = (VMStateField[]) { + VMSTATE_UINT32(entry_size, uefi_var_policy), + VMSTATE_VBUFFER_ALLOC_UINT32(entry, uefi_var_policy, + 0, NULL, entry_size), + VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST() + }, +}; + +static void print_policy_entry(variable_policy_entry *pe) +{ + uint16_t *name = (void *)pe + pe->offset_to_name; + + fprintf(stderr, "%s:\n", __func__); + + fprintf(stderr, " name ยด"); + while (*name) { + fprintf(stderr, "%c", *name); + name++; + } + fprintf(stderr, "', version=%d.%d, size=%d\n", + pe->version >> 16, pe->version & 0xffff, pe->size); + + if (pe->min_size) { + fprintf(stderr, " size min=%d\n", pe->min_size); + } + if (pe->max_size != UINT32_MAX) { + fprintf(stderr, " size max=%u\n", pe->max_size); + } + if (pe->attributes_must_have) { + fprintf(stderr, " attr must=0x%x\n", pe->attributes_must_have); + } + if (pe->attributes_cant_have) { + fprintf(stderr, " attr cant=0x%x\n", pe->attributes_cant_have); + } + if (pe->lock_policy_type) { + fprintf(stderr, " lock policy type %d\n", pe->lock_policy_type); + } +} + +static gboolean wildcard_str_equal(uefi_var_policy *pol, + uefi_variable *var) +{ + return uefi_str_equal_ex(pol->name, pol->name_size, + var->name, var->name_size, + true); +} + +static uefi_var_policy *find_policy(uefi_vars_state *uv, QemuUUID guid, + uint16_t *name, uint64_t name_size) +{ + uefi_var_policy *pol; + + QTAILQ_FOREACH(pol, &uv->var_policies, next) { + if (!qemu_uuid_is_equal(&pol->entry->namespace, &guid)) { + continue; + } + if (!uefi_str_equal(pol->name, pol->name_size, + name, name_size)) { + continue; + } + return pol; + } + return NULL; +} + +static uefi_var_policy *wildcard_find_policy(uefi_vars_state *uv, + uefi_variable *var) +{ + uefi_var_policy *pol; + + QTAILQ_FOREACH(pol, &uv->var_policies, next) { + if (!qemu_uuid_is_equal(&pol->entry->namespace, &var->guid)) { + continue; + } + if (!wildcard_str_equal(pol, var)) { + continue; + } + return pol; + } + return NULL; +} + +static void calc_policy(uefi_var_policy *pol) +{ + variable_policy_entry *pe = pol->entry; + unsigned int i; + + pol->name = (void *)pol->entry + pe->offset_to_name; + pol->name_size = pe->size - pe->offset_to_name; + + for (i = 0; i < pol->name_size / 2; i++) { + if (pol->name[i] == '#') { + pol->hashmarks++; + } + } +} + +uefi_var_policy *uefi_vars_add_policy(uefi_vars_state *uv, + variable_policy_entry *pe) +{ + uefi_var_policy *pol, *p; + + pol = g_new0(uefi_var_policy, 1); + pol->entry = g_malloc(pe->size); + memcpy(pol->entry, pe, pe->size); + pol->entry_size = pe->size; + + calc_policy(pol); + + /* keep list sorted by priority, add to tail of priority group */ + QTAILQ_FOREACH(p, &uv->var_policies, next) { + if ((p->hashmarks > pol->hashmarks) || + (!p->name_size && pol->name_size)) { + QTAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(p, pol, next); + return pol; + } + } + + QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&uv->var_policies, pol, next); + return pol; +} + +efi_status uefi_vars_policy_check(uefi_vars_state *uv, + uefi_variable *var, + gboolean is_newvar) +{ + uefi_var_policy *pol; + variable_policy_entry *pe; + variable_lock_on_var_state *lvarstate; + uint16_t *lvarname; + size_t lvarnamesize; + uefi_variable *lvar; + + if (!uv->end_of_dxe) { + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + + pol = wildcard_find_policy(uv, var); + if (!pol) { + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + pe = pol->entry; + + uefi_trace_variable(__func__, var->guid, var->name, var->name_size); + print_policy_entry(pe); + + if ((var->attributes & pe->attributes_must_have) != pe->attributes_must_have) { + trace_uefi_vars_policy_deny("must-have-attr"); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + if ((var->attributes & pe->attributes_cant_have) != 0) { + trace_uefi_vars_policy_deny("cant-have-attr"); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + if (var->data_size < pe->min_size) { + trace_uefi_vars_policy_deny("min-size"); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + if (var->data_size > pe->max_size) { + trace_uefi_vars_policy_deny("max-size"); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + switch (pe->lock_policy_type) { + case VARIABLE_POLICY_TYPE_NO_LOCK: + break; + + case VARIABLE_POLICY_TYPE_LOCK_NOW: + trace_uefi_vars_policy_deny("lock-now"); + return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED; + + case VARIABLE_POLICY_TYPE_LOCK_ON_CREATE: + if (!is_newvar) { + trace_uefi_vars_policy_deny("lock-on-create"); + return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED; + } + break; + + case VARIABLE_POLICY_TYPE_LOCK_ON_VAR_STATE: + lvarstate = (void *)pol->entry + sizeof(*pe); + lvarname = (void *)pol->entry + sizeof(*pe) + sizeof(*lvarstate); + lvarnamesize = pe->offset_to_name - sizeof(*pe) - sizeof(*lvarstate); + + uefi_trace_variable(__func__, lvarstate->namespace, + lvarname, lvarnamesize); + lvar = uefi_vars_find_variable(uv, lvarstate->namespace, + lvarname, lvarnamesize); + if (lvar && lvar->data_size == 1) { + uint8_t *value = lvar->data; + if (lvarstate->value == *value) { + return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED; + } + } + break; + } + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +void uefi_vars_policies_clear(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + uefi_var_policy *pol; + + while (!QTAILQ_EMPTY(&uv->var_policies)) { + pol = QTAILQ_FIRST(&uv->var_policies); + QTAILQ_REMOVE(&uv->var_policies, pol, next); + g_free(pol->entry); + g_free(pol); + } +} + +static size_t uefi_vars_mm_policy_error(mm_header *mhdr, + mm_check_policy *mchk, + uint64_t status) +{ + mchk->result = status; + return sizeof(*mchk); +} + +static uint32_t uefi_vars_mm_check_policy_is_enabled(uefi_vars_state *uv, + mm_header *mhdr, + mm_check_policy *mchk, + void *func) +{ + mm_check_policy_is_enabled *mpar = func; + size_t length; + + length = sizeof(*mchk) + sizeof(*mpar); + if (mhdr->length < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_policy_error(mhdr, mchk, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + mpar->state = TRUE; + mchk->result = EFI_SUCCESS; + return sizeof(*mchk); +} + +static uint32_t uefi_vars_mm_check_policy_register(uefi_vars_state *uv, + mm_header *mhdr, + mm_check_policy *mchk, + void *func) +{ + variable_policy_entry *pe = func; + uefi_var_policy *pol; + uint64_t length; + + if (uadd64_overflow(sizeof(*mchk), pe->size, &length)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_policy_error(mhdr, mchk, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + if (mhdr->length < length) { + return uefi_vars_mm_policy_error(mhdr, mchk, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + if (pe->size < sizeof(*pe)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_policy_error(mhdr, mchk, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + if (pe->offset_to_name < sizeof(*pe)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_policy_error(mhdr, mchk, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + if (pe->lock_policy_type == VARIABLE_POLICY_TYPE_LOCK_ON_VAR_STATE && + pe->offset_to_name < sizeof(*pe) + sizeof(variable_lock_on_var_state)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_policy_error(mhdr, mchk, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + /* check space for minimum string length */ + if (pe->size < (size_t)pe->offset_to_name) { + return uefi_vars_mm_policy_error(mhdr, mchk, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + } + + if (!uefi_str_is_valid((void *)pe + pe->offset_to_name, + pe->size - pe->offset_to_name, + false)) { + return uefi_vars_mm_policy_error(mhdr, mchk, EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + pol = find_policy(uv, pe->namespace, + (void *)pe + pe->offset_to_name, + pe->size - pe->offset_to_name); + if (pol) { + return uefi_vars_mm_policy_error(mhdr, mchk, EFI_ALREADY_STARTED); + } + + uefi_vars_add_policy(uv, pe); + + mchk->result = EFI_SUCCESS; + return sizeof(*mchk); +} + +uint32_t uefi_vars_mm_check_policy_proto(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + static const char *fnames[] = { + "zero", + "disable", + "is-enabled", + "register", + "dump", + "lock", + }; + const char *fname; + mm_header *mhdr = (mm_header *) uv->buffer; + mm_check_policy *mchk = (mm_check_policy *) (uv->buffer + sizeof(*mhdr)); + void *func = (uv->buffer + sizeof(*mhdr) + sizeof(*mchk)); + + if (mhdr->length < sizeof(*mchk)) { + return UEFI_VARS_STS_ERR_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; + } + + fname = mchk->command < ARRAY_SIZE(fnames) + ? fnames[mchk->command] + : "unknown"; + trace_uefi_vars_policy_cmd(fname); + + switch (mchk->command) { + case VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMMAND_DISABLE: + mchk->result = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + break; + case VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMMAND_IS_ENABLED: + uefi_vars_mm_check_policy_is_enabled(uv, mhdr, mchk, func); + break; + case VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMMAND_REGISTER: + if (uv->policy_locked) { + mchk->result = EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED; + } else { + uefi_vars_mm_check_policy_register(uv, mhdr, mchk, func); + } + break; + case VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMMAND_LOCK: + uv->policy_locked = true; + mchk->result = EFI_SUCCESS; + break; + default: + mchk->result = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + break; + } + + uefi_trace_status(__func__, mchk->result); + return UEFI_VARS_STS_SUCCESS; +} -- cgit v1.1 From 90ca4e03c27dc8ac821a2e1686e705ae9a93d301 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:14 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add var-service-core.c This is the core code for guest <-> host communication. This accepts request messages from the guest, dispatches them to the service called, and sends back the response message. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-11-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/var-service-core.c | 321 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 321 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/var-service-core.c (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-core.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-core.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ed8378 --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-core.c @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * uefi vars device + */ +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "qemu/crc32c.h" +#include "system/dma.h" +#include "migration/vmstate.h" + +#include "hw/uefi/var-service.h" +#include "hw/uefi/var-service-api.h" +#include "hw/uefi/var-service-edk2.h" + +#include "trace/trace-hw_uefi.h" + +static int uefi_vars_pre_load(void *opaque) +{ + uefi_vars_state *uv = opaque; + + uefi_vars_clear_all(uv); + uefi_vars_policies_clear(uv); + g_free(uv->buffer); + return 0; +} + +static int uefi_vars_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id) +{ + uefi_vars_state *uv = opaque; + + uefi_vars_update_storage(uv); + uv->buffer = g_malloc(uv->buf_size); + return 0; +} + +const VMStateDescription vmstate_uefi_vars = { + .name = "uefi-vars", + .pre_load = uefi_vars_pre_load, + .post_load = uefi_vars_post_load, + .fields = (VMStateField[]) { + VMSTATE_UINT16(sts, uefi_vars_state), + VMSTATE_UINT32(buf_size, uefi_vars_state), + VMSTATE_UINT32(buf_addr_lo, uefi_vars_state), + VMSTATE_UINT32(buf_addr_hi, uefi_vars_state), + VMSTATE_UINT32(pio_xfer_offset, uefi_vars_state), + VMSTATE_VBUFFER_ALLOC_UINT32(pio_xfer_buffer, uefi_vars_state, + 0, NULL, buf_size), + VMSTATE_BOOL(end_of_dxe, uefi_vars_state), + VMSTATE_BOOL(ready_to_boot, uefi_vars_state), + VMSTATE_BOOL(exit_boot_service, uefi_vars_state), + VMSTATE_BOOL(policy_locked, uefi_vars_state), + VMSTATE_UINT64(used_storage, uefi_vars_state), + VMSTATE_QTAILQ_V(variables, uefi_vars_state, 0, + vmstate_uefi_variable, uefi_variable, next), + VMSTATE_QTAILQ_V(var_policies, uefi_vars_state, 0, + vmstate_uefi_var_policy, uefi_var_policy, next), + VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST() + }, +}; + +static uint32_t uefi_vars_cmd_mm(uefi_vars_state *uv, bool dma_mode) +{ + hwaddr dma; + mm_header *mhdr; + uint64_t size; + uint32_t retval; + + dma = uv->buf_addr_lo | ((hwaddr)uv->buf_addr_hi << 32); + mhdr = (mm_header *) uv->buffer; + + if (!uv->buffer || uv->buf_size < sizeof(*mhdr)) { + return UEFI_VARS_STS_ERR_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; + } + + /* read header */ + if (dma_mode) { + dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, dma, + uv->buffer, sizeof(*mhdr), + MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED); + } else { + memcpy(uv->buffer, uv->pio_xfer_buffer, sizeof(*mhdr)); + } + + if (uadd64_overflow(sizeof(*mhdr), mhdr->length, &size)) { + return UEFI_VARS_STS_ERR_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; + } + if (uv->buf_size < size) { + return UEFI_VARS_STS_ERR_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; + } + + /* read buffer (excl header) */ + if (dma_mode) { + dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, dma + sizeof(*mhdr), + uv->buffer + sizeof(*mhdr), mhdr->length, + MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED); + } else { + memcpy(uv->buffer + sizeof(*mhdr), + uv->pio_xfer_buffer + sizeof(*mhdr), + mhdr->length); + } + memset(uv->buffer + size, 0, uv->buf_size - size); + + /* dispatch */ + if (qemu_uuid_is_equal(&mhdr->guid, &EfiSmmVariableProtocolGuid)) { + retval = uefi_vars_mm_vars_proto(uv); + + } else if (qemu_uuid_is_equal(&mhdr->guid, &VarCheckPolicyLibMmiHandlerGuid)) { + retval = uefi_vars_mm_check_policy_proto(uv); + + } else if (qemu_uuid_is_equal(&mhdr->guid, &EfiEndOfDxeEventGroupGuid)) { + trace_uefi_event("end-of-dxe"); + uv->end_of_dxe = true; + retval = UEFI_VARS_STS_SUCCESS; + + } else if (qemu_uuid_is_equal(&mhdr->guid, &EfiEventReadyToBootGuid)) { + trace_uefi_event("ready-to-boot"); + uv->ready_to_boot = true; + retval = UEFI_VARS_STS_SUCCESS; + + } else if (qemu_uuid_is_equal(&mhdr->guid, &EfiEventExitBootServicesGuid)) { + trace_uefi_event("exit-boot-service"); + uv->exit_boot_service = true; + retval = UEFI_VARS_STS_SUCCESS; + + } else { + retval = UEFI_VARS_STS_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* write buffer */ + if (dma_mode) { + dma_memory_write(&address_space_memory, dma, + uv->buffer, sizeof(*mhdr) + mhdr->length, + MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED); + } else { + memcpy(uv->pio_xfer_buffer + sizeof(*mhdr), + uv->buffer + sizeof(*mhdr), + sizeof(*mhdr) + mhdr->length); + } + + return retval; +} + +static void uefi_vars_soft_reset(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + g_free(uv->buffer); + uv->buffer = NULL; + uv->buf_size = 0; + uv->buf_addr_lo = 0; + uv->buf_addr_hi = 0; +} + +void uefi_vars_hard_reset(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + trace_uefi_hard_reset(); + uefi_vars_soft_reset(uv); + + uv->end_of_dxe = false; + uv->ready_to_boot = false; + uv->exit_boot_service = false; + uv->policy_locked = false; + + uefi_vars_clear_volatile(uv); + uefi_vars_policies_clear(uv); + uefi_vars_auth_init(uv); +} + +static uint32_t uefi_vars_cmd(uefi_vars_state *uv, uint32_t cmd) +{ + switch (cmd) { + case UEFI_VARS_CMD_RESET: + uefi_vars_soft_reset(uv); + return UEFI_VARS_STS_SUCCESS; + case UEFI_VARS_CMD_DMA_MM: + return uefi_vars_cmd_mm(uv, true); + case UEFI_VARS_CMD_PIO_MM: + return uefi_vars_cmd_mm(uv, false); + case UEFI_VARS_CMD_PIO_ZERO_OFFSET: + uv->pio_xfer_offset = 0; + return UEFI_VARS_STS_SUCCESS; + default: + return UEFI_VARS_STS_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +} + +static uint64_t uefi_vars_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned size) +{ + uefi_vars_state *uv = opaque; + uint64_t retval = -1; + void *xfer_ptr; + + trace_uefi_reg_read(addr, size); + + switch (addr) { + case UEFI_VARS_REG_MAGIC: + retval = UEFI_VARS_MAGIC_VALUE; + break; + case UEFI_VARS_REG_CMD_STS: + retval = uv->sts; + break; + case UEFI_VARS_REG_BUFFER_SIZE: + retval = uv->buf_size; + break; + case UEFI_VARS_REG_DMA_BUFFER_ADDR_LO: + retval = uv->buf_addr_lo; + break; + case UEFI_VARS_REG_DMA_BUFFER_ADDR_HI: + retval = uv->buf_addr_hi; + break; + case UEFI_VARS_REG_PIO_BUFFER_TRANSFER: + if (uv->pio_xfer_offset + size > uv->buf_size) { + retval = 0; + break; + } + xfer_ptr = uv->pio_xfer_buffer + uv->pio_xfer_offset; + switch (size) { + case 1: + retval = *(uint8_t *)xfer_ptr; + break; + case 2: + retval = *(uint16_t *)xfer_ptr; + break; + case 4: + retval = *(uint32_t *)xfer_ptr; + break; + case 8: + retval = *(uint64_t *)xfer_ptr; + break; + } + uv->pio_xfer_offset += size; + break; + case UEFI_VARS_REG_PIO_BUFFER_CRC32C: + retval = crc32c(0xffffffff, uv->pio_xfer_buffer, uv->pio_xfer_offset); + break; + case UEFI_VARS_REG_FLAGS: + retval = 0; + if (uv->use_pio) { + retval |= UEFI_VARS_FLAG_USE_PIO; + } + } + return retval; +} + +static void uefi_vars_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t val, unsigned size) +{ + uefi_vars_state *uv = opaque; + void *xfer_ptr; + + trace_uefi_reg_write(addr, val, size); + + switch (addr) { + case UEFI_VARS_REG_CMD_STS: + uv->sts = uefi_vars_cmd(uv, val); + break; + case UEFI_VARS_REG_BUFFER_SIZE: + if (val > MAX_BUFFER_SIZE) { + val = MAX_BUFFER_SIZE; + } + uv->buf_size = val; + g_free(uv->buffer); + g_free(uv->pio_xfer_buffer); + uv->buffer = g_malloc(uv->buf_size); + uv->pio_xfer_buffer = g_malloc(uv->buf_size); + break; + case UEFI_VARS_REG_DMA_BUFFER_ADDR_LO: + uv->buf_addr_lo = val; + break; + case UEFI_VARS_REG_DMA_BUFFER_ADDR_HI: + uv->buf_addr_hi = val; + break; + case UEFI_VARS_REG_PIO_BUFFER_TRANSFER: + if (uv->pio_xfer_offset + size > uv->buf_size) { + break; + } + xfer_ptr = uv->pio_xfer_buffer + uv->pio_xfer_offset; + switch (size) { + case 1: + *(uint8_t *)xfer_ptr = val; + break; + case 2: + *(uint16_t *)xfer_ptr = val; + break; + case 4: + *(uint32_t *)xfer_ptr = val; + break; + case 8: + *(uint64_t *)xfer_ptr = val; + break; + } + uv->pio_xfer_offset += size; + break; + case UEFI_VARS_REG_PIO_BUFFER_CRC32C: + case UEFI_VARS_REG_FLAGS: + default: + break; + } +} + +static const MemoryRegionOps uefi_vars_ops = { + .read = uefi_vars_read, + .write = uefi_vars_write, + .endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN, + .impl = { + .min_access_size = 2, + .max_access_size = 4, + }, +}; + +void uefi_vars_init(Object *obj, uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + QTAILQ_INIT(&uv->variables); + QTAILQ_INIT(&uv->var_policies); + uv->jsonfd = -1; + memory_region_init_io(&uv->mr, obj, &uefi_vars_ops, uv, + "uefi-vars", UEFI_VARS_REGS_SIZE); +} + +void uefi_vars_realize(uefi_vars_state *uv, Error **errp) +{ + uefi_vars_json_init(uv, errp); + uefi_vars_json_load(uv, errp); +} -- cgit v1.1 From 3e33af2cb306311d6fa4372c6d27489c165c1bd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:15 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add var-service-pkcs7.c This implements pkcs7 signature verification using gnutls. Needed to check authenticated variable updates. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-12-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/var-service-pkcs7.c | 436 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 436 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/var-service-pkcs7.c (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-pkcs7.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-pkcs7.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..32accf4 --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-pkcs7.c @@ -0,0 +1,436 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * uefi vars device - pkcs7 verification + */ +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "qemu/error-report.h" +#include "system/dma.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "hw/uefi/var-service.h" + +#define AUTHVAR_DIGEST_ALGO GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256 +#define AUTHVAR_DIGEST_SIZE 32 + +/* + * Replicate the signed data for signature verification. + */ +static gnutls_datum_t *build_signed_data(mm_variable_access *va, void *data) +{ + variable_auth_2 *auth = data; + uint64_t data_offset = sizeof(efi_time) + auth->hdr_length; + uint16_t *name = (void *)va + sizeof(mm_variable_access); + gnutls_datum_t *sdata; + uint64_t pos = 0; + + sdata = g_new(gnutls_datum_t, 1); + sdata->size = (va->name_size - 2 + + sizeof(QemuUUID) + + sizeof(va->attributes) + + sizeof(auth->timestamp) + + va->data_size - data_offset); + sdata->data = g_malloc(sdata->size); + + /* Variable Name (without terminating \0) */ + memcpy(sdata->data + pos, name, va->name_size - 2); + pos += va->name_size - 2; + + /* Variable Namespace Guid */ + memcpy(sdata->data + pos, &va->guid, sizeof(va->guid)); + pos += sizeof(va->guid); + + /* Attributes */ + memcpy(sdata->data + pos, &va->attributes, sizeof(va->attributes)); + pos += sizeof(va->attributes); + + /* TimeStamp */ + memcpy(sdata->data + pos, &auth->timestamp, sizeof(auth->timestamp)); + pos += sizeof(auth->timestamp); + + /* Variable Content */ + memcpy(sdata->data + pos, data + data_offset, va->data_size - data_offset); + pos += va->data_size - data_offset; + + assert(pos == sdata->size); + return sdata; +} + +/* + * See WrapPkcs7Data() in edk2. + * + * UEFI spec allows pkcs7 signatures being used without the envelope which + * identifies them as pkcs7 signatures. openssl and gnutls will not parse them + * without the envelope though. So add it if needed. + */ +static void wrap_pkcs7(gnutls_datum_t *pkcs7) +{ + static uint8_t signed_data_oid[9] = { + 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02 + }; + gnutls_datum_t wrap; + + if (pkcs7->data[4] == 0x06 && + pkcs7->data[5] == 0x09 && + memcmp(pkcs7->data + 6, signed_data_oid, sizeof(signed_data_oid)) == 0 && + pkcs7->data[15] == 0x0a && + pkcs7->data[16] == 0x82) { + return; + } + + wrap.size = pkcs7->size + 19; + wrap.data = g_malloc(wrap.size); + + wrap.data[0] = 0x30; + wrap.data[1] = 0x82; + wrap.data[2] = (wrap.size - 4) >> 8; + wrap.data[3] = (wrap.size - 4) & 0xff; + wrap.data[4] = 0x06; + wrap.data[5] = 0x09; + memcpy(wrap.data + 6, signed_data_oid, sizeof(signed_data_oid)); + + wrap.data[15] = 0xa0; + wrap.data[16] = 0x82; + wrap.data[17] = pkcs7->size >> 8; + wrap.data[18] = pkcs7->size & 0xff; + memcpy(wrap.data + 19, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->size); + + g_free(pkcs7->data); + *pkcs7 = wrap; +} + +static gnutls_datum_t *build_pkcs7(void *data) +{ + variable_auth_2 *auth = data; + gnutls_datum_t *pkcs7; + + pkcs7 = g_new(gnutls_datum_t, 1); + pkcs7->size = auth->hdr_length - 24; + pkcs7->data = g_malloc(pkcs7->size); + memcpy(pkcs7->data, data + 16 + 24, pkcs7->size); + + wrap_pkcs7(pkcs7); + + return pkcs7; +} + +/* + * Read UEFI signature database, store x509 all certificates found in + * gnutls_x509_trust_list_t. + */ +static gnutls_x509_trust_list_t build_trust_list_sb(uefi_variable *var) +{ + gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tlist; + gnutls_datum_t cert_data; + gnutls_x509_crt_t cert; + uefi_vars_siglist siglist; + uefi_vars_cert *c; + int rc; + + rc = gnutls_x509_trust_list_init(&tlist, 0); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_trust_list_init error: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + return NULL; + } + + uefi_vars_siglist_init(&siglist); + uefi_vars_siglist_parse(&siglist, var->data, var->data_size); + + QTAILQ_FOREACH(c, &siglist.x509, next) { + cert_data.size = c->size; + cert_data.data = c->data; + + rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_crt_init error: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc)); + break; + } + rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert, &cert_data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_crt_import error: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert); + break; + } + rc = gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_cas(tlist, &cert, 1, 0); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_crt_import error: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert); + break; + } + } + + uefi_vars_siglist_free(&siglist); + + return tlist; +} + +static int build_digest_authvar(gnutls_x509_crt_t signer, + gnutls_x509_crt_t root, + uint8_t *hash_digest) +{ + char *cn; + size_t cn_size = 0; + uint8_t fp[AUTHVAR_DIGEST_SIZE]; + size_t fp_size = sizeof(fp); + gnutls_hash_hd_t hash; + int rc; + + /* get signer CN */ + rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(signer, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME, + 0, 0, NULL, &cn_size); + if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid error #1: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + return rc; + } + + cn = g_malloc(cn_size); + rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(signer, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME, + 0, 0, cn, &cn_size); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid error #2: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto err; + } + + /* get root certificate fingerprint */ + rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint(root, AUTHVAR_DIGEST_ALGO, + fp, &fp_size); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint error: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto err; + } + + /* digest both items */ + rc = gnutls_hash_init(&hash, AUTHVAR_DIGEST_ALGO); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_hash_init error: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto err; + } + rc = gnutls_hash(hash, cn, cn_size); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_hash error: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto err; + } + rc = gnutls_hash(hash, fp, fp_size); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_hash error: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto err; + } + gnutls_hash_deinit(hash, hash_digest); + + return 0; + +err: + g_free(cn); + return rc; +} + +/* + * uefi spec 2.9, section 8.2.2 + * + * For EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS variables which are + * NOT secure boot variables we should track the root certificate of the trust + * chain, and the subject CN of the signer certificate. + * + * So we'll go store a digest of these two items so we can verify this. Also + * create a gnutls_x509_trust_list_t with the root certificate, so + * gnutls_pkcs7_verify() will pass (assuming the signature is otherwise + * correct). + */ +static gnutls_x509_trust_list_t build_trust_list_authvar(gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7, + uint8_t *hash_digest) +{ + gnutls_datum_t signer_data = { 0 }; + gnutls_datum_t root_data = { 0 }; + gnutls_x509_crt_t signer = NULL; + gnutls_x509_crt_t root = NULL; + gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tlist = NULL; + int n, rc; + + n = gnutls_pkcs7_get_crt_count(pkcs7); + + /* first is signer certificate */ + rc = gnutls_pkcs7_get_crt_raw2(pkcs7, 0, &signer_data); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_pkcs7_get_crt_raw2(0) error: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto done; + } + rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&signer); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_crt_init error: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto done; + } + rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(signer, &signer_data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_crt_import error: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(signer); + goto done; + } + + /* last is root-of-trust certificate (can be identical to signer) */ + rc = gnutls_pkcs7_get_crt_raw2(pkcs7, n - 1, &root_data); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_pkcs7_get_crt_raw2(%d) error: %s", + n - 1, gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto done; + } + rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&root); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_crt_init error: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto done; + } + rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(root, &root_data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_crt_import error: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto done; + } + + /* calc digest for signer CN + root cert */ + rc = build_digest_authvar(signer, root, hash_digest); + if (rc < 0) { + goto done; + } + + /* add root to trust list */ + rc = gnutls_x509_trust_list_init(&tlist, 0); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_trust_list_init error: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto done; + } + rc = gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_cas(tlist, &root, 1, 0); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_x509_crt_import error: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + gnutls_x509_trust_list_deinit(tlist, 1); + tlist = NULL; + goto done; + } else { + /* ownership passed to tlist */ + root = NULL; + } + +done: + if (signer_data.data) { + gnutls_free(signer_data.data); + } + if (root_data.data) { + gnutls_free(root_data.data); + } + if (signer) { + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(signer); + } + if (root) { + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(root); + } + return tlist; +} + +static void free_datum(gnutls_datum_t *ptr) +{ + if (!ptr) { + return; + } + g_free(ptr->data); + g_free(ptr); +} + +static void gnutls_log_stderr(int level, const char *msg) +{ + if (strncmp(msg, "ASSERT:", 7) == 0) { + return; + } + fprintf(stderr, " %d: %s", level, msg); +} + +/* + * pkcs7 signature verification (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2). + */ +efi_status uefi_vars_check_pkcs7_2(uefi_variable *siglist, + void **digest, uint32_t *digest_size, + mm_variable_access *va, void *data) +{ + gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tlist = NULL; + gnutls_datum_t *signed_data = NULL; + gnutls_datum_t *pkcs7_data = NULL; + gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7 = NULL; + efi_status status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; + int rc; + + if (0) { + /* gnutls debug logging */ + static bool first = true; + + if (first) { + first = false; + gnutls_global_set_log_function(gnutls_log_stderr); + gnutls_global_set_log_level(99); + } + } + + signed_data = build_signed_data(va, data); + pkcs7_data = build_pkcs7(data); + + rc = gnutls_pkcs7_init(&pkcs7); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_pkcs7_init error: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto out; + } + + rc = gnutls_pkcs7_import(pkcs7, pkcs7_data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_pkcs7_import error: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto out; + } + + if (siglist) { + /* secure boot variables */ + tlist = build_trust_list_sb(siglist); + } else if (digest && digest_size) { + /* other authenticated variables */ + *digest_size = AUTHVAR_DIGEST_SIZE; + *digest = g_malloc(*digest_size); + tlist = build_trust_list_authvar(pkcs7, *digest); + } else { + /* should not happen */ + goto out; + } + + rc = gnutls_pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, tlist, + NULL, 0, + 0, signed_data, + GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_TIME_CHECKS | + GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_TRUSTED_TIME_CHECKS); + if (rc < 0) { + warn_report("gnutls_pkcs7_verify error: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto out; + } + + /* check passed */ + status = EFI_SUCCESS; + +out: + free_datum(signed_data); + free_datum(pkcs7_data); + if (tlist) { + gnutls_x509_trust_list_deinit(tlist, 1); + } + if (pkcs7) { + gnutls_pkcs7_deinit(pkcs7); + } + return status; +} -- cgit v1.1 From 4ec89b00d5bd4184455cf41af859ec08ed87d8e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:16 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add var-service-pkcs7-stub.c pkcs7 stub which is used in case gnutls is not available. It throws EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED errors unconditionally, so all authenticated variables are readonly for the guest. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-13-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/var-service-pkcs7-stub.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/var-service-pkcs7-stub.c (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-pkcs7-stub.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-pkcs7-stub.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..118cba4 --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-pkcs7-stub.c @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * uefi vars device - pkcs7 stubs + */ +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "system/dma.h" + +#include "hw/uefi/var-service.h" + +efi_status uefi_vars_check_pkcs7_2(uefi_variable *siglist, + void **digest, uint32_t *digest_size, + mm_variable_access *va, void *data) +{ + return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED; +} -- cgit v1.1 From f903e88306adfcce3b80a512a222c8551718d719 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:17 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add var-service-siglist.c Functions to serialize and de-serialize EFI signature databases. This is needed to merge signature databases (happens in practice when appending dbx updates) and also to extract the certificates for pkcs7 signature verification. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-14-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/var-service-siglist.c | 212 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 212 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/var-service-siglist.c (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-siglist.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-siglist.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8948f1b --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-siglist.c @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * uefi vars device - parse and generate efi signature databases + */ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "qemu/error-report.h" +#include "system/dma.h" + +#include "hw/uefi/var-service.h" + +/* + * Add x509 certificate to list (with duplicate check). + */ +static void uefi_vars_siglist_add_x509(uefi_vars_siglist *siglist, + QemuUUID *owner, + void *data, uint64_t size) +{ + uefi_vars_cert *c; + + QTAILQ_FOREACH(c, &siglist->x509, next) { + if (c->size != size) { + continue; + } + if (memcmp(c->data, data, size) != 0) { + continue; + } + return; + } + + c = g_malloc(sizeof(*c) + size); + c->owner = *owner; + c->size = size; + memcpy(c->data, data, size); + QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&siglist->x509, c, next); +} + +/* + * Add sha256 hash to list (with duplicate check). + */ +static void uefi_vars_siglist_add_sha256(uefi_vars_siglist *siglist, + QemuUUID *owner, + void *data) +{ + uefi_vars_hash *h; + + QTAILQ_FOREACH(h, &siglist->sha256, next) { + if (memcmp(h->data, data, 32) != 0) { + continue; + } + return; + } + + h = g_malloc(sizeof(*h) + 32); + h->owner = *owner; + memcpy(h->data, data, 32); + QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&siglist->sha256, h, next); +} + +void uefi_vars_siglist_init(uefi_vars_siglist *siglist) +{ + memset(siglist, 0, sizeof(*siglist)); + QTAILQ_INIT(&siglist->x509); + QTAILQ_INIT(&siglist->sha256); +} + +void uefi_vars_siglist_free(uefi_vars_siglist *siglist) +{ + uefi_vars_cert *c, *cs; + uefi_vars_hash *h, *hs; + + QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(c, &siglist->x509, next, cs) { + QTAILQ_REMOVE(&siglist->x509, c, next); + g_free(c); + } + QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(h, &siglist->sha256, next, hs) { + QTAILQ_REMOVE(&siglist->sha256, h, next); + g_free(h); + } +} + +/* + * Parse UEFI signature list. + */ +void uefi_vars_siglist_parse(uefi_vars_siglist *siglist, + void *data, uint64_t size) +{ + efi_siglist *efilist; + uint64_t start; + + while (size) { + if (size < sizeof(*efilist)) { + break; + } + efilist = data; + if (size < efilist->siglist_size) { + break; + } + + if (uadd64_overflow(sizeof(*efilist), efilist->header_size, &start)) { + break; + } + if (efilist->sig_size <= sizeof(QemuUUID)) { + break; + } + + if (qemu_uuid_is_equal(&efilist->guid_type, &EfiCertX509Guid)) { + if (start + efilist->sig_size != efilist->siglist_size) { + break; + } + uefi_vars_siglist_add_x509(siglist, + (QemuUUID *)(data + start), + data + start + sizeof(QemuUUID), + efilist->sig_size - sizeof(QemuUUID)); + + } else if (qemu_uuid_is_equal(&efilist->guid_type, &EfiCertSha256Guid)) { + if (efilist->sig_size != sizeof(QemuUUID) + 32) { + break; + } + if (start + efilist->sig_size > efilist->siglist_size) { + break; + } + while (start <= efilist->siglist_size - efilist->sig_size) { + uefi_vars_siglist_add_sha256(siglist, + (QemuUUID *)(data + start), + data + start + sizeof(QemuUUID)); + start += efilist->sig_size; + } + + } else { + QemuUUID be = qemu_uuid_bswap(efilist->guid_type); + char *str_uuid = qemu_uuid_unparse_strdup(&be); + warn_report("%s: unknown type (%s)", __func__, str_uuid); + g_free(str_uuid); + } + + data += efilist->siglist_size; + size -= efilist->siglist_size; + } +} + +uint64_t uefi_vars_siglist_blob_size(uefi_vars_siglist *siglist) +{ + uefi_vars_cert *c; + uefi_vars_hash *h; + uint64_t size = 0; + + QTAILQ_FOREACH(c, &siglist->x509, next) { + size += sizeof(efi_siglist) + sizeof(QemuUUID) + c->size; + } + + if (!QTAILQ_EMPTY(&siglist->sha256)) { + size += sizeof(efi_siglist); + QTAILQ_FOREACH(h, &siglist->sha256, next) { + size += sizeof(QemuUUID) + 32; + } + } + + return size; +} + +/* + * Generate UEFI signature list. + */ +void uefi_vars_siglist_blob_generate(uefi_vars_siglist *siglist, + void *data, uint64_t size) +{ + uefi_vars_cert *c; + uefi_vars_hash *h; + efi_siglist *efilist; + uint64_t pos = 0, start; + uint32_t i; + + QTAILQ_FOREACH(c, &siglist->x509, next) { + efilist = data + pos; + efilist->guid_type = EfiCertX509Guid; + efilist->sig_size = sizeof(QemuUUID) + c->size; + efilist->header_size = 0; + + start = pos + sizeof(efi_siglist); + memcpy(data + start, + &c->owner, sizeof(QemuUUID)); + memcpy(data + start + sizeof(QemuUUID), + c->data, c->size); + + efilist->siglist_size = sizeof(efi_siglist) + efilist->sig_size; + pos += efilist->siglist_size; + } + + if (!QTAILQ_EMPTY(&siglist->sha256)) { + efilist = data + pos; + efilist->guid_type = EfiCertSha256Guid; + efilist->sig_size = sizeof(QemuUUID) + 32; + efilist->header_size = 0; + + i = 0; + start = pos + sizeof(efi_siglist); + QTAILQ_FOREACH(h, &siglist->sha256, next) { + memcpy(data + start + efilist->sig_size * i, + &h->owner, sizeof(QemuUUID)); + memcpy(data + start + efilist->sig_size * i + sizeof(QemuUUID), + h->data, 32); + i++; + } + + efilist->siglist_size = sizeof(efi_siglist) + efilist->sig_size * i; + pos += efilist->siglist_size; + } + + assert(pos == size); +} -- cgit v1.1 From 12058948abdf7eed8364aee79add66b40002fd5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:18 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add var-service-json.c + qapi for NV vars. Define qapi schema for the uefi variable store state. Use it and the generated visitor helper functions to store persistent (EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) variables in JSON format on disk. Acked-by: Markus Armbruster Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-15-kraxel@redhat.com> [ incremental fix squashed in ] Message-ID: --- hw/uefi/var-service-json.c | 243 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 243 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/var-service-json.c (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-json.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-json.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..761082c --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-json.c @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * uefi vars device - serialize non-volatile varstore from/to json, + * using qapi + * + * tools which can read/write these json files: + * - https://gitlab.com/kraxel/virt-firmware + * - https://github.com/awslabs/python-uefivars + */ +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "qemu/cutils.h" +#include "qemu/error-report.h" +#include "system/dma.h" + +#include "hw/uefi/var-service.h" + +#include "qobject/qobject.h" +#include "qobject/qjson.h" + +#include "qapi/dealloc-visitor.h" +#include "qapi/qobject-input-visitor.h" +#include "qapi/qobject-output-visitor.h" +#include "qapi/qapi-types-uefi.h" +#include "qapi/qapi-visit-uefi.h" + +static char *generate_hexstr(void *data, size_t len) +{ + static const char hex[] = { + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', + '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f', + }; + uint8_t *src = data; + char *dest; + size_t i; + + dest = g_malloc(len * 2 + 1); + for (i = 0; i < len * 2;) { + dest[i++] = hex[*src >> 4]; + dest[i++] = hex[*src & 15]; + src++; + } + dest[i++] = 0; + + return dest; +} + +static UefiVarStore *uefi_vars_to_qapi(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + UefiVarStore *vs; + UefiVariableList **tail; + UefiVariable *v; + QemuUUID be; + uefi_variable *var; + + vs = g_new0(UefiVarStore, 1); + vs->version = 2; + tail = &vs->variables; + + QTAILQ_FOREACH(var, &uv->variables, next) { + if (!(var->attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE)) { + continue; + } + + v = g_new0(UefiVariable, 1); + be = qemu_uuid_bswap(var->guid); + v->guid = qemu_uuid_unparse_strdup(&be); + v->name = uefi_ucs2_to_ascii(var->name, var->name_size); + v->attr = var->attributes; + + v->data = generate_hexstr(var->data, var->data_size); + + if (var->attributes & + EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) { + v->time = generate_hexstr(&var->time, sizeof(var->time)); + if (var->digest && var->digest_size) { + v->digest = generate_hexstr(var->digest, var->digest_size); + } + } + + QAPI_LIST_APPEND(tail, v); + } + return vs; +} + +static unsigned parse_hexchar(char c) +{ + switch (c) { + case '0' ... '9': return c - '0'; + case 'a' ... 'f': return c - 'a' + 0xa; + case 'A' ... 'F': return c - 'A' + 0xA; + default: return 0; + } +} + +static void parse_hexstr(void *dest, char *src, int len) +{ + uint8_t *data = dest; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 2) { + *(data++) = + parse_hexchar(src[i]) << 4 | + parse_hexchar(src[i + 1]); + } +} + +static void uefi_vars_from_qapi(uefi_vars_state *uv, UefiVarStore *vs) +{ + UefiVariableList *item; + UefiVariable *v; + QemuUUID be; + uefi_variable *var; + uint8_t *data; + size_t i, len; + + for (item = vs->variables; item != NULL; item = item->next) { + v = item->value; + + var = g_new0(uefi_variable, 1); + var->attributes = v->attr; + qemu_uuid_parse(v->guid, &be); + var->guid = qemu_uuid_bswap(be); + + len = strlen(v->name); + var->name_size = len * 2 + 2; + var->name = g_malloc(var->name_size); + for (i = 0; i <= len; i++) { + var->name[i] = v->name[i]; + } + + len = strlen(v->data); + var->data_size = len / 2; + var->data = data = g_malloc(var->data_size); + parse_hexstr(var->data, v->data, len); + + if (v->time && strlen(v->time) == 32) { + parse_hexstr(&var->time, v->time, 32); + } + + if (v->digest) { + len = strlen(v->digest); + var->digest_size = len / 2; + var->digest = g_malloc(var->digest_size); + parse_hexstr(var->digest, v->digest, len); + } + + QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&uv->variables, var, next); + } +} + +static GString *uefi_vars_to_json(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + UefiVarStore *vs = uefi_vars_to_qapi(uv); + QObject *qobj = NULL; + Visitor *v; + GString *gstr; + + v = qobject_output_visitor_new(&qobj); + if (visit_type_UefiVarStore(v, NULL, &vs, NULL)) { + visit_complete(v, &qobj); + } + visit_free(v); + qapi_free_UefiVarStore(vs); + + gstr = qobject_to_json_pretty(qobj, true); + qobject_unref(qobj); + + return gstr; +} + +void uefi_vars_json_init(uefi_vars_state *uv, Error **errp) +{ + if (uv->jsonfile) { + uv->jsonfd = qemu_create(uv->jsonfile, O_RDWR, 0666, errp); + } +} + +void uefi_vars_json_save(uefi_vars_state *uv) +{ + GString *gstr; + int rc; + + if (uv->jsonfd == -1) { + return; + } + + gstr = uefi_vars_to_json(uv); + + lseek(uv->jsonfd, 0, SEEK_SET); + rc = ftruncate(uv->jsonfd, 0); + if (rc != 0) { + warn_report("%s: ftruncate error", __func__); + } + rc = write(uv->jsonfd, gstr->str, gstr->len); + if (rc != gstr->len) { + warn_report("%s: write error", __func__); + } + fsync(uv->jsonfd); + + g_string_free(gstr, true); +} + +void uefi_vars_json_load(uefi_vars_state *uv, Error **errp) +{ + UefiVarStore *vs; + QObject *qobj; + Visitor *v; + char *str; + size_t len; + int rc; + + if (uv->jsonfd == -1) { + return; + } + + len = lseek(uv->jsonfd, 0, SEEK_END); + if (len == 0) { + return; + } + + str = g_malloc(len + 1); + lseek(uv->jsonfd, 0, SEEK_SET); + rc = read(uv->jsonfd, str, len); + if (rc != len) { + warn_report("%s: read error", __func__); + } + str[len] = 0; + + qobj = qobject_from_json(str, errp); + v = qobject_input_visitor_new(qobj); + visit_type_UefiVarStore(v, NULL, &vs, errp); + visit_free(v); + + if (!(*errp)) { + uefi_vars_from_qapi(uv, vs); + uefi_vars_update_storage(uv); + } + + qapi_free_UefiVarStore(vs); + qobject_unref(qobj); + g_free(str); +} -- cgit v1.1 From 9282bed590ab54a24659fdcff668d46d7129d946 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:19 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add trace-events Add trace events for debugging and trouble shooting. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-16-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/trace-events | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/trace-events (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/trace-events b/hw/uefi/trace-events new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3694712 --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/trace-events @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# device +uefi_reg_read(uint64_t addr, unsigned size) "addr 0x%" PRIx64 ", size %u" +uefi_reg_write(uint64_t addr, uint64_t val, unsigned size) "addr 0x%" PRIx64 ", val 0x%" PRIx64 ", size %d" +uefi_hard_reset(void) "" + +# generic uefi +uefi_variable(const char *context, const char *name, uint64_t size, const char *uuid) "context %s, name %s, size %" PRIu64 ", uuid %s" +uefi_status(const char *context, const char *name) "context %s, status %s" +uefi_event(const char *name) "event %s" + +# variable protocol +uefi_vars_proto_cmd(const char *cmd) "cmd %s" +uefi_vars_security_violation(const char *reason) "reason %s" + +# variable policy protocol +uefi_vars_policy_cmd(const char *cmd) "cmd %s" +uefi_vars_policy_deny(const char *reason) "reason %s" -- cgit v1.1 From e8371973d7e651f9d7b82100cb9745fd2795d722 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:20 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add UEFI_VARS to Kconfig Add UEFI_VARS config option, enable by default for x86_64 and aarch64. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-17-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/Kconfig | 1 + hw/uefi/Kconfig | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/Kconfig (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/Kconfig b/hw/Kconfig index 1b4e9bb..c4dfe2e 100644 --- a/hw/Kconfig +++ b/hw/Kconfig @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ source smbios/Kconfig source ssi/Kconfig source timer/Kconfig source tpm/Kconfig +source uefi/Kconfig source ufs/Kconfig source usb/Kconfig source virtio/Kconfig diff --git a/hw/uefi/Kconfig b/hw/uefi/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ca6c2bc --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +config UEFI_VARS + bool + default y if X86_64 || AARCH64 -- cgit v1.1 From 736ca80cdd18c837dcfca016a6df746a70d33bb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:21 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add to meson Wire up uefi-vars in the build system. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-18-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/meson.build | 1 + hw/uefi/meson.build | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+) (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/meson.build b/hw/meson.build index b827c82..138f5d5 100644 --- a/hw/meson.build +++ b/hw/meson.build @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ subdir('smbios') subdir('ssi') subdir('timer') subdir('tpm') +subdir('uefi') subdir('ufs') subdir('usb') subdir('vfio') diff --git a/hw/uefi/meson.build b/hw/uefi/meson.build index a8b1689..e63708a 100644 --- a/hw/uefi/meson.build +++ b/hw/uefi/meson.build @@ -1 +1,20 @@ system_ss.add(files('hardware-info.c')) + +uefi_vars_ss = ss.source_set() +if (config_all_devices.has_key('CONFIG_UEFI_VARS')) + uefi_vars_ss.add(files('var-service-core.c', + 'var-service-json.c', + 'var-service-vars.c', + 'var-service-auth.c', + 'var-service-guid.c', + 'var-service-utils.c', + 'var-service-policy.c')) + uefi_vars_ss.add(when: gnutls, + if_true: files('var-service-pkcs7.c'), + if_false: files('var-service-pkcs7-stub.c')) + uefi_vars_ss.add(files('var-service-siglist.c')) +endif + +modules += { 'hw-uefi' : { + 'vars' : uefi_vars_ss, +}} -- cgit v1.1 From 5bb89df2e37382d6d278d52cfb22ae61f60daf70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:22 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi: add uefi-vars-sysbus device This adds sysbus bindings for the variable service. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-19-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/meson.build | 3 +- hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/meson.build b/hw/uefi/meson.build index e63708a..91eb95f 100644 --- a/hw/uefi/meson.build +++ b/hw/uefi/meson.build @@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ if (config_all_devices.has_key('CONFIG_UEFI_VARS')) 'var-service-auth.c', 'var-service-guid.c', 'var-service-utils.c', - 'var-service-policy.c')) + 'var-service-policy.c', + 'var-service-sysbus.c')) uefi_vars_ss.add(when: gnutls, if_true: files('var-service-pkcs7.c'), if_false: files('var-service-pkcs7-stub.c')) diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..60072c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * uefi vars device - sysbus variant. + */ +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "migration/vmstate.h" + +#include "hw/qdev-properties.h" +#include "hw/sysbus.h" + +#include "hw/uefi/var-service.h" +#include "hw/uefi/var-service-api.h" + +OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(uefi_vars_sysbus_state, UEFI_VARS_SYSBUS) + +struct uefi_vars_sysbus_state { + SysBusDevice parent_obj; + struct uefi_vars_state state; +}; + +static const VMStateDescription vmstate_uefi_vars_sysbus = { + .name = TYPE_UEFI_VARS_SYSBUS, + .fields = (VMStateField[]) { + VMSTATE_STRUCT(state, uefi_vars_sysbus_state, 0, + vmstate_uefi_vars, uefi_vars_state), + VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST() + } +}; + +static const Property uefi_vars_sysbus_properties[] = { + DEFINE_PROP_SIZE("size", uefi_vars_sysbus_state, state.max_storage, + 256 * 1024), + DEFINE_PROP_STRING("jsonfile", uefi_vars_sysbus_state, state.jsonfile), + DEFINE_PROP_BOOL("force-secure-boot", uefi_vars_sysbus_state, + state.force_secure_boot, false), + DEFINE_PROP_BOOL("disable-custom-mode", uefi_vars_sysbus_state, + state.disable_custom_mode, false), + DEFINE_PROP_BOOL("use-pio", uefi_vars_sysbus_state, + state.use_pio, false), +}; + +static void uefi_vars_sysbus_init(Object *obj) +{ + uefi_vars_sysbus_state *uv = UEFI_VARS_SYSBUS(obj); + + uefi_vars_init(obj, &uv->state); +} + +static void uefi_vars_sysbus_reset(DeviceState *dev) +{ + uefi_vars_sysbus_state *uv = UEFI_VARS_SYSBUS(dev); + + uefi_vars_hard_reset(&uv->state); +} + +static void uefi_vars_sysbus_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp) +{ + uefi_vars_sysbus_state *uv = UEFI_VARS_SYSBUS(dev); + SysBusDevice *sysbus = SYS_BUS_DEVICE(dev); + + sysbus_init_mmio(sysbus, &uv->state.mr); + uefi_vars_realize(&uv->state, errp); +} + +static void uefi_vars_sysbus_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data) +{ + DeviceClass *dc = DEVICE_CLASS(klass); + + dc->realize = uefi_vars_sysbus_realize; + dc->vmsd = &vmstate_uefi_vars_sysbus; + device_class_set_legacy_reset(dc, uefi_vars_sysbus_reset); + device_class_set_props(dc, uefi_vars_sysbus_properties); + set_bit(DEVICE_CATEGORY_MISC, dc->categories); +} + +static const TypeInfo uefi_vars_sysbus_info = { + .name = TYPE_UEFI_VARS_SYSBUS, + .parent = TYPE_SYS_BUS_DEVICE, + .instance_size = sizeof(uefi_vars_sysbus_state), + .instance_init = uefi_vars_sysbus_init, + .class_init = uefi_vars_sysbus_class_init, +}; +module_obj(TYPE_UEFI_VARS_SYSBUS); + +static void uefi_vars_sysbus_register_types(void) +{ + type_register_static(&uefi_vars_sysbus_info); +} + +type_init(uefi_vars_sysbus_register_types) -- cgit v1.1 From 03223b665c675f6f7d05555d9c6a69678c9ab875 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:23 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi-vars-sysbus: qemu platform bus support Add and register function to create an device tree entry when the device is added to the qemu platform bus. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-20-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/core/sysbus-fdt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+) (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/core/sysbus-fdt.c b/hw/core/sysbus-fdt.c index 774c0ae..e85066b 100644 --- a/hw/core/sysbus-fdt.c +++ b/hw/core/sysbus-fdt.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include "hw/vfio/vfio-calxeda-xgmac.h" #include "hw/vfio/vfio-amd-xgbe.h" #include "hw/display/ramfb.h" +#include "hw/uefi/var-service-api.h" #include "hw/arm/fdt.h" /* @@ -471,6 +472,28 @@ static int add_tpm_tis_fdt_node(SysBusDevice *sbdev, void *opaque) } #endif +static int add_uefi_vars_node(SysBusDevice *sbdev, void *opaque) +{ + PlatformBusFDTData *data = opaque; + PlatformBusDevice *pbus = data->pbus; + const char *parent_node = data->pbus_node_name; + void *fdt = data->fdt; + uint64_t mmio_base; + char *nodename; + + mmio_base = platform_bus_get_mmio_addr(pbus, sbdev, 0); + nodename = g_strdup_printf("%s/%s@%" PRIx64, parent_node, + UEFI_VARS_FDT_NODE, mmio_base); + qemu_fdt_add_subnode(fdt, nodename); + qemu_fdt_setprop_string(fdt, nodename, + "compatible", UEFI_VARS_FDT_COMPAT); + qemu_fdt_setprop_sized_cells(fdt, nodename, "reg", + 1, mmio_base, + 1, UEFI_VARS_REGS_SIZE); + g_free(nodename); + return 0; +} + static int no_fdt_node(SysBusDevice *sbdev, void *opaque) { return 0; @@ -495,6 +518,7 @@ static const BindingEntry bindings[] = { TYPE_BINDING(TYPE_TPM_TIS_SYSBUS, add_tpm_tis_fdt_node), #endif TYPE_BINDING(TYPE_RAMFB_DEVICE, no_fdt_node), + TYPE_BINDING(TYPE_UEFI_VARS_SYSBUS, add_uefi_vars_node), TYPE_BINDING("", NULL), /* last element */ }; diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c index 60072c8..2857298 100644 --- a/hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ static void uefi_vars_sysbus_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data) dc->realize = uefi_vars_sysbus_realize; dc->vmsd = &vmstate_uefi_vars_sysbus; + dc->user_creatable = true; device_class_set_legacy_reset(dc, uefi_vars_sysbus_reset); device_class_set_props(dc, uefi_vars_sysbus_properties); set_bit(DEVICE_CATEGORY_MISC, dc->categories); -- cgit v1.1 From 69392de9138fe6d49f96dfae8adfb9cd64e0578e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:24 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi-vars-sysbus: add x64 variant The x86 variant of the device is mapped on the fixed address 0xfef10000 and uses etc/hardware-info instead of FDT to pass the mapping location to the edk2 firmware. The latter allows to move the device to a different location should that turn out to be necessary in the future. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-21-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+) (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c b/hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c index 2857298..97da867 100644 --- a/hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c +++ b/hw/uefi/var-service-sysbus.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "hw/qdev-properties.h" #include "hw/sysbus.h" +#include "hw/uefi/hardware-info.h" #include "hw/uefi/var-service.h" #include "hw/uefi/var-service-api.h" @@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ static void uefi_vars_sysbus_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data) set_bit(DEVICE_CATEGORY_MISC, dc->categories); } +/* generic: hardware discovery via FDT */ static const TypeInfo uefi_vars_sysbus_info = { .name = TYPE_UEFI_VARS_SYSBUS, .parent = TYPE_SYS_BUS_DEVICE, @@ -84,9 +86,39 @@ static const TypeInfo uefi_vars_sysbus_info = { }; module_obj(TYPE_UEFI_VARS_SYSBUS); +static void uefi_vars_x64_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp) +{ + HARDWARE_INFO_SIMPLE_DEVICE hwinfo = { + .mmio_address = cpu_to_le64(0xfef10000), + }; + SysBusDevice *sysbus = SYS_BUS_DEVICE(dev); + + uefi_vars_sysbus_realize(dev, errp); + + hardware_info_register(HardwareInfoQemuUefiVars, + &hwinfo, sizeof(hwinfo)); + sysbus_mmio_map(sysbus, 0, hwinfo.mmio_address); +} + +static void uefi_vars_x64_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data) +{ + DeviceClass *dc = DEVICE_CLASS(klass); + + dc->realize = uefi_vars_x64_realize; +} + +/* x64: hardware discovery via etc/hardware-info fw_cfg */ +static const TypeInfo uefi_vars_x64_info = { + .name = TYPE_UEFI_VARS_X64, + .parent = TYPE_UEFI_VARS_SYSBUS, + .class_init = uefi_vars_x64_class_init, +}; +module_obj(TYPE_UEFI_VARS_X64); + static void uefi_vars_sysbus_register_types(void) { type_register_static(&uefi_vars_sysbus_info); + type_register_static(&uefi_vars_x64_info); } type_init(uefi_vars_sysbus_register_types) -- cgit v1.1 From 22ebb90e62e97a431ec50edf7ddb19412a934555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:25 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi-vars-sysbus: allow for arm virt Allow the device being added to aarch64 virt VMs. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-22-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/arm/virt.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/arm/virt.c b/hw/arm/virt.c index ee69081..904c698 100644 --- a/hw/arm/virt.c +++ b/hw/arm/virt.c @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ #include "hw/mem/pc-dimm.h" #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h" #include "hw/acpi/generic_event_device.h" +#include "hw/uefi/var-service-api.h" #include "hw/virtio/virtio-md-pci.h" #include "hw/virtio/virtio-iommu.h" #include "hw/char/pl011.h" @@ -3162,6 +3163,7 @@ static void virt_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(mc, TYPE_VFIO_AMD_XGBE); machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(mc, TYPE_RAMFB_DEVICE); machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(mc, TYPE_VFIO_PLATFORM); + machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(mc, TYPE_UEFI_VARS_SYSBUS); #ifdef CONFIG_TPM machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(mc, TYPE_TPM_TIS_SYSBUS); #endif -- cgit v1.1 From 918b8a12247090a03ac8db61ac19a97170a553df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:26 +0100 Subject: hw/uefi-vars-sysbus: allow for pc and q35 Allow the device being added to x86_64 pc and q35 VMs. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-23-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/i386/pc_piix.c | 2 ++ hw/i386/pc_q35.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/i386/pc_piix.c b/hw/i386/pc_piix.c index 04d2957..6c91e2d 100644 --- a/hw/i386/pc_piix.c +++ b/hw/i386/pc_piix.c @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ #include "system/numa.h" #include "hw/hyperv/vmbus-bridge.h" #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h" +#include "hw/uefi/var-service-api.h" #include "hw/i386/acpi-build.h" #include "target/i386/cpu.h" @@ -468,6 +469,7 @@ static void pc_i440fx_machine_options(MachineClass *m) m->no_parallel = !module_object_class_by_name(TYPE_ISA_PARALLEL); machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(m, TYPE_RAMFB_DEVICE); machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(m, TYPE_VMBUS_BRIDGE); + machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(m, TYPE_UEFI_VARS_X64); object_class_property_add_enum(oc, "x-south-bridge", "PCSouthBridgeOption", &PCSouthBridgeOption_lookup, diff --git a/hw/i386/pc_q35.c b/hw/i386/pc_q35.c index 77536dd..fd96d03 100644 --- a/hw/i386/pc_q35.c +++ b/hw/i386/pc_q35.c @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #include "system/numa.h" #include "hw/hyperv/vmbus-bridge.h" #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h" +#include "hw/uefi/var-service-api.h" #include "hw/i386/acpi-build.h" #include "target/i386/cpu.h" @@ -355,6 +356,7 @@ static void pc_q35_machine_options(MachineClass *m) machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(m, TYPE_INTEL_IOMMU_DEVICE); machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(m, TYPE_RAMFB_DEVICE); machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(m, TYPE_VMBUS_BRIDGE); + machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(m, TYPE_UEFI_VARS_X64); compat_props_add(m->compat_props, pc_q35_compat_defaults, pc_q35_compat_defaults_len); } -- cgit v1.1 From 2bc10b15deb4b29391628e10b18701bfbcf4be17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 17:30:28 +0100 Subject: docs: add uefi variable service documentation Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann Message-ID: <20250225163031.1409078-25-kraxel@redhat.com> --- hw/uefi/LIMITATIONS.md | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/uefi/LIMITATIONS.md (limited to 'hw') diff --git a/hw/uefi/LIMITATIONS.md b/hw/uefi/LIMITATIONS.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..29308bd --- /dev/null +++ b/hw/uefi/LIMITATIONS.md @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +known issues and limitations +---------------------------- + +* works only on little endian hosts + - accessing structs in guest ram is done without endian conversion. +* works only for 64-bit guests + - UINTN is mapped to uint64_t, for 32-bit guests that would be uint32_t -- cgit v1.1