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This validates that connections to an NBD server running on a UNIX
socket can use TLS with pre-shared keys (PSK).
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220304193610.3293146-13-berrange@redhat.com>
[eblake: squash in rebase fix]
Tested-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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This validates that connections to an NBD server running on a UNIX
socket can use TLS, and require a TLS hostname override to pass
certificate validation.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220304193610.3293146-12-berrange@redhat.com>
[eblake: squash in rebase fix]
Tested-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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This validates that connections to an NBD server where the certificate
hostname does not match will fail. It further validates that using the
new 'tls-hostname' override option can solve the failure.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220304193610.3293146-11-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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Using standard filters is more future proof than rolling our own.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220304193610.3293146-10-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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The version of GNUTLS in Fedora 34 has changed the order in which encodes
fields when generating new TLS certificates. This in turn changes the
order seen when querying the distinguished name. This ultimately breaks
the expected output in the NBD TLS iotests. We don't need to be
comparing the exact distinguished name text for the purpose of the test
though, so it is fine to filter it out.
Reported-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210804180330.3469683-1-berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hanna Reitz <hreitz@redhat.com>
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I received an off-list report of failure to connect to an NBD server
expecting an x509 certificate, when the client was attempting something
similar to this command line:
$ ./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64 -name 'blah' -machine q35 -nodefaults \
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,endpoint=client,dir=$path_to_certs \
-device virtio-scsi-pci,id=virtio_scsi_pci0,bus=pcie.0,addr=0x6 \
-drive id=drive_image1,if=none,snapshot=off,aio=threads,cache=none,format=raw,file=nbd:localhost:9000,werror=stop,rerror=stop,tls-creds=tls0 \
-device scsi-hd,id=image1,drive=drive_image1,bootindex=0
qemu-system-x86_64: -drive id=drive_image1,if=none,snapshot=off,aio=threads,cache=none,format=raw,file=nbd:localhost:9000,werror=stop,rerror=stop,tls-creds=tls0: TLS negotiation required before option 7 (go)
server reported: Option 0x7 not permitted before TLS
The problem? As specified, -drive is trying to pass tls-creds to the
raw format driver instead of the nbd protocol driver, but before we
get to the point where we can detect that raw doesn't know what to do
with tls-creds, the nbd driver has already failed because the server
complained. The fix to the broken command line? Pass
'...,file.tls-creds=tls0' to ensure the tls-creds option is handed to
nbd, not raw. But since the error message was rather cryptic, I'm
trying to improve the error message.
With this patch, the error message adds a line:
qemu-system-x86_64: -drive id=drive_image1,if=none,snapshot=off,aio=threads,cache=none,format=raw,file=nbd:localhost:9000,werror=stop,rerror=stop,tls-creds=tls0: TLS negotiation required before option 7 (go)
Did you forget a valid tls-creds?
server reported: Option 0x7 not permitted before TLS
And with luck, someone grepping for that error message will find this
commit message and figure out their command line mistake. Sadly, the
only mention of file.tls-creds in our docs relates to an --image-opts
use of PSK encryption with qemu-img as the client, rather than x509
certificate encryption with qemu-kvm as the client.
CC: Tingting Mao <timao@redhat.com>
CC: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190907172055.26870-1-eblake@redhat.com>
[eblake: squash in iotest 233 fix]
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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The server side is fairly straightforward: we can always advertise
support for detection of fast zero, and implement it by mapping the
request to the block layer BDRV_REQ_NO_FALLBACK.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190823143726.27062-5-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
[eblake: update iotests 223, 233]
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A server may have a reason to reject a request for structured replies,
beyond just not recognizing them as a valid request; similarly, it may
have a reason for rejecting a request for a meta context. It doesn't
hurt us to continue talking to such a server; otherwise 'qemu-nbd
--list' of such a server fails to display all available details about
the export.
Encountered when temporarily tweaking nbdkit to reply with
NBD_REP_ERR_POLICY. Present since structured reply support was first
added (commit d795299b reused starttls handling, but starttls is
different in that we can't fall back to other behavior on any error).
Note that for an unencrypted client trying to connect to a server that
requires encryption, this defers the point of failure to when we
finally execute a strict command (such as NBD_OPT_GO or NBD_OPT_LIST),
now that the intermediate NBD_OPT_STRUCTURED_REPLY does not diagnose
NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD as fatal; but as the protocol eventually gets us
to a command where we can't continue onwards, the changed error
message doesn't cause any security concerns.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190824172813.29720-3-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
[eblake: fix iotest 233]
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233 generally filters the port, but in two cases does not. If some
other concurrently running application has already taken port 10809,
this will result in an output mismatch. Fix this by applying the
filter in these two cases, too.
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190506160529.6955-1-mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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Disk sizes close to INT64_MAX cause overflow, for some pretty
ridiculous output:
$ ./nbdkit -U - memory size=$((2**63 - 512)) --run 'qemu-img info $nbd'
image: nbd+unix://?socket=/tmp/nbdkitHSAzNz/socket
file format: raw
virtual size: -8388607T (9223372036854775296 bytes)
disk size: unavailable
But there's no reason to have two separate implementations of integer
to human-readable abbreviation, where one has overflow and stops at
'T', while the other avoids overflow and goes all the way to 'E'. With
this patch, the output now claims 8EiB instead of -8388607T, which
really is the correct rounding of largest file size supported by qemu
(we could go 511 bytes larger if we used byte-accurate sizing instead
of rounding up to the next sector boundary, but that wouldn't change
the human-readable result).
Quite a few iotests need updates to expected output to match.
Reported-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alberto Garcia <berto@igalia.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
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Both NBD_CMD_BLOCK_STATUS and structured NBD_CMD_READ will split their
reply according to bdrv_block_status() boundaries. If the block device
has a request_alignment smaller than 512, but we advertise a block
alignment of 512 to the client, then this can result in the server
reply violating client expectations by reporting a smaller region of
the export than what the client is permitted to address (although this
is less of an issue for qemu 4.0 clients, given recent client patches
to overlook our non-compliance at EOF). Since it's always better to
be strict in what we send, it is worth advertising the actual minimum
block limit rather than blindly rounding it up to 512.
Note that this patch is not foolproof - it is still possible to
provoke non-compliant server behavior using:
$ qemu-nbd --image-opts driver=blkdebug,align=512,image.driver=file,image.filename=/path/to/non-aligned-file
That is arguably a bug in the blkdebug driver (it should never pass
back block status smaller than its alignment, even if it has to make
multiple bdrv_get_status calls and determine the
least-common-denominator status among the group to return). It may
also be possible to observe issues with a backing layer with smaller
alignment than the active layer, although so far I have been unable to
write a reliable iotest for that scenario (but again, an issue like
that could be argued to be a bug in the block layer, or something
where we need a flag to bdrv_block_status() to state whether the
result must be aligned to the current layer's limits or can be
subdivided for accuracy when chasing backing files).
Anyways, as blkdebug is not normally used, and as this patch makes our
server more interoperable with qemu 3.1 clients, it is worth applying
now, even while we still work on a larger patch series for the 4.1
timeframe to have byte-accurate file lengths.
Note that the iotests output changes - for 223 and 233, we can see the
server's better granularity advertisement; and for 241, the three test
cases have the following effects:
- natural alignment: the server's smaller alignment is now advertised,
and the hole reported at EOF is now the right result; we've gotten rid
of the server's non-compliance
- forced server alignment: the server still advertises 512 bytes, but
still sends a mid-sector hole. This is still a server compliance bug,
which needs to be fixed in the block layer in a later patch; output
does not change because the client is already being tolerant of the
non-compliance
- forced client alignment: the server's smaller alignment means that
the client now sees the server's status change mid-sector without any
protocol violations, but the fact that the map shows an unaligned
mid-sector hole is evidence of the block layer problems with aligned
block status, to be fixed in a later patch
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190329042750.14704-7-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
[eblake: rebase to enhanced iotest 241 coverage]
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Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use
the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option
for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate.
This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA
before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly
low bar to cross.
This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which
takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will
be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients
failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD
server.
For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client
whose x509 certificate distinguished name is
CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
escape the commas in the name and use:
qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
--object 'authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB' \
--tls-creds tls0 \
--tls-authz authz0 \
....other qemu-nbd args...
NB: a real shell command line would not have leading whitespace after
the line continuation, it is just included here for clarity.
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190227162035.18543-2-berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
[eblake: split long line in --help text, tweak 233 to show that whitespace
after ,, in identity= portion is actually okay]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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Any good new feature deserves some regression testing :)
Coverage includes:
- 223: what happens when there are 0 or more than 1 export,
proof that we can see multiple contexts including qemu:dirty-bitmap
- 233: proof that we can list over TLS, and that mix-and-match of
plain/TLS listings will behave sanely
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Message-Id: <20190117193658.16413-22-eblake@redhat.com>
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We have a race between the nbd server and the client both trying
to report errors at once which can make the test sometimes fail
if the output lines swap order under load. Break the race by
collecting server messages into a file and then replaying that
at the end of the test.
We may yet want to fix the server to not output ANYTHING for a
client action except when -v was used (to avoid malicious clients
from being able to DoS a server by filling up its logs), but that
is saved for a future patch.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
CC: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190117193658.16413-2-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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This changes output from:
$ qemu-nbd nosuch
Failed to blk_new_open 'nosuch': Could not open 'nosuch': No such file or directory
to something more consistent with qemu-img and qemu:
$ qemu-nbd nosuch
qemu-nbd: Failed to blk_new_open 'nosuch': Could not open 'nosuch': No such file or directory
Update the lone affected test to match. (Hmm - is it sad that we don't
do much testing of expected failures?)
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Message-Id: <20181215135324.152629-2-eblake@redhat.com>
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Enhance test 233 to also perform I/O beyond the initial handshake.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20181118022403.2211483-1-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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Add tests that validate it is possible to connect to an NBD server
running TLS mode. Also test mis-matched TLS vs non-TLS connections
correctly fail.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20181116155325.22428-7-berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
[eblake: rebase to iotests shell cleanups, use ss instead of socat for
port probing, sanitize port number in expected output]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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