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2024-01-05target/i386: the sgx_epc_get_section stub is reachablePaolo Bonzini1-1/+1
The sgx_epc_get_section stub is reachable from cpu_x86_cpuid. It should not assert, instead it should just return true just like the "real" sgx_epc_get_section does when SGX is disabled. Reported-by: Vladimír Beneš <vbenes@redhat.com> Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-ID: <20220201190941.106001-1-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit 219615740425d9683588207b40a365e6741691a6) Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2021-12-10numa: Enable numa for SGX EPC sectionsYang Zhong1-0/+4
The basic SGX did not enable numa for SGX EPC sections, which result in all EPC sections located in numa node 0. This patch enable SGX numa function in the guest and the EPC section can work with RAM as one numa node. The Guest kernel related log: [ 0.009981] ACPI: SRAT: Node 0 PXM 0 [mem 0x180000000-0x183ffffff] [ 0.009982] ACPI: SRAT: Node 1 PXM 1 [mem 0x184000000-0x185bfffff] The SRAT table can normally show SGX EPC sections menory info in different numa nodes. The SGX EPC numa related command: ...... -m 4G,maxmem=20G \ -smp sockets=2,cores=2 \ -cpu host,+sgx-provisionkey \ -object memory-backend-ram,size=2G,host-nodes=0,policy=bind,id=node0 \ -object memory-backend-epc,id=mem0,size=64M,prealloc=on,host-nodes=0,policy=bind \ -numa node,nodeid=0,cpus=0-1,memdev=node0 \ -object memory-backend-ram,size=2G,host-nodes=1,policy=bind,id=node1 \ -object memory-backend-epc,id=mem1,size=28M,prealloc=on,host-nodes=1,policy=bind \ -numa node,nodeid=1,cpus=2-3,memdev=node1 \ -M sgx-epc.0.memdev=mem0,sgx-epc.0.node=0,sgx-epc.1.memdev=mem1,sgx-epc.1.node=1 \ ...... Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com> Message-Id: <20211101162009.62161-2-yang.zhong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-10-13hw/i386/sgx: Move qmp_query_sgx() and hmp_info_sgx() to hw/i386/sgx.cPhilippe Mathieu-Daudé1-2/+8
Move qmp_query_sgx() and hmp_info_sgx() from target/i386/monitor.c to hw/i386/sgx.c, removing the sgx_get_info() indirection and the "hw/i386/sgx.h" header. Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20211007175612.496366-5-philmd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-10-13hw/i386/sgx: Move qmp_query_sgx_capabilities() to hw/i386/sgx.cPhilippe Mathieu-Daudé1-1/+3
Move qmp_query_sgx_capabilities() from target/i386/monitor.c to hw/i386/sgx.c, removing the sgx_get_capabilities() indirection. Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20211007175612.496366-4-philmd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-10-13hw/i386/sgx: Have sgx_epc_get_section() return a booleanPhilippe Mathieu-Daudé1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20211007175612.496366-3-philmd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-09-30target/i386: Add the query-sgx-capabilities QMP commandYang Zhong1-0/+6
Libvirt can use query-sgx-capabilities to get the host sgx capabilities to decide how to allocate SGX EPC size to VM. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com> Message-Id: <20210910102258.46648-3-yang.zhong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-09-30target/i386: Add HMP and QMP interfaces for SGXYang Zhong1-0/+7
The QMP and HMP interfaces can be used by monitor or QMP tools to retrieve the SGX information from VM side when SGX is enabled on Intel platform. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com> Message-Id: <20210910102258.46648-2-yang.zhong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-09-30i386: Update SGX CPUID info according to hardware/KVM/user inputSean Christopherson1-0/+13
Expose SGX to the guest if and only if KVM is enabled and supports virtualization of SGX. While the majority of ENCLS can be emulated to some degree, because SGX uses a hardware-based root of trust, the attestation aspects of SGX cannot be emulated in software, i.e. ultimately emulation will fail as software cannot generate a valid quote/report. The complexity of partially emulating SGX in Qemu far outweighs the value added, e.g. an SGX specific simulator for userspace applications can emulate SGX for development and testing purposes. Note, access to the PROVISIONKEY is not yet advertised to the guest as KVM blocks access to the PROVISIONKEY by default and requires userspace to provide additional credentials (via ioctl()) to expose PROVISIONKEY. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com> Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-13-yang.zhong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>