diff options
author | Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> | 2017-12-18 19:12:26 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> | 2018-01-12 13:48:54 +0100 |
commit | f887cf165db20f405cb8805c716bd363aaadf815 (patch) | |
tree | 4442dfe4e8c7af7c811c71510a709b448de47554 /ui/trace-events | |
parent | ada8d2e4369ea49677d8672ac81bce73eefd5b54 (diff) | |
download | qemu-f887cf165db20f405cb8805c716bd363aaadf815.zip qemu-f887cf165db20f405cb8805c716bd363aaadf815.tar.gz qemu-f887cf165db20f405cb8805c716bd363aaadf815.tar.bz2 |
ui: place a hard cap on VNC server output buffer size
The previous patches fix problems with throttling of forced framebuffer updates
and audio data capture that would cause the QEMU output buffer size to grow
without bound. Those fixes are graceful in that once the client catches up with
reading data from the server, everything continues operating normally.
There is some data which the server sends to the client that is impractical to
throttle. Specifically there are various pseudo framebuffer update encodings to
inform the client of things like desktop resizes, pointer changes, audio
playback start/stop, LED state and so on. These generally only involve sending
a very small amount of data to the client, but a malicious guest might be able
to do things that trigger these changes at a very high rate. Throttling them is
not practical as missed or delayed events would cause broken behaviour for the
client.
This patch thus takes a more forceful approach of setting an absolute upper
bound on the amount of data we permit to be present in the output buffer at
any time. The previous patch set a threshold for throttling the output buffer
by allowing an amount of data equivalent to one complete framebuffer update and
one seconds worth of audio data. On top of this it allowed for one further
forced framebuffer update to be queued.
To be conservative, we thus take that throttling threshold and multiply it by
5 to form an absolute upper bound. If this bound is hit during vnc_write() we
forceably disconnect the client, refusing to queue further data. This limit is
high enough that it should never be hit unless a malicious client is trying to
exploit the sever, or the network is completely saturated preventing any sending
of data on the socket.
This completes the fix for CVE-2017-15124 started in the previous patches.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-12-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'ui/trace-events')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions