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authorAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>2011-11-02 20:23:23 +0100
committerRiku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org>2012-02-02 17:51:19 +0200
commit3be14d05d45774b67398debe42e3bb5524998f4f (patch)
tree838849287089f6368b1fb259726396f634362667 /linux-user
parent125b0f55b63d11518f7d17480c795697c98b9bd3 (diff)
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linux-user: add open() hijack infrastructure
There are a number of files in /proc that expose host information to the guest program. This patch adds infrastructure to override the open() syscall for guest programs to enable us to on the fly generate guest sensible files. Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'linux-user')
-rw-r--r--linux-user/syscall.c52
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/linux-user/syscall.c b/linux-user/syscall.c
index 2bf9e7e..e100025 100644
--- a/linux-user/syscall.c
+++ b/linux-user/syscall.c
@@ -4600,6 +4600,52 @@ int get_osversion(void)
return osversion;
}
+static int do_open(void *cpu_env, const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
+{
+ struct fake_open {
+ const char *filename;
+ int (*fill)(void *cpu_env, int fd);
+ };
+ const struct fake_open *fake_open;
+ static const struct fake_open fakes[] = {
+ { NULL, NULL }
+ };
+
+ for (fake_open = fakes; fake_open->filename; fake_open++) {
+ if (!strncmp(pathname, fake_open->filename,
+ strlen(fake_open->filename))) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (fake_open->filename) {
+ const char *tmpdir;
+ char filename[PATH_MAX];
+ int fd, r;
+
+ /* create temporary file to map stat to */
+ tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR");
+ if (!tmpdir)
+ tmpdir = "/tmp";
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/qemu-open.XXXXXX", tmpdir);
+ fd = mkstemp(filename);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ return fd;
+ }
+ unlink(filename);
+
+ if ((r = fake_open->fill(cpu_env, fd))) {
+ close(fd);
+ return r;
+ }
+ lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+
+ return fd;
+ }
+
+ return get_errno(open(path(pathname), flags, mode));
+}
+
/* do_syscall() should always have a single exit point at the end so
that actions, such as logging of syscall results, can be performed.
All errnos that do_syscall() returns must be -TARGET_<errcode>. */
@@ -4685,9 +4731,9 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1,
case TARGET_NR_open:
if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg1)))
goto efault;
- ret = get_errno(open(path(p),
- target_to_host_bitmask(arg2, fcntl_flags_tbl),
- arg3));
+ ret = get_errno(do_open(cpu_env, p,
+ target_to_host_bitmask(arg2, fcntl_flags_tbl),
+ arg3));
unlock_user(p, arg1, 0);
break;
#if defined(TARGET_NR_openat) && defined(__NR_openat)