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author | Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> | 2015-05-24 10:53:44 +0200 |
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committer | Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> | 2015-06-10 15:03:02 +0100 |
commit | 9f7c594c006289ad41169b854d70f5da6e400a2a (patch) | |
tree | c0ec35dc415f0ae1f0306b1dbc21b0d8668ba849 /hw/net/pcnet.c | |
parent | b0411142f482df92717f8b4a3b746081a62b724f (diff) | |
download | qemu-9f7c594c006289ad41169b854d70f5da6e400a2a.zip qemu-9f7c594c006289ad41169b854d70f5da6e400a2a.tar.gz qemu-9f7c594c006289ad41169b854d70f5da6e400a2a.tar.bz2 |
pcnet: force the buffer access to be in bounds during tx
4096 is the maximum length per TMD and it is also currently the size of
the relay buffer pcnet driver uses for sending the packet data to QEMU
for further processing. With packet spanning multiple TMDs it can
happen that the overall packet size will be bigger than sizeof(buffer),
which results in memory corruption.
Fix this by only allowing to queue maximum sizeof(buffer) bytes.
This is CVE-2015-3209.
[Fixed 3-space indentation to QEMU's 4-space coding standard.
--Stefan]
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Matt Tait <matttait@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'hw/net/pcnet.c')
-rw-r--r-- | hw/net/pcnet.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c index bdfd38f..68b9981 100644 --- a/hw/net/pcnet.c +++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c @@ -1241,6 +1241,14 @@ static void pcnet_transmit(PCNetState *s) } bcnt = 4096 - GET_FIELD(tmd.length, TMDL, BCNT); + + /* if multi-tmd packet outsizes s->buffer then skip it silently. + Note: this is not what real hw does */ + if (s->xmit_pos + bcnt > sizeof(s->buffer)) { + s->xmit_pos = -1; + goto txdone; + } + s->phys_mem_read(s->dma_opaque, PHYSADDR(s, tmd.tbadr), s->buffer + s->xmit_pos, bcnt, CSR_BSWP(s)); s->xmit_pos += bcnt; |