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authorKashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>2019-05-29 16:31:03 +0200
committerLaurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>2019-07-03 17:23:39 +0200
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VirtIO-RNG: Update default entropy source to `/dev/urandom`
When QEMU exposes a VirtIO-RNG device to the guest, that device needs a source of entropy, and that source needs to be "non-blocking", like `/dev/urandom`. However, currently QEMU defaults to the problematic `/dev/random`, which on Linux is "blocking" (as in, it waits until sufficient entropy is available). Why prefer `/dev/urandom` over `/dev/random`? --------------------------------------------- The man pages of urandom(4) and random(4) state: "The /dev/random device is a legacy interface which dates back to a time where the cryptographic primitives used in the implementation of /dev/urandom were not widely trusted. It will return random bytes only within the estimated number of bits of fresh noise in the entropy pool, blocking if necessary. /dev/random is suitable for applications that need high quality randomness, and can afford indeterminate delays." Further, the "Usage" section of the said man pages state: "The /dev/random interface is considered a legacy interface, and /dev/urandom is preferred and sufficient in all use cases, with the exception of applications which require randomness during early boot time; for these applications, getrandom(2) must be used instead, because it will block until the entropy pool is initialized. "If a seed file is saved across reboots as recommended below (all major Linux distributions have done this since 2000 at least), the output is cryptographically secure against attackers without local root access as soon as it is reloaded in the boot sequence, and perfectly adequate for network encryption session keys. Since reads from /dev/random may block, users will usually want to open it in nonblocking mode (or perform a read with timeout), and provide some sort of user notification if the desired entropy is not immediately available." And refer to random(7) for a comparison of `/dev/random` and `/dev/urandom`. What about other OSes? ---------------------- `/dev/urandom` exists and works on OS-X, FreeBSD, DragonFlyBSD, NetBSD and OpenBSD, which cover all the non-Linux platforms we explicitly support, aside from Windows. On Windows `/dev/random` doesn't work either so we don't regress. This is actually another argument in favour of using the newly proposed 'rng-builtin' backend by default, as that will work on Windows. - - - Given the above, change the entropy source for VirtIO-RNG device to `/dev/urandom`. Related discussion in these[1][2] past threads. [1] https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-06/msg08335.html -- "RNG: Any reason QEMU doesn't default to `/dev/urandom`?" [2] https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg02724.html -- "[RFC] Virtio RNG: Consider changing the default entropy source to /dev/urandom" Signed-off-by: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20190529143106.11789-2-lvivier@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
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