ntsec patch

1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/winsup/doc/ntsec.sgml b/winsup/doc/ntsec.sgml
index 1daecb5..0a5fe42 100644
--- a/winsup/doc/ntsec.sgml
+++ b/winsup/doc/ntsec.sgml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 <sect1 id="ntsec"><title>NT security and the <literal>ntsec</literal> usage</title>
 
-<para>The design goal of the ntsec patch was to get a more UNIX like
+<para>The design goal of ntsec is to get a more UNIX like
 permission structure based upon the security features of Windows NT.
 To describe the changes, I will give a short overview of NT security
 in chapter one.</para>
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ set </para></listitem>
 </itemizedlist>
 
 <para>The two important types of ACEs are the `access allowed ACE' and the
-`access denied ACE'. The ntsec patch only used `access allowed ACEs' up
+`access denied ACE'. The ntsec functionality only used `access allowed ACEs' up
 to Cygwin version 1.1.0. Later versions also use `access denied ACEs' 
 to reflect the UNIX permissions as well as possible.</para>
 
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ from the write permission.</para>
 to objects in a far more specific way. But what about cygwin? In a POSIX
 environment it would be fine to have the security behavior of a POSIX
 system. The NT security model is MOSTLY able to reproduce the POSIX model.
-The ntsec patch tries to do this in cygwin.</para>
+The ntsec method tries to do this in cygwin.</para>
 
 <para>You ask "Mostly? Why mostly???" Because there's a leak in the NT model.
 I will describe that in detail in chapter 4.</para>
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ see only two simple variations in use:</para>
 data structure is used, the `security attributes' (SA). This structure
 contains an SD and a flag that specifies whether the returned handle
 to the object is inherited to child processes or not.
-This property is not important for the ntsec patch description so in
+This property is not important for ntsec so in
 this document the difference between SDs and SAs is ignored.</para>
 
 </sect2>
@@ -168,14 +168,14 @@ this document the difference between SDs and SAs is ignored.</para>
 <para>Any process started under control of cygwin has a semaphore attached
 to it, that is used for signaling purposes. The creation of this semaphore
 can be found in sigproc.cc, function `getsem'. The first parameter to the
-function call `CreateSemaphore' is an SA. Without ntsec patch this SA 
+function call `CreateSemaphore' is an SA. Without ntsec this SA 
 assigns default security to the semaphore. There is a simple disadvantage:
 Only the owner of the process may send signals to it. Or, in other words,
 if the owner of the process is not a member of the administrators' group,
 no administrator may kill the process! This is especially annoying, if
 processes are started via service manager.</para>
 
-<para>The ntsec patch now assigns an SA to the process control semaphore, that
+<para>Ntsec now assigns an SA to the process control semaphore, that
 has each permission set for the user of the process, for the
 administrators' group and for `system', which is a synonym for the
 operating system itself. The creation of this SA is done by the function
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ in French, etc.), in domains it is named 'Domain Users'.  Unfortunately,
 the group `None' is never shown in the user admin tool outside of domains!
 This is very confusing but this seems to have no negative consequences.</para>
 
-<para>To work correctly the ntsec patch depends on the files
+<para>To work correctly, ntsec depends on the files
 <filename>/etc/passwd/</filename> and <filename>/etc/group</filename>.
 In cygwin release 1.0 the names and the IDs must correspond to the
 appropriate NT IDs! The IDs used in cygwin are the RID of the NT SID, as