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-rw-r--r--ChangeLog25
-rw-r--r--elf/Makefile6
-rw-r--r--elf/dl-tunable-types.h15
-rw-r--r--elf/dl-tunables.c119
-rw-r--r--elf/dl-tunables.h15
-rw-r--r--elf/dl-tunables.list16
-rw-r--r--elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c60
-rw-r--r--elf/tst-env-setuid.c282
-rw-r--r--scripts/gen-tunables.awk8
9 files changed, 511 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b2f41e3..aed8764 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,28 @@
+2017-02-02 Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
+
+ [BZ #21073]
+ * elf/dl-tunable-types.h (tunable_seclevel_t): New enum.
+ * elf/dl-tunables.c (tunables_strdup): Remove.
+ (get_next_env): Also return the previous envp.
+ (parse_tunables): Erase tunables of category
+ TUNABLES_SECLEVEL_SXID_ERASE.
+ (maybe_enable_malloc_check): Make MALLOC_CHECK_
+ TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_NONE if /etc/setuid-debug is accessible.
+ (__tunables_init)[TUNABLES_FRONTEND ==
+ TUNABLES_FRONTEND_valstring]: Update GLIBC_TUNABLES envvar
+ after parsing.
+ [TUNABLES_FRONTEND != TUNABLES_FRONTEND_valstring]: Erase
+ tunable envvars of category TUNABLES_SECLEVEL_SXID_ERASE.
+ * elf/dl-tunables.h (struct _tunable): Change member is_secure
+ to security_level.
+ * elf/dl-tunables.list: Add security_level annotations for all
+ tunables.
+ * scripts/gen-tunables.awk: Recognize and generate enum values
+ for security_level.
+ * elf/tst-env-setuid.c: New test case.
+ * elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables: new test case.
+ * elf/Makefile (tests-static): Add them.
+
2017-02-01 Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
* sysdeps/alpha/memchr.c (__memchr): Use saturating arithmetic
diff --git a/elf/Makefile b/elf/Makefile
index c7a2969..61abeb5 100644
--- a/elf/Makefile
+++ b/elf/Makefile
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ tests-static = tst-tls1-static tst-tls2-static tst-stackguard1-static \
tst-leaks1-static tst-array1-static tst-array5-static \
tst-ptrguard1-static tst-dl-iter-static \
tst-tlsalign-static tst-tlsalign-extern-static \
- tst-linkall-static
+ tst-linkall-static tst-env-setuid tst-env-setuid-tunables
ifeq (yes,$(build-shared))
tests-static += tst-tls9-static
tst-tls9-static-ENV = \
@@ -1397,3 +1397,7 @@ $(objpfx)tst-nodelete-dlclose-plugin.so: $(objpfx)tst-nodelete-dlclose-dso.so
$(objpfx)tst-nodelete-dlclose: $(objpfx)tst-nodelete-dlclose-dso.so
$(objpfx)tst-nodelete-dlclose.out: $(objpfx)tst-nodelete-dlclose-dso.so \
$(objpfx)tst-nodelete-dlclose-plugin.so
+
+tst-env-setuid-ENV = MALLOC_CHECK_=2 MALLOC_MMAP_THRESHOLD_=4096
+tst-env-setuid-tunables-ENV = \
+ GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.malloc.check=2:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096
diff --git a/elf/dl-tunable-types.h b/elf/dl-tunable-types.h
index 5273dab..a986f0b 100644
--- a/elf/dl-tunable-types.h
+++ b/elf/dl-tunable-types.h
@@ -43,4 +43,19 @@ typedef union
const char *strval;
} tunable_val_t;
+/* Security level for tunables. This decides what to do with individual
+ tunables for AT_SECURE binaries. */
+typedef enum
+{
+ /* Erase the tunable for AT_SECURE binaries so that child processes don't
+ read it. */
+ TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_SXID_ERASE = 0,
+ /* Ignore the tunable for AT_SECURE binaries, but don't erase it, so that
+ child processes can read it. */
+ TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_SXID_IGNORE = 1,
+ /* Read the tunable. */
+ TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_NONE = 2,
+} tunable_seclevel_t;
+
+
#endif
diff --git a/elf/dl-tunables.c b/elf/dl-tunables.c
index cbf4c8e..a8d53d6 100644
--- a/elf/dl-tunables.c
+++ b/elf/dl-tunables.c
@@ -76,10 +76,12 @@ tunables_strdup (const char *in)
#endif
static char **
-get_next_env (char **envp, char **name, size_t *namelen, char **val)
+get_next_env (char **envp, char **name, size_t *namelen, char **val,
+ char ***prev_envp)
{
while (envp != NULL && *envp != NULL)
{
+ char **prev = envp;
char *envline = *envp++;
int len = 0;
@@ -93,6 +95,7 @@ get_next_env (char **envp, char **name, size_t *namelen, char **val)
*name = envline;
*namelen = len;
*val = &envline[len + 1];
+ *prev_envp = prev;
return envp;
}
@@ -243,8 +246,13 @@ tunable_initialize (tunable_t *cur, const char *strval)
}
#if TUNABLES_FRONTEND == TUNABLES_FRONTEND_valstring
+/* Parse the tunable string TUNESTR and adjust it to drop any tunables that may
+ be unsafe for AT_SECURE processes so that it can be used as the new
+ environment variable value for GLIBC_TUNABLES. VALSTRING is the original
+ environment variable string which we use to make NULL terminated values so
+ that we don't have to allocate memory again for it. */
static void
-parse_tunables (char *tunestr)
+parse_tunables (char *tunestr, char *valstring)
{
if (tunestr == NULL || *tunestr == '\0')
return;
@@ -275,37 +283,65 @@ parse_tunables (char *tunestr)
p += len + 1;
- char *value = p;
+ /* Take the value from the valstring since we need to NULL terminate it. */
+ char *value = &valstring[p - tunestr];
len = 0;
while (p[len] != ':' && p[len] != '\0')
len++;
- char end = p[len];
- p[len] = '\0';
-
/* Add the tunable if it exists. */
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof (tunable_list) / sizeof (tunable_t); i++)
{
tunable_t *cur = &tunable_list[i];
- /* If we are in a secure context (AT_SECURE) then ignore the tunable
- unless it is explicitly marked as secure. Tunable values take
- precendence over their envvar aliases. */
- if (__libc_enable_secure && !cur->is_secure)
- continue;
-
if (is_name (cur->name, name))
{
+ /* If we are in a secure context (AT_SECURE) then ignore the tunable
+ unless it is explicitly marked as secure. Tunable values take
+ precendence over their envvar aliases. */
+ if (__libc_enable_secure)
+ {
+ if (cur->security_level == TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_SXID_ERASE)
+ {
+ if (p[len] == '\0')
+ {
+ /* Last tunable in the valstring. Null-terminate and
+ return. */
+ *name = '\0';
+ return;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Remove the current tunable from the string. We do
+ this by overwriting the string starting from NAME
+ (which is where the current tunable begins) with
+ the remainder of the string. We then have P point
+ to NAME so that we continue in the correct
+ position in the valstring. */
+ char *q = &p[len + 1];
+ p = name;
+ while (*q != '\0')
+ *name++ = *q++;
+ name[0] = '\0';
+ len = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cur->security_level != TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_NONE)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ value[len] = '\0';
tunable_initialize (cur, value);
break;
}
}
- if (end == ':')
- p += len + 1;
- else
+ if (p[len] == '\0')
return;
+ else
+ p += len + 1;
}
}
#endif
@@ -320,8 +356,9 @@ static inline void
__always_inline
maybe_enable_malloc_check (void)
{
- if (__access_noerrno ("/etc/suid-debug", F_OK) == 0)
- tunable_list[TUNABLE_ENUM_NAME(glibc, malloc, check)].is_secure = true;
+ tunable_id_t id = TUNABLE_ENUM_NAME (glibc, malloc, check);
+ if (__libc_enable_secure && __access_noerrno ("/etc/suid-debug", F_OK) == 0)
+ tunable_list[id].security_level = TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_NONE;
}
/* Initialize the tunables list from the environment. For now we only use the
@@ -333,17 +370,21 @@ __tunables_init (char **envp)
char *envname = NULL;
char *envval = NULL;
size_t len = 0;
+ char **prev_envp = envp;
maybe_enable_malloc_check ();
- while ((envp = get_next_env (envp, &envname, &len, &envval)) != NULL)
+ while ((envp = get_next_env (envp, &envname, &len, &envval,
+ &prev_envp)) != NULL)
{
#if TUNABLES_FRONTEND == TUNABLES_FRONTEND_valstring
if (is_name (GLIBC_TUNABLES, envname))
{
- char *val = tunables_strdup (envval);
- if (val != NULL)
- parse_tunables (val);
+ char *new_env = tunables_strdup (envname);
+ if (new_env != NULL)
+ parse_tunables (new_env + len + 1, envval);
+ /* Put in the updated envval. */
+ *prev_envp = new_env;
continue;
}
#endif
@@ -354,8 +395,7 @@ __tunables_init (char **envp)
/* Skip over tunables that have either been set already or should be
skipped. */
- if (cur->strval != NULL || cur->env_alias == NULL
- || (__libc_enable_secure && !cur->is_secure))
+ if (cur->strval != NULL || cur->env_alias == NULL)
continue;
const char *name = cur->env_alias;
@@ -363,6 +403,39 @@ __tunables_init (char **envp)
/* We have a match. Initialize and move on to the next line. */
if (is_name (name, envname))
{
+ /* For AT_SECURE binaries, we need to check the security settings of
+ the tunable and decide whether we read the value and also whether
+ we erase the value so that child processes don't inherit them in
+ the environment. */
+ if (__libc_enable_secure)
+ {
+ if (cur->security_level == TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_SXID_ERASE)
+ {
+ /* Erase the environment variable. */
+ char **ep = prev_envp;
+
+ while (*ep != NULL)
+ {
+ if (is_name (name, *ep))
+ {
+ char **dp = ep;
+
+ do
+ dp[0] = dp[1];
+ while (*dp++);
+ }
+ else
+ ++ep;
+ }
+ /* Reset the iterator so that we read the environment again
+ from the point we erased. */
+ envp = prev_envp;
+ }
+
+ if (cur->security_level != TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_NONE)
+ continue;
+ }
+
tunable_initialize (cur, envval);
break;
}
diff --git a/elf/dl-tunables.h b/elf/dl-tunables.h
index e07825c..f33adfb 100644
--- a/elf/dl-tunables.h
+++ b/elf/dl-tunables.h
@@ -41,11 +41,16 @@ struct _tunable
tunable_val_t val; /* The value. */
const char *strval; /* The string containing the value,
points into envp. */
- bool is_secure; /* Whether the tunable must be read
- even for setuid binaries. Note that
- even if the tunable is read, it may
- not get used by the target module if
- the value is considered unsafe. */
+ tunable_seclevel_t security_level; /* Specify the security level for the
+ tunable with respect to AT_SECURE
+ programs. See description of
+ tunable_seclevel_t to see a
+ description of the values.
+
+ Note that even if the tunable is
+ read, it may not get used by the
+ target module if the value is
+ considered unsafe. */
/* Compatibility elements. */
const char *env_alias; /* The compatibility environment
variable name. */
diff --git a/elf/dl-tunables.list b/elf/dl-tunables.list
index d8cd912..cb9e8f1 100644
--- a/elf/dl-tunables.list
+++ b/elf/dl-tunables.list
@@ -21,8 +21,13 @@
# minval: Optional minimum acceptable value
# maxval: Optional maximum acceptable value
# env_alias: An alias environment variable
-# is_secure: Specify whether the environment variable should be read for
-# setuid binaries.
+# security_level: Specify security level of the tunable. Valid values are:
+#
+# SXID_ERASE: (default) Don't read for AT_SECURE binaries and
+# removed so that child processes can't read it.
+# SXID_IGNORE: Don't read for AT_SECURE binaries, but retained for
+# non-AT_SECURE subprocesses.
+# SXID_NONE: Read all the time.
glibc {
malloc {
@@ -35,34 +40,41 @@ glibc {
top_pad {
type: SIZE_T
env_alias: MALLOC_TOP_PAD_
+ security_level: SXID_IGNORE
}
perturb {
type: INT_32
minval: 0
maxval: 0xff
env_alias: MALLOC_PERTURB_
+ security_level: SXID_IGNORE
}
mmap_threshold {
type: SIZE_T
env_alias: MALLOC_MMAP_THRESHOLD_
+ security_level: SXID_IGNORE
}
trim_threshold {
type: SIZE_T
env_alias: MALLOC_TRIM_THRESHOLD_
+ security_level: SXID_IGNORE
}
mmap_max {
type: INT_32
env_alias: MALLOC_MMAP_MAX_
+ security_level: SXID_IGNORE
}
arena_max {
type: SIZE_T
env_alias: MALLOC_ARENA_MAX
minval: 1
+ security_level: SXID_IGNORE
}
arena_test {
type: SIZE_T
env_alias: MALLOC_ARENA_TEST
minval: 1
+ security_level: SXID_IGNORE
}
}
}
diff --git a/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c b/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a563f69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ This file is part of the GNU C Library.
+
+ The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+
+ The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ Lesser General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
+ <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
+
+/* Verify that tunables correctly filter out unsafe tunables like
+ glibc.malloc.check and glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold but also retain
+ glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold in an unprivileged child. */
+
+#define test_parent test_parent_tunables
+#define test_child test_child_tunables
+
+static int test_child_tunables (void);
+static int test_parent_tunables (void);
+
+#include "tst-env-setuid.c"
+
+#define CHILD_VALSTRING_VALUE "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096"
+#define PARENT_VALSTRING_VALUE \
+ "glibc.malloc.check=2:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096"
+
+static int
+test_child_tunables (void)
+{
+ const char *val = getenv ("GLIBC_TUNABLES");
+
+ if (val != NULL && strcmp (val, CHILD_VALSTRING_VALUE) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (val != NULL)
+ printf ("Unexpected GLIBC_TUNABLES VALUE %s\n", val);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+test_parent_tunables (void)
+{
+ const char *val = getenv ("GLIBC_TUNABLES");
+
+ if (val != NULL && strcmp (val, PARENT_VALSTRING_VALUE) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (val != NULL)
+ printf ("Unexpected GLIBC_TUNABLES VALUE %s\n", val);
+
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/elf/tst-env-setuid.c b/elf/tst-env-setuid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85d423d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/elf/tst-env-setuid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 2012-2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ This file is part of the GNU C Library.
+
+ The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+
+ The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ Lesser General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
+ <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
+
+/* Verify that tunables correctly filter out unsafe environment variables like
+ MALLOC_CHECK_ and MALLOC_MMAP_THRESHOLD_ but also retain
+ MALLOC_MMAP_THRESHOLD_ in an unprivileged child. */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <support/support.h>
+#include <support/test-driver.h>
+
+static char SETGID_CHILD[] = "setgid-child";
+#define CHILD_STATUS 42
+
+/* Return a GID which is not our current GID, but is present in the
+ supplementary group list. */
+static gid_t
+choose_gid (void)
+{
+ const int count = 64;
+ gid_t groups[count];
+ int ret = getgroups (count, groups);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ {
+ printf ("getgroups: %m\n");
+ exit (1);
+ }
+ gid_t current = getgid ();
+ for (int i = 0; i < ret; ++i)
+ {
+ if (groups[i] != current)
+ return groups[i];
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Spawn and execute a program and verify that it returns the CHILD_STATUS. */
+static pid_t
+do_execve (char **args)
+{
+ pid_t kid = vfork ();
+
+ if (kid < 0)
+ {
+ printf ("vfork: %m\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (kid == 0)
+ {
+ /* Child process. */
+ execve (args[0], args, environ);
+ _exit (-errno);
+ }
+
+ if (kid < 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ int status;
+
+ if (waitpid (kid, &status, 0) < 0)
+ {
+ printf ("waitpid: %m\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!WIFEXITED (status) || WEXITSTATUS (status) != CHILD_STATUS)
+ {
+ printf ("Unexpected exit status %d from child process\n",
+ status);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Copies the executable into a restricted directory, so that we can
+ safely make it SGID with the TARGET group ID. Then runs the
+ executable. */
+static int
+run_executable_sgid (gid_t target)
+{
+ char *dirname = xasprintf ("%s/tst-tunables-setuid.%jd",
+ test_dir, (intmax_t) getpid ());
+ char *execname = xasprintf ("%s/bin", dirname);
+ int infd = -1;
+ int outfd = -1;
+ int ret = 0;
+ if (mkdir (dirname, 0700) < 0)
+ {
+ printf ("mkdir: %m\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ infd = open ("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
+ if (infd < 0)
+ {
+ printf ("open (/proc/self/exe): %m\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ outfd = open (execname, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0700);
+ if (outfd < 0)
+ {
+ printf ("open (%s): %m\n", execname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ char buf[4096];
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ ssize_t rdcount = read (infd, buf, sizeof (buf));
+ if (rdcount < 0)
+ {
+ printf ("read: %m\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rdcount == 0)
+ break;
+ char *p = buf;
+ char *end = buf + rdcount;
+ while (p != end)
+ {
+ ssize_t wrcount = write (outfd, buf, end - p);
+ if (wrcount == 0)
+ errno = ENOSPC;
+ if (wrcount <= 0)
+ {
+ printf ("write: %m\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += wrcount;
+ }
+ }
+ if (fchown (outfd, getuid (), target) < 0)
+ {
+ printf ("fchown (%s): %m\n", execname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (fchmod (outfd, 02750) < 0)
+ {
+ printf ("fchmod (%s): %m\n", execname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (close (outfd) < 0)
+ {
+ printf ("close (outfd): %m\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (close (infd) < 0)
+ {
+ printf ("close (infd): %m\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ char *args[] = {execname, SETGID_CHILD, NULL};
+
+ ret = do_execve (args);
+
+err:
+ if (outfd >= 0)
+ close (outfd);
+ if (infd >= 0)
+ close (infd);
+ if (execname)
+ {
+ unlink (execname);
+ free (execname);
+ }
+ if (dirname)
+ {
+ rmdir (dirname);
+ free (dirname);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef test_child
+static int
+test_child (void)
+{
+ if (getenv ("MALLOC_CHECK_") != NULL)
+ {
+ printf ("MALLOC_CHECK_ is still set\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (getenv ("MALLOC_MMAP_THRESHOLD_") == NULL)
+ {
+ printf ("MALLOC_MMAP_THRESHOLD_ lost\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef test_parent
+static int
+test_parent (void)
+{
+ if (getenv ("MALLOC_CHECK_") == NULL)
+ {
+ printf ("MALLOC_CHECK_ lost\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (getenv ("MALLOC_MMAP_THRESHOLD_") == NULL)
+ {
+ printf ("MALLOC_MMAP_THRESHOLD_ lost\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int
+do_test_prep (int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ /* Setgid child process. */
+ if (argc == 2 && strcmp (argv[1], SETGID_CHILD) == 0)
+ {
+ if (getgid () == getegid ())
+ {
+ /* This can happen if the file system is mounted nosuid. */
+ fprintf (stderr, "SGID failed: GID and EGID match (%jd)\n",
+ (intmax_t) getgid ());
+ exit (EXIT_UNSUPPORTED);
+ }
+
+ int ret = test_child ();
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ exit (1);
+
+ exit (CHILD_STATUS);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (test_parent () != 0)
+ exit (1);
+
+ /* Try running a setgid program. */
+ gid_t target = choose_gid ();
+ if (target == 0)
+ {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ "Could not find a suitable GID for user %jd, skipping test\n",
+ (intmax_t) getuid ());
+ exit (0);
+ }
+
+ if (run_executable_sgid (target) == 0)
+ exit (0);
+ }
+
+ /* Something went wrong and our argv was corrupted. */
+ _exit (1);
+}
+
+#define TEST_FUNCTION_ARGV do_test_prep
+#include <support/test-driver.c>
diff --git a/scripts/gen-tunables.awk b/scripts/gen-tunables.awk
index b65b5a4..e7bfc22 100644
--- a/scripts/gen-tunables.awk
+++ b/scripts/gen-tunables.awk
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ $1 == "}" {
env_alias[top_ns][ns][tunable] = "NULL"
}
if (!is_secure[top_ns][ns][tunable]) {
- is_secure[top_ns][ns][tunable] = "false"
+ is_secure[top_ns][ns][tunable] = "SXID_ERASE"
}
tunable = ""
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ $1 == "}" {
else if (attr == "env_alias") {
env_alias[top_ns][ns][tunable] = sprintf("\"%s\"", val)
}
- else if (attr == "is_secure") {
- if (val == "true" || val == "false") {
+ else if (attr == "security_level") {
+ if (val == "SXID_ERASE" || val == "SXID_IGNORE" || val == "NONE") {
is_secure[top_ns][ns][tunable] = val
}
else {
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ END {
for (n in types[t]) {
for (m in types[t][n]) {
printf (" {TUNABLE_NAME_S(%s, %s, %s)", t, n, m)
- printf (", {TUNABLE_TYPE_%s, %s, %s}, {.numval = 0}, NULL, %s, %s},\n",
+ printf (", {TUNABLE_TYPE_%s, %s, %s}, {.numval = 0}, NULL, TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_%s, %s},\n",
types[t][n][m], minvals[t][n][m], maxvals[t][n][m],
is_secure[t][n][m], env_alias[t][n][m]);
}