diff options
| author | Stan Shebs <shebs@codesourcery.com> | 1994-07-05 21:50:43 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stan Shebs <shebs@codesourcery.com> | 1994-07-05 21:50:43 +0000 |
| commit | 11676adc147c73e8034629e386f9c28066eed561 (patch) | |
| tree | 53b9cfa5a682155641c2dffc2e7546afc91d4e9a /bfd/aoutx.h | |
| parent | 10f67315f93ce4aa1957d66b97124143431904a1 (diff) | |
| download | gdb-11676adc147c73e8034629e386f9c28066eed561.zip gdb-11676adc147c73e8034629e386f9c28066eed561.tar.gz gdb-11676adc147c73e8034629e386f9c28066eed561.tar.bz2 | |
Mach 3 support.
* config.bfd (m88*-*-mach3*, mips*-dec-mach3*, mips*-*-mach3*):
New targets.
* configure.host (i[34]86-*-mach3*, ns32k-*-mach3*): Recognize
"mach3" instead of "mach".
(m88*-*-mach3*, mips*-dec-mach3*, mips*-*-mach3*): New hosts.
* targets.c (m88kmach3_vec): New target vector.
(bfd_target_vector): Add i386mach3_vec and m88kmach3_vec, but
inside #if 0.
* aoutx.h (some_aout_object_p) [MACH]: Recognize executables by
checking for execute permission, instead of looking at entry
point.
* i386mach3.c: Update, define MACH, N_TXTOFF, N_TXTADDR,
N_SHARED_LIB, don't include aout/*.h files, etc.
* m88kmach3.c: New file, m88k Mach 3 target.
* config/m88k-mach3.mt, config/mips-mach3.mt: New files, target
makefile fragments.
* config/i386mach3.mh, config/m88kmach3.mh, config/mipsmach3.mh:
New files, host makefile fragments.
* hosts/m88kmach3.h, hosts/mipsmach3.h: New files, host definitions.
Diffstat (limited to 'bfd/aoutx.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | bfd/aoutx.h | 21 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/bfd/aoutx.h b/bfd/aoutx.h index 42ec797..c53b446 100644 --- a/bfd/aoutx.h +++ b/bfd/aoutx.h @@ -481,15 +481,12 @@ NAME(aout,some_aout_object_p) (abfd, execp, callback_to_real_object_p) obj_datasec (abfd)->_raw_size = execp->a_data; obj_bsssec (abfd)->_raw_size = execp->a_bss; - /* If this object is dynamically linked, we assume that both - sections have relocs. This does no real harm, even though it may - not be true. */ obj_textsec (abfd)->flags = - (execp->a_trsize != 0 || (abfd->flags & DYNAMIC) != 0 + (execp->a_trsize != 0 ? (SEC_ALLOC | SEC_LOAD | SEC_CODE | SEC_HAS_CONTENTS | SEC_RELOC) : (SEC_ALLOC | SEC_LOAD | SEC_CODE | SEC_HAS_CONTENTS)); obj_datasec (abfd)->flags = - (execp->a_drsize != 0 || (abfd->flags & DYNAMIC) != 0 + (execp->a_drsize != 0 ? (SEC_ALLOC | SEC_LOAD | SEC_DATA | SEC_HAS_CONTENTS | SEC_RELOC) : (SEC_ALLOC | SEC_LOAD | SEC_DATA | SEC_HAS_CONTENTS)); obj_bsssec (abfd)->flags = SEC_ALLOC; @@ -553,6 +550,19 @@ NAME(aout,some_aout_object_p) (abfd, execp, callback_to_real_object_p) result = (*callback_to_real_object_p)(abfd); +#ifdef MACH + /* Stat the file to decide whether or not it's executable. + Many Mach programs use text at very unconventional addresses, + including the emulator, so the standard heuristic is incorrect. */ + { + struct stat st; + + stat (abfd->filename, &st); + /* Are any exec 'x' bits on? */ + if (st.st_mode & 0111) + abfd->flags |= EXEC_P; + } +#else /* ! MACH */ /* Now that the segment addresses have been worked out, take a better guess at whether the file is executable. If the entry point is within the text segment, assume it is. (This makes files @@ -564,6 +574,7 @@ NAME(aout,some_aout_object_p) (abfd, execp, callback_to_real_object_p) if ((execp->a_entry >= obj_textsec(abfd)->vma) && (execp->a_entry < obj_textsec(abfd)->vma + obj_textsec(abfd)->_raw_size)) abfd->flags |= EXEC_P; +#endif /* MACH */ if (result) { #if 0 /* These should be set correctly anyways. */ |