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author | Luis Machado <luis.machado@arm.com> | 2022-10-26 13:00:50 +0100 |
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committer | Luis Machado <luis.machado@arm.com> | 2022-10-26 13:00:50 +0100 |
commit | 23295de1317433210cb0303ef304e68763607c78 (patch) | |
tree | ab4370d67c756622bc8cd3caa29e2d058e4d5c27 | |
parent | b2e9e754e122d97511bbd6b990e38a23dafb6176 (diff) | |
download | gdb-23295de1317433210cb0303ef304e68763607c78.zip gdb-23295de1317433210cb0303ef304e68763607c78.tar.gz gdb-23295de1317433210cb0303ef304e68763607c78.tar.bz2 |
gdb/arm: Fix M-profile EXC_RETURN
Arm v8-M Architecture Reference Manual,
D1.2.95 EXC_RETURN, Exception Return Payload
describes ES bit:
"ES, bit [0]
Exception Secure. The security domain the exception was taken to.
The possible values of this bit are:
0 Non-secure.
1 Secure"
arm-tdep.c:3443, arm_m_exception_cache () function tests this bit:
exception_domain_is_secure = (bit (lr, 0) == 0);
The test is negated!
Later on line 3553, the condition evaluates if an additional state
context is stacked:
/* With the Security extension, the hardware saves R4..R11 too. */
if (tdep->have_sec_ext && secure_stack_used
&& (!default_callee_register_stacking || exception_domain_is_secure))
RM, B3.19 Exception entry, context stacking
reads:
RPLHM "In a PE with the Security Extension, on taking an exception,
the PE hardware:
...
2. If exception entry requires a transition from Secure state to
Non-secure state, the PE hardware extends the stack frame and also
saves additional state context."
So we should test for !exception_domain_is_secure instead of non-negated
value!
These two bugs compensate each other so unstacking works correctly.
But another test of exception_domain_is_secure (negated due to the
first bug) prevents arm_unwind_secure_frames to work as expected:
/* Unwinding from non-secure to secure can trip security
measures. In order to avoid the debugger being
intrusive, rely on the user to configure the requested
mode. */
if (secure_stack_used && !exception_domain_is_secure
&& !arm_unwind_secure_frames)
Test with GNU gdb (GDB) 13.0.50.20221016-git.
Stopped in a non-secure handler:
(gdb) set arm unwind-secure-frames 0
(gdb) bt
#0 HAL_SYSTICK_Callback () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/NonSecure/Src/nsmain.c:490
#1 0x0804081c in SysTick_Handler ()
at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/NonSecure/Src/nsstm32l5xx_it.c:134
#2 <signal handler called>
#3 HAL_GPIO_ReadPin (GPIOx=0x52020800, GPIO_Pin=8192)
at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Drivers/STM32L5xx_HAL_Driver/Src/stm32l5xx_hal_gpio.c:386
#4 0x0c000338 in SECURE_Mode () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Secure/Src/main.c:86
#5 0x080403f2 in main () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/NonSecure/Src/nsmain.c:278
Backtrace stopped: previous frame inner to this frame (corrupt stack?)
The frames #3 and #4 are secure. backtrace should stop before #3.
Stopped in a secure handler:
(gdb) bt
#0 HAL_SYSTICK_Callback () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Secure/Src/main.c:425
#1 0x0c000b6a in SysTick_Handler ()
at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Secure/Src/stm32l5xx_it.c:234
warning: Non-secure to secure stack unwinding disabled.
#2 <signal handler called>
The exception from secure to secure erroneously stops unwinding. It should
continue as far as the security unlimited backtrace:
(gdb) set arm unwind-secure-frames 1
(gdb) si <-- used to rebuild frame cache after change of unwind-secure-frames
0x0c0008e6 425 if (SecureTimingDelay != 0U)
(gdb) bt
#0 0x0c0008e6 in HAL_SYSTICK_Callback () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Secure/Src/main.c:425
#1 0x0c000b6a in SysTick_Handler ()
at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Secure/Src/stm32l5xx_it.c:234
#2 <signal handler called>
#3 0x0c000328 in SECURE_Mode () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Secure/Src/main.c:88
#4 0x080403f2 in main () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/NonSecure/Src/nsmain.c:278
Backtrace stopped: previous frame inner to this frame (corrupt stack?)
Set exception_domain_is_secure to the value expected by its name.
Fix exception_domain_is_secure usage in the additional state context
stacking condition.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Vanek <vanekt@fbl.cz>
-rw-r--r-- | gdb/arm-tdep.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/gdb/arm-tdep.c b/gdb/arm-tdep.c index 247e552..7cb3f5f 100644 --- a/gdb/arm-tdep.c +++ b/gdb/arm-tdep.c @@ -3489,7 +3489,7 @@ arm_m_exception_cache (frame_info_ptr this_frame) { secure_stack_used = (bit (lr, 6) != 0); default_callee_register_stacking = (bit (lr, 5) != 0); - exception_domain_is_secure = (bit (lr, 0) == 0); + exception_domain_is_secure = (bit (lr, 0) != 0); /* Unwinding from non-secure to secure can trip security measures. In order to avoid the debugger being @@ -3599,7 +3599,7 @@ arm_m_exception_cache (frame_info_ptr this_frame) /* With the Security extension, the hardware saves R4..R11 too. */ if (tdep->have_sec_ext && secure_stack_used - && (!default_callee_register_stacking || exception_domain_is_secure)) + && (!default_callee_register_stacking || !exception_domain_is_secure)) { /* Read R4..R11 from the integer callee registers. */ cache->saved_regs[4].set_addr (unwound_sp + 0x08); |