Revert "[ARM] Fix PR85434: spilling of stack protector guard's address on ARM"

This reverts commit r263245.

From-SVN: r263252

1 files changed, 8 insertions, 47 deletions

diff --git a/gcc/doc/md.texi b/gcc/doc/md.texi
index e5851a6..02f9e1e 100644
--- a/gcc/doc/md.texi
+++ b/gcc/doc/md.texi
@@ -7388,61 +7388,22 @@ builtins.
 The get/set patterns have a single output/input operand respectively,
 with @var{mode} intended to be @code{Pmode}.
 
-@cindex @code{stack_protect_combined_set} instruction pattern
-@item @samp{stack_protect_combined_set}
-This pattern, if defined, moves a @code{ptr_mode} value from an address
-whose declaration RTX is given in operand 1 to the memory in operand 0
-without leaving the value in a register afterward.  If several
-instructions are needed by the target to perform the operation (eg. to
-load the address from a GOT entry then load the @code{ptr_mode} value
-and finally store it), it is the backend's responsibility to ensure no
-intermediate result gets spilled.  This is to avoid leaking the value
-some place that an attacker might use to rewrite the stack guard slot
-after having clobbered it.
-
-If this pattern is not defined, then the address declaration is
-expanded first in the standard way and a @code{stack_protect_set}
-pattern is then generated to move the value from that address to the
-address in operand 0.
-
 @cindex @code{stack_protect_set} instruction pattern
 @item @samp{stack_protect_set}
-This pattern, if defined, moves a @code{ptr_mode} value from the valid
-memory location in operand 1 to the memory in operand 0 without leaving
-the value in a register afterward.  This is to avoid leaking the value
-some place that an attacker might use to rewrite the stack guard slot
-after having clobbered it.
-
-Note: on targets where the addressing modes do not allow to load
-directly from stack guard address, the address is expanded in a standard
-way first which could cause some spills.
+This pattern, if defined, moves a @code{ptr_mode} value from the memory
+in operand 1 to the memory in operand 0 without leaving the value in
+a register afterward.  This is to avoid leaking the value some place
+that an attacker might use to rewrite the stack guard slot after
+having clobbered it.
 
 If this pattern is not defined, then a plain move pattern is generated.
 
-@cindex @code{stack_protect_combined_test} instruction pattern
-@item @samp{stack_protect_combined_test}
-This pattern, if defined, compares a @code{ptr_mode} value from an
-address whose declaration RTX is given in operand 1 with the memory in
-operand 0 without leaving the value in a register afterward and
-branches to operand 2 if the values were equal.  If several
-instructions are needed by the target to perform the operation (eg. to
-load the address from a GOT entry then load the @code{ptr_mode} value
-and finally store it), it is the backend's responsibility to ensure no
-intermediate result gets spilled.  This is to avoid leaking the value
-some place that an attacker might use to rewrite the stack guard slot
-after having clobbered it.
-
-If this pattern is not defined, then the address declaration is
-expanded first in the standard way and a @code{stack_protect_test}
-pattern is then generated to compare the value from that address to the
-value at the memory in operand 0.
-
 @cindex @code{stack_protect_test} instruction pattern
 @item @samp{stack_protect_test}
 This pattern, if defined, compares a @code{ptr_mode} value from the
-valid memory location in operand 1 with the memory in operand 0 without
-leaving the value in a register afterward and branches to operand 2 if
-the values were equal.
+memory in operand 1 with the memory in operand 0 without leaving the
+value in a register afterward and branches to operand 2 if the values
+were equal.
 
 If this pattern is not defined, then a plain compare pattern and
 conditional branch pattern is used.