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authorGavin Romig-Koch <gavin@cygnus.com>1999-07-21 12:48:13 +0000
committerGavin Romig-Koch <gavin@gcc.gnu.org>1999-07-21 12:48:13 +0000
commitcc1446556229298c9ab0d0e502f9298a23042c61 (patch)
tree18a978b65c1955538288e08abc9951fe096952c7 /gcc/c-lex.c
parent0f03776326098b582ff036d3f76ad2bda47850db (diff)
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For gcc:
* c-lex.c (yylex) : Correct the test for overflow when lexing integer literals. For gcc/cp: * lex.c (real_yylex) : Correct the test for overflow when lexing integer literals. From-SVN: r28206
Diffstat (limited to 'gcc/c-lex.c')
-rw-r--r--gcc/c-lex.c46
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/gcc/c-lex.c b/gcc/c-lex.c
index 252888d..52387f8 100644
--- a/gcc/c-lex.c
+++ b/gcc/c-lex.c
@@ -1477,16 +1477,19 @@ yylex ()
int count = 0;
int largest_digit = 0;
int numdigits = 0;
- /* for multi-precision arithmetic,
- we actually store only HOST_BITS_PER_CHAR bits in each part.
- The number of parts is chosen so as to be sufficient to hold
- the enough bits to fit into the two HOST_WIDE_INTs that contain
- the integer value (this is always at least as many bits as are
- in a target `long long' value, but may be wider). */
-#define TOTAL_PARTS ((HOST_BITS_PER_WIDE_INT / HOST_BITS_PER_CHAR) * 2 + 2)
- int parts[TOTAL_PARTS];
int overflow = 0;
+ /* We actually store only HOST_BITS_PER_CHAR bits in each part.
+ The code below which fills the parts array assumes that a host
+ int is at least twice as wide as a host char, and that
+ HOST_BITS_PER_WIDE_INT is an even multiple of HOST_BITS_PER_CHAR.
+ Two HOST_WIDE_INTs is the largest int literal we can store.
+ In order to detect overflow below, the number of parts (TOTAL_PARTS)
+ must be exactly the number of parts needed to hold the bits
+ of two HOST_WIDE_INTs. */
+#define TOTAL_PARTS ((HOST_BITS_PER_WIDE_INT / HOST_BITS_PER_CHAR) * 2)
+ unsigned int parts[TOTAL_PARTS];
+
enum anon1 { NOT_FLOAT, AFTER_POINT, TOO_MANY_POINTS, AFTER_EXPON}
floatflag = NOT_FLOAT;
@@ -1616,11 +1619,16 @@ yylex ()
else
parts[0] += c;
}
-
- /* If the extra highest-order part ever gets anything in it,
- the number is certainly too big. */
- if (parts[TOTAL_PARTS - 1] != 0)
- overflow = 1;
+
+ /* If the highest-order part overflows (gets larger than
+ a host char will hold) then the whole number has
+ overflowed. Record this and truncate the highest-order
+ part. */
+ if (parts[TOTAL_PARTS - 1] >> HOST_BITS_PER_CHAR)
+ {
+ overflow = 1;
+ parts[TOTAL_PARTS - 1] &= (1 << HOST_BITS_PER_CHAR) - 1;
+ }
if (p >= token_buffer + maxtoken - 3)
p = extend_token_buffer (p);
@@ -1772,12 +1780,12 @@ yylex ()
c = GETC();
}
- /* If it won't fit in the host's representation for integers,
- then pedwarn. */
-
- warn = overflow;
- if (warn)
- pedwarn ("integer constant is too large for this configuration of the compiler - truncated to %d bits", HOST_BITS_PER_WIDE_INT * 2);
+ /* If the literal overflowed, pedwarn about it now. */
+ if (overflow)
+ {
+ warn = 1;
+ pedwarn ("integer constant is too large for this configuration of the compiler - truncated to %d bits", HOST_BITS_PER_WIDE_INT * 2);
+ }
/* This is simplified by the fact that our constant
is always positive. */