From 0fad8bde3fddf68e9d6ed87cb73e12ab8cdd4341 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AKASHI Takahiro Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 17:24:23 +0900 Subject: CI: enforce packages upgrade for Msys2 on Windows We need to install libgnutls-devel package to build the host tool, mkeficapsule, and as of now, there seems to be a depencency conflict in the current msys2 installer; :: installing libp11-kit (0.24.1-1) breaks dependency \ 'libp11-kit=0.23.22' required by p11-kit To resolve this conflict, however, the initial "pacman -Syyuu" in 'tools_only_windows' job is not enough. Another "pacman -Su" will enforce all the out-of-date packages being upgraded. (Probably the first "-Syyuu" can be changed to "-Syu".) See the installation steps in https://www.msys2.org/ Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro --- .azure-pipelines.yml | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/.azure-pipelines.yml b/.azure-pipelines.yml index 81ab77e..b532abc 100644 --- a/.azure-pipelines.yml +++ b/.azure-pipelines.yml @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ stages: - script: | sfx.exe -y -o%CD:~0,2%\ %CD:~0,2%\msys64\usr\bin\bash -lc "pacman --noconfirm -Syyuu" + %CD:~0,2%\msys64\usr\bin\bash -lc "pacman --noconfirm -Su" displayName: 'Update MSYS2' - script: | %CD:~0,2%\msys64\usr\bin\bash -lc "pacman --noconfirm --needed -Sy make gcc bison flex diffutils openssl-devel" -- cgit v1.1 From 0caf57eeaa5dfe4078c894205ff9c67f70bfd12c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AKASHI Takahiro Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 19:10:34 +0900 Subject: tools: build mkeficapsule with tools-only_defconfig Add CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE. Then we want to always build mkeficapsule if tools-only_defconfig is used. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro Reviewed-by: Simon Glass --- configs/tools-only_defconfig | 1 + tools/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++ tools/Makefile | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/configs/tools-only_defconfig b/configs/tools-only_defconfig index 054e008..64eb766 100644 --- a/configs/tools-only_defconfig +++ b/configs/tools-only_defconfig @@ -35,3 +35,4 @@ CONFIG_I2C_EDID=y # CONFIG_VIRTIO_SANDBOX is not set # CONFIG_GENERATE_ACPI_TABLE is not set # CONFIG_EFI_LOADER is not set +CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE=y diff --git a/tools/Kconfig b/tools/Kconfig index 91ce8ae..117c921 100644 --- a/tools/Kconfig +++ b/tools/Kconfig @@ -90,4 +90,12 @@ config TOOLS_SHA512 help Enable SHA512 support in the tools builds +config TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE + bool "Build efimkcapsule command" + default y if EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK + help + This command allows users to create a UEFI capsule file and, + optionally sign that file. If you want to enable UEFI capsule + update feature on your target, you certainly need this. + endmenu diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile index 1763f44..766c067 100644 --- a/tools/Makefile +++ b/tools/Makefile @@ -238,8 +238,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MIPS) += mips-relocs hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1_COMPILER) += asn1_compiler HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -idirafter $(srctree)/include -mkeficapsule-objs := mkeficapsule.o $(LIBFDT_OBJS) -hostprogs-$(CONFIG_EFI_HAVE_CAPSULE_SUPPORT) += mkeficapsule +hostprogs-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE) += mkeficapsule # We build some files with extra pedantic flags to try to minimize things # that won't build on some weird host compiler -- though there are lots of -- cgit v1.1 From 8e6f73c4daeef6342cc85deec07d2e0e8b8334b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AKASHI Takahiro Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 19:10:35 +0900 Subject: tools: mkeficapsule: add firmware image signing With this enhancement, mkeficapsule will be able to sign a capsule file when it is created. A signature added will be used later in the verification at FMP's SetImage() call. To do that, we need specify additional command parameters: -monotonic-cout : monotonic count -private-key : private key file -certificate : certificate file Only when all of those parameters are given, a signature will be added to a capsule file. Users are expected to maintain and increment the monotonic count at every time of the update for each firmware image. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro Reviewed-by: Simon Glass Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas --- .azure-pipelines.yml | 2 +- tools/Makefile | 1 + tools/eficapsule.h | 115 ++++++++++++++++ tools/mkeficapsule.c | 380 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 463 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/eficapsule.h diff --git a/.azure-pipelines.yml b/.azure-pipelines.yml index b532abc..2c421da 100644 --- a/.azure-pipelines.yml +++ b/.azure-pipelines.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ stages: %CD:~0,2%\msys64\usr\bin\bash -lc "pacman --noconfirm -Su" displayName: 'Update MSYS2' - script: | - %CD:~0,2%\msys64\usr\bin\bash -lc "pacman --noconfirm --needed -Sy make gcc bison flex diffutils openssl-devel" + %CD:~0,2%\msys64\usr\bin\bash -lc "pacman --noconfirm --needed -Sy make gcc bison flex diffutils openssl-devel libgnutls-devel" displayName: 'Install Toolchain' - script: | echo make tools-only_defconfig tools-only NO_SDL=1 > build-tools.sh diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile index 766c067..8da07d6 100644 --- a/tools/Makefile +++ b/tools/Makefile @@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MIPS) += mips-relocs hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1_COMPILER) += asn1_compiler HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -idirafter $(srctree)/include +HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += -lgnutls hostprogs-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE) += mkeficapsule # We build some files with extra pedantic flags to try to minimize things diff --git a/tools/eficapsule.h b/tools/eficapsule.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c1560b --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/eficapsule.h @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright 2021 Linaro Limited + * Author: AKASHI Takahiro + * + * derived from efi.h and efi_api.h to make the file POSIX-compliant + */ + +#ifndef _EFI_CAPSULE_H +#define _EFI_CAPSULE_H + +#include +#include /* WIN_CERTIFICATE */ + +/* + * Gcc's predefined attributes are not recognized by clang. + */ +#ifndef __packed +#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) +#endif + +#ifndef __aligned +#define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x))) +#endif + +typedef struct { + uint8_t b[16]; +} efi_guid_t __aligned(8); + +#define EFI_GUID(a, b, c, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7) \ + {{ (a) & 0xff, ((a) >> 8) & 0xff, ((a) >> 16) & 0xff, \ + ((a) >> 24) & 0xff, \ + (b) & 0xff, ((b) >> 8) & 0xff, \ + (c) & 0xff, ((c) >> 8) & 0xff, \ + (d0), (d1), (d2), (d3), (d4), (d5), (d6), (d7) } } + +#define EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_ID_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0x6dcbd5ed, 0xe82d, 0x4c44, 0xbd, 0xa1, \ + 0x71, 0x94, 0x19, 0x9a, 0xd9, 0x2a) + +#define EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_FIT_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0xae13ff2d, 0x9ad4, 0x4e25, 0x9a, 0xc8, \ + 0x6d, 0x80, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0x21, 0x47) + +#define EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0xe2bb9c06, 0x70e9, 0x4b14, 0x97, 0xa3, \ + 0x5a, 0x79, 0x13, 0x17, 0x6e, 0x3f) + +#define EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0x4aafd29d, 0x68df, 0x49ee, 0x8a, 0xa9, \ + 0x34, 0x7d, 0x37, 0x56, 0x65, 0xa7) + +/* flags */ +#define CAPSULE_FLAGS_PERSIST_ACROSS_RESET 0x00010000 + +struct efi_capsule_header { + efi_guid_t capsule_guid; + uint32_t header_size; + uint32_t flags; + uint32_t capsule_image_size; +} __packed; + +struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header { + uint32_t version; + uint16_t embedded_driver_count; + uint16_t payload_item_count; + uint32_t item_offset_list[]; +} __packed; + +/* image_capsule_support */ +#define CAPSULE_SUPPORT_AUTHENTICATION 0x0000000000000001 + +struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header { + uint32_t version; + efi_guid_t update_image_type_id; + uint8_t update_image_index; + uint8_t reserved[3]; + uint32_t update_image_size; + uint32_t update_vendor_code_size; + uint64_t update_hardware_instance; + uint64_t image_capsule_support; +} __packed; + +/** + * win_certificate_uefi_guid - A certificate that encapsulates + * a GUID-specific signature + * + * @hdr: Windows certificate header + * @cert_type: Certificate type + * @cert_data: Certificate data + */ +struct win_certificate_uefi_guid { + WIN_CERTIFICATE hdr; + efi_guid_t cert_type; + uint8_t cert_data[]; +} __packed; + +/** + * efi_firmware_image_authentication - Capsule authentication method + * descriptor + * + * This structure describes an authentication information for + * a capsule with IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED set + * and should be included as part of the capsule. + * Only EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID is accepted. + * + * @monotonic_count: Count to prevent replay + * @auth_info: Authentication info + */ +struct efi_firmware_image_authentication { + uint64_t monotonic_count; + struct win_certificate_uefi_guid auth_info; +} __packed; + +#endif /* _EFI_CAPSULE_H */ diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c index d6e3725..a5aac7d 100644 --- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c +++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c @@ -15,21 +15,13 @@ #include #include -typedef __u8 u8; -typedef __u16 u16; -typedef __u32 u32; -typedef __u64 u64; -typedef __s16 s16; -typedef __s32 s32; +#include -#define aligned_u64 __aligned_u64 +#include +#include +#include -#ifndef __packed -#define __packed __attribute__((packed)) -#endif - -#include -#include +#include "eficapsule.h" static const char *tool_name = "mkeficapsule"; @@ -38,12 +30,19 @@ efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit = EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_FIT_GUID; efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw = EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID; +efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID; + +static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:p:c:m:dh"; static struct option options[] = { {"fit", required_argument, NULL, 'f'}, {"raw", required_argument, NULL, 'r'}, {"index", required_argument, NULL, 'i'}, {"instance", required_argument, NULL, 'I'}, + {"private-key", required_argument, NULL, 'p'}, + {"certificate", required_argument, NULL, 'c'}, + {"monotonic-count", required_argument, NULL, 'm'}, + {"dump-sig", no_argument, NULL, 'd'}, {"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'}, {NULL, 0, NULL, 0}, }; @@ -57,11 +56,41 @@ static void print_usage(void) "\t-r, --raw new raw image file\n" "\t-i, --index update image index\n" "\t-I, --instance update hardware instance\n" + "\t-p, --private-key private key file\n" + "\t-c, --certificate signer's certificate file\n" + "\t-m, --monotonic-count monotonic count\n" + "\t-d, --dump_sig dump signature (*.p7)\n" "\t-h, --help print a help message\n", tool_name); } /** + * auth_context - authentication context + * @key_file: Path to a private key file + * @cert_file: Path to a certificate file + * @image_data: Pointer to firmware data + * @image_size: Size of firmware data + * @auth: Authentication header + * @sig_data: Signature data + * @sig_size: Size of signature data + * + * Data structure used in create_auth_data(). @key_file through + * @image_size are input parameters. @auth, @sig_data and @sig_size + * are filled in by create_auth_data(). + */ +struct auth_context { + char *key_file; + char *cert_file; + uint8_t *image_data; + size_t image_size; + struct efi_firmware_image_authentication auth; + uint8_t *sig_data; + size_t sig_size; +}; + +static int dump_sig; + +/** * read_bin_file - read a firmware binary file * @bin: Path to a firmware binary file * @data: Pointer to pointer of allocated buffer @@ -74,7 +103,7 @@ static void print_usage(void) * * 0 - on success * * -1 - on failure */ -static int read_bin_file(char *bin, void **data, off_t *bin_size) +static int read_bin_file(char *bin, uint8_t **data, off_t *bin_size) { FILE *g; struct stat bin_stat; @@ -147,6 +176,205 @@ static int write_capsule_file(FILE *f, void *data, size_t size, const char *msg) } /** + * create_auth_data - compose authentication data in capsule + * @auth_context: Pointer to authentication context + * + * Fill up an authentication header (.auth) and signature data (.sig_data) + * in @auth_context, using library functions from openssl. + * All the parameters in @auth_context must be filled in by a caller. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - on success + * * -1 - on failure + */ +static int create_auth_data(struct auth_context *ctx) +{ + gnutls_datum_t cert; + gnutls_datum_t key; + off_t file_size; + gnutls_privkey_t pkey; + gnutls_x509_crt_t x509; + gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7; + gnutls_datum_t data; + gnutls_datum_t signature; + int ret; + + ret = read_bin_file(ctx->cert_file, &cert.data, &file_size); + if (ret < 0) + return -1; + if (file_size > UINT_MAX) + return -1; + cert.size = file_size; + + ret = read_bin_file(ctx->key_file, &key.data, &file_size); + if (ret < 0) + return -1; + if (ret < 0) + return -1; + if (file_size > UINT_MAX) + return -1; + key.size = file_size; + + /* + * For debugging, + * gnutls_global_set_time_function(mytime); + * gnutls_global_set_log_function(tls_log_func); + * gnutls_global_set_log_level(6); + */ + + ret = gnutls_privkey_init(&pkey); + if (ret < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "error in gnutls_privkey_init(): %s\n", + gnutls_strerror(ret)); + return -1; + } + + ret = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509); + if (ret < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "error in gnutls_x509_crt_init(): %s\n", + gnutls_strerror(ret)); + return -1; + } + + /* load a private key */ + ret = gnutls_privkey_import_x509_raw(pkey, &key, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, + 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, + "error in gnutls_privkey_import_x509_raw(): %s\n", + gnutls_strerror(ret)); + return -1; + } + + /* load x509 certificate */ + ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); + if (ret < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "error in gnutls_x509_crt_import(): %s\n", + gnutls_strerror(ret)); + return -1; + } + + /* generate a PKCS #7 structure */ + ret = gnutls_pkcs7_init(&pkcs7); + if (ret < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "error in gnutls_pkcs7_init(): %s\n", + gnutls_strerror(ret)); + return -1; + } + + /* sign */ + /* + * Data should have + * * firmware image + * * monotonic count + * in this order! + * See EDK2's FmpAuthenticatedHandlerRsa2048Sha256() + */ + data.size = ctx->image_size + sizeof(ctx->auth.monotonic_count); + data.data = malloc(data.size); + if (!data.data) { + fprintf(stderr, "allocating memory (0x%x) failed\n", data.size); + return -1; + } + memcpy(data.data, ctx->image_data, ctx->image_size); + memcpy(data.data + ctx->image_size, &ctx->auth.monotonic_count, + sizeof(ctx->auth.monotonic_count)); + + ret = gnutls_pkcs7_sign(pkcs7, x509, pkey, &data, NULL, NULL, + GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256, + /* GNUTLS_PKCS7_EMBED_DATA? */ + GNUTLS_PKCS7_INCLUDE_CERT | + GNUTLS_PKCS7_INCLUDE_TIME); + if (ret < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "error in gnutls_pkcs7)sign(): %s\n", + gnutls_strerror(ret)); + return -1; + } + + /* export */ + ret = gnutls_pkcs7_export2(pkcs7, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, &signature); + if (ret < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "error in gnutls_pkcs7_export2: %s\n", + gnutls_strerror(ret)); + return -1; + } + ctx->sig_data = signature.data; + ctx->sig_size = signature.size; + + /* fill auth_info */ + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.dwLength = sizeof(ctx->auth.auth_info) + + ctx->sig_size; + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wRevision = WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0; + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID; + memcpy(&ctx->auth.auth_info.cert_type, &efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7, + sizeof(efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7)); + + /* + * For better clean-ups, + * gnutls_pkcs7_deinit(pkcs7); + * gnutls_privkey_deinit(pkey); + * gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509); + * free(cert.data); + * free(key.data); + * if error + * gnutls_free(signature.data); + */ + + return 0; +} + +/** + * dump_signature - dump out a signature + * @path: Path to a capsule file + * @signature: Signature data + * @sig_size: Size of signature data + * + * Signature data pointed to by @signature will be saved into + * a file whose file name is @path with ".p7" suffix. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - on success + * * -1 - on failure + */ +static int dump_signature(const char *path, uint8_t *signature, size_t sig_size) +{ + char *sig_path; + FILE *f; + size_t size; + int ret = -1; + + sig_path = malloc(strlen(path) + 3 + 1); + if (!sig_path) + return ret; + + sprintf(sig_path, "%s.p7", path); + f = fopen(sig_path, "w"); + if (!f) + goto err; + + size = fwrite(signature, 1, sig_size, f); + if (size == sig_size) + ret = 0; + + fclose(f); +err: + free(sig_path); + return ret; +} + +/** + * free_sig_data - free out signature data + * @ctx: Pointer to authentication context + * + * Free signature data allocated in create_auth_data(). + */ +static void free_sig_data(struct auth_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx->sig_size) + gnutls_free(ctx->sig_data); +} + +/** * create_fwbin - create an uefi capsule file * @path: Path to a created capsule file * @bin: Path to a firmware binary to encapsulate @@ -167,23 +395,25 @@ static int write_capsule_file(FILE *f, void *data, size_t size, const char *msg) * * -1 - on failure */ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, - unsigned long index, unsigned long instance) + unsigned long index, unsigned long instance, + uint64_t mcount, char *privkey_file, char *cert_file) { struct efi_capsule_header header; struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header capsule; struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header image; + struct auth_context auth_context; FILE *f; - void *data; + uint8_t *data; off_t bin_size; - u64 offset; + uint64_t offset; int ret; #ifdef DEBUG - printf("For output: %s\n", path); - printf("\tbin: %s\n\ttype: %pUl\n", bin, guid); - printf("\tindex: %ld\n\tinstance: %ld\n", index, instance); + fprintf(stderr, "For output: %s\n", path); + fprintf(stderr, "\tbin: %s\n\ttype: %pUl\n", bin, guid); + fprintf(stderr, "\tindex: %lu\n\tinstance: %lu\n", index, instance); #endif - + auth_context.sig_size = 0; f = NULL; data = NULL; ret = -1; @@ -194,6 +424,27 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, if (read_bin_file(bin, &data, &bin_size)) goto err; + /* first, calculate signature to determine its size */ + if (privkey_file && cert_file) { + auth_context.key_file = privkey_file; + auth_context.cert_file = cert_file; + auth_context.auth.monotonic_count = mcount; + auth_context.image_data = data; + auth_context.image_size = bin_size; + + if (create_auth_data(&auth_context)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Signing firmware image failed\n"); + goto err; + } + + if (dump_sig && + dump_signature(path, auth_context.sig_data, + auth_context.sig_size)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Creating signature file failed\n"); + goto err; + } + } + /* * write a capsule file */ @@ -211,9 +462,12 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, /* TODO: The current implementation ignores flags */ header.flags = CAPSULE_FLAGS_PERSIST_ACROSS_RESET; header.capsule_image_size = sizeof(header) - + sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64) + + sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(uint64_t) + sizeof(image) + bin_size; + if (auth_context.sig_size) + header.capsule_image_size += sizeof(auth_context.auth) + + auth_context.sig_size; if (write_capsule_file(f, &header, sizeof(header), "Capsule header")) goto err; @@ -229,7 +483,7 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, "Firmware capsule header")) goto err; - offset = sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64); + offset = sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(uint64_t); if (write_capsule_file(f, &offset, sizeof(offset), "Offset to capsule image")) goto err; @@ -244,14 +498,33 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, image.reserved[1] = 0; image.reserved[2] = 0; image.update_image_size = bin_size; + if (auth_context.sig_size) + image.update_image_size += sizeof(auth_context.auth) + + auth_context.sig_size; image.update_vendor_code_size = 0; /* none */ image.update_hardware_instance = instance; image.image_capsule_support = 0; + if (auth_context.sig_size) + image.image_capsule_support |= CAPSULE_SUPPORT_AUTHENTICATION; if (write_capsule_file(f, &image, sizeof(image), "Firmware capsule image header")) goto err; /* + * signature + */ + if (auth_context.sig_size) { + if (write_capsule_file(f, &auth_context.auth, + sizeof(auth_context.auth), + "Authentication header")) + goto err; + + if (write_capsule_file(f, auth_context.sig_data, + auth_context.sig_size, "Signature")) + goto err; + } + + /* * firmware binary */ if (write_capsule_file(f, data, bin_size, "Firmware binary")) @@ -261,28 +534,43 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, err: if (f) fclose(f); + free_sig_data(&auth_context); free(data); return ret; } -/* - * Usage: - * $ mkeficapsule -f +/** + * main - main entry function of mkeficapsule + * @argc: Number of arguments + * @argv: Array of pointers to arguments + * + * Create an uefi capsule file, optionally signing it. + * Parse all the arguments and pass them on to create_fwbin(). + * + * Return: + * * 0 - on success + * * -1 - on failure */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *file; efi_guid_t *guid; unsigned long index, instance; + uint64_t mcount; + char *privkey_file, *cert_file; int c, idx; file = NULL; guid = NULL; index = 0; instance = 0; + mcount = 0; + privkey_file = NULL; + cert_file = NULL; + dump_sig = 0; for (;;) { - c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "f:r:i:I:v:h", options, &idx); + c = getopt_long(argc, argv, opts_short, options, &idx); if (c == -1) break; @@ -290,7 +578,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) case 'f': if (file) { fprintf(stderr, "Image already specified\n"); - return -1; + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } file = optarg; guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit; @@ -298,7 +586,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) case 'r': if (file) { fprintf(stderr, "Image already specified\n"); - return -1; + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } file = optarg; guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw; @@ -309,14 +597,38 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) case 'I': instance = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0); break; + case 'p': + if (privkey_file) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Private Key already specified\n"); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + privkey_file = optarg; + break; + case 'c': + if (cert_file) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Certificate file already specified\n"); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + cert_file = optarg; + break; + case 'm': + mcount = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0); + break; + case 'd': + dump_sig = 1; + break; case 'h': print_usage(); - return 0; + exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } } - /* need an output file */ - if (argc != optind + 1) { + /* check necessary parameters */ + if ((argc != optind + 1) || !file || + ((privkey_file && !cert_file) || + (!privkey_file && cert_file))) { print_usage(); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } @@ -327,8 +639,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } - if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance) - < 0) { + if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance, + mcount, privkey_file, cert_file) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Creating firmware capsule failed\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } -- cgit v1.1 From 2e5112559b566fcf64a8f5e7ab2ed0c0270927b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AKASHI Takahiro Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 19:10:36 +0900 Subject: tools: mkeficapsule: add man page Add a man page for mkeficapsule command. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro Reviewed-by: Simon Glass Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + doc/mkeficapsule.1 | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 100 insertions(+) create mode 100644 doc/mkeficapsule.1 diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index b6a4b5d..1c98029 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -762,6 +762,7 @@ S: Maintained T: git https://source.denx.de/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-efi.git F: doc/api/efi.rst F: doc/develop/uefi/* +F: doc/mkeficapsule.1 F: doc/usage/bootefi.rst F: drivers/rtc/emul_rtc.c F: include/capitalization.h diff --git a/doc/mkeficapsule.1 b/doc/mkeficapsule.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..680362f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/mkeficapsule.1 @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +.\" Copyright (c) 2021, Linaro Limited +.\" written by AKASHI Takahiro +.TH MAEFICAPSULE 1 "May 2021" + +.SH NAME +mkeficapsule \- Generate EFI capsule file for U-Boot + +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B mkeficapsule +.RI [ options "] " capsule-file + +.SH "DESCRIPTION" +.B mkeficapsule +command is used to create an EFI capsule file for use with the U-Boot +EFI capsule update. +A capsule file may contain various type of firmware blobs which +are to be applied to the system and must be placed in the specific +directory on the UEFI system partition. +An update will be automatically executed at next reboot. + +Optionally, a capsule file can be signed with a given private key. +In this case, the update will be authenticated by verifying the signature +before applying. + +.B mkeficapsule +supports two different format of image files: +.TP +.I raw image +format is a single binary blob of any type of firmware. + +.TP +.I FIT (Flattened Image Tree) image +format is the same as used in the new uImage format and allows for +multiple binary blobs in a single capsule file. +This type of image file can be generated by +.BR mkimage . + +.SH "OPTIONS" +One of +.BR --fit " or " --raw +option must be specified. + +.TP +.BI "-f\fR,\fB --fit " fit-image-file +Specify a FIT image file + +.TP +.BI "-r\fR,\fB --raw " raw-image-file +Specify a raw image file + +.TP +.BI "-i\fR,\fB --index " index +Specify an image index + +.TP +.BI "-I\fR,\fB --instance " instance +Specify a hardware instance + +.TP +.BR -h ", " --help +Print a help message + +.PP +With signing, +.BR --private-key ", " --certificate " and " --monotonic-count +are all mandatory. + +.TP +.BI "-p\fR,\fB --private-key " private-key-file +Specify signer's private key file in PEM + +.TP +.BI "-c\fR,\fB --certificate " certificate-file +Specify signer's certificate file in EFI certificate list format + +.TP +.BI "-m\fR,\fB --monotonic-count " count +Specify a monotonic count which is set to be monotonically incremented +at every firmware update. + +.TP +.B "-d\fR,\fB --dump_sig" +Dump signature data into *.p7 file + +.PP +.SH FILES +.TP +.I /EFI/UpdateCapsule +The directory in which all capsule files be placed + +.SH SEE ALSO +.BR mkimage (1) + +.SH AUTHORS +Written by AKASHI Takahiro + +.SH HOMEPAGE +http://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot/WebHome -- cgit v1.1 From 73e022d077f6bf1da388fe3913fbb2696a9212b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AKASHI Takahiro Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 19:10:37 +0900 Subject: doc: update UEFI document for usage of mkeficapsule Now we can use mkeficapsule command instead of EDK-II's script to create a signed capsule file. So update the instruction for capsule authentication. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro Reviewed-by: Simon Glass Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas --- doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst | 151 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst index 43fb10f..52a38c6 100644 --- a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst +++ b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst @@ -284,37 +284,56 @@ Support has been added for the UEFI capsule update feature which enables updating the U-Boot image using the UEFI firmware management protocol (FMP). The capsules are not passed to the firmware through the UpdateCapsule runtime service. Instead, capsule-on-disk -functionality is used for fetching the capsule from the EFI System -Partition (ESP) by placing the capsule file under the -\EFI\UpdateCapsule directory. - -The directory \EFI\UpdateCapsule is checked for capsules only within the -EFI system partition on the device specified in the active boot option -determined by reference to BootNext variable or BootOrder variable processing. -The active Boot Variable is the variable with highest priority BootNext or -within BootOrder that refers to a device found to be present. Boot variables -in BootOrder but referring to devices not present are ignored when determining -active boot variable. -Before starting a capsule update make sure your capsules are installed in the -correct ESP partition or set BootNext. +functionality is used for fetching capsules from the EFI System +Partition (ESP) by placing capsule files under the directory:: + + \EFI\UpdateCapsule + +The directory is checked for capsules only within the +EFI system partition on the device specified in the active boot option, +which is determined by BootXXXX variable in BootNext, or if not, the highest +priority one within BootOrder. Any BootXXXX variables referring to devices +not present are ignored when determining the active boot option. + +Please note that capsules will be applied in the alphabetic order of +capsule file names. + +Creating a capsule file +*********************** + +A capsule file can be created by using tools/mkeficapsule. +To build this tool, enable:: + + CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE=y + CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO=y + +Run the following command + +.. code-block:: console + + $ mkeficapsule \ + --index 1 --instance 0 \ + [--fit | --raw ] \ + Performing the update ********************* -Since U-boot doesn't currently support SetVariable at runtime there's a Kconfig -option (CONFIG_EFI_IGNORE_OSINDICATIONS) to disable the OsIndications variable -check. If that option is enabled just copy your capsule to \EFI\UpdateCapsule. +Put capsule files under the directory mentioned above. +Then, following the UEFI specification, you'll need to set +the EFI_OS_INDICATIONS_FILE_CAPSULE_DELIVERY_SUPPORTED +bit in OsIndications variable with -If that option is disabled, you'll need to set the OsIndications variable with:: +.. code-block:: console => setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -v OsIndications =0x04 -Finally, the capsule update can be initiated either by rebooting the board, -which is the preferred method, or by issuing the following command:: - - => efidebug capsule disk-update +Since U-boot doesn't currently support SetVariable at runtime, its value +won't be taken over across the reboot. If this is the case, you can skip +this feature check with the Kconfig option (CONFIG_EFI_IGNORE_OSINDICATIONS) +set. -**The efidebug command is should only be used during debugging/development.** +Finally, the capsule update can be initiated by rebooting the board. Enabling Capsule Authentication ******************************* @@ -324,82 +343,64 @@ be updated by verifying the capsule signature. The capsule signature is computed and prepended to the capsule payload at the time of capsule generation. This signature is then verified by using the public key stored as part of the X509 certificate. This certificate is -in the form of an efi signature list (esl) file, which is embedded as -part of U-Boot. +in the form of an efi signature list (esl) file, which is embedded in +a device tree. The capsule authentication feature can be enabled through the following config, in addition to the configs listed above for capsule update:: CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH= The public and private keys used for the signing process are generated -and used by the steps highlighted below:: +and used by the steps highlighted below. - 1. Install utility commands on your host - * OPENSSL +1. Install utility commands on your host + * openssl * efitools - 2. Create signing keys and certificate files on your host +2. Create signing keys and certificate files on your host - $ openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj /CN=CRT/ \ - -keyout CRT.key -out CRT.crt -nodes -days 365 - $ cert-to-efi-sig-list CRT.crt CRT.esl +.. code-block:: console - $ openssl x509 -in CRT.crt -out CRT.cer -outform DER - $ openssl x509 -inform DER -in CRT.cer -outform PEM -out CRT.pub.pem + $ openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj /CN=CRT/ \ + -keyout CRT.key -out CRT.crt -nodes -days 365 + $ cert-to-efi-sig-list CRT.crt CRT.esl - $ openssl pkcs12 -export -out CRT.pfx -inkey CRT.key -in CRT.crt - $ openssl pkcs12 -in CRT.pfx -nodes -out CRT.pem +3. Run the following command to create and sign the capsule file -The capsule file can be generated by using the GenerateCapsule.py -script in EDKII:: +.. code-block:: console - $ ./BaseTools/BinWrappers/PosixLike/GenerateCapsule -e -o \ - --monotonic-count --fw-version \ - --lsv --guid \ - e2bb9c06-70e9-4b14-97a3-5a7913176e3f --verbose \ - --update-image-index --signer-private-cert \ - /path/to/CRT.pem --trusted-public-cert \ - /path/to/CRT.pub.pem --other-public-cert /path/to/CRT.pub.pem \ - + $ mkeficapsule --monotonic-count 1 \ + --private-key CRT.key \ + --certificate CRT.crt \ + --index 1 --instance 0 \ + [--fit | --raw ] \ + -Place the capsule generated in the above step on the EFI System -Partition under the EFI/UpdateCapsule directory +4. Insert the signature list into a device tree in the following format:: -Testing on QEMU -*************** + { + signature { + capsule-key = [ ]; + } + ... + } -Currently, support has been added on the QEMU ARM64 virt platform for -updating the U-Boot binary as a raw image when the platform is booted -in non-secure mode, i.e. with CONFIG_TFABOOT disabled. For this -configuration, the QEMU platform needs to be booted with -'secure=off'. The U-Boot binary placed on the first bank of the NOR -flash at offset 0x0. The U-Boot environment is placed on the second -NOR flash bank at offset 0x4000000. +You can do step-4 manually with -The capsule update feature is enabled with the following configuration -settings:: +.. code-block:: console - CONFIG_MTD=y - CONFIG_FLASH_CFI_MTD=y - CONFIG_CMD_MTDPARTS=y - CONFIG_CMD_DFU=y - CONFIG_DFU_MTD=y - CONFIG_PCI_INIT_R=y - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK=y - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT=y - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE=y - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_RAW=y + $ dtc -@ -I dts -O dtb -o signature.dtbo signature.dts + $ fdtoverlay -i orig.dtb -o new.dtb -v signature.dtbo -In addition, the following config needs to be disabled(QEMU ARM specific):: +where signature.dts looks like:: - CONFIG_TFABOOT - -The capsule file can be generated by using the tools/mkeficapsule:: - - $ mkeficapsule --raw --index 1 + &{/} { + signature { + capsule-key = /incbin/("CRT.esl"); + }; + }; Executing the boot manager ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- cgit v1.1 From e0009d886d806c536cf6e56a9bc86a5acd31e846 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AKASHI Takahiro Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 19:10:38 +0900 Subject: test/py: efi_capsule: add image authentication test Add a couple of test cases against capsule image authentication for capsule-on-disk, where only a signed capsule file with the verified signature will be applied to the system. Due to the difficulty of embedding a public key (esl file) in U-Boot binary during pytest setup time, all the keys/certificates are pre-created. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro Reviewed-by: Simon Glass Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas --- test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py | 5 + test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 52 ++++- test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts | 10 + .../test_capsule_firmware_signed.py | 254 +++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py index 4fd6353..59b40f1 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py @@ -3,3 +3,8 @@ # Directories CAPSULE_DATA_DIR = '/EFI/CapsuleTestData' CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR = '/EFI/UpdateCapsule' + +# v1.5.1 or earlier of efitools has a bug in sha256 calculation, and +# you need build a newer version on your own. +# The path must terminate with '/' if it is not null. +EFITOOLS_PATH = '' diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py index 6ad5608..27c0597 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py @@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ import pytest from capsule_defs import * # -# Fixture for UEFI secure boot test +# Fixture for UEFI capsule test # - @pytest.fixture(scope='session') def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config): - """Set up a file system to be used in UEFI capsule test. + """Set up a file system to be used in UEFI capsule and + authentication test. Args: request: Pytest request object. @@ -40,6 +40,36 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config): check_call('mkdir -p %s' % data_dir, shell=True) check_call('mkdir -p %s' % install_dir, shell=True) + capsule_auth_enabled = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_authenticate') + if capsule_auth_enabled: + # Create private key (SIGNER.key) and certificate (SIGNER.crt) + check_call('cd %s; ' + 'openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 ' + '-subj /CN=TEST_SIGNER/ -keyout SIGNER.key ' + '-out SIGNER.crt -nodes -days 365' + % data_dir, shell=True) + check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-sig-list SIGNER.crt SIGNER.esl' + % (data_dir, EFITOOLS_PATH), shell=True) + + # Update dtb adding capsule certificate + check_call('cd %s; ' + 'cp %s/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts .' + % (data_dir, u_boot_config.source_dir), shell=True) + check_call('cd %s; ' + 'dtc -@ -I dts -O dtb -o signature.dtbo signature.dts; ' + 'fdtoverlay -i %s/arch/sandbox/dts/test.dtb ' + '-o test_sig.dtb signature.dtbo' + % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True) + + # Create *malicious* private key (SIGNER2.key) and certificate + # (SIGNER2.crt) + check_call('cd %s; ' + 'openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 ' + '-subj /CN=TEST_SIGNER/ -keyout SIGNER2.key ' + '-out SIGNER2.crt -nodes -days 365' + % data_dir, shell=True) + # Create capsule files # two regions: one for u-boot.bin and the other for u-boot.env check_call('cd %s; echo -n u-boot:Old > u-boot.bin.old; echo -n u-boot:New > u-boot.bin.new; echo -n u-boot-env:Old -> u-boot.env.old; echo -n u-boot-env:New > u-boot.env.new' % data_dir, @@ -56,6 +86,22 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config): check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --raw u-boot.bin.new --index 1 Test02' % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True) + if capsule_auth_enabled: + # firmware signed with proper key + check_call('cd %s; ' + '%s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --monotonic-count 1 ' + '--private-key SIGNER.key --certificate SIGNER.crt ' + '--raw u-boot.bin.new Test11' + % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), + shell=True) + # firmware signed with *mal* key + check_call('cd %s; ' + '%s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --monotonic-count 1 ' + '--private-key SIGNER2.key ' + '--certificate SIGNER2.crt ' + '--raw u-boot.bin.new Test12' + % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), + shell=True) # Create a disk image with EFI system partition check_call('virt-make-fs --partition=gpt --size=+1M --type=vfat %s %s' % diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..078cfc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + +/dts-v1/; +/plugin/; + +&{/} { + signature { + capsule-key = /incbin/("SIGNER.esl"); + }; +}; diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..593b032 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +# Copyright (c) 2021, Linaro Limited +# Author: AKASHI Takahiro +# +# U-Boot UEFI: Firmware Update (Signed capsule) Test + +""" +This test verifies capsule-on-disk firmware update +with signed capsule files +""" + +import pytest +from capsule_defs import CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR + +@pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('efi_capsule_firmware_raw') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('efi_capsule_authenticate') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('dfu') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('dfu_sf') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_efidebug') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_fat') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_memory') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_nvedit_efi') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_sf') +@pytest.mark.slow +class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareSigned(object): + def test_efi_capsule_auth1( + self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data): + """ + Test Case 1 - Update U-Boot on SPI Flash, raw image format + 0x100000-0x150000: U-Boot binary (but dummy) + + If the capsule is properly signed, the authentication + should pass and the firmware be updated. + """ + disk_img = efi_capsule_data + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1-a, before reboot'): + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi', + 'efidebug boot order 1', + 'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004', + 'env set dfu_alt_info ' + '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 ' + '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'env save']) + + # initialize content + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old' + % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'sf write 4000000 100000 10', + 'sf read 5000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 5000000 10']) + assert 'Old' in ''.join(output) + + # place a capsule file + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test11' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test11 $filesize' + % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test11' in ''.join(output) + + # reboot + mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/test_efi_capsule' + u_boot_console.config.dtb = mnt_point + CAPSULE_DATA_DIR \ + + '/test_sig.dtb' + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + + capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1-b, after reboot'): + if not capsule_early: + # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables + # are not available. + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'env set dfu_alt_info ' + '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 ' + '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test11' in ''.join(output) + + # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'env print -e Capsule0000') + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test11' not in ''.join(output) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 4000000 10']) + assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) + + def test_efi_capsule_auth2( + self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data): + """ + Test Case 2 - Update U-Boot on SPI Flash, raw image format + 0x100000-0x150000: U-Boot binary (but dummy) + + If the capsule is signed but with an invalid key, + the authentication should fail and the firmware + not be updated. + """ + disk_img = efi_capsule_data + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2-a, before reboot'): + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi', + 'efidebug boot order 1', + 'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004', + 'env set dfu_alt_info ' + '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 ' + '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'env save']) + + # initialize content + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old' + % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'sf write 4000000 100000 10', + 'sf read 5000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 5000000 10']) + assert 'Old' in ''.join(output) + + # place a capsule file + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test12' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test12 $filesize' + % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test12' in ''.join(output) + + # reboot + mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/test_efi_capsule' + u_boot_console.config.dtb = mnt_point + CAPSULE_DATA_DIR \ + + '/test_sig.dtb' + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + + capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2-b, after reboot'): + if not capsule_early: + # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables + # are not available. + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'env set dfu_alt_info ' + '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 ' + '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test12' in ''.join(output) + + # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'env print -e Capsule0000') + + # deleted any way + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test12' not in ''.join(output) + + # TODO: check CapsuleStatus in CapsuleXXXX + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 4000000 10']) + assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output) + + def test_efi_capsule_auth3( + self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data): + """ + Test Case 3 - Update U-Boot on SPI Flash, raw image format + 0x100000-0x150000: U-Boot binary (but dummy) + + If the capsule is not signed, the authentication + should fail and the firmware not be updated. + """ + disk_img = efi_capsule_data + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3-a, before reboot'): + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi', + 'efidebug boot order 1', + 'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004', + 'env set dfu_alt_info ' + '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 ' + '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'env save']) + + # initialize content + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old' + % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'sf write 4000000 100000 10', + 'sf read 5000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 5000000 10']) + assert 'Old' in ''.join(output) + + # place a capsule file + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test02' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test02 $filesize' + % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test02' in ''.join(output) + + # reboot + mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/test_efi_capsule' + u_boot_console.config.dtb = mnt_point + CAPSULE_DATA_DIR \ + + '/test_sig.dtb' + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + + capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3-b, after reboot'): + if not capsule_early: + # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables + # are not available. + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'env set dfu_alt_info ' + '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 ' + '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test02' in ''.join(output) + + # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'env print -e Capsule0000') + + # deleted any way + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test02' not in ''.join(output) + + # TODO: check CapsuleStatus in CapsuleXXXX + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 4000000 10']) + assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output) -- cgit v1.1 From a7ddb3f614e2b7fc01ba0b8097890acf18470ea4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AKASHI Takahiro Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 19:10:39 +0900 Subject: tools: mkeficapsule: allow for specifying GUID explicitly The existing options, "--fit" and "--raw," are only used to put a proper GUID in a capsule header, where GUID identifies a particular FMP (Firmware Management Protocol) driver which then would handle the firmware binary in a capsule. In fact, mkeficapsule does the exact same job in creating a capsule file whatever the firmware binary type is. To prepare for the future extension, the command syntax will be a bit modified to allow users to specify arbitrary GUID for their own FMP driver. OLD: [--fit | --raw ] NEW: [--fit | --raw | --guid ] Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro Reviewed-by: Simon Glass --- .azure-pipelines.yml | 4 +-- doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst | 4 +-- doc/mkeficapsule.1 | 26 +++++++++++---- tools/Makefile | 2 +- tools/mkeficapsule.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 5 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/.azure-pipelines.yml b/.azure-pipelines.yml index 2c421da..db45291 100644 --- a/.azure-pipelines.yml +++ b/.azure-pipelines.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ stages: %CD:~0,2%\msys64\usr\bin\bash -lc "pacman --noconfirm -Su" displayName: 'Update MSYS2' - script: | - %CD:~0,2%\msys64\usr\bin\bash -lc "pacman --noconfirm --needed -Sy make gcc bison flex diffutils openssl-devel libgnutls-devel" + %CD:~0,2%\msys64\usr\bin\bash -lc "pacman --noconfirm --needed -Sy make gcc bison flex diffutils openssl-devel libgnutls-devel libutil-linux-devel" displayName: 'Install Toolchain' - script: | echo make tools-only_defconfig tools-only NO_SDL=1 > build-tools.sh @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ stages: pool: vmImage: $(macos_vm) steps: - - script: brew install make + - script: brew install make ossp-uuid displayName: Brew install dependencies - script: | gmake tools-only_config tools-only NO_SDL=1 \ diff --git a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst index 52a38c6..b7bf135 100644 --- a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst +++ b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst @@ -375,8 +375,8 @@ and used by the steps highlighted below. --private-key CRT.key \ --certificate CRT.crt \ --index 1 --instance 0 \ - [--fit | --raw ] \ - + [--fit | --raw | --guid 4. Insert the signature list into a device tree in the following format:: diff --git a/doc/mkeficapsule.1 b/doc/mkeficapsule.1 index 680362f..8babb27 100644 --- a/doc/mkeficapsule.1 +++ b/doc/mkeficapsule.1 @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ mkeficapsule \- Generate EFI capsule file for U-Boot .SH SYNOPSIS .B mkeficapsule -.RI [ options "] " capsule-file +.RI [ options "] " image-blob " " capsule-file .SH "DESCRIPTION" .B mkeficapsule @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ In this case, the update will be authenticated by verifying the signature before applying. .B mkeficapsule -supports two different format of image files: +takes any type of image files, including: .TP .I raw image format is a single binary blob of any type of firmware. @@ -36,18 +36,30 @@ multiple binary blobs in a single capsule file. This type of image file can be generated by .BR mkimage . +.PP +If you want to use other types than above two, you should explicitly +specify a guid for the FMP driver. + .SH "OPTIONS" One of -.BR --fit " or " --raw +.BR --fit ", " --raw " or " --guid option must be specified. .TP -.BI "-f\fR,\fB --fit " fit-image-file -Specify a FIT image file +.BR -f ", " --fit +Indicate that the blob is a FIT image file .TP -.BI "-r\fR,\fB --raw " raw-image-file -Specify a raw image file +.BR -r ", " --raw +Indicate that the blob is a raw image file + +.TP +.BI "-g\fR,\fB --guid " guid-string +Specify guid for image blob type. The format is: + xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx + +The first three elements are in little endian, while the rest +is in big endian. .TP .BI "-i\fR,\fB --index " index diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile index 8da07d6..5409ff2 100644 --- a/tools/Makefile +++ b/tools/Makefile @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MIPS) += mips-relocs hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1_COMPILER) += asn1_compiler HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -idirafter $(srctree)/include -HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += -lgnutls +HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += -lgnutls -luuid hostprogs-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE) += mkeficapsule # We build some files with extra pedantic flags to try to minimize things diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c index a5aac7d..550f5f8 100644 --- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c +++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #include #include - +#include #include #include @@ -32,11 +32,12 @@ efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw = EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID; efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID; -static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:p:c:m:dh"; +static const char *opts_short = "frg:i:I:v:p:c:m:dh"; static struct option options[] = { - {"fit", required_argument, NULL, 'f'}, - {"raw", required_argument, NULL, 'r'}, + {"fit", no_argument, NULL, 'f'}, + {"raw", no_argument, NULL, 'r'}, + {"guid", required_argument, NULL, 'g'}, {"index", required_argument, NULL, 'i'}, {"instance", required_argument, NULL, 'I'}, {"private-key", required_argument, NULL, 'p'}, @@ -49,11 +50,12 @@ static struct option options[] = { static void print_usage(void) { - printf("Usage: %s [options] \n" + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] \n" "Options:\n" - "\t-f, --fit new FIT image file\n" - "\t-r, --raw new raw image file\n" + "\t-f, --fit FIT image type\n" + "\t-r, --raw raw image type\n" + "\t-g, --guid guid for image blob type\n" "\t-i, --index update image index\n" "\t-I, --instance update hardware instance\n" "\t-p, --private-key private key file\n" @@ -541,6 +543,37 @@ err: } /** + * convert_uuid_to_guid() - convert UUID to GUID + * @buf: UUID binary + * + * UUID and GUID have the same data structure, but their binary + * formats are different due to the endianness. See lib/uuid.c. + * Since uuid_parse() can handle only UUID, this function must + * be called to get correct data for GUID when parsing a string. + * + * The correct data will be returned in @buf. + */ +void convert_uuid_to_guid(unsigned char *buf) +{ + unsigned char c; + + c = buf[0]; + buf[0] = buf[3]; + buf[3] = c; + c = buf[1]; + buf[1] = buf[2]; + buf[2] = c; + + c = buf[4]; + buf[4] = buf[5]; + buf[5] = c; + + c = buf[6]; + buf[6] = buf[7]; + buf[7] = c; +} + +/** * main - main entry function of mkeficapsule * @argc: Number of arguments * @argv: Array of pointers to arguments @@ -554,14 +587,13 @@ err: */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { - char *file; efi_guid_t *guid; + unsigned char uuid_buf[16]; unsigned long index, instance; uint64_t mcount; char *privkey_file, *cert_file; int c, idx; - file = NULL; guid = NULL; index = 0; instance = 0; @@ -576,21 +608,34 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) switch (c) { case 'f': - if (file) { - fprintf(stderr, "Image already specified\n"); + if (guid) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Image type already specified\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } - file = optarg; guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit; break; case 'r': - if (file) { - fprintf(stderr, "Image already specified\n"); + if (guid) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Image type already specified\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } - file = optarg; guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw; break; + case 'g': + if (guid) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Image type already specified\n"); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + if (uuid_parse(optarg, uuid_buf)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Wrong guid format\n"); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + convert_uuid_to_guid(uuid_buf); + guid = (efi_guid_t *)uuid_buf; + break; case 'i': index = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0); break; @@ -626,20 +671,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) } /* check necessary parameters */ - if ((argc != optind + 1) || !file || + if ((argc != optind + 2) || !guid || ((privkey_file && !cert_file) || (!privkey_file && cert_file))) { print_usage(); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } - /* need a fit image file or raw image file */ - if (!file) { - print_usage(); - exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); - } - - if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance, + if (create_fwbin(argv[argc - 1], argv[argc - 2], guid, index, instance, mcount, privkey_file, cert_file) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Creating firmware capsule failed\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); -- cgit v1.1 From f6b69618d647cec90c6026895b4fc01095af108a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AKASHI Takahiro Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 19:10:40 +0900 Subject: test/py: efi_capsule: align with the syntax change of mkeficapsule Since the syntax of mkeficapsule was changed in the previous commit, we need to modify command line arguments in a pytest script. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro Reviewed-by: Simon Glass --- test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py index 27c0597..a5a25c5 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py @@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config): check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkimage -f uboot_bin_env.its uboot_bin_env.itb' % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True) - check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --fit uboot_bin_env.itb --index 1 Test01' % + check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --fit uboot_bin_env.itb Test01' % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True) - check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --raw u-boot.bin.new --index 1 Test02' % + check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --raw u-boot.bin.new Test02' % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True) if capsule_auth_enabled: -- cgit v1.1 From 89b04229410a4a7300f3185a5d4a795cb831808d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AKASHI Takahiro Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 19:10:41 +0900 Subject: test/py: efi_capsule: add a test for "--guid" option This test scenario tests a new feature of mkeficapsule, "--guid" option, which allows us to specify FMP driver's guid explicitly at the command line. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro --- test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 3 + .../test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+) diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py index a5a25c5..9076087 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py @@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config): check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --raw u-boot.bin.new Test02' % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True) + check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --guid E2BB9C06-70E9-4B14-97A3-5A7913176E3F u-boot.bin.new Test03' % + (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), + shell=True) if capsule_auth_enabled: # firmware signed with proper key check_call('cd %s; ' diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py index 9eeaae2..9cc9735 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py @@ -247,3 +247,70 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object): 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', 'md.b 4000000 10']) assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) + + def test_efi_capsule_fw4( + self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data): + """ + Test Case 4 - Test "--guid" option of mkeficapsule + The test scenario is the same as Case 3. + """ + disk_img = efi_capsule_data + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 4-a, before reboot'): + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi -s ""', + 'efidebug boot order 1', + 'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004', + 'env set dfu_alt_info "sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'env save']) + + # initialize content + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'sf write 4000000 100000 10', + 'sf read 5000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 5000000 10']) + assert 'Old' in ''.join(output) + + # place a capsule file + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test03' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test03 $filesize' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test03' in ''.join(output) + + # reboot + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + + capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 4-b, after reboot'): + if not capsule_early: + # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables + # are not available. + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'env set dfu_alt_info "sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test03' in ''.join(output) + + # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'env print -e Capsule0000') + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list(['efidebug capsule esrt']) + + # ensure that EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID is in the ESRT. + assert 'E2BB9C06-70E9-4B14-97A3-5A7913176E3F' in ''.join(output) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test03' not in ''.join(output) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 4000000 10']) + assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) -- cgit v1.1 From edbce80ebd541cfa96535686c231a9003e7e1299 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AKASHI Takahiro Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 19:10:42 +0900 Subject: test/py: efi_capsule: check the results in case of CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE Before the capsule authentication is supported, this test script works correctly, but with the feature enabled, most tests will fail due to unsigned capsules. So check the results depending on CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE or not. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro Reviewed-by: Simon Glass --- .../test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py | 26 ++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py index 9cc9735..6e803f6 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py @@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object): capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + capsule_auth = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_authenticate') with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2-b, after reboot'): if not capsule_early: # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables @@ -171,12 +173,18 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object): 'sf probe 0:0', 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', 'md.b 4000000 10']) - assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) + if capsule_auth: + assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output) + else: + assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ 'sf read 4000000 150000 10', 'md.b 4000000 10']) - assert 'u-boot-env:New' in ''.join(output) + if capsule_auth: + assert 'u-boot-env:Old' in ''.join(output) + else: + assert 'u-boot-env:New' in ''.join(output) def test_efi_capsule_fw3( self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data): @@ -215,6 +223,8 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object): capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + capsule_auth = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_authenticate') with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3-b, after reboot'): if not capsule_early: # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables @@ -246,7 +256,10 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object): 'sf probe 0:0', 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', 'md.b 4000000 10']) - assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) + if capsule_auth: + assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output) + else: + assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) def test_efi_capsule_fw4( self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data): @@ -285,6 +298,8 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object): capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + capsule_auth = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_authenticate') with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 4-b, after reboot'): if not capsule_early: # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables @@ -313,4 +328,7 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object): 'sf probe 0:0', 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', 'md.b 4000000 10']) - assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) + if capsule_auth: + assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output) + else: + assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) -- cgit v1.1 From 72d8b30455b29ae4d3c84f018f701d0f81467e10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilias Apalodimas Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 09:37:49 +0200 Subject: efi_loader: fix dual signed image certification The EFI spec allows for images to carry multiple signatures. Currently we don't adhere to the verification process for such images. The spec says: "Multiple signatures are allowed to exist in the binary's certificate table (as per PE/COFF Section "Attribute Certificate Table"). Only one hash or signature is required to be present in db in order to pass validation, so long as neither the SHA-256 hash of the binary nor any present signature is reflected in dbx." With our current implementation signing the image with two certificates and inserting both of them in db and one of them dbx doesn't always reject the image. The rejection depends on the order that the image was signed and the order the certificates are read (and checked) in db. While at it move the sha256 hash verification outside the signature checking loop, since it only needs to run once per image and get simplify the logic for authenticating an unsigned imahe using sha256 hashes. Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas --- lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 88 ++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c index f41cfa4..5df3593 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c @@ -517,53 +517,6 @@ err: #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT /** - * efi_image_unsigned_authenticate() - authenticate unsigned image with - * SHA256 hash - * @regs: List of regions to be verified - * - * If an image is not signed, it doesn't have a signature. In this case, - * its message digest is calculated and it will be compared with one of - * hash values stored in signature databases. - * - * Return: true if authenticated, false if not - */ -static bool efi_image_unsigned_authenticate(struct efi_image_regions *regs) -{ - struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; - bool ret = false; - - dbx = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u"dbx"); - if (!dbx) { - EFI_PRINT("Getting signature database(dbx) failed\n"); - goto out; - } - - db = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u"db"); - if (!db) { - EFI_PRINT("Getting signature database(db) failed\n"); - goto out; - } - - /* try black-list first */ - if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, dbx, true)) { - EFI_PRINT("Image is not signed and its digest found in \"dbx\"\n"); - goto out; - } - - /* try white-list */ - if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, db, false)) - ret = true; - else - EFI_PRINT("Image is not signed and its digest not found in \"db\" or \"dbx\"\n"); - -out: - efi_sigstore_free(db); - efi_sigstore_free(dbx); - - return ret; -} - -/** * efi_image_authenticate() - verify a signature of signed image * @efi: Pointer to image * @efi_size: Size of @efi @@ -608,14 +561,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) if (!efi_image_parse(new_efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, &wincerts_len)) { EFI_PRINT("Parsing PE executable image failed\n"); - goto err; - } - - if (!wincerts) { - /* The image is not signed */ - ret = efi_image_unsigned_authenticate(regs); - - goto err; + goto out; } /* @@ -624,18 +570,18 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) db = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u"db"); if (!db) { EFI_PRINT("Getting signature database(db) failed\n"); - goto err; + goto out; } dbx = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u"dbx"); if (!dbx) { EFI_PRINT("Getting signature database(dbx) failed\n"); - goto err; + goto out; } if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, dbx, true)) { EFI_PRINT("Image's digest was found in \"dbx\"\n"); - goto err; + goto out; } /* @@ -678,7 +624,8 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) if (guidcmp(auth, &efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7)) { EFI_PRINT("Certificate type not supported: %pUs\n", auth); - continue; + ret = false; + goto out; } auth += sizeof(efi_guid_t); @@ -686,7 +633,8 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) } else if (wincert->wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) { EFI_PRINT("Certificate type not supported\n"); - continue; + ret = false; + goto out; } msg = pkcs7_parse_message(auth, auth_size); @@ -717,32 +665,32 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) */ /* try black-list first */ if (efi_signature_verify_one(regs, msg, dbx)) { + ret = false; EFI_PRINT("Signature was rejected by \"dbx\"\n"); - continue; + goto out; } if (!efi_signature_check_signers(msg, dbx)) { + ret = false; EFI_PRINT("Signer(s) in \"dbx\"\n"); - continue; + goto out; } /* try white-list */ if (efi_signature_verify(regs, msg, db, dbx)) { ret = true; - break; + continue; } EFI_PRINT("Signature was not verified by \"db\"\n"); + } - if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, db, false)) { - ret = true; - break; - } - EFI_PRINT("Image's digest was not found in \"db\" or \"dbx\"\n"); - } + /* last resort try the image sha256 hash in db */ + if (!ret && efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, db, false)) + ret = true; -err: +out: efi_sigstore_free(db); efi_sigstore_free(dbx); pkcs7_free_message(msg); -- cgit v1.1 From 8c5ed53328712894c19b8b60101b6248358e7dea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilias Apalodimas Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 09:37:50 +0200 Subject: test/py: efi_secboot: adjust secure boot tests to code changes The previous patch is changing U-Boot's behavior wrt certificate based binary authentication. Specifically an image who's digest of a certificate is found in dbx is now rejected. Fix the test accordingly and add another one testing signatures in reverse order Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas --- test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py index 0aee344..cc9396a 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ class TestEfiSignedImage(object): assert 'Hello, world!' in ''.join(output) with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 5c'): - # Test Case 5c, not rejected if one of signatures (digest of + # Test Case 5c, rejected if one of signatures (digest of # certificate) is revoked output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 dbx_hash.auth', @@ -195,7 +195,8 @@ class TestEfiSignedImage(object): output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ 'efidebug boot next 1', 'efidebug test bootmgr']) - assert 'Hello, world!' in ''.join(output) + assert '\'HELLO\' failed' in ''.join(output) + assert 'efi_start_image() returned: 26' in ''.join(output) with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 5d'): # Test Case 5d, rejected if both of signatures are revoked @@ -209,6 +210,31 @@ class TestEfiSignedImage(object): assert '\'HELLO\' failed' in ''.join(output) assert 'efi_start_image() returned: 26' in ''.join(output) + # Try rejection in reverse order. + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 5e'): + # Test Case 5e, authenticated even if only one of signatures + # is verified. Same as before but reject dbx_hash1.auth only + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000:$filesize db', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000:$filesize KEK', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000:$filesize PK', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db1.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -a -i 4000000:$filesize db', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 dbx_hash1.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000:$filesize dbx']) + assert 'Failed to set EFI variable' not in ''.join(output) + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'efidebug boot add -b 1 HELLO host 0:1 /helloworld.efi.signed_2sigs -s ""', + 'efidebug boot next 1', + 'efidebug test bootmgr']) + assert '\'HELLO\' failed' in ''.join(output) + assert 'efi_start_image() returned: 26' in ''.join(output) + def test_efi_signed_image_auth6(self, u_boot_console, efi_boot_env): """ Test Case 6 - using digest of signed image in database -- cgit v1.1