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authorAndrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com>2019-04-12 12:54:45 -0400
committerTom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>2019-04-26 17:51:51 -0400
commit3a543a8084aabae5b31b9858525cbe507d2c67fb (patch)
treef92c7b5e240d8b88c935b174dc00c977ef525798 /arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c
parentff6043a5fd9ada40d5890eb6cf4f624e22c14c80 (diff)
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arm: mach-k3: Add secure device support
K3 devices have High Security (HS) variants along with the non-HS already supported. Like the previous generation devices (OMAP/Keystone2) K3 supports boot chain-of-trust by authenticating and optionally decrypting images as they are unpacked from FIT images. Add support for this here. Signed-off-by: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com> Reviewed-by: Andreas Dannenberg <dannenberg@ti.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c63
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c b/arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * K3: Security functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Texas Instruments Incorporated - http://www.ti.com/
+ * Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com>
+ */
+
+#include <common.h>
+#include <dm.h>
+#include <linux/soc/ti/ti_sci_protocol.h>
+#include <mach/spl.h>
+#include <spl.h>
+
+void board_fit_image_post_process(void **p_image, size_t *p_size)
+{
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ struct ti_sci_handle *ti_sci;
+ struct ti_sci_proc_ops *proc_ops;
+ u64 image_addr;
+ u32 image_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Get handle to Device Management and Security Controller (SYSFW) */
+ ret = uclass_get_device_by_name(UCLASS_FIRMWARE, "dmsc", &dev);
+ if (ret) {
+ printf("Failed to get handle to SYSFW (%d)\n", ret);
+ hang();
+ }
+ ti_sci = (struct ti_sci_handle *)(ti_sci_get_handle_from_sysfw(dev));
+ proc_ops = &ti_sci->ops.proc_ops;
+
+ image_addr = (uintptr_t)*p_image;
+
+ debug("Authenticating image at address 0x%016llx\n", image_addr);
+
+ /* Authenticate image */
+ ret = proc_ops->proc_auth_boot_image(ti_sci, &image_addr, &image_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ printf("Authentication failed!\n");
+ hang();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The image_size returned may be 0 when the authentication process has
+ * moved the image. When this happens no further processing on the
+ * image is needed or often even possible as it may have also been
+ * placed behind a firewall when moved.
+ */
+ *p_size = image_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Output notification of successful authentication to re-assure the
+ * user that the secure code is being processed as expected. However
+ * suppress any such log output in case of building for SPL and booting
+ * via YMODEM. This is done to avoid disturbing the YMODEM serial
+ * protocol transactions.
+ */
+ if (!(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_BUILD) &&
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_YMODEM_SUPPORT) &&
+ spl_boot_device() == BOOT_DEVICE_UART))
+ printf("Authentication passed\n");
+}