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| author | Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> | 2018-01-12 12:40:08 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> | 2018-01-14 17:26:30 +0100 |
| commit | 1addedadc4e9a7ca05a985fb6bf9b07c6458ff27 (patch) | |
| tree | b8297ab86fd77a17d118dc28e4d05eddc8bb7b77 /arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx | |
| parent | 824ef302f362c3350fa17c8a006300b159430a16 (diff) | |
| download | u-boot-1addedadc4e9a7ca05a985fb6bf9b07c6458ff27.zip u-boot-1addedadc4e9a7ca05a985fb6bf9b07c6458ff27.tar.gz u-boot-1addedadc4e9a7ca05a985fb6bf9b07c6458ff27.tar.bz2 | |
arm: imx: hab: Define rvt_check_target()
The hab_rvt_check_target() callback according to the HABv4 documentation:
"This function reports whether or not a given target region is allowed for
either peripheral configuration or image loading in memory. It is intended
for use by post-ROM boot stage components, via the ROM Vector Table, in
order to avoid configuring security-sensitive peripherals, or loading
images over sensitive memory regions or outside recognized memory devices
in the address map."
It is a useful function to support as a precursor to calling into
authenticate_image() to validate the target memory region is good.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx/hab.h | 9 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx/hab.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx/hab.h index 28cde38..14e1220 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx/hab.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx/hab.h @@ -113,6 +113,12 @@ enum hab_context { HAB_CTX_MAX }; +enum hab_target { + HAB_TGT_MEMORY = 0x0f, + HAB_TGT_PERIPHERAL = 0xf0, + HAB_TGT_ANY = 0x55, +}; + struct imx_sec_config_fuse_t { int bank; int word; @@ -132,6 +138,8 @@ typedef enum hab_status hab_rvt_entry_t(void); typedef enum hab_status hab_rvt_exit_t(void); typedef void *hab_rvt_authenticate_image_t(uint8_t, ptrdiff_t, void **, size_t *, hab_loader_callback_f_t); +typedef enum hab_status hab_rvt_check_target_t(enum hab_target, const void *, + size_t); typedef void hapi_clock_init_t(void); #define HAB_ENG_ANY 0x00 /* Select first compatible engine */ @@ -158,6 +166,7 @@ typedef void hapi_clock_init_t(void); #define HAB_RVT_ENTRY (*(uint32_t *)(HAB_RVT_BASE + 0x04)) #define HAB_RVT_EXIT (*(uint32_t *)(HAB_RVT_BASE + 0x08)) +#define HAB_RVT_CHECK_TARGET (*(uint32_t *)(HAB_RVT_BASE + 0x0C)) #define HAB_RVT_AUTHENTICATE_IMAGE (*(uint32_t *)(HAB_RVT_BASE + 0x10)) #define HAB_RVT_REPORT_EVENT (*(uint32_t *)(HAB_RVT_BASE + 0x20)) #define HAB_RVT_REPORT_STATUS (*(uint32_t *)(HAB_RVT_BASE + 0x24)) |