aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorSvyatoslav Ryhel <clamor95@gmail.com>2023-10-03 09:36:44 +0300
committerTom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>2023-11-03 12:37:15 -0400
commitf2cf7feb80889b6a777e470f6cc2ece4ac03374f (patch)
treede23b76a7f29f5fd5c310f08fadab1725c16defc
parent8632091e1e15b67bbf05b48a5ae7e612d1db36fe (diff)
downloadu-boot-f2cf7feb80889b6a777e470f6cc2ece4ac03374f.zip
u-boot-f2cf7feb80889b6a777e470f6cc2ece4ac03374f.tar.gz
u-boot-f2cf7feb80889b6a777e470f6cc2ece4ac03374f.tar.bz2
ARM: tegra20: tegra30: support EBTUPDATE on non-encrypted devices
Re-crypt support was extended to devices without burnt SBK. In case SBK is not set, place from where it is read is filled with zeroes. This patch adds support for ebtupdate function to detect nosbk device and avoid crypto operations for it. Tested-by: Maksim Kurnosenko <asusx2@mail.ru> Signed-off-by: Svyatoslav Ryhel <clamor95@gmail.com>
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra20/bct.c30
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra30/bct.c30
2 files changed, 40 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra20/bct.c b/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra20/bct.c
index 5eb4899..b2c44f3 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra20/bct.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra20/bct.c
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
#include "bct.h"
#include "uboot_aes.h"
+/* Device with "sbk burned: false" will expose zero key */
+const u8 nosbk[AES128_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 };
+
/*
* @param bct boot config table start in RAM
* @param ect bootloader start in RAM
@@ -23,22 +26,27 @@ static int bct_patch(u8 *bct, u8 *ebt, u32 ebt_size)
u8 ebt_hash[AES128_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 };
u8 sbk[AES128_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 };
u8 *bct_hash = bct;
+ bool encrypted;
int ret;
bct += BCT_HASH;
+ ebt_size = roundup(ebt_size, EBT_ALIGNMENT);
+
memcpy(sbk, (u8 *)(bct + BCT_LENGTH),
NVBOOT_CMAC_AES_HASH_LENGTH * 4);
- ret = decrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk);
- if (ret)
- return 1;
+ encrypted = memcmp(&sbk, &nosbk, AES128_KEY_LENGTH);
- ebt_size = roundup(ebt_size, EBT_ALIGNMENT);
+ if (encrypted) {
+ ret = decrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk);
+ if (ret)
+ return 1;
- ret = encrypt_data_block(ebt, ebt_size, sbk);
- if (ret)
- return 1;
+ ret = encrypt_data_block(ebt, ebt_size, sbk);
+ if (ret)
+ return 1;
+ }
ret = sign_enc_data_block(ebt, ebt_size, ebt_hash, sbk);
if (ret)
@@ -52,9 +60,11 @@ static int bct_patch(u8 *bct, u8 *ebt, u32 ebt_size)
bct_tbl->bootloader[0].load_addr = CONFIG_SPL_TEXT_BASE;
bct_tbl->bootloader[0].length = ebt_size;
- ret = encrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk);
- if (ret)
- return 1;
+ if (encrypted) {
+ ret = encrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk);
+ if (ret)
+ return 1;
+ }
ret = sign_enc_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, bct_hash, sbk);
if (ret)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra30/bct.c b/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra30/bct.c
index c56958d..cff1a3e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra30/bct.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra30/bct.c
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
#include "bct.h"
#include "uboot_aes.h"
+/* Device with "sbk burned: false" will expose zero key */
+const u8 nosbk[AES128_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 };
+
/*
* @param bct boot config table start in RAM
* @param ect bootloader start in RAM
@@ -23,22 +26,27 @@ static int bct_patch(u8 *bct, u8 *ebt, u32 ebt_size)
u8 ebt_hash[AES128_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 };
u8 sbk[AES128_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 };
u8 *bct_hash = bct;
+ bool encrypted;
int ret;
bct += BCT_HASH;
+ ebt_size = roundup(ebt_size, EBT_ALIGNMENT);
+
memcpy(sbk, (u8 *)(bct + BCT_LENGTH),
NVBOOT_CMAC_AES_HASH_LENGTH * 4);
- ret = decrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk);
- if (ret)
- return 1;
+ encrypted = memcmp(&sbk, &nosbk, AES128_KEY_LENGTH);
- ebt_size = roundup(ebt_size, EBT_ALIGNMENT);
+ if (encrypted) {
+ ret = decrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk);
+ if (ret)
+ return 1;
- ret = encrypt_data_block(ebt, ebt_size, sbk);
- if (ret)
- return 1;
+ ret = encrypt_data_block(ebt, ebt_size, sbk);
+ if (ret)
+ return 1;
+ }
ret = sign_enc_data_block(ebt, ebt_size, ebt_hash, sbk);
if (ret)
@@ -52,9 +60,11 @@ static int bct_patch(u8 *bct, u8 *ebt, u32 ebt_size)
bct_tbl->bootloader[0].load_addr = CONFIG_SPL_TEXT_BASE;
bct_tbl->bootloader[0].length = ebt_size;
- ret = encrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk);
- if (ret)
- return 1;
+ if (encrypted) {
+ ret = encrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk);
+ if (ret)
+ return 1;
+ }
ret = sign_enc_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, bct_hash, sbk);
if (ret)