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The self-test suite does not currently ever attempt to sleep the CPU.
This is an operation that may fail (e.g. by attempting to execute a
privileged instruction while running as a Linux userspace binary, or
by halting the CPU with all interrupts disabled).
Add a trivial self-test to exercise the ability to sleep the CPU
without crashing or halting forever.
Inspired-by: Xiaotian Wu <wuxiaotian@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The network device index currently serves two purposes: acting as a
sequential index for network device names ("net0", "net1", etc), and
acting as an opaque unique integer identifier used in socket address
scope IDs.
There is no particular need for these usages to be linked, and it can
lead to situations in which devices are named unexpectedly. For
example: if a system has two network devices "net0" and "net1", a VLAN
is created as "net1-42", and then a USB NIC is connected, then the USB
NIC will be named "net3" rather than the expected "net2" since the
VLAN device "net1-42" will have consumed an index.
Separate the usages: rename the "index" field to "scope_id" (matching
its one and only use case), and assign the name without reference to
the scope ID by finding the first unused name. For consistency,
assign the scope ID by similarly finding the first unused scope ID.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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TLS relies upon the ability of ciphers to perform in-place decryption,
in order to avoid allocating additional I/O buffers for received data.
Add verification of in-place encryption and decryption to the cipher
self-tests.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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TLS relies upon the ability to reuse a cipher by resetting only the
initialisation vector while reusing the existing key.
Add verification of resetting the initialisation vector to the cipher
self-tests.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The GCM cipher mode of operation (in common with other counter-based
modes of operation) has a notion of blocksize that does not neatly
fall into our current abstraction: it does operate in 16-byte blocks
but allows for an arbitrary overall data length (i.e. the final block
may be incomplete).
Model this by adding a concept of alignment size. Each call to
encrypt() or decrypt() must begin at a multiple of the alignment size
from the start of the data stream. This allows us to model GCM by
using a block size of 1 byte and an alignment size of 16 bytes.
As a side benefit, this same concept allows us to neatly model the
fact that raw AES can encrypt only a single 16-byte block, by
specifying an alignment size of zero on this cipher.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Some ciphers (such as GCM) support the concept of a tag that can be
used to authenticate the encrypted data. Add a cipher method for
generating an authentication tag.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Some ciphers (such as GCM) support the concept of additional
authenticated data, which does not appear in the ciphertext but may
affect the operation of the cipher.
Allow cipher_encrypt() and cipher_decrypt() to be called with a NULL
destination buffer in order to pass additional data.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Add an implementation of the Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange
algorithm as defined in RFC2631, with test vectors taken from the NIST
Cryptographic Toolkit.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Simplify the internal HMAC API so that the key is provided only at the
point of calling hmac_init(), and the (potentially reduced) key is
stored as part of the context for later use by hmac_final().
This simplifies the calling code, and avoids the need for callers such
as TLS to allocate a potentially variable length block in order to
retain a copy of the unmodified key.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The HMAC code is already tested indirectly via several consuming
algorithms that themselves provide self-tests (e.g. HMAC-DRBG, NTLM
authentication, and PeerDist content identification), but lacks any
direct test vectors.
Add explicit HMAC tests and ensure that corner cases such as empty
keys, block-length keys, and over-length keys are all covered.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Some newer HP products expose the host-based MAC (HBMAC) address using
an ACPI method named "RTMA" returning a part-binary string of the form
"_RTXMAC_#<mac>#", where "<mac>" comprises the raw MAC address bytes.
Extend the existing support to handle this format alongside the older
"_AUXMAC_" format (which uses a base16-encoded MAC address).
Reported-by: Andreas Hammarskjöld <junior@2PintSoftware.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Hammarskjöld <junior@2PintSoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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RFC3986 allows for colons to appear within the path component of a
relative URI, but iPXE will currently parse such URIs incorrectly by
interpreting the text before the colon as the URI scheme.
Fix by checking for valid characters when identifying the URI scheme.
Deliberately deviate from the RFC3986 definition of valid characters
by accepting "_" (which was incorrectly used in the iPXE-specific
"ib_srp" URI scheme and so must be accepted for compatibility with
existing deployments), and by omitting the code to check for
characters that are not used in any URI scheme supported by iPXE.
Reported-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The RFC4122 specification defines UUIDs as being in network byte
order, but an unfortunately significant amount of (mostly Microsoft)
software treats them as having the first three fields in little-endian
byte order.
In an ideal world, any server-side software that compares UUIDs for
equality would perform an endian-insensitive comparison (analogous to
comparing strings for equality using a case-insensitive comparison),
and would therefore not care about byte order differences.
Define a setting type name ":guid" to allow a UUID setting to be
formatted in little-endian order, to simplify interoperability with
server-side software that expects such a formatting.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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iPXE decodes any percent-encoded characters during the URI parsing
stage, thereby allowing protocol implementations to consume the raw
field values directly without further decoding.
When reconstructing a URI string for use in an HTTP request line, the
percent-encoding is currently reapplied in a reversible way: we
guarantee that our reconstructed URI string could be decoded to give
the same raw field values.
This technically violates RFC3986, which states that "URIs that differ
in the replacement of a reserved character with its corresponding
percent-encoded octet are not equivalent". Experiments show that
several HTTP server applications will attach meaning to the choice of
whether or not a particular character was percent-encoded, even when
the percent-encoding is unnecessary from the perspective of parsing
the URI into its component fields.
Fix by storing the originally encoded substrings for the path, query,
and fragment fields and using these original encoded versions when
reconstructing a URI string. The path field is also stored as a
decoded string, for use by protocols such as TFTP that communicate
using raw strings rather than URI-encoded strings. All other fields
(such as the username and password) continue to be stored only in
their decoded versions since nothing ever needs to know the originally
encoded versions of these fields.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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DNS names are case-insensitive, and RFC 5280 (unlike RFC 3280)
mandates support for case-insensitive name comparison in X.509
certificates.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Record the root of trust used at the point that a certificate is
validated, redefine validation as checking a certificate against a
specific root of trust, and pass an explicit root of trust when
creating a TLS connection.
This allows a custom TLS connection to be used with a custom root of
trust, without causing any validated certificates to be treated as
valid for normal purposes.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Fix memcmp() to return proper standard positive/negative values for
unequal comparisons. Current implementation is backwards (i.e. the
functions are returning negative when should be positive and
vice-versa).
Currently most consumers of these functions only check the return value
for ==0 or !=0 and so we can safely change the implementation without
breaking things.
However, there is one call that checks the polarity of this function,
and that is prf_sha1() for wireless WPA 4-way handshake. Due to the
incorrect memcmp() polarity, the WPA handshake creates an incorrect
PTK, and the handshake would fail after step 2. Undoubtedly, the AP
noticed the supplicant failed the mic check. This commit fixes that
issue.
Similar to commit 3946aa9 ("[libc] Fix strcmp()/strncmp() to return
proper values").
Signed-off-by: Michael Bazzinotti <bazz@bazz1.com>
Modified-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Fix strcmp() and strncmp() to return proper standard positive/negative
values for unequal strings. Current implementation is backwards
(i.e. the functions are returning negative when should be positive and
vice-versa).
Currently all consumers of these functions only check the return value
for ==0 or !=0 and so we can safely change the implementation without
breaking things.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Young <Aaron.Young@oracle.com>
Modified-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Reported-by: Vinson Lee <vlee@freedesktop.org>
Reported-by: Liang Yan <lyan@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Add PEM-encoded ASN.1 as an image format. We accept as PEM any image
containing a line starting with a "-----BEGIN" boundary marker.
We allow for PEM files containing multiple ASN.1 objects, such as a
certificate chain produced by concatenating individual certificate
files.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Add DER-encoded ASN.1 as an image format. There is no fixed signature
for DER files. We treat an image as DER if it comprises a single
valid SEQUENCE object covering the entire length of the image.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Select the IPv6 source address and corresponding router (if any) using
a very simplified version of the algorithm from RFC6724:
- Ignore any source address that has a smaller scope than the
destination address. For example, do not use a link-local source
address when sending to a global destination address.
- If we have a source address which is on the same link as the
destination address, then use that source address.
- If we are left with multiple possible source addresses, then choose
the address with the smallest scope. For example, if we are sending
to a site-local destination address and we have both a global source
address and a site-local source address, then use the site-local
source address.
- If we are still left with multiple possible source addresses, then
choose the address with the longest matching prefix.
For the purposes of this algorithm, we treat RFC4193 Unique Local
Addresses as having organisation-local scope. Since we use only
link-local scope for our multicast transmissions, this approximation
should remain valid in all practical situations.
Originally-implemented-by: Thomas Bächler <thomas@archlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Extend the 16-bit PCI bus:dev.fn address to a 32-bit seg:bus:dev.fn
address, assuming a segment value of zero in contexts where multiple
segments are unsupported by the underlying data structures (e.g. in
the iBFT or BOFM tables).
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The existing code intends to print NULL strings as "<NULL>" (for the
sake of debug messages), but the logic is incorrect when handling
wide-character strings. Fix the logic and add applicable unit tests.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Guard against various corner cases (such as zero-length buffers, zero
alignments, and integer overflow when rounding up allocation lengths
and alignments) and ensure that the struct io_buffer is correctly
aligned even when the caller requests a non-zero alignment for the I/O
buffer itself.
Add self-tests to verify that the resulting alignments and lengths are
correct for a range of allocations.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The various early-exit paths in parse_uri() accidentally bypass the
URI field decoding. The result is that opaque or relative URIs do not
undergo URI field decoding, resulting in double-encoding when the URIs
are subsequently used. For example:
#!ipxe
set mac ${macstring}
imgfetch /boot/by-mac/${mac:uristring}
would result in an HTTP GET such as
GET /boot/by-mac/00%253A0c%253A29%253Ac5%253A39%253Aa1 HTTP/1.1
rather than the expected
GET /boot/by-mac/00%3A0c%3A29%3Ac5%3A39%3Aa1 HTTP/1.1
Fix by ensuring that URI decoding is always applied regardless of the
URI format.
Reported-by: Andrew Widdersheim <awiddersheim@inetu.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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