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RFC 2131 leaves undefined the behaviour of the client in response to a
DHCPNAK that comes from a server other than the selected DHCP server.
A substantial amount of online documentation suggests using multiple
independent DHCP servers with non-overlapping ranges in the same
subnet in order to provide some minimal redundancy. Experimentation
shows that in this setup, at least ISC dhcpd will send a DHCPNAK in
response to the client's DHCPREQUEST for an address that is not within
the range defined on that server. (Since the requested address does
lie within the subnet defined on that server, this will happen
regardless of the "authoritative" parameter.) The client will
therefore receive a DHCPACK from the selected DHCP server along with
one or more DHCPNAKs from each of the non-selected DHCP servers.
Filter out responses from non-selected DHCP servers before checking
for a DHCPNAK, so that these arguably spurious DHCPNAKs will not cause
iPXE to return to the discovery state.
Continue to check for DHCPNAK before filtering out responses for
non-selected lease addresses, since experimentation shows that the
DHCPNAK will usually have an empty yiaddr field.
Reported-by: Anders Blomdell <anders.blomdell@control.lth.se>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Move the platform-specific DHCP client architecture definitions to
header files of the form <ipxe/$(PLATFORM)/dhcparch.h>. This
simplifies the directory structure and allows the otherwise unused
arch/$(ARCH)/include/$(PLATFORM) to be removed from the include
directory search path, which avoids the confusing situation in which a
header file may potentially be accessed through more than one path.
For Linux userspace binaries on any architecture, use the EFI values
for that architecture by delegating to the EFI header file. This
avoids the need to explicitly select values for Linux userspace
binaries for each architecture.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Ensure that the "${netX/...}" settings mechanism always uses the same
interpretation of the network device corresponding to "netX" as any
other mechanism that performs a name-based lookup of a network device.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Add the ability to automatically create a VLAN device for a specified
trunk device link-layer address and VLAN tag.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Many laptops now include the ability to specify a "system-specific MAC
address" (also known as "pass-through MAC"), which is supposed to be
used for both the onboard NIC and for any attached docking station or
other USB NIC. This is intended to simplify interoperability with
software or hardware that relies on a MAC address to recognise an
individual machine: for example, a deployment server may associate the
MAC address with a particular operating system image to be deployed.
This therefore creates legitimate situations in which duplicate MAC
addresses may exist within the same system.
As described in commit 98d09a1 ("[netdevice] Avoid registering
duplicate network devices"), the Xen netfront driver relies on the
rejection of duplicate MAC addresses in order to inhibit registration
of the emulated PCI devices that a Xen PV-HVM guest will create to
shadow each of the paravirtual network devices.
Move the code that rejects duplicate MAC addresses from the network
device core to the Xen netfront driver, to allow for the existence of
duplicate MAC addresses in non-Xen setups.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The network device index currently serves two purposes: acting as a
sequential index for network device names ("net0", "net1", etc), and
acting as an opaque unique integer identifier used in socket address
scope IDs.
There is no particular need for these usages to be linked, and it can
lead to situations in which devices are named unexpectedly. For
example: if a system has two network devices "net0" and "net1", a VLAN
is created as "net1-42", and then a USB NIC is connected, then the USB
NIC will be named "net3" rather than the expected "net2" since the
VLAN device "net1-42" will have consumed an index.
Separate the usages: rename the "index" field to "scope_id" (matching
its one and only use case), and assign the name without reference to
the scope ID by finding the first unused name. For consistency,
assign the scope ID by similarly finding the first unused scope ID.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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UEFI implements VLAN support within the Managed Network Protocol (MNP)
driver, which may create child VLAN devices automatically based on
stored UEFI variables. These child devices do not themselves provide
a raw-packet interface via EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL, and may be
consumed only via the EFI_MANAGED_NETWORK_PROTOCOL interface.
The device paths constructed for these child devices may conflict with
those for the EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL instances that iPXE attempts
to install for its own VLAN devices. The upshot is that creating an
iPXE VLAN device (e.g. via the "vcreate" command) will fail if the
UEFI Managed Network Protocol has already created a device for the
same VLAN tag.
Fix by providing our own EFI_VLAN_CONFIG_PROTOCOL instance on the same
device handle as EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL. This causes the MNP
driver to treat iPXE's device as supporting hardware VLAN offload, and
it will therefore not attempt to install its own instance of the
protocol.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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All existing cipher suites use SHA-256 as the TLSv1.2 and above
handshake digest algorithm (even when using SHA-1 as the MAC digest
algorithm). Some GCM cipher suites use SHA-384 as the handshake
digest algorithm.
Allow the cipher suite to specify the handshake (and PRF) digest
algorithm to be used for TLSv1.2 and above.
This requires some restructuring to allow for the fact that the
ClientHello message must be included within the handshake digest, even
though the relevant digest algorithm is not yet known at the point
that the ClientHello is sent. Fortunately, the ClientHello may be
reproduced verbatim at the point of receiving the ServerHello, so we
rely on reconstructing (rather than storing) this message.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Always send the maximum supported version in our ClientHello message,
even when performing renegotiation (in which case the current version
may already be lower than the maximum supported version).
This is permitted by the specification, and allows the ClientHello to
be reconstructed verbatim at the point of selecting the handshake
digest algorithm in tls_new_server_hello().
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Allow for AEAD cipher suites where the MAC length may be zero and the
authentication is instead provided by an authenticating cipher, with
the plaintext authentication tag appended to the ciphertext.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Harden against padding oracle attacks by treating invalid block
padding as zero length padding, thereby deferring the failure until
after computing the (incorrect) MAC.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Restructure the encryption and decryption operations to allow for the
use of ciphers where the initialisation vector is constructed by
concatenating the fixed IV (derived as part of key expansion) with a
record IV (prepended to the ciphertext).
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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TLS stream and block ciphers use a MAC with a length equal to the
output length of the digest algorithm in use. For AEAD ciphers there
is no MAC, with the equivalent functionality provided by the cipher
algorithm's authentication tag.
Allow for the existence of AEAD cipher suites by making the MAC length
a parameter of the cipher suite.
Assume that the MAC key length is equal to the MAC length, since this
is true for all currently supported cipher suites.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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All TLS cipher types use a common structure for the per-record data
that is authenticated in addition to the plaintext itself. This data
is used as a prefix in the HMAC calculation for stream and block
ciphers, or as additional authenticated data for AEAD ciphers.
Define a "TLS authentication header" structure to hold this data as a
contiguous block, in order to meet the alignment requirement for AEAD
ciphers such as GCM.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Adjust the length of the first received ciphertext data buffer to
ensure that all decryption operations respect the cipher's alignment
size.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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TLS block ciphers always use CBC (as per RFC 5246 section 6.2.3.2)
with a record initialisation vector length that is equal to the cipher
block size, and no fixed initialisation vector.
The initialisation vector for AEAD ciphers such as GCM is less
straightforward, and requires both a fixed and per-record component.
Extend the definition of a cipher suite to include fixed and record
initialisation vector lengths, and generate the fixed portion (if any)
as part of key expansion.
Do not add explicit calls to cipher_setiv() in tls_assemble_block()
and tls_split_block(), since the constraints imposed by RFC 5246 are
specifically chosen to allow implementations to avoid doing so.
(Instead, add a sanity check that the record initialisation vector
length is equal to the cipher block size.)
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The TLSv1.0 protocol was deprecated by RFC 8996 (along with TLSv1.1),
and has been disabled by default in iPXE since commit dc785b0fb
("[tls] Default to supporting only TLSv1.1 or above") in June 2020.
While there is value in continuing to support older protocols for
interoperability with older server appliances, the additional
complexity of supporting the implicit initialisation vector for
TLSv1.0 is not worth the cost.
Remove support for the obsolete TLSv1.0 protocol, to reduce complexity
of the implementation and simplify ongoing maintenance.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Allow for the key exchange mechanism to vary depending upon the
selected cipher suite.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Accept and record the ServerKeyExchange record, which is required for
key exchange mechanisms such as Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE).
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The pre-master secret is currently constructed at the time of
instantiating the TLS connection. This precludes the use of key
exchange mechanisms such as Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE), which
require a ServerKeyExchange message to exchange additional key
material before the pre-master secret can be constructed.
Allow for the use of such cipher suites by deferring generation of the
master secret until the point of sending the ClientKeyExchange
message.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The master secret is currently constructed upon receiving the
ServerHello message. This precludes the use of key exchange
mechanisms such as Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE), which require a
ServerKeyExchange message to exchange additional key material before
the pre-master secret and master secret can be constructed.
Allow for the use of such cipher suites by deferring generation of the
master secret until the point of sending the ClientKeyExchange
message.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Simplify the internal HMAC API so that the key is provided only at the
point of calling hmac_init(), and the (potentially reduced) key is
stored as part of the context for later use by hmac_final().
This simplifies the calling code, and avoids the need for callers such
as TLS to allocate a potentially variable length block in order to
retain a copy of the unmodified key.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Experience suggests that routers are often misconfigured to advertise
SLAAC even on prefixes that do not have a SLAAC-compatible prefix
length. iPXE will currently treat this as an error, resulting in the
prefix being ignored completely.
Handle this misconfiguration by ignoring the autonomous address flag
when the prefix length is unsuitable for SLAAC.
Reported-by: Malte Janduda <mail@janduda.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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We currently define the active DNS server as a global variable. All
queries will start by attempting to contact the active DNS server, and
the active DNS server will be changed only if we fail to get a
response. This effectively treats the DNS server list as expressing a
weak preference ordering: we will try servers in order, but once we
have found a working server we will stick with that server for as long
as it continues to respond to queries.
Some sites are misconfigured to hand out DNS servers that do not have
a consistent worldview. For example: the site may hand out two DNS
server addresses, the first being an internal DNS server (which is
able to resolve names in private DNS domains) and the second being a
public DNS server such as 8.8.8.8 (which will correctly return
NXDOMAIN for any private DNS domains). This type of configuration is
fundamentally broken and should never be used, since any DNS resolver
performing a query for a name within a private DNS domain may obtain a
spurious NXDOMAIN response for a valid private DNS name.
Work around these broken configurations by treating the DNS server
list as expressing a strong preference ordering, and always starting
DNS queries from the first server in the list (rather than maintaining
a global concept of the active server). This will have the debatable
benefit of converting permanent spurious NXDOMAIN errors into
transient spurious NXDOMAIN errors, which can at least be worked
around at a higher level (e.g. by retrying a download in a loop within
an iPXE script).
The cost of always starting DNS queries from the first server in the
list is a slight delay introduced when the first server is genuinely
unavailable. This should be negligible in practice since DNS queries
are relatively infrequent and the failover expiry time is short.
Treating the DNS server list as a preference ordering is permitted by
the language of RFC 2132, which defines DHCP option 6 as a list in
which "[DNS] servers SHOULD be listed in order of preference". No
specification defines a precise algorithm for how this preference
order should be applied in practice: this new approach seems as good
as any.
Requested-by: Andreas Hammarskjöld <junior@2PintSoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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As reported by Coverity, xsmp_rx_xve_modify() currently passes a
partially initialised struct ib_address_vector to xve_update_tca() and
thence to eoib_set_gateway(), which uses memcpy() to store the whole
structure including the (unused and unneeded) uninitialised fields.
Silence the Coverity warning by zeroing the whole structure.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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iPXE decodes any percent-encoded characters during the URI parsing
stage, thereby allowing protocol implementations to consume the raw
field values directly without further decoding.
When reconstructing a URI string for use in an HTTP request line, the
percent-encoding is currently reapplied in a reversible way: we
guarantee that our reconstructed URI string could be decoded to give
the same raw field values.
This technically violates RFC3986, which states that "URIs that differ
in the replacement of a reserved character with its corresponding
percent-encoded octet are not equivalent". Experiments show that
several HTTP server applications will attach meaning to the choice of
whether or not a particular character was percent-encoded, even when
the percent-encoding is unnecessary from the perspective of parsing
the URI into its component fields.
Fix by storing the originally encoded substrings for the path, query,
and fragment fields and using these original encoded versions when
reconstructing a URI string. The path field is also stored as a
decoded string, for use by protocols such as TFTP that communicate
using raw strings rather than URI-encoded strings. All other fields
(such as the username and password) continue to be stored only in
their decoded versions since nothing ever needs to know the originally
encoded versions of these fields.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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RFC 3986 section 3.1 defines URI schemes as case-insensitive (though
the canonical form is always lowercase).
Use strcasecmp() rather than strcmp() to allow for case insensitivity
in URI schemes.
Requested-by: Andreas Hammarskjöld <junior@2PintSoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The peer discovery time has a significant impact on the overall
PeerDist download speed, since each block requires an individual
discovery attempt. In most cases, a peer that responds for block N
will turn out to also respond for block N+1.
Assume that the most recently discovered peer (for any block) probably
has a copy of the next block to be discovered, thereby allowing the
peer download attempt to begin immediately.
In the case that this assumption is incorrect, the existing error
recovery path will allow for fallback to newly discovered peers (or to
the origin server).
Suggested-by: Andreas Hammarskjöld <junior@2PintSoftware.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Hammarskjöld <junior@2PintSoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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When CONSOLE_SYSLOG is used, a DBG() from within a network device
driver may cause its transmit() or poll() methods to be unexpectedly
re-entered. Since these methods are not intended to be re-entrant,
this can lead to undefined behaviour.
Add an explicit re-entrancy guard to both methods. Note that this
must operate at a per-netdevice level, since there are legitimate
circumstances under which the netdev_tx() or netdev_poll() functions
may be re-entered (e.g. when using VLAN devices).
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Handle a DHCPNAK by returning to the discovery state to allow iPXE to
attempt to obtain a replacement IPv4 address.
Reuse the existing logic for deferring discovery when the link is
blocked: this avoids hammering a misconfigured DHCP server with a
non-stop stream of requests and allows the DHCP process to eventually
time out and fail.
Originally-implemented-by: Blake Rouse <blake.rouse@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The DNS server list is currently printed as a debug message whenever
settings are applied. This can result in some very noisy debug logs
when a script makes extensive use of settings.
Move the DNS server list debug messages to DBGLVL_EXTRA.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Require drivers to report the total number of Infiniband ports. This
is necessary to report the correct number of ports on devices with
dynamic port types.
For example, dual-port Mellanox cards configured for (eth, ib) would
be rejected by the subnet manager, because they report using "port 2,
out of 1".
Signed-off-by: Christian Iversen <ci@iversenit.dk>
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Provide some visibility into the turnaround times on both client and
server sides as perceived by iPXE, to assist in debugging inexplicably
slow TFTP transfers.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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A switch port using 802.1x authentication will send EAP
Request-Identity packets once the physical link is up, and will not be
forwarding packets until the port identity has been established.
We do not currently support 802.1x authentication. However, a
reasonably common configuration involves using a preset list of
permitted MAC addresses, with the "authentication" taking place
between the switch and a RADIUS server. In this configuration, the
end device does not need to perform any authentication step, but does
need to be prepared for the switch port to fail to forward packets for
a substantial time after physical link-up. This exactly matches the
"blocked link" semantics already used when detecting a non-forwarding
switch port via LACP or STP.
Treat a received EAP Request-Identity as indicating a blocked link.
Unlike LACP or STP, there is no way to determine the expected time
until the next EAP packet and so we must choose a fixed timeout.
Erroneously assuming that the link is blocked is relatively harmless
since we will still attempt to transmit and receive data even over a
link that is marked as blocked, and so the net effect is merely to
prolong DHCP attempts. In contrast, erroneously assuming that the
link is unblocked will potentially cause DHCP to time out and give up,
resulting in a failed boot.
The default EAP Request-Identity interval in Cisco switches (where
this is most likely to be encountered in practice) is 30 seconds, so
choose 45 seconds as a timeout that is likely to avoid gaps during
which we falsely assume that the link is unblocked.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Replace the GPL2+-only EAPoL code (currently used only for WPA) with
new code licensed under GPL2+-or-UBDL.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Continue to transmit DHCPDISCOVER while waiting for a blocked link, in
order to support mechanisms such as Cisco MAC Authentication Bypass
that require repeated transmission attempts in order to trigger the
action that will result in the link becoming unblocked.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Record the root of trust used at the point that a certificate is
validated, redefine validation as checking a certificate against a
specific root of trust, and pass an explicit root of trust when
creating a TLS connection.
This allows a custom TLS connection to be used with a custom root of
trust, without causing any validated certificates to be treated as
valid for normal purposes.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Use the existing certificate store to automatically append any
available issuing certificates to the selected client certificate.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Restructure the use of add_tls() to insert a TLS filter onto an
existing interface. This allows for the possibility of using
add_tls() to start TLS on an existing connection (as used in several
protocols which will negotiate the choice to use TLS before the
ClientHello is sent).
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Unlike netdev_rx_err(), there is no valid circumstance under which
netdev_rx() may be called with a null I/O buffer, since a call to
netdev_rx() represents the successful reception of a packet. Fix the
code comment to reflect this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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netdev_tx_err() may be called with a null I/O buffer (e.g. to record a
transmit error with no associated buffer). Avoid a potential null
pointer dereference in the DMA unmapping code path.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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