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Claiming the SNP devices has the side effect of raising the TPL to
iPXE's normal operating level of TPL_CALLBACK (see the commit message
for c89a446 ("[efi] Run at TPL_CALLBACK to protect against UEFI
timers") for details). This must happen before executing any code
that relies upon the TPL having been raised to TPL_CALLBACK.
The call to efi_snp_claim() in efi_download_start() currently happens
only after the call to xfer_open(). Calling xfer_open() will
typically result in a retry timer being started, which will result in
a call to currticks() in order to initialise the timer. The call to
currticks() will drop to TPL_APPLICATION and restore to TPL_CALLBACK
in order to allow a timer tick to occur. Since this call happened
before the call to efi_snp_claim(), the restored TPL is incorrect.
This in turn results in efi_snp_claim() recording the incorrect
original TPL, causing efi_snp_release() to eventually restore the
incorrect TPL, causing the system to lock up when ExitBootServices()
is called at TPL_CALLBACK.
Fix by moving the call to efi_snp_claim() to the start of
efi_download_start().
Debugged-by: Jarrod Johnson <jjohnson2@lenovo.com>
Debugged-by: He He4 Huang <huanghe4@lenovo.com>
Debugged-by: James Wang <jameswang@ami.com.tw>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The NUL byte included within the stack cookie to act as a string
terminator should be placed at the lowest byte address within the
stack cookie, in order to avoid potentially including the stack cookie
value within an accidentally unterminated string.
Suggested-by: Pete Beck <pete.beck@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Several of the values used to compute a stack cookie (in the absence
of a viable entropy source) will tend to have either all-zeroes or
all-ones in the higher order bits. Rotate the values in order to
distribute the (minimal) available entropy more evenly.
Suggested-by: Pete Beck <pete.beck@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Generalise the bit rotation implementations to use a common macro, and
add roll() and rorl() to handle unsigned long values.
Each function will still compile down to a single instruction.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The only remaining use case in iPXE for the CPU direction flag is in
__memcpy_reverse() where it is set to allow the use of "rep movsb" to
perform the memory copy. This matches the equivalent functionality in
the EDK2 codebase, which has functions such as InternalMemCopyMem that
also temporarily set the direction flag in order to use "rep movsb".
As noted in commit d2fb317 ("[crypto] Avoid temporarily setting
direction flag in bigint_is_geq()"), some UEFI implementations are
known to have buggy interrupt handlers that may reboot the machine if
a timer interrupt happens to occur while the direction flag is set.
Work around these buggy UEFI implementations by using the
(unoptimised) generic_memcpy_reverse() on i386 or x86_64 UEFI
platforms.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The UEFI specification states that the calling convention for IA-32
and x64 includes "Direction flag in EFLAGS is clear". This
specification covers only the calling convention used at the point of
calling functions annotated with EFIAPI. The specification explicitly
states that other functions (such as private functions or static
library calls) are not required to follow the UEFI calling
conventions.
The reference EDK2 implementation follows this specification. In
particular, the EDK2 interrupt handlers will clear the direction flag
before calling any EFIAPI functions, and will restore the direction
flag when returning from the interrupt handler. Some EDK2 private
library functions (most notably InternalMemCopyMem) may set the
direction flag temporarily in order to make efficient use of CPU
string operations.
The current implementation of iPXE's bigint_is_geq() for i386 and
x86_64 will similarly set the direction flag temporarily in order to
make efficient use of CPU string operations.
On some UEFI implementations (observed with a Getac RX10 tablet), a
timer interrupt that happens to occur while the direction flag is set
will reboot the machine. This very strongly indicates that the UEFI
timer interrupt handler is failing to clear the direction flag before
performing an affected operation (such as copying a block of memory).
Work around such buggy UEFI implementations by rewriting
bigint_is_geq() to avoid the use of string operations and so obviate
the requirement to temporarily set the direction flag.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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A failure in device registration (e.g. due to a device with malformed
descriptors) will currently result in the port being disabled as part
of the error path. This in turn causes the hardware to detect the
device as newly connected, leading to an endless loop of failed device
registrations.
Fix by leaving the port enabled in the case of a registration failure.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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When connected to a USB3 port, the AX88179 seems to have an
approximately 50% chance of producing a USB transaction error on each
of its three endpoints after being closed and reopened. The root
cause is unclear, but rewriting the USB device configuration value
seems to clear whatever internal error state has accumulated.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Experimentation shows that the existing 20ms delay is insufficient,
and often results in device detection being deferred until after iPXE
has completed startup.
Fix by increasing the delay to 100ms.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The driver-private data for root hubs is already set immediately after
allocating the USB bus. There seems to be no reason to set it again
when opening the root hub.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The "disabled" port states for USB2 and USB3 are not directly
equivalent. In particular, a disabled USB3 port will not detect new
device connections. The result is that a USB3 device disconnected
from and reconnected to an xHCI root hub port will end up reconnecting
as a USB2 device.
Fix by setting the link state to RxDetect after disabling the port, as
is already done during initialisation.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The USB3 specification removes PORT_ENABLE from the list of features
that may be cleared via a CLEAR_FEATURE request. Experimentation
shows that omitting the attempt to clear PORT_ENABLE seems to result
in the correct hotplug behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Resetting the host endpoint may immediately restart any pending
transfers for that endpoint. If the device endpoint halt has not yet
been cleared, then this will probably result in a second failed
transfer.
This second failure may be detected within usb_endpoint_reset() while
waiting for usb_clear_feature() to complete. The endpoint will
subsequently be removed from the list of halted endpoints, causing the
second failure to be effectively ignored and leaving the host endpoint
in a permanently halted state.
Fix by deferring the host endpoint reset until after the device
endpoint is ready to accept new transfers.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The ASIX USB NICs are capable of autodetecting the Ethernet link speed
and reporting it via PLSR but will not automatically update the
relevant GM and PS bits in MSR. The result is that a non-gigabit link
will fail to send or receive any packets.
The interrupt endpoint used to report link state includes the values
of the PHY BMSR and LPA registers. These are not sufficient to
differentiate between 100Mbps and 1000Mbps, since the LPA_NPAGE bit
does not necessarily indicate that the link partner is advertising
1000Mbps.
Extend axge_check_link() to write the MSR value based on the link
speed read from PLSR, and simplify the interrupt endpoint handler to
merely trigger a call to axge_check_link().
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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As per commit c89a446 ("[efi] Run at TPL_CALLBACK to protect against
UEFI timers") we expect to run at TPL_CALLBACK almost all of the time.
Various code paths rely on this assumption. Code paths that need to
temporarily lower the TPL (e.g. for entropy gathering) will restore it
to TPL_CALLBACK.
The entropy gathering code will be run during DRBG initialisation,
which happens during the call to startup(). In the case of iPXE
compiled as an EFI application this code will run within the scope of
efi_snp_claim() and so will execute at TPL_CALLBACK as expected.
In the case of iPXE compiled as an EFI driver the code will
incorrectly run at TPL_APPLICATION since there is nothing within the
EFI driver entry point that raises (and restores) the TPL. The net
effect is that a build that includes the entropy-gathering code
(e.g. a build with HTTPS enabled) will return from the driver entry
point at TPL_CALLBACK, which causes a system lockup.
Fix by raising and restoring the TPL within the EFI driver entry
point.
Debugged-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on the Microsoft Surface Go does not generate
random numbers. Successive calls to GetRNG() without any intervening
I/O operations (such as writing to the console) will produce identical
results. Successive reboots will produce identical results.
It is unclear what the Microsoft Surface Go is attempting to use as an
entropy source, but it is demonstrably producing zero bits of entropy.
The failure is already detected by the ANS-mandated Repetition Count
Test performed as part of our GetEntropy implementation. This
currently results in the entropy source being marked as broken, with
the result that iPXE refuses to perform any operations that require a
working entropy source.
We cannot use the existing EFI driver blacklisting mechanism to unload
the broken driver, since the RngDxe driver is integrated into the
DxeCore image.
Work around the broken driver by checking for consecutive identical
results returned by EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL and falling back to the original
timer-based entropy source.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Some versions of gcc (observed with the cross-compiling gcc 9.3.0 in
Ubuntu 20.04) default to enabling -fPIE. Experimentation shows that
this results in the emission of R_AARCH64_ADR_GOT_PAGE relocation
records for __stack_chk_guard. These relocation types are not
supported by elf2efi.c.
Fix by explicitly disabling position-independent code for ARM64 EFI
builds.
Debugged-by: Antony Messerli <antony@mes.ser.li>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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GCC 10 emits warnings for implicit conversions of enumerated types.
The flexboot_nodnic code defines nodnic_queue_pair_type with values
identical to those of ib_queue_pair_type, and implicitly casts between
them. Add an explicit cast to fix the warning.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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GCC 10 produces a spurious warning about an out-of-bounds array access
for the unsized raw dword array in union intelvf_msg.
Avoid the warning by embedding the zero-length array within a struct.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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gcc10 switched default behavior from -fcommon to -fno-common. Since
"__shared" relies on the legacy behavior, explicitly specify it.
Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
Modified-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Various implementation quirks in OCSP servers make it impractical to
use anything other than SHA1 to construct the issuerNameHash and
issuerKeyHash identifiers in the request certID. For example: both
the OpenCA OCSP responder used by ipxe.org and the Boulder OCSP
responder used by LetsEncrypt will fail if SHA256 is used in the
request certID.
As of commit 6ffe28a ("[ocsp] Accept response certID with missing
hashAlgorithm parameters") we rely on asn1_digest_algorithm() to parse
the algorithm identifier in the response certID. This will fail if
SHA1 is disabled via config/crypto.h.
Fix by using a direct ASN.1 object comparison on the OID within the
algorithm identifier.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Enable -fstack-protector for EFI builds, where binary size is less
critical than for BIOS builds.
The stack cookie must be constructed immediately on entry, which
prohibits the use of any viable entropy source. Construct a cookie by
XORing together various mildly random quantities to produce a value
that will at least not be identical on each run.
On detecting a stack corruption, attempt to call Exit() with an
appropriate error. If that fails, then lock up the machine since
there is no other safe action that can be taken.
The old conditional check for support of -fno-stack-protector is
omitted since this flag dates back to GCC 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Some devices (observed with a Getac RX10 tablet and docking station
containing an embedded AX88179 USB NIC) seem to be capable of
detecting link state only during the call to Initialize(), and will
occasionally erroneously report that the link is down for the first
few such calls.
Work around these devices by retrying the Initialize() call multiple
times, terminating early if a link is detected. The eventual absence
of a link is treated as a non-fatal error, since it is entirely
possible that the link really is down.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Disable the use of MD5 as an OID-identifiable algorithm. Note that
the MD5 algorithm implementation will still be present in the build,
since it is used implicitly by various cryptographic components such
as HTTP digest authentication; this commit removes it only from the
list of OID-identifiable algorithms.
It would be appropriate to similarly disable the use of SHA-1 by
default, but doing so would break the use of OCSP since several OCSP
responders (including the current version of openca-ocspd) are not
capable of interpreting the hashAlgorithm field and so will fail if
the client uses any algorithm other than the configured default.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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There are many ways in which the object for a cryptographic algorithm
may be included, even if not explicitly enabled in config/crypto.h.
For example: the MD5 algorithm is required by TLSv1.1 or earlier, by
iSCSI CHAP authentication, by HTTP digest authentication, and by NTLM
authentication.
In the current implementation, inclusion of an algorithm for any
reason will result in the algorithm's ASN.1 object identifier being
included in the "asn1_algorithms" table, which consequently allows the
algorithm to be used for any ASN1-identified purpose. For example: if
the MD5 algorithm is included in order to support HTTP digest
authentication, then iPXE would accept a (validly signed) TLS
certificate using an MD5 digest.
Split the ASN.1 object identifiers into separate files that are
required only if explicitly enabled in config/crypto.h. This allows
an algorithm to be omitted from the "asn1_algorithms" table even if
the algorithm implementation is dragged in for some other purpose.
The end result is that only the algorithms that are explicitly enabled
in config/crypto.h can be used for ASN1-identified purposes such as
signature verification.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The supported ciphers and digest algorithms may already be specified
via config/crypto.h. Extend this to allow a minimum TLS protocol
version to be specified.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Some platforms (observed with an AMI BIOS on an Apollo Lake system)
will spuriously fail the call to ConnectController() when the UEFI
network stack is disabled. This appears to be a BIOS bug that also
affects attempts to connect any non-iPXE driver to the NIC controller
handle via the UEFI shell "connect" utility.
Work around this BIOS bug by falling back to calling our
efi_driver_start() directly if the call to ConnectController() fails.
This bypasses any BIOS policy in terms of deciding which driver to
connect but still cooperates with the UEFI driver model in terms of
handle ownership, since the use of EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_BY_DRIVER ensures
that the BIOS is aware of our ownership claim.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The URI parsing code for "host[:port]" checks that the final character
is not ']' in order to allow for IPv6 literals. If the entire
"host[:port]" portion of the URL is an empty string, then this will
access the preceding character. This does not result in accessing
invalid memory (since the string is guaranteed by construction to
always have a preceding character) and does not result in incorrect
behaviour (since if the string is empty then strrchr() is guaranteed
to return NULL), but it does make the code confusing to read.
Fix by inverting the order of the two tests.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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As described in the previous commit, work around a UEFI specification
bug that necessitates calling UnloadImage if the return value from
LoadImage is EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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iPXE currently assumes that any error returned from LoadImage()
indicates that the image was not loaded. This assumption was correct
at the time the code was written and remained correct for UEFI
specifications up to and including version 2.1.
In version 2.3, the UEFI specification broke API and ABI compatibility
by defining that a return value of EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION would now
indicate that the image had been loaded and a valid image handle had
been created, but that the image should not be started.
The wording in version 2.2 is ambiguous, and does not define whether
or not a return value of EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION indicates that a valid
image handle has been created.
Attempt to work around all of these incompatible and partially
undefined APIs by calling UnloadImage if we get a return value of
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION. Minimise the risk of passing an uninitialised
pointer to UnloadImage by setting ImageHandle to NULL prior to calling
LoadImage.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Joseph Wong <joseph.wong@broadcom.com>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Reduce the size of the USB disk image in the common case that
CONSOLE_INT13 is not enabled.
Originally-implemented-by: Romain Guyard <romain.guyard@mujin.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Eliminate an unnecessary variable-length stack allocation and memory
copy by allowing TFTP option processors to modify the option string
in-place.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Remove clone depth limit, to ensure that the most recent tag (from
which the version should be constructed) is always present.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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